OPINION BY
President Judge COLINS.
This case involves an appeal by Robert B. Campbell Jr. (Controller) from a mandamus order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County requiring the Controller to sign certain documents related to a redevelopment project in the City of Lancaster (Lancaster). The mandamus order further allowed for Charles W. Smithgall (Mayor) to sign documents in the Controller’s stead as attorney-in-fact.
The facts of this case date back several years and center on a plan to revitalize the commercial center of Lancaster, Penn Square, through the construction of a convention center and hotel complex. The plan itself dates back to the late 1990s, but protracted litigation did not yield a financing agreement until 2004. The financing agreement involves multiple parties including Lancaster, the Redevelopment Authority of the City of Lancaster (RACL), Penn Square Partners, and the Lancaster County Convention Center Authority.
The entire financing package is complex and amounts to an estimated $130 million. However, only two parts of the financing package, amounting to $12,000,000.00 and $24 million respectively, are relevant to this case. The City Council of Lancaster passed three ordinances on April 12, 2005, including debt statements for the $12 million and $24 million grants. Both grants are being guaranteed in part by Lancaster and therefore require approval by the Department of Community Affairs and Economic Development (DCED). DCED advised the parties to the financing agreement that applications for departmental approval of local government unit debt financing were to be submitted prior to April 30, 2005.1
Ten days prior to the deadline, on April 20, 2005, Lancaster’s business manager presented the Controller with three documents related to the financing of the grants mentioned above. The documents detailed how both grants were to receive substantial guarantees from Lancaster and grant funding from the Commonwealth, including providing local real estate tax immunity for the property to be leased to Penn Square Partners. On the same day, the Controller read a memorandum from the Lancaster County solicitor questioning whether the RACL could extend its tax immune status to Penn Square Partners, a private, for-profit entity; whether Lancaster could guarantee against the loss of revenue if the property were subject to local real estate taxes; and whether it was a violation of the law for the RACL not to require Penn Square Partners to pay such taxes under the Infrastructure and Facilities Improvement Program, sometimes re[672]*672ferred to as Act 28 of 2004, 12 Pa.C.S. § 3406(b)(ll). Upon reading this memorandum the Controller began to question the advisability and legality of the financing scheme approved by the City Council and the Mayor.
On April 22, 2005, the Controller sent a letter to the Mayor stating that he would not execute the documents in question until he had received comfort in the form of an independent review by counsel of the Controller’s choosing to investigate the issues raised by the county solicitor’s memorandum. In response, and motivated by the impending application deadline, the Mayor sued the Controller to compel him to sign the documents. On April 25, 2005, the Controller was ordered to appear in common pleas court, and the judge entered a preliminary order requiring the Controller to execute the documents and, in the alternative, allowing the Mayor to sign as attorney-in-fact. That order was made permanent following a further hearing on April 27, 2005. The Mayor then stopped submitting further documents related to the plan to the Controller and instead executed them himself. The Controller appealed to this Court seeking to have the order vacated.2
There are four issues before this Court on appeal. The first is whether a controller of a city of the third class has discretion not to execute documents that he believes may result in a violation of Commonwealth law until .he receives legal assurance to the contrary. The second issue is whether it was proper for a common pleas court sitting in equity to grant the power of attorney-in-fact to a mayor in order to execute certain documents without submitting such documents to the controller. The third issue is whether the redevelopment plan at issue in this case will result in a violation of Commonwealth law if the plan is implemented. The final issue is whether it was proper for the common pleas court to deny counsel fees and costs to a city controller, who was sued in his official capacity, but who preferred to hire counsel of his own choosing rather than court-appointed counsel. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand in part.
I. Section 1706 of the Third Class City Code3 states that the city controller “shall countersign all warrants for the payment of moneys out of the city treasury when satisfied of the legality of such payment.” 53 P.S. § 36706. A controller has some discretion based upon the statutory language to refuse to sign. However, the case law establishes that this discretion has long been limited to situations wherein the city has committed intentional irregularities such as fraud. Appellee correctly points to our Supreme Court’s precedent in Duncan Meter Corporation v. Gritsavage, 361 Pa. 607, 65 A.2d 402 (1949). Duncan Meter clearly enunciates the rule that city controllers of third class cities have discretion not to sign only where the violation of law is clear and well known, or where there is fraud or bad faith present. Id. We will address the [673]*673legality of the financing scheme below. For now, suffice it to say that the answer to that question is neither clear nor well known. Neither does the current controversy involve allegations of fraud or other irregularities. Indeed, it seems to be a disagreement over fiscal policy. This Court followed the Duncan Meter holding in Marflak v. City of Clairton, 97 Pa.Cmwlth. 643, 510 A.2d 874 (1986). Marflak also involved a third class city controller who refused to sign documents despite no allegations of fraud or other irregularities. In such cases, controllers of cities of the third class have a clear duty to sign, just as the city council has a right to see its duly passed ordinances executed. Mandamus was proper in this case because the Controller abused his discretion. The Controller must sign. We affirm the common pleas court on this issue.
