Smith v. State

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ROBERT L. SMITH, § § No. 179, 2024 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 1602012206 STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §

Submitted: July 9, 2025 Decided: August 14, 2025

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

ORDER

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears

to the Court that:

(1) On August 30, 2017, Robert Smith pleaded Guilty But Mentally Ill

(“GBMI”) to Murder First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the

Commission of a Felony (“PDWDCF”) for the stabbing and resulting death of his

girlfriend, Igna Coffee Young, in 2016. Five weeks later, Smith sent his counsel a

letter seeking to withdraw his plea on the basis that there was a defect in his

indictment. Trial counsel met with Smith to discuss his request to withdraw, but no

motion was filed. Two weeks after that meeting, the Superior Court sentenced Smith

1 as follows: for Murder First Degree, the balance of his natural life at Level V; for

PDWDCF, 25 years at Level V followed by 6 months at Level III.1

(2) After prolonged postconviction proceedings, the Superior Court denied

Smith’s motion for postconviction relief. In its decision denying the motion, the

Superior Court identified this Court’s decision in Scarborough v. State2 as the proper

test (the “Scarborough factors”) for determining whether Smith was prejudiced by

his trial counsel’s failure to move to withdraw the plea at Smith’s request. 3 The

court, however, did not expressly apply the Scarborough factors to Smith’s case, as

our decision in Reed v. State4 requires. The Superior Court separately addressed and

rejected Smith’s argument regarding his counsel’s advice to plead GBMI to the first-

degree murder charge.

(3) Smith appealed and argued that the Superior Court erred in two ways:

(1) by finding that he was not entitled to postconviction relief due to his trial

counsel’s failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) by holding that

his trial counsel was not ineffective in advising Smith to plead guilty.

(4) On November 15, 2024 this Court issued an order affirming the

Superior Court’s decision that trial counsel was not ineffective in recommending

1 App. to Opening Br. at A48–52. 2 Scarborough v. State, 938 A.2d 644 (Del. 2007). 3 State v. Smith, 2024 WL 1577183 (Del. Super. Apr. 11, 2024). 4 Reed v. State, 258 A.3d 807, 830 (Del. 2021).

2 that Smith plead guilty.5 We remanded the case to the Superior Court to complete

its analysis of the Scarborough factors. The Superior Court analyzed each of the

Scarborough factors upon remand (the “Remand Order”).6 At our request, the

parties filed supplemental briefing addressing the Superior Court’s Remand Order.

We now consider the remaining issue of whether Smith suffered prejudice under

Strickland.

(5) This Court reviews the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for

postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.7 We review legal and constitutional

questions, including ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, de novo.8 To prevail

on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must satisfy the two-

prong standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington.9 Under Strickland, the

defendant must prove that (1) his trial counsel’s performance was objectively

unreasonable; and (2) his defense was prejudiced as a result.10

(6) The Superior Court found, and the State does not contest, that trial

counsel’s failure to move to withdraw Smith’s guilty plea or move to withdraw as

5 Smith v. State, 2024 WL 6467485 (Del. Nov. 15, 2024). 6 Smith v. State, 2025 WL 466968 (Del. Super. Feb. 11, 2025) [hereinafter the “Remand Order”]. 7 Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013). 8 Id. 9 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 10 Id. at 687–88, 691–92.

3 counsel was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, only

the prejudice prong of Strickland remains. That prong requires us to determine

whether there would have been a different outcome but for trial counsel’s

deficiency.11 “In the context of pleas a defendant must show the outcome of the plea

process would have been different with competent advice.”12 As we explained in

Reed, “in the plea withdrawal context, [the defendant] must show that there is some

reasonable probability that but for counsel’s error, [the defendant] would have

insisted on going to trial and the trial court would have granted his motion to

withdraw the plea.”13

(7) A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is addressed to the trial court’s

sound discretion.14 “The defendant bears the burden to show, under Superior Court

Criminal Rule 32(d), that there is a fair and just reason to permit the withdrawal.”15

11 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 691–92. 12 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012). 13 Reed, 258 A.3d at 829–30; see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (“In other words, in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”); Bradley v. State, 929 A.2d 783, 2007 WL 1599991, at *1 (Del. 2007) (TABLE) (“In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on proceeding to trial.”); Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (“counsel’s actions were so prejudicial that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 14 Blackwell v. State, 736 A.2d 971, 972 (Del. 1999). 15 Scarborough, 938 A.2d at 649 (citing State v. Cabrera, 891 A.2d 1066, 1069 (Del. Super. 2005)).

