Smith v. Stevens

Supreme Court

Smith v. Stevens

77 U.S. 321, 19 L. Ed. 933, 10 Wall. 321, 1870 U.S. LEXIS 1124

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedDecember 18, 1870

StatusPublished

Cited by37 cases

This text of 77 U.S. 321 (Smith v. Stevens) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Smith v. Stevens, 77 U.S. 321, 19 L. Ed. 933, 10 Wall. 321, 1870 U.S. LEXIS 1124 (1870).

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Opinion

Mr. Justice DAVIS

delivered the opinion of the court.

The eleventh article of the treaty of 1825 contains a stipu- • lation, that the nation shall not sell the specified allotment of lauds reserved for the benefit of each of the half-breeds named in it (Victoria Smith being one of them) without the permission of the government; and it would seem.-that the contracting parties intended this prohibition to apply to the individual members of the tribe, for, if it were not so, the policy which dictated the restriction would be in danger of being defeated altogether.

It is, however, not necessary, for the purposes of this suit, to decide this point, as the deed in question was made after the passage of the act of Congress of the 26th day of May, 1860, which relieves the subject of all difficulty. This act vested the title of the United States to the lauds which the treaty had' set apart for the use of the half-breeds, in the *326 reservees, if living, or, if dead, in their heirs, and declared void all prior contracts for their sale, and forbade any future disposition of them, except by the Secretary of the Interior on the request of the party interested. There is no ambiguity in the act, nor is it requisite to extend the words of it beyond their plain meaning in order to arrive at the intention of the legislature. It was considered by Congress to be necessary, in case the reservees should be desirous of relinquishing the occupation - of their lands, that' some method óf disposing of them should be adopted which would be a safeguard against their-own improvidence; and the .power of Congress to impose a restriction on the right of alienation, in order to accomplish this object, cannot be questioned. "Without this power, it is easy to see, there would be no way of preventing the Indians from being wronged in contracts for the sale of their lands, and the history of our country affords abundant proof that it is at all times difficult, by the most' careful legislation, to protect their interests against the superior capacity and adroitness of their more civilized neighbors. It was, manifestly, the purpose of Congress, in conferring the authority to sell on the Secretary of the Interior, to save the lands of the reservees from the cupidity of the white race; and, if the provisions of.the treaty were not enough for the purpose, the speedy action of Congress was demanded by the rapid settlement of the adjacent country. In 1825, when the treaty was made,-it was not regarded as a probable event that these Indians, owing to the remoteness of the country to which they were removed, would suffer from the encroachments of our people, but in 1860 the' same population that had demanded their removal from organized communities, followed them to Kansas. In this condition of things Congress acted, and the necessity for legislation on the subject, if, indeed, there were need for any, is shown by the defence which is interposed t.o this suit.

It needs no argument or authority to show that the statute, having provided the way in which these half-breed lands could be sold, by necessary implication, prohibited their sale *327 in any other way. The sale in question not only contravened the policy and spirit of the statute, but violated its positive provisions.

It appealing, then, that by the treaty and law in .force at the date of the deed, Victoria Smith had no capacity to aliénate her land, and the authority to sell being vested in the Secretary of the Interior, and there being no evidence that this officer ever authorized the sale, or in any manner consented to it, it follows that the sale was void, and that the deed conveys no title to the purchaser.

It is hardly necessary to say that a joint resolution passed nearly two years after this transaction, removing the restriction on alienation, cannot relate back and give validity to a conveyance which, when executed, was void, nor have >ve any reason to suppose that Congress contemplated that any such effect would be claimed for its legislation on the subject.

JüD&MENT AFFIRMED.

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Mr. Justice DAVIS

delivered the opinion of the court.

The eleventh article of the treaty of 1825 contains a stipu- • lation, that the nation shall not sell the specified allotment of lauds reserved for the benefit of each of the half-breeds named in it (Victoria Smith being one of them) without the permission of the government; and it would seem.-that the contracting parties intended this prohibition to apply to the individual members of the tribe, for, if it were not so, the policy which dictated the restriction would be in danger of being defeated altogether.

It is, however, not necessary, for the purposes of this suit, to decide this point, as the deed in question was made after the passage of the act of Congress of the 26th day of May, 1860, which relieves the subject of all difficulty. This act vested the title of the United States to the lauds which the treaty had' set apart for the use of the half-breeds, in the *326 reservees, if living, or, if dead, in their heirs, and declared void all prior contracts for their sale, and forbade any future disposition of them, except by the Secretary of the Interior on the request of the party interested. There is no ambiguity in the act, nor is it requisite to extend the words of it beyond their plain meaning in order to arrive at the intention of the legislature. It was considered by Congress to be necessary, in case the reservees should be desirous of relinquishing the occupation - of their lands, that' some method óf disposing of them should be adopted which would be a safeguard against their-own improvidence; and the .power of Congress to impose a restriction on the right of alienation, in order to accomplish this object, cannot be questioned. "Without this power, it is easy to see, there would be no way of preventing the Indians from being wronged in contracts for the sale of their lands, and the history of our country affords abundant proof that it is at all times difficult, by the most' careful legislation, to protect their interests against the superior capacity and adroitness of their more civilized neighbors. It was, manifestly, the purpose of Congress, in conferring the authority to sell on the Secretary of the Interior, to save the lands of the reservees from the cupidity of the white race; and, if the provisions of.the treaty were not enough for the purpose, the speedy action of Congress was demanded by the rapid settlement of the adjacent country. In 1825, when the treaty was made,-it was not regarded as a probable event that these Indians, owing to the remoteness of the country to which they were removed, would suffer from the encroachments of our people, but in 1860 the' same population that had demanded their removal from organized communities, followed them to Kansas. In this condition of things Congress acted, and the necessity for legislation on the subject, if, indeed, there were need for any, is shown by the defence which is interposed t.o this suit.

It needs no argument or authority to show that the statute, having provided the way in which these half-breed lands could be sold, by necessary implication, prohibited their sale *327 in any other way. The sale in question not only contravened the policy and spirit of the statute, but violated its positive provisions.

It appealing, then, that by the treaty and law in .force at the date of the deed, Victoria Smith had no capacity to aliénate her land, and the authority to sell being vested in the Secretary of the Interior, and there being no evidence that this officer ever authorized the sale, or in any manner consented to it, it follows that the sale was void, and that the deed conveys no title to the purchaser.

It is hardly necessary to say that a joint resolution passed nearly two years after this transaction, removing the restriction on alienation, cannot relate back and give validity to a conveyance which, when executed, was void, nor have >ve any reason to suppose that Congress contemplated that any such effect would be claimed for its legislation on the subject.

JüD&MENT AFFIRMED.

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Bluebook (online)

77 U.S. 321, 19 L. Ed. 933, 10 Wall. 321, 1870 U.S. LEXIS 1124, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-stevens-scotus-1870.

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