II. The opinion of the common pleas court suggests two reasons for granting the power of attorney to the may- or: 1) the Controller feared personal liability if he signed the documents in question; and 2) the mayor and the common pleas court had no desire to revisit the same issues every time a document related to the redevelopment plan was submitted to the Controller. This Court is not persuaded of the need for such a remedy in either instance. To begin with, Lancaster has adopted the Mayor-Council Plan A of the Optional Third Class City Charter Law.4 Section 413(c) of that law states that “[a]ll bonds, notes, contracts and written obligations of the City shall be executed on its behalf by the mayor and the controller.” 53 P.S. § 41413(c) (emphasis added). The order in question directly contravenes this section of the law and therefore cannot be said to lie within the broad equitable discretion of a common pleas judge in fashioning a remedy.
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OPINION BY
President Judge COLINS.
This case involves an appeal by Robert B. Campbell Jr. (Controller) from a mandamus order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County requiring the Controller to sign certain documents related to a redevelopment project in the City of Lancaster (Lancaster). The mandamus order further allowed for Charles W. Smithgall (Mayor) to sign documents in the Controller’s stead as attorney-in-fact.
The facts of this case date back several years and center on a plan to revitalize the commercial center of Lancaster, Penn Square, through the construction of a convention center and hotel complex. The plan itself dates back to the late 1990s, but protracted litigation did not yield a financing agreement until 2004. The financing agreement involves multiple parties including Lancaster, the Redevelopment Authority of the City of Lancaster (RACL), Penn Square Partners, and the Lancaster County Convention Center Authority.
The entire financing package is complex and amounts to an estimated $130 million. However, only two parts of the financing package, amounting to $12,000,000.00 and $24 million respectively, are relevant to this case. The City Council of Lancaster passed three ordinances on April 12, 2005, including debt statements for the $12 million and $24 million grants. Both grants are being guaranteed in part by Lancaster and therefore require approval by the Department of Community Affairs and Economic Development (DCED). DCED advised the parties to the financing agreement that applications for departmental approval of local government unit debt financing were to be submitted prior to April 30, 2005.1
Ten days prior to the deadline, on April 20, 2005, Lancaster’s business manager presented the Controller with three documents related to the financing of the grants mentioned above. The documents detailed how both grants were to receive substantial guarantees from Lancaster and grant funding from the Commonwealth, including providing local real estate tax immunity for the property to be leased to Penn Square Partners. On the same day, the Controller read a memorandum from the Lancaster County solicitor questioning whether the RACL could extend its tax immune status to Penn Square Partners, a private, for-profit entity; whether Lancaster could guarantee against the loss of revenue if the property were subject to local real estate taxes; and whether it was a violation of the law for the RACL not to require Penn Square Partners to pay such taxes under the Infrastructure and Facilities Improvement Program, sometimes re[672]*672ferred to as Act 28 of 2004, 12 Pa.C.S. § 3406(b)(ll). Upon reading this memorandum the Controller began to question the advisability and legality of the financing scheme approved by the City Council and the Mayor.
On April 22, 2005, the Controller sent a letter to the Mayor stating that he would not execute the documents in question until he had received comfort in the form of an independent review by counsel of the Controller’s choosing to investigate the issues raised by the county solicitor’s memorandum. In response, and motivated by the impending application deadline, the Mayor sued the Controller to compel him to sign the documents. On April 25, 2005, the Controller was ordered to appear in common pleas court, and the judge entered a preliminary order requiring the Controller to execute the documents and, in the alternative, allowing the Mayor to sign as attorney-in-fact. That order was made permanent following a further hearing on April 27, 2005. The Mayor then stopped submitting further documents related to the plan to the Controller and instead executed them himself. The Controller appealed to this Court seeking to have the order vacated.2
There are four issues before this Court on appeal. The first is whether a controller of a city of the third class has discretion not to execute documents that he believes may result in a violation of Commonwealth law until .he receives legal assurance to the contrary. The second issue is whether it was proper for a common pleas court sitting in equity to grant the power of attorney-in-fact to a mayor in order to execute certain documents without submitting such documents to the controller. The third issue is whether the redevelopment plan at issue in this case will result in a violation of Commonwealth law if the plan is implemented. The final issue is whether it was proper for the common pleas court to deny counsel fees and costs to a city controller, who was sued in his official capacity, but who preferred to hire counsel of his own choosing rather than court-appointed counsel. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand in part.
