IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
UNIQUE SMITH, § § No. 243, 2024 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 2009007545 (S) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §
Submitted: September 4, 2024 Decided: October 28, 2024
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Unique Smith appeals the Superior Court’s denial of his second motion
for postconviction relief. The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the
judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Smith’s opening brief
that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) In October 2020, a Superior Court grand jury indicted Smith for first-
degree murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (PFDCF),
third-degree assault, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and offensive touching.
On October 6, 2021, Smith pleaded guilty to manslaughter, as a lesser-included- offense of first-degree murder, and PFDCF. In exchange for his plea, the State
agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to cap its sentencing recommendation
at 25 years of unsuspended incarceration. Following a presentence investigation, on
November 19, 2021, the Superior Court sentenced Smith as follows: for
manslaughter, to 25 years of incarceration, suspended after 12 years followed by
decreasing levels of supervision; and for PFDCF, to 25 years of incarceration,
suspended after 10 years followed by two years of Level III probation. Smith did not
appeal, but, with the assistance of counsel (“trial counsel”), filed a timely motion for
sentence modification. The Superior Court denied the motion,1 and we affirmed its
denial on appeal.2
(3) After the Supreme Court mandate issued, trial counsel, who also
represented Smith on appeal, sent a letter to Smith, enclosing a copy of this Court’s
order affirming the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for sentence modification.
Trial counsel’s letter incorrectly stated that this Court had denied Smith’s direct
appeal and informed him that he had one year from the date the mandate issued on
March 17, 2023, to file a timely motion for postconviction relief under Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61.3 In fact, Smith had one year from the date his conviction
became final on December 19, 2021, to file a timely motion for postconviction
1 State v. Smith, 2022 WL 1158559 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2022). 2 Smith v. State, 2023 WL 2289140 (Del. Mar. 1, 2023). 3 Opening Br., Ex. C. 2 relief.4 In other words, by the time Smith received trial counsel’s letter in March
2023, the deadline for the timely filing of a motion for postconviction relief had
passed almost three months earlier—in December 2022.
(4) Nevertheless, Smith, now proceeding pro se, filed what he believed to
be a timely motion for postconviction relief on July 24, 2023, raising various
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Much of Smith’s motion focused on his
belief that video footage of the shooting of the victim, Jeffrey Adkins, would have
undermined the State’s case if it had been shown to a jury. In the last sentence of
his motion, Smith also claimed that “a person of interest” had been shot and killed,
“possibly in retaliation” for Adkins’ shooting—evidence that Smith argued was
exculpatory.5 The Superior Court denied Smith’s motion, finding that (i) the motion
was procedurally barred as untimely, and (ii) Smith could not avail himself of the
new-evidence-of-actual-innocence exception to the procedural bar because the video
footage, which had been shared with defense counsel, was neither new evidence nor
evidence of Smith’s actual innocence.6 Smith did not appeal.
(5) In May 2024, Smith filed a second motion for postconviction relief,
arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal on Smith’s
4 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (providing that a motion for postconviction relief “may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final”); Del. Super. Crim. Ct. R. 61(m)(1)(i) (providing that a judgment of conviction is final “[i]f the defendant does not file a direct appeal, 30 days after the Superior Court imposes sentence”). 5 State’s Mt. to Affirm, Ex. D. 6 State v. Smith, 2023 WL 5031712 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2023). 3 behalf—a fact that Smith claimed he only learned upon receiving the Superior
Court’s decision denying his first motion for postconviction relief. The Superior
Court denied Smith’s second motion as procedurally barred.7 In so doing, the court
implied that trial counsel had, in fact, filed a direct appeal on Smith’s behalf and
stated that trial counsel had accurately informed Smith of his postconviction rights.8
This appeal followed.
(6) In his opening brief on appeal, Smith raises three arguments: (i) if trial
counsel had, in fact, correctly informed Smith that he had until March 16, 2024, to
file a timely motion for postconviction relief, the Superior Court improperly denied
his first motion as untimely; (ii) the Superior Court misconstrued the “actual
innocence” argument that he raised in his first motion for postconviction relief; and
(iii) the Superior Court conflated his appeal from the denial of his motion for
sentence modification, which trial counsel filed (and briefed), with a direct appeal
of his conviction, which trial counsel did not file. Although the Superior Court
inaccurately opined that trial counsel had accurately advised Smith of the deadline
to file a motion for postconviction relief and implied that trial counsel had filed a
direct appeal on Smith’s behalf when he had not, we nevertheless affirm the Superior
7 State v. Smith, 2024 WL 2815341 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2024). 8 Id. at *2–3 (“You state that Trial Counsel failed to timely file a direct appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court. This is incorrect. You pled guilty and were sentenced. Your Trial Counsel then filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence…, which was denied…. Your Trial Counsel then filed an appeal of that ruling…. You cast aspersions on Trial Counsel for failing to properly advise you of your appellate and postconviction rights. This is false.”). 4 Court’s judgment on the independent and alternative ground that Smith’s second
motion for postconviction relief was subject to summary dismissal.9
(7) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion.10 We review de novo claims of constitutional violations,
including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.11 Under the well-known
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington,12 in order to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (i) trial
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (the
“performance prong”),13 and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different (the
“prejudice prong”).14 Before examining the merits of a motion for postconviction
relief, however, “our courts must first apply the rules governing the procedural
requirements for relief set forth in Rule 61.”15
(8) Here, both of Smith’s motions for postconviction relief were
procedurally barred.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
UNIQUE SMITH, § § No. 243, 2024 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below–Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 2009007545 (S) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §
Submitted: September 4, 2024 Decided: October 28, 2024
Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the appellee’s motion to
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Unique Smith appeals the Superior Court’s denial of his second motion
for postconviction relief. The State of Delaware has filed a motion to affirm the
judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Smith’s opening brief
that his appeal is without merit. We agree and affirm.