4 In Scarborough v. State, this Court identified five questions that “the judge must

[address] . . . [i]n evaluating whether to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty

plea.”16 The factors do not need to be balanced, and some alone may justify relief.17

Those five questions are:

(1) Was there a procedural defect in taking the plea; (2) Did [defendant] knowingly and voluntarily consent to the plea agreement; (3) Does [defendant] presently have a basis to assert legal innocence; (4) Did [defendant] have adequate legal counsel throughout the proceedings; and, (5) Does granting the motion prejudice the State or unduly inconvenience the Court.18

(8) The Superior Court analyzed the Scarborough factors on remand. In

its Remand Order, the Superior Court made the following findings regarding the five

factors:

1. Was there a procedural defect in taking the plea?

“[A]lthough the [Superior] Court did not comply with the express language

of 11 Del. C. § 408 or the process set forth in Taylor v. State, the experts’ reports

were reviewed and Smith’s mental illness was discussed prior to his GBMI plea

being accepted.”19

16 Id. (emphasis added). 17 Id. (citing Patterson v. State, 684 A.2d 1234, 1239 (Del. 1996)). 18 Id. (citing Patterson, 684 A.2d at 1239). 19 Remand Order at *3.

5 2. Did Smith knowingly and voluntarily consent to the plea agreement?

“Smith’s plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily after a

thorough colloquy.”20

3. Does Smith presently have a basis to assert legal innocence?

“Smith does not make an assertion of legal innocence in his case. Rather, he

argues that had he gone to trial, he would have raised two defenses: self-defense and

extreme emotional distress (EED).”21 “[S]elf-defense was not a viable defense in

Smith’s case”22 because “Smith cannot point to specific evidence that forms the basis

for a credible self-defense claim because the victim allegedly pushing, spitting, and

slapping Smith in the face does not justify his use of deadly force.”23 “As to Smith’s

EED defense, EED is not a defense that would have resulted in an acquittal even if

it was successful at trial.” Instead, under 11 Del. C. § 641, it is a “mitigating

circumstance” that “is not the same as asserting a basis for legal innocence.”24

20 Id. at *4. 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. at *5. 24 Id.

6 4. Did Smith have adequate legal counsel throughout the proceedings?

“Smith’s Trial Counsel were inadequate when (and because) they failed to file

Smith’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, or withdraw as counsel so Smith could

proceed pro se with his motion.”25

5. Does granting the motion prejudice the State or unduly inconvenience the Court?

“Based on the record, there is nothing to suggest that granting Smith’s motion

to withdraw his guilty plea would have prejudiced the State or unduly

inconvenienced the Court.”26

(9) In his supplemental brief, Smith agrees with the Superior Court’s

analysis under each of the factors except factor three.27 Smith disagrees with the

trial court’s conclusion that he had no basis to assert legal innocence and rests much

of his argument for prejudice on this disagreement. As he did in the Superior Court,

Smith contends that self-defense and extreme emotional distress were viable

defenses allowing him to assert legal innocence.28 Smith further asserts that “he did

not have adequate legal counsel as found by the trial court, and there would have

25 Id. Smith agrees with the trial court’s analysis and asserts that “in citing to Mr. Smith’s testimony at the Evidentiary Hearing on the Motion for Post Conviction Relief, [the court] impliedly found that Mr. Smith would have gone to trial if he had received effective assistance of counsel.” Supplemental Opening Br. at 9. This is not, however, what the Superior Court found. 26 Remand Order at *6. 27 Supplemental Opening Br. at 8. 28 Id. at 7–8.

7 been no prejudice to the State or undue inconvenience to the trial court.”29 We find

that the court correctly accorded no weight to factor three, and the Superior Court’s

complete Scarborough analysis supports a finding of no prejudice under Strickland.