I. Section 1706 of the Third Class City Code3 states that the city controller “shall countersign all warrants for the payment of moneys out of the city treasury when satisfied of the legality of such payment.” 53 P.S. § 36706. A controller has some discretion based upon the statutory language to refuse to sign. However, the case law establishes that this discretion has long been limited to situations wherein the city has committed intentional irregularities such as fraud. Appellee correctly points to our Supreme Court’s precedent in Duncan Meter Corporation v. Gritsavage, 361 Pa. 607, 65 A.2d 402 (1949). Duncan Meter clearly enunciates the rule that city controllers of third class cities have discretion not to sign only where the violation of law is clear and well known, or where there is fraud or bad faith present. Id. We will address the [673]*673legality of the financing scheme below. For now, suffice it to say that the answer to that question is neither clear nor well known. Neither does the current controversy involve allegations of fraud or other irregularities. Indeed, it seems to be a disagreement over fiscal policy. This Court followed the Duncan Meter holding in Marflak v. City of Clairton, 97 Pa.Cmwlth. 643, 510 A.2d 874 (1986). Marflak also involved a third class city controller who refused to sign documents despite no allegations of fraud or other irregularities. In such cases, controllers of cities of the third class have a clear duty to sign, just as the city council has a right to see its duly passed ordinances executed. Mandamus was proper in this case because the Controller abused his discretion. The Controller must sign. We affirm the common pleas court on this issue.
II. The opinion of the common pleas court suggests two reasons for granting the power of attorney to the may- or: 1) the Controller feared personal liability if he signed the documents in question; and 2) the mayor and the common pleas court had no desire to revisit the same issues every time a document related to the redevelopment plan was submitted to the Controller. This Court is not persuaded of the need for such a remedy in either instance. To begin with, Lancaster has adopted the Mayor-Council Plan A of the Optional Third Class City Charter Law.4 Section 413(c) of that law states that “[a]ll bonds, notes, contracts and written obligations of the City shall be executed on its behalf by the mayor and the controller.” 53 P.S. § 41413(c) (emphasis added). The order in question directly contravenes this section of the law and therefore cannot be said to lie within the broad equitable discretion of a common pleas judge in fashioning a remedy. Next, the Controller repeatedly averred that his refusal to sign the documents was based solely on a concern over the legality of the plan, not his own personal liability. Additionally, given our ruling on the issue of the proper scope of a city controller’s discretion in a city of the third class, we trust there will be no further confusion on the part of the Controller as to his duties. Indeed, we also note that the common pleas court need not fashion a further remedy to its mandamus order. Contempt proceedings would be the appropriate remedy were the Controller to continue to refuse to execute the documents in question. The portion of the order granting power of attorney-in-fact to the Mayor is vacated. All documents executed by the Mayor as attorney-in-fact pri- or to this ruling shall remain valid. Our ruling is prospective only. Henceforth, all appropriate documents shall be forwarded to the Controller for execution. We further instruct the Controller that the willful refusal to follow a valid order of the Court is contemptuous conduct. Such conduct can be penalized through fines and result in incarceration of the contemnor until such time as he or she complies with the Court’s order.
III. On the issue of whether the financing scheme is illegal under what is known as Act 23, this Court affirms the common pleas court. This question is not properly at bar. No controversy has yet arisen. The financing scheme has not yet been approved by DCED, which is empowered to address precisely this issue. We are loath to usurp the authority of the DCED or any other appropriate agency whose authority may be implicated in this matter. To do so would not only be a usurpation of authority, it would also be ruling on a matter which has not yet, and indeed may never, come to pass. The [674]*674Controller, in effect, seeks an advisory opinion. The duties of the Controller do not depend on a legal determination of an event that has not occurred. “It is well established that a judicial determination that is unnecessary to decide an actual dispute constitutes an advisory opinion and has no legal effect.... In general, the courts of this Commonwealth may not exercise jurisdiction to decide issues that do not determine the resolution of an actual case or controversy.” Borough of Marcus Hook v. Pennsylvania Municipal Retirement Board, 720 A.2d 803, 804 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998).
IV. Finally, we turn to the question of whether the common pleas court erred in refusing to order Lancaster to pay counsel fees and costs. Generally, an elected official sued in his or her official capacity and within the scope of his or her employment has a right to have an attorney appointed. Often the government will pay reasonable counsel fees and costs in such instances. However, in this case the Controller has refused his appointed counsel and instead retained an attorney of his own choosing. The Controller may have his reasons, but so far as this Court can determine those reasons are not of the kind that would require Lancaster to pay his counsel fees. As the common pleas court found in its opinion, the purported conflict of interest the Controller claimed was purely speculative. (Common pleas court opinion, p. 7.) The common pleas court is correct that a speculative conflict of interest is not enough to warrant either the dismissal of the court-appointed attorney or for Lancaster to have to pay the Controller’s preferred attorney’s fees. The court below did not abuse its discretion. However, we believe the issue of costs is wholly separate from the dispute over which attorney represents the Controller. We see no reason Lancaster should not pay the Controller’s costs. Therefore, we remand for a determination of the amount of costs, exclusive of counsel fees.
Accordingly, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of October 2005, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County in the above-captioned matter is affirmed as it relates to the controller’s duty to execute documents to effectuate the ordinances and bills identified in the complaint and the denial of counsel fees.
Forthwith, all appropriate documents are to be forwarded to the Controller for execution.
The order is vacated in so far as it grants the power of attorney-in-fact to the mayor.
This Court remands for a determination of costs to the controller that are to be paid by the City of Lancaster.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.