OPINION
CONNOR, Justice.
Appellant was convicted by a superior court jury of unlawful and felonious possession of heroin in violation of AS 17.10.-010. Three days prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress as evidence all property seized during execution of a search warrant issued September 4, 1970, by district court Judge Dorothy O. Tyner. In that motion appellant alleged that the search [794]*794warrant was issued upon information obtained by three illegal searches. This appeal is based on the denial of that motion.
On or about August 22, 1970, appellant and one Charles Smith occupied Apt. No. 409 of the Caye Ann Apartments, located at 731 B Street in Anchorage. Having received information that Charles Smith was involved in narcotics activities, Investigator Dean Bivens of the Alaska State Troopers instituted on August 22, 1970, a “stakeout” giving 24-hour coverage of the Caye Ann Apartments. This surveillance lasted approximately 12 days.
Investigator Bivens and the state troopers who worked with him operated from a camp trailer across B Street from the Caye Ann Apartments. This vantage point afforded them a view both of the apartment building and of the dumpster garbage receptacle located outside the building, adjacent to the northwest corner of the building, closest to B Street. Bivens specifically assigned the troopers manning the stakeout to remove garbage placed in the dumpster by either Charles Smith or the appellant.
In addition to the dumpster located outside the apartment building, the facilities of the Caye Ann Apartments included an indoor garbage room located on the ground floor, equipped with a 20-gallon garbage hand cart. At the time in question, it was the practice of the resident manager of the apartment building to empty the contents of the 20-gallon hand cart into the dumpster whenever the hand cart became filled up. The dumpster itself was slightly sheltered by an overhang of the building. Municipal refuse collection was made exclusively from the dumpster and not from the indoor garbage room.
On August 22, 1970, Trooper Wes Taylor removed two ba,gs of garbage which he had seen Charles Smith place in the dumpster. On August '31, Trooper Casper Johnsen removed a tan colored plastic garbage bag, which he had seen appellant place in the dumpster. On September 2, Trooper Taylor again removed items from the dumpster which he had seen Charles Smith, accompanied by appellant, place there. Each of the bags or other containers thus obtained was opened by Investigator Bivens and the contents of each provided evidence that occupants of Apt. No. 409 were involved with unlawful drugs.
On the basis of the evidence taken from the dumpster, a search warrant was subsequently issued, and a number of drug-related items were found in the apartment, including marijuana, cigarette papers, hypodermic syringes and, in a paper “slip”, approximately one gram of a brownish powder which chemical analysis proved to be unusually pure heroin. In addition, the troopers found and seized a can of “milk sugar”, a substance commonly used to dilute heroin before use.
Appellant contends that the police activity outlined above constitutes an illegal search. Specifically, she argues that official removal and examination of the contents of various bags and other garbage receptacles placed in the dumpster by herself and Charles Smith violates both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 1 and Article I, Section 14, of the Alaska Constitution.2 In short, appellant reads both constitutions to require that the police should have demonstrated probable cause to an • independent magistrate and secured a search warrant before undertaking the search of Smith’s garbage.3
[795]*795We disagree, and we hold that the trial court’s failure to grant appellant’s motion to suppress does not constitute error. However, inasmuch as we are profoundly-committed to the preservation of personal privacy and deeply sensitive to the dependence of our most cherished rights upon judicial vindication, we are unwilling to announce a general rule sanctioning official gathering and analysis of an individual’s refuse. Accordingly, we limit our holding to the particular facts of the case at bar.4
We commence our analysