Smith v. Tri-State Transit of Louisiana

171 So. 119
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 11, 1936
DocketNos. 5317-5320.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 171 So. 119 (Smith v. Tri-State Transit of Louisiana) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Tri-State Transit of Louisiana, 171 So. 119 (La. Ct. App. 1936).

Opinion

HAMITER, Judge.

The causes of action alleged upon in these four consolidated cases grew out of a collision between defendant’s passenger bus and the Chevrolet coupé of plaintiff, Guy Smith, then being driven by his wife, Mrs. Mamie Crawford Smith, on the Dixie-Overland Highway, 18 miles west of the city of Monroe. The accident occurred at 5:15 p. m., January 20, 1934, about 760 feet west of the east end of an 1,160-foot gradual, upgrade tangent. Visibility in both directions was not materially obscured. The coupé was traveling easterly; the bus, on schedule time, was going west. In addition to Mrs. Smith, the cargo of the coupé consisted of her sister, Mrs. White, a plaintiff, and her four small girls; one, age 9, occupied the front seat between her mother and Mrs. Smith; another, age 4, was standing up at her mother’s right; another, age 6, reclined in the elevated space back of the seat; while the baby, age 2, rested on its mother’s lap. The bus, of 30-passenger capacity, was fairly well loaded. Heavy rains had fallen during the day and a light shower was falling at the time of the collision. The surface of the concrete road was well soaked, being conducive to skidding. The shoulders, composed of not well-settled earth, were soft and unstable. Mrs. Smith and Mrs. White sue defendant and its insurer to recover damages for physical injuries and suffering experienced by them in and from the accident. Guy Smith sues to recover the amount he expended to repair the coupé and for physicians’, sanitarium, and drug bills necessarily incurred to relieve his wife’s injuries. Ralph White, father of the little girls, seeks to recover damages for injuries three of them sustained, and for doctors’, drug, and other bills incurred in treating them and Mrs. White for their injuries.

The gravamen of the petitions is virtually identical. It is that defendant’s bus operator drove his machine at an excessive, unreasonable, and unlawful rate of speed, in excess of 45 miles per hour, in attempting to overtake and pass a passenger car, while approaching the crest of a hill and while turning a curve at a time when his view was obscured; and that in doing so, the bus was being driven on the left (south) side of the center of the highway at a time when and place where that side of the road was not clearly visible and free from on-coming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to safely permit the overtaking and passing of cars. They rely upon subsections (c) and (d) of rule 7 of section 3, title 2, of Act No. 21 of 1932, which read as follows:

“(c) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of the highway in overtaking and passing another vehicle traveling in the same direc *120 tion, unless such left side is clearly visible and free from oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking and passing to be made in perfect safety; provided, that whenever an’accident occurs under such circumstances, the responsibility therefor shall rest prima facie upon the driver of the vehicle doing the overtaking or passing.
“(d) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake and pass another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, approaching the crest of a hill or substantial grade, or upon a curve in the highway or elsewhere, where the view of the driver doing the overtaking or passing is obstructed within a distance of five hundred (500) feet.”

Defendant denies that the accident in whole or in part was attributable to any negligence or lack of care of its servant, and therefore denies liability to either plaintiff. It avers that as the coupé emerged into view at the top of the hill at the western end of the 1,160-foot tangent, it was astride the medial black line of the road, and as it approached the bus, it was pulled over toward its right side, close to the center; that it then began to skid first to its left and then to its right, executing in order three different movements of this character,' and at the completion of the third one, the vehicles collided on the north side of the concrete part of the road, the side on which the bus then had the right to be. It is additionally averred that the bus’s operator, as soon as he observed the coupé skidding, applied the brakes and steered the bus to the extreme right (north) side of the road, and that it was moving slowly with the right wheels on the soft dirt shoulder when the collision occurred; that said collision happened solely because Mrs. Smith lost control of her car when she suddenly and imprudently applied the brakes while running at a too rapid speed on wet and slippery pavement, a contributing cause of such loss of control, it is averred, being the unreasonably crowded condition of the coupé, designed to carry only two persons. These alleged acts of negligence are also, in the alternative, advanced as a bar to a recovery by Mrs. Smith and Mrs. White and their husbands. All plaintiffs were awarded judgments in the lower court. The bus company and its insurer, Central Surety & Insurance Corporation, appealed.

As plaintiffs’ cases are entirely buttressed upon the charge that defendant’s operator violated the traffic laws by attempting to pass another car when too close to the crest of the hill ahead of him, thereby creating an emergency resulting in the accident, they must succeed or fall upon the verity or lack of verity of the charge. A question of fact only is involved in the proposition. That question was resolved in favor of plaintiffs by the trial judge, but we, after a studious consideration of the testimony in the case and after ascribing to the lower court’s decision the usual degree of weight due trial judges’ rulings on factual questions, find ourselves unable to affirm his conclusions thereon. We are left in no doubt whatever on the paramount question in the case. The testimony of numerous disinterested witnesses who saw the accident convinces us that at most the bus’s passing the car when and where it did had very little if any influence on the collision, and that the car was passed when more than 500 feet from the crest of the hill, looking westerly, and that the bus had regained its side of the road at the moment of impact.

At the east end of the 1,160-foot tangent, the highway is traversed by a culvert. Immediately after clearing this culvert, the bus began to execute the usual movements to pass a passenger car directly ahead of it. The evidence fairly well establishes that it required but 75 yards to do this. That the effort was completed successfully before the impact is beyond- question, because all witnesses, excepting one, agree that the passed car was at a stop 25 feet to the rear of the bus following the collision. The testimony also establishes beyond any doubt that the collision actually occurred not over 50 feet west of a metal sign on the roadside bearing the legend, “Monroe — 18 miles,” and it is not disputed that this sign is 445 feet from the crest of the hill over which the coupé came. Therefore we may safely conclude that the situs of the collision is not less than 400 feet from the hill’s crest. It follows unquestionably, as the majority of the witnesses say, that the bus was well toward the culvert when it began to pass the other car, and by simple deduction it becomes clear that at that time the coupé was not in sight. These facts being well established, the charge that defendant’s operator violated the above-quoted sections of the highway traffic regulation act falls.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Demby v. Plischke
38 So. 2d 266 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1949)
Smith v. Tri-State Transit Co. of La
175 So. 83 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1937)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
171 So. 119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-tri-state-transit-of-louisiana-lactapp-1936.