(10) Regarding Smith’s EED argument, the Superior Court correctly noted

that EED is not a defense that could have resulted in Smith’s acquittal even if he

were successful in asserting it at trial.30 Under the criminal code, EED is a

“mitigating circumstance” that would “reduc[e] the crime of murder in the first

degree as defined by § 636 of this title to the crime of manslaughter as defined by

§ 632 of this title.”31 We have not had occasion to address whether a viable EED

defense should be given weight under the Scarborough legal-innocence factor.32 But

even if a statutory mitigating circumstance could be a valid consideration under

Scarborough in some cases, the Superior Court correctly concluded that it should

not receive any weight in Smith’s case because it is undisputed that Smith was a

29 Id. at 8. 30 Remand Order at *5. 31 11 Del. C. § 641. 32 See Carney v. State, 319 A.3d 842, 846 n.32 (Del. 2024) (“A defendant seeking relief based on legal innocence, or ‘legal insufficiency,’ contends that the prosecutor has failed to produce sufficient evidence at a criminal trial to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, a defendant seeking relief based on actual innocence contends that he or she did not commit the crime alleged, regardless of the judge or jury's finding of legal innocence. Unlike [] legal innocence, actual innocence focuses entirely on the factual predicate of the offense.” (quoting and citing Matthew Aglialoro, A Case for Actual Innocence, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 635, 639 (2014))); State v. Capobianco, 2014 WL 890946, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 5, 2014) (“To assert a basis for legal innocence after entering a guilty plea and admitting guilt at a plea hearing, the defendant must point to specific evidence that forms the basis for assertion of legal innocence.”).

8 habitual offender. Accordingly, even if Smith had successfully argued EED at trial,

a conviction on the reduced charge would not have meaningfully reduced his

sentence.33 Therefore, Smith’s EED defense, even if viable, was not entitled to

significant weight in the Scarborough analysis.

(11) Smith’s assertion that he would have argued self defense fares no better.

The Superior Court concluded that it was not enough for Smith to state that he would

have asserted a self-defense claim. Rather, he needed to “point to specific evidence

that forms the basis for a credible self-defense claim.”34 That standard is consistent

with Strickland and Scarborough; after pleading guilty to a crime, a defendant must

do more than merely obliquely raise a legal innocence claim.35 Smith does not

identify specific evidence of legal innocence nor does he meaningfully dispute the

Superior Court’s holding that there was no basis for him to assert a justification

33 Even with a Manslaughter conviction (and the associated PDWDCF conviction), Smith would have faced a minimum sentence of 50 years up to life imprisonment. Smith, 2024 WL 1577183, at *6; see also Cruz v. State, 12 A.3d 1132, 1136 (Del. 2011) (“If a defendant intentionally caused the death of another person under the influence of EED and proves EED by a preponderance of the evidence, then EED mitigates the homicide from first degree murder to manslaughter.”). 34 Remand Order at *5 (citing Capobianco, 2014 WL 890946, at *2); see also State v. Wright, 2009 WL 866185, at *5 (Del. Super. Mar. 30, 2009) (After pleading guilty to a crime, “[a]n assertion of legal innocence must be substantiated by specific evidence.”); State v. Harden, 1998 WL 735879, at *5 (Del. Super. Jan. 13, 1998), aff’d, 719 A.2d 947 (Del. 1998) (“Additionally, an assertion of innocence must be founded on specific evidence.”). 35 Accord Capobianco, 2014 WL 890946, at *2; Wright, 2009 WL 866185, at *5; State v. McNeill, 2001 WL 392465, at *3 (Del. Super. Apr. 5, 2001).

9 defense. Smith’s desire to assert the defense is not enough to carry his burden under

Scarborough and Strickland.

(12) The Superior Court ultimately concluded that Smith had not established

Strickland prejudice because the five Scarborough factors did not support a finding

that there was a reasonable probability that Smith would have been permitted to

withdraw his plea. The trial court held that Smith knowingly and voluntarily entered

the plea and did not have a basis to assert legal innocence. In the court’s view, those

findings were not outweighed by the absence of prejudice and counsel’s ineffective

assistance after the plea was entered. That conclusion was not an abuse of discretion,

and we therefore affirm the Superior Court’s decision denying Smith’s post-

conviction motion.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that the Superior Court’s decision

denying Smith’s motion for postconviction relief is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow Justice