(2) In October 2020, a Superior Court grand jury indicted Smith for first-
degree murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (PFDCF),
third-degree assault, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, and offensive touching.
On October 6, 2021, Smith pleaded guilty to manslaughter, as a lesser-included- offense of first-degree murder, and PFDCF. In exchange for his plea, the State
agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to cap its sentencing recommendation
at 25 years of unsuspended incarceration. Following a presentence investigation, on
November 19, 2021, the Superior Court sentenced Smith as follows: for
manslaughter, to 25 years of incarceration, suspended after 12 years followed by
decreasing levels of supervision; and for PFDCF, to 25 years of incarceration,
suspended after 10 years followed by two years of Level III probation. Smith did not
appeal, but, with the assistance of counsel (“trial counsel”), filed a timely motion for
sentence modification. The Superior Court denied the motion,1 and we affirmed its
denial on appeal.2
(3) After the Supreme Court mandate issued, trial counsel, who also
represented Smith on appeal, sent a letter to Smith, enclosing a copy of this Court’s
order affirming the Superior Court’s denial of his motion for sentence modification.
Trial counsel’s letter incorrectly stated that this Court had denied Smith’s direct
appeal and informed him that he had one year from the date the mandate issued on
March 17, 2023, to file a timely motion for postconviction relief under Superior
Court Criminal Rule 61.3 In fact, Smith had one year from the date his conviction
became final on December 19, 2021, to file a timely motion for postconviction
1 State v. Smith, 2022 WL 1158559 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2022). 2 Smith v. State, 2023 WL 2289140 (Del. Mar. 1, 2023). 3 Opening Br., Ex. C. 2 relief.4 In other words, by the time Smith received trial counsel’s letter in March
2023, the deadline for the timely filing of a motion for postconviction relief had
passed almost three months earlier—in December 2022.
(4) Nevertheless, Smith, now proceeding pro se, filed what he believed to
be a timely motion for postconviction relief on July 24, 2023, raising various
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Much of Smith’s motion focused on his
belief that video footage of the shooting of the victim, Jeffrey Adkins, would have
undermined the State’s case if it had been shown to a jury. In the last sentence of
his motion, Smith also claimed that “a person of interest” had been shot and killed,
“possibly in retaliation” for Adkins’ shooting—evidence that Smith argued was
exculpatory.5 The Superior Court denied Smith’s motion, finding that (i) the motion
was procedurally barred as untimely, and (ii) Smith could not avail himself of the
new-evidence-of-actual-innocence exception to the procedural bar because the video
footage, which had been shared with defense counsel, was neither new evidence nor
evidence of Smith’s actual innocence.6 Smith did not appeal.
(5) In May 2024, Smith filed a second motion for postconviction relief,
arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a direct appeal on Smith’s
4 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1) (providing that a motion for postconviction relief “may not be filed more than one year after the judgment of conviction is final”); Del. Super. Crim. Ct. R. 61(m)(1)(i) (providing that a judgment of conviction is final “[i]f the defendant does not file a direct appeal, 30 days after the Superior Court imposes sentence”). 5 State’s Mt. to Affirm, Ex. D. 6 State v. Smith, 2023 WL 5031712 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2023). 3 behalf—a fact that Smith claimed he only learned upon receiving the Superior
Court’s decision denying his first motion for postconviction relief. The Superior
Court denied Smith’s second motion as procedurally barred.7 In so doing, the court
implied that trial counsel had, in fact, filed a direct appeal on Smith’s behalf and
stated that trial counsel had accurately informed Smith of his postconviction rights.8
This appeal followed.
