COUGHLIN, J.
Petitioners seek annulment of a workmen ’s compensation award in favor of four minor children on account of the industrially caused death of their mother. The award was made by the Industrial Accident Commission, now Imown as the Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, which will be referred to herein as the Commission. The issue is whether at the time of injury resulting in death the children [294]*294were totally dependent upon their mother within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation statute.
The mother and father were divorced. Custody of the minor children was awarded the latter with the right of reasonable visitation granted the former. The custody order made no provision for support. The children lived with their father, but from time to time stayed with their mother overnight or longer.
The referee hearing the matter found the children were supported in part by their father and in part by their mother; the latter contributed $3,600 annually toward their support; and, for this reason, they were partially dependent upon her. The surviving father was not dependent upon the mother.
The evidence, under the elementary rule on review requiring acceptance of that version thereof which supports the award (Douglas Aircraft, Inc. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 47 Cal.2d 903, 905 [306 P.2d 425]), justifies the conclusion that while the mother and father were living together the mother’s income was used in part to maintain the children; the father, after separation, was able to provide them with the necessities of life, but was not able to maintain them in that standard of living to which they had been accustomed prior to separation; the mother’s contribution to their support after separation maintained them in that standard; and the amount of that contribution was as found by the referee.
Upon petition for reconsideration, the Commission, relying on the conclusive presumption prescribed by Labor Code, section 3501, subdivision (b), found the children were totally dependent upon the mother, and made an award accordingly.
Pertinent provisions of Labor Code, section 3501, subdivision (b) declare: “The following shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: ... (b) A child under the age of eighteen years . . . , upon the parent with whom he is living at the time of the injury of the parent or for whose maintenance the parent was legally liable at the time of injury, there being no surviving dependent parent. ”
By express terms of this statute, the conclusive presumption applies to children of a mother who died as a result of an industrial injury if they were living with her at the time of the injury, or if she was legally liable for their support at that time, providing their surviving father was not dependent upon their mother. (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 24 Cal.2d 340, 343 [149 P.2d 702].)
[295]*295The primary issue in the case is whether the evidence supports the conclusion, implied in the Commission’s finding of total dependency,1 that the mother of the children was legally liable for their support at the time of the injury resulting in her death. We conclude it does.
Evidence establishing facts to which the conclusive presumption of total dependency attaches as a matter of law need not show actual dependency, either total or partial, as a matter of fact. (Fireman’s Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 24 Cal.2d 942 [149 P.2d 705] ; Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 340; Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 195 Cal. 283, 289 [233 P. 335].)2
In substance, Labor Code, section 3501, subdivision (b), prescribes a definition of total dependency for workmen’s compensation purposes in addition to and wholly independent of the definition of total dependency used in determining its actual existence as a matter of fact. Stated otherwise, an award of compensation under the statute on account of the death of an employee is made to a child as a total dependent when the facts giving rise to the presumption exist, regardless of actual dependency. A review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of total dependency based upon the presumption is restricted to a consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of facts giving rise to the presumption. Thus, granted the existence of such facts, application of the presumption is not precluded by a showing the child actually did not receive any support from the deceased parent (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 340, 343) ; received only a portion of his required support from that parent (Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 195 Cal. 283, 289); was not entitled to receive any support from the deceased parent (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 340, 343) ; received partial support from the surviving parent (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Indusrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 340, [296]*296341; Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 195 Cal. 283, 290) ; was supported entirely by the surviving parent or another (Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 92 Cal.App. 355, 359 [268 P. 415]); was legally dependent for his entire support upon the surviving parent or another (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 340, 343; Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 92 Cal.App. 355, 359); or partially supported himself. (Pacific Gold Dredging Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 184 Cal. 462, 467-468 [194 P. 1, 13 A.L.R. 725].)
In the ease at bench the Commission awarded compensation pursuant to Labor Code, section 3501, subdivision (b) under an implied finding that the deceased employee, at the time of the injury, was “legally liable” to maintain her children whose custody had been awarded to their father and were supported in part by him.
The duty of parents to support their children is prescribed statutorily by a number of sections in the Civil Code.
In 1955 California adopted the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act which provides:
(1) “Every man shall support his wife, and his child; and his parent when in need” (Civ. Code, § 242);
(2) “Every woman shall support her child; and her husband and her parent when in need” (Civ. Code, § 243) ;
(3) A child “means a son or daughter under the age of 21 years” (Civ. Code, § 241, subd. (d)) ;
(4) The duties thus imposed are “subject to” the provisions of sections 196, 206 and, respectively, 175 and 176 of the Civil Code (Civ. Code, §§ 242, 243); and
(5) The child may enforce his “right to support” against the parent by action in the superior court. (Civ. Code, § 248.)
