Smith v. Warden Childers

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided February 11, 2025·No. 2:23-cv-00527·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4

5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 8 EDDIE SOWELL SMITH, Case No.: 2:23-cv-00527-GMN-MDC

9 Petitioner Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Petition 10 v.

11 WARDEN CHILDERS,

12 Respondent.

13 Pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Habeas Corpus Petitioner Eddie Sowell Smith 14 challenges his conviction pursuant to a guilty plea of two counts involving battery. (ECF 15 No. 33.) He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not 16 voluntary and intelligent. (Id.) Respondents move to dismiss the Petition on the basis 17 that it is untimely and/or because the two grounds are unexhausted. (ECF No. 34.) 18 Because the Petition was filed outside of the federal statute of limitations, it is dismissed 19 as untimely. 20 I. Background 21

In February 2020, in Eighth Judicial District Court (Clark County), Nevada, Smith 22 pleaded guilty to two counts of Attempt Battery Causing Substantial Bodily Harm. (Exh. 23 1 19.)1 The case stemmed from an incident in Las Vegas where Smith and his former 2 girlfriend Cassandra Hines were arguing, and he struck her with a golf club. They 3 continued arguing outside Hines’ friend’s apartment; Smith pushed the friend, who fell 4 backwards onto a table, bumping her head. (See ECF No. 34; Exh. 5.) The state district

5 court sentenced Smith to consecutive terms of 12 to 48 months. (Exh. 18.) Judgment of 6 Conviction was entered on February 12, 2020. (Exh. 19.) Smith did not file a direct 7 appeal. He filed a state Postconviction Habeas Corpus Petition in January 2021. (Exh. 8 29.) The Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the Petition in January 2022. 9 (Exh. 67.) 10 Smith dispatched his federal Habeas Corpus Petition for mailing about March 15, 11 2023. (ECF No. 6.) He ultimately filed a Fourth Amended Petition raising two grounds: 12 Ground 1: Smith’s guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent:

13 A. he was incorrectly advised he would be sentenced under the habitual criminal statute if he went to trial; and 14 B. there was a defect in the guilty plea agreement. 15 Ground 2: Trial counsel was ineffective for: 16 A. failing to investigate and defend a theory of Smith’s innocence; 17 B. failing to argue for a misdemeanor sentence; and 18 C. attacking Smith’s character. 19 (ECF No. 33.) 20 21 22 23 1 Exhibits referenced in this order are exhibits to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 34, and are found at ECF Nos. 28, 29, 31. 1 Respondents now move to dismiss the Petition as untimely; alternatively, they 2 argue that the grounds are unexhausted. (ECF No. 34.)2 3 II. Legal Standards & Analysis 4 a. Timeliness -- AEDPA Statute of Limitations 5 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) imposes a one-year 6 statute of limitations on the filing of federal habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 7 2244(d). The one-year time limitation can run from the date on which a petitioner’s 8 judgment became final by conclusion of direct review, or the expiration of the time for 9 seeking direct review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). “[T]he process of direct review . . . 10 includes the right to petition [the United States Supreme Court] for a writ of certiorari.” 11 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983). The one-year period of limitations begins 12 to run when the Supreme Court affirms a conviction on the merits, denies a petition for a 13 writ of certiorari, or the 90 days expires. See Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 14 (2009). Where a defendant fails to seek direct review of the judgment of conviction

15 before the Nevada Supreme Court or the Nevada Court of Appeals, the one-year period 16 of limitations begins to run 30 days after the entry of the judgment of conviction. See 17 Nev. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 149-50, (2012). 18 The period is not tolled until an “application for State post-conviction or other 19 collateral review” is properly filed with the state court clerk and the period continues to 20 toll while the application remains “pending.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Orpiada v. 21 McDaniel, 750 F.3d 1086, 1087 (9th Cir. 2014). The prison mailbox rule does not apply 22 to that application for collateral review. Orpiada, 750 F.3d at 1087. If an application for 23

2 Smith opposed, and Respondents replied. (ECF Nos. 38, 40.) 1 collateral review tolls the one-year period of limitations, the application remains pending 2 “until the application has achieved final resolution through the State’s post-conviction 3 procedures.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). “[A] pro se petitioner’s [federal 4 habeas] petition is deemed constructively filed at the moment it is delivered to prison

5 officials to be forwarded to the court clerk.” Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 6 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001). “[Section] 2244(d)(2) does not toll the limitation period during the 7 pendency of a federal habeas petition.” Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181. 8 b. Smith’s Federal Petition is Untimely 9 10 Here, Judgment of Conviction was entered on February 12, 2020, so Smith’s 30 11 days to file a Notice of Appeal with the Nevada Supreme Court expired on March 13, 12 2020. (See Exh. 19.) Because he did not file a direct appeal, the AEDPA statute of 13 limitations began to run on that day. Smith filed his state Postconviction Habeas 14 Corpus Petition 298 days later on January 5, 2021. (Exh. 29.) Remittitur issued on the 15 Nevada Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the denial of the state petition on February 7, 16 2022, so the limitations period resumed running the next day. (See Exh. 69.) The one- 17 year statute of limitations expired 67 days later on April 18, 2022.3 18 But Smith did not mail his federal petition until 401 days later on March 15, 2023. 19 (ECF No. 6.) Thus, 699 days of untolled time elapsed between the expiration of Smith’s 20 time for seeking direct review and the date he mailed his original federal petition to this 21 Court. So the petition is untimely by almost a year. 22 23 3 Saturday, April 16, 2022, is actually the date the limitations period expired, so Smith would have had until Monday, April 18, 2022 to file a federal habeas petition. 1 In Smith’s opposition to the motion to dismiss, he asserts that he is entitled to 2 equitable tolling. (ECF No. 38.) Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the 3 burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, 4 and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

5 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 6 96 (1990)). Smith states in his opposition that at some point he was in pre-trial custody 7 in San Jose, California, for 90 days and that jail personnel told him there were no 8 institutional procedures in place for him to submit the filing fee. But he provided no 9 dates regarding this custody.

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Related

Simpson v. United States
435 U.S. 6 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Barefoot v. Estelle
463 U.S. 880 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs
498 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Carey v. Saffold
536 U.S. 214 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Pace v. DiGuglielmo
544 U.S. 408 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Jimenez v. Quarterman
555 U.S. 113 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Donald Ray Patterson v. Terry L. Stewart
251 F.3d 1243 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Antonio Orpiada v. E. McDaniel
750 F.3d 1086 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
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