(6) In his opening brief on appeal, Smith raises three arguments: (i) if trial
counsel had, in fact, correctly informed Smith that he had until March 16, 2024, to
file a timely motion for postconviction relief, the Superior Court improperly denied
his first motion as untimely; (ii) the Superior Court misconstrued the “actual
innocence” argument that he raised in his first motion for postconviction relief; and
(iii) the Superior Court conflated his appeal from the denial of his motion for
sentence modification, which trial counsel filed (and briefed), with a direct appeal
of his conviction, which trial counsel did not file. Although the Superior Court
inaccurately opined that trial counsel had accurately advised Smith of the deadline
to file a motion for postconviction relief and implied that trial counsel had filed a
direct appeal on Smith’s behalf when he had not, we nevertheless affirm the Superior
7 State v. Smith, 2024 WL 2815341 (Del. Super. Ct. May 31, 2024). 8 Id. at *2–3 (“You state that Trial Counsel failed to timely file a direct appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court. This is incorrect. You pled guilty and were sentenced. Your Trial Counsel then filed a Motion for Reduction of Sentence…, which was denied…. Your Trial Counsel then filed an appeal of that ruling…. You cast aspersions on Trial Counsel for failing to properly advise you of your appellate and postconviction rights. This is false.”). 4 Court’s judgment on the independent and alternative ground that Smith’s second
motion for postconviction relief was subject to summary dismissal.9
(7) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for
abuse of discretion.10 We review de novo claims of constitutional violations,
including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.11 Under the well-known
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington,12 in order to prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that (i) trial
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (the
“performance prong”),13 and (ii) there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different (the
“prejudice prong”).14 Before examining the merits of a motion for postconviction
relief, however, “our courts must first apply the rules governing the procedural
requirements for relief set forth in Rule 61.”15
(8) Here, both of Smith’s motions for postconviction relief were
procedurally barred. Smith’s first motion was filed more than one year after his
9 See Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (recognizing that this Court may affirm a lower court’s judgment on the basis of a different rationale than that which was articulated by the trial court). 10 Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019). 11 Id. 12 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 13 Id. at 687–88. 14 Id. at 694. 15 Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 2002). 5 convictions became final and was procedurally barred because it was untimely.
Smith could not avail himself of the new-evidence-of-actual-innocence exception to
this procedural bar because neither his claim that “a person of interest” was killed in
“apparent” retaliation for Adkins’ killing nor his claim regarding the inconclusive
nature of the video footage of Adkins’ shooting was new evidence of Smith’s actual
innocence. Indeed, Smith does not identify this person of interest, nor does he
explain how this person’s death exonerates Smith. And, as the Superior Court
observed, the video footage had been disclosed to trial counsel before trial. Smith’s
second motion for postconviction relief was subject to summary dismissal under
Rule 61(d).16
(9) Although the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Smith’s second motion for postconviction relief, for sake of completeness, we
address the claim of error Smith raised below and those he makes on appeal.
Regarding Smith’s argument below—that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
file a direct appeal from Smith’s convictions and sentence—even if Smith had raised
this claim in a timely fashion, he would not be entitled to relief. Assuming arguendo
that trial counsel did not file an appeal after Smith advised trial counsel that he
16 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2) (providing that a second or subsequent motion for postconviction relief must be summarily dismissed unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the motion pleads with particularity (i) new evidence of actual innocence or (ii) that a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review, applies to the movant’s case and renders the conviction invalid). 6 wished to appeal and that trial counsel’s failure to do so was objectively
unreasonable, Smith cannot show that an appeal would have been successful. Smith
does not identify any claims of error that he would have raised on appeal, and,
importantly, by pleading guilty, Smith waived his right to challenge any errors or
defects that took place before the court accepted his plea, even those of constitutional
dimension.17 Simply put, Smith was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to file
a direct appeal.18
(10) Turning to Smith’s arguments advanced on appeal, as noted above and
despite the Superior Court’s incorrect statement that trial counsel correctly advised
Smith of the deadline for filing a motion for postconviction relief, the Superior Court
properly denied Smith’s first motion for postconviction relief because it was
untimely. Second, to the extent that Smith disagreed with the Superior Court’s
characterization of his claim of actual innocence, his recourse was to seek review of
the Superior Court’s denial of his first motion for postconviction relief in this Court.
17 Smith v. State, 2004 WL 120530, at *1 (Del. Jan. 15, 2004). Smith cites the recent case of State v. Tisinger, 2024 WL 1757229 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2024), for the proposition that the trial court should have vacated his sentence and resentenced him to allow him to file a direct appeal. Smith’s reliance is misplaced: unlike Smith, Tisinger (i) went to trial and (ii) filed a timely motion for postconviction relief. 18 See Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 174–75 (Del. 2020) (“[The Court] may dispose of an ineffective-assistance claim based on the absence of sufficient prejudice without addressing the performance prong if, in fact, prejudice is lacking.”). We also note that Smith received a legal sentence. From a practical standpoint, therefore, the filing of a timely motion for sentence modification in the Superior Court was more likely to result in a favorable outcome for Smith than the filing of a direct appeal. 7 He did not. In any event and as noted above, the allegedly retaliatory killing of a
“person of interest” is not new evidence of Smith’s actual innocence. Third, any
conflation on the part of the Superior Court with a direct appeal and an appeal from
the court’s denial of Smith’s motion for sentence modification was harmless:
Smith’s second motion for postconviction relief was unequivocally procedurally
barred as a successive motion following the entry of a guilty plea.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm be
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court be AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gary F. Traynor Justice