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COUGHLIN, J.
Petitioners seek annulment of a workmen ’s compensation award in favor of four minor children on account of the industrially caused death of their mother. The award was made by the Industrial Accident Commission, now Imown as the Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, which will be referred to herein as the Commission. The issue is whether at the time of injury resulting in death the children [294]*294were totally dependent upon their mother within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation statute.
The mother and father were divorced. Custody of the minor children was awarded the latter with the right of reasonable visitation granted the former. The custody order made no provision for support. The children lived with their father, but from time to time stayed with their mother overnight or longer.
The referee hearing the matter found the children were supported in part by their father and in part by their mother; the latter contributed $3,600 annually toward their support; and, for this reason, they were partially dependent upon her. The surviving father was not dependent upon the mother.
The evidence, under the elementary rule on review requiring acceptance of that version thereof which supports the award (Douglas Aircraft, Inc. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 47 Cal.2d 903, 905 [306 P.2d 425]), justifies the conclusion that while the mother and father were living together the mother’s income was used in part to maintain the children; the father, after separation, was able to provide them with the necessities of life, but was not able to maintain them in that standard of living to which they had been accustomed prior to separation; the mother’s contribution to their support after separation maintained them in that standard; and the amount of that contribution was as found by the referee.
Upon petition for reconsideration, the Commission, relying on the conclusive presumption prescribed by Labor Code, section 3501, subdivision (b), found the children were totally dependent upon the mother, and made an award accordingly.
Pertinent provisions of Labor Code, section 3501, subdivision (b) declare: “The following shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee: ... (b) A child under the age of eighteen years . . . , upon the parent with whom he is living at the time of the injury of the parent or for whose maintenance the parent was legally liable at the time of injury, there being no surviving dependent parent. ”
By express terms of this statute, the conclusive presumption applies to children of a mother who died as a result of an industrial injury if they were living with her at the time of the injury, or if she was legally liable for their support at that time, providing their surviving father was not dependent upon their mother. (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 24 Cal.2d 340, 343 [149 P.2d 702].)
[295]*295The primary issue in the case is whether the evidence supports the conclusion, implied in the Commission’s finding of total dependency,1 that the mother of the children was legally liable for their support at the time of the injury resulting in her death. We conclude it does.
Evidence establishing facts to which the conclusive presumption of total dependency attaches as a matter of law need not show actual dependency, either total or partial, as a matter of fact. (Fireman’s Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 24 Cal.2d 942 [149 P.2d 705] ; Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 340; Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 195 Cal. 283, 289 [233 P. 335].)2
In substance, Labor Code, section 3501, subdivision (b), prescribes a definition of total dependency for workmen’s compensation purposes in addition to and wholly independent of the definition of total dependency used in determining its actual existence as a matter of fact. Stated otherwise, an award of compensation under the statute on account of the death of an employee is made to a child as a total dependent when the facts giving rise to the presumption exist, regardless of actual dependency. A review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of total dependency based upon the presumption is restricted to a consideration of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of facts giving rise to the presumption. Thus, granted the existence of such facts, application of the presumption is not precluded by a showing the child actually did not receive any support from the deceased parent (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 340, 343) ; received only a portion of his required support from that parent (Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 195 Cal. 283, 289); was not entitled to receive any support from the deceased parent (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 340, 343) ; received partial support from the surviving parent (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Indusrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 340, [296]*296341; Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 195 Cal. 283, 290) ; was supported entirely by the surviving parent or another (Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 92 Cal.App. 355, 359 [268 P. 415]); was legally dependent for his entire support upon the surviving parent or another (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 340, 343; Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 92 Cal.App. 355, 359); or partially supported himself. (Pacific Gold Dredging Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 184 Cal. 462, 467-468 [194 P. 1, 13 A.L.R. 725].)
In the ease at bench the Commission awarded compensation pursuant to Labor Code, section 3501, subdivision (b) under an implied finding that the deceased employee, at the time of the injury, was “legally liable” to maintain her children whose custody had been awarded to their father and were supported in part by him.
The duty of parents to support their children is prescribed statutorily by a number of sections in the Civil Code.
In 1955 California adopted the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act which provides:
(1) “Every man shall support his wife, and his child; and his parent when in need” (Civ. Code, § 242);
(2) “Every woman shall support her child; and her husband and her parent when in need” (Civ. Code, § 243) ;
(3) A child “means a son or daughter under the age of 21 years” (Civ. Code, § 241, subd. (d)) ;
(4) The duties thus imposed are “subject to” the provisions of sections 196, 206 and, respectively, 175 and 176 of the Civil Code (Civ. Code, §§ 242, 243); and
(5) The child may enforce his “right to support” against the parent by action in the superior court. (Civ. Code, § 248.)
The act further provides: “The rights herein created are in addition to and not in substitution for any other rights.” (Civ. Code, § 251.)
Prior to adoption of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, the courts of this state held it was the duty of both the father and mother to support their children (White v. White, 71 Cal.App.2d 390, 391 [163 P.2d 89]; In re Carboni, 46 Cal.App.2d 605, 613 [116 P.2d 453]; In re Keck, 100 Cal.App. 513, 514 [280 P. 387]); the duty of the father was primary (Newell v. Newell, 146 Cal.App.2d 166, 178 [303 P.2d 839]; Metson v. Metson, 56 Cal.App.2d 328, 333 [132 P.2d 513] ; Fagan v. Fagan, 43 Cal.App.2d 189, 198 [110 P.2d [297]*297520]); and the duty of the mother was secondary. (Fox v. Industrial Acc. Com., 194 Cal. 173,178 [228 P. 38].)
In 1951, by statute, a child was given the right to maintain an action “against the mother or father, or both,” to enforce their duty to provide for his support. (Civ. Code, § 137.1.)
The duty of a parent to support a child is not limited to furnishing the necessities of life but includes also maintenance in accord with the latter’s station in life and customary mode of living. (Bailey v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 548, 555 [11 P.2d 865] ; Newell v. Newell, supra, 146 Cal.App.2d 166, 178; Wong v. Young, 80 Cal.App.2d 391, 395 [181 P.2d 741].) A similarly stated rule applies to the determination of the issue of dependency as a matter of fact in workmen’s compensation eases. (Larsen v. Industrial Acc. Com., 34 Cal.2d 772, 774 [215 P.2d 16]; London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 203 Cal. 12, 16 [263 P. 196]; London Guar, etc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 57 Cal.App.2d 616, 619 [135 P.2d 7].)
Confusion respecting the mutuality of parental duty to support a child came about in cases where custody had been awarded to one parent with no provision for support by the other, or with a provision limiting the extent of such support. (Gen. see Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 195 Cal. 283, 286; Llewellyn Iron Works v. Industrial Acc. Com., 191 Cal. 28, 30 [214 P. 846]; Svoboda v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. 727, 728-729 [214 P. 440]; Pacific Gold Dredging Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 184 Cal. 462, 464-465; R. Sherer & Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., 182 Cal. 488, 490 [188 P. 798] ; Lewis v. Lewis, 174 Cal. 336 [163 P. 42]; Matter of McMullin, 164 Cal.. 504 [129 P. 773]; Davies v. Fisher, 34 Cal.App. 137 [166 P. 833].) However, it now is settled that where custody of a child is awarded to one parent the duty to support may be shifted or modified as between each of the parents, but not as between each parent and the child. (Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 195 Cal. 283, 287; Pacific Gold Dredging Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 184 Cal. 462, 466; Estate of Goulart, 218 Cal.App.2d 260, 263 [32 Cal.Rptr. 229, 6 A.L.R.3d 1380]; Watkins v. Clemmer, 129 Cal.App. 567, 576 [19 P.2d 303]; Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 92 Cal.App. 355, 358; see also Svoboda v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal. 727, 728.)
One source of confusion was Civil Code, section 196, which provides: “The parent entitled to the custody of a child must [298]*298give him support and education suitable to his circumstances. If the support and education which the father of a legitimate child is able to give are inadequate, the mother must assist him to the extent of her ability. ’ ’
The rights and obligations defined in this code section are subject to the limitations contained in Civil Code, sections 137.2 and 139 authorizing the court, in custody proceedings, to order either parent to support the child. Where custody of a child is awarded to the mother, the effect of section 196, as between the parents, absent any decree of court directing otherwise, is to shift the primary duty to support from the father to the mother, but as between the father and the child it does not absolve the former from the duty to support the latter. (Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 195 Cal. 283, 289; Pacific Gold Dredging Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 184 Cal. 462, 465; Watkins v. Clemmer, supra, 129 Cal.App. 567, 576, 577; Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 92 Cal.App. 355, 358.) Where, under similar circumstances, custody is given the father, as between the father and mother the duty of the former to support continues to be primary and that of the latter continues to be secondary. In either event, however, as between the parents and the child neither of the former is absolved of the duty to support the latter. (Ibid.)
In 1924, which was prior to adoption of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act and of Civil Code, section 137.1, our Supreme Court, in Fox v. Industrial Acc. Com., 194 Cal. 173 [228 P. 38], held the total dependency presumption provisions of the workmen's compensation statutes did not authorize a total dependency award to the children of an employed mother who had sustained industrial injury resulting in death where the mother and father were living together; both were employed, and their joint earnings were placed in a bank account in the father's name; the children did not live with them, but received the sum of $35 per month from their joint earnings; and there was no showing that any part of this sum actually came from the mother’s earnings, or that the father was unable to pay the whole thereof from his earnings. The children urged application of the conclusive presumption upon the ground their mother was legally liable for their support. In .response to this contention the court said: “It will serve no purpose to further discuss this point, since neither by the statute law of this state nor by voluntary contribution to the support of the minor children did the deceased parent become [299]*299legally liable for their maintenance, and such being the fact the conclusive presumption of total dependency does not apply as to her.” (Fox v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 194 Cal. 173, 181.)
This decision supports the position that the secondary duty of a mother to support her child per se is not the legal liability to support authorizing invocation of the total dependency presumption. On the other hand, the presumption has been applied in favor of a child of a deceased father whose duty to support was secondary, because custody of the child had been awarded the mother, where the father actually had been partially supporting or had been ordered to partially support the child. (Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 195 Cal. 283; Pacific Gold Dredging Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 184 Cal. 462.)
The total dependency presumption of Labor Code, section 3501, subdivision (b), by necessary inference from its express provisions, does not apply to every child of an employed mother. If the intention of the section were otherwise, it would be accomplished simply by applying the presumption to a surviving child of the deceased employee in every instance where there was “no surviving dependent parent,” and eliminating the provisions limiting its application to a child who was living with the deceased parent or for whose maintenance the deceased parent was legally liable at time of injury. A statute should be construed so as to give effect to all of its parts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1858; Weber v. County of Santa Barbara, 15 Cal.2d 82, 86 [98 P.2d 492].) All parts of section 3501, subdivision (b), would be given effect by accepting a construction of the provision applying the presumption in favor of a child “for whose maintenance the parent was legally liable at the time of injury” which differentiates between the legal duty of a parent to support the child and the current legal liability under that duty to support the child. Although the duty to support is constant, liability thereunder exists only when the obligee is in need of support and the obligor is able to support. (Gen. see Bernard v. Bernard, 79 Cal.App.2d 353, 359 [179 P.2d 625]; Metson v. Metson, supra, 56 Cal.App.2d 328, 332.) Nonfulfillment of a primary duty constitutes the need activating its secondary counterpart.
In the case at bench the evidence supports the conclusion that the secondary duty of the mother to support her children was activated by their need for support in addition to [300]*300that which their father was able to provide to maintain them in the mode of living to which they were accustomed; their mother was able to provide that additional support; and by virtue of these circumstances the mother was legally liable for the support of her children at the time of injury causing death.
No doubt about the mother’s legal liability would exist if, in the custody proceedings, pursuant to the provisions of Civil Code, sections 139 and 196, the court had ordered her to pay a designated amount toward the support of her children. The fact she honored her legal obligation voluntarily, rather than requiring its enforcement by court order, does not contradict its existence. (See Llewellyn Iron Works v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 191 Cal. 28, 32-33; Pacific Gold Dredging Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 184 Cal. 462, 464, 467, 468.)
Similarly, the fact the father of the children was contributing to their support and the legal liability of the mother was for partial rather than total support, does not foreclose application of the total dependency presumption. (Federal Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 195 Cal. 283, 290.) This conclusion conforms to the “social policy’’ expressed by the provision of Labor Code, section 3501, subdivision (b), directing application of the total dependency presumption in favor of a child on account of the death of his employed mother, even though at time of injury causing death he was living with and supported by his surviving father. (Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 340, 341; Fireman’s Fund Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 24 Cal.2d 942.)
It is of no concern to a determination of the issue in this ease whether the legal liability of the mother was predicated upon her specific duty to support prescribed by Civil Code, section 196; her general secondary duty under other statutes, the enforcement of which is authorized by Civil Code, section 137.1; or her additional duty under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, which, by the terms thereof, is subject to the provisions of Civil Code, section 196. In either event, an enforceable obligation to support existed at the time of injury resulting in death and this fact authorized application of the total dependency presumption.
The award is affirmed.
Brown, P. J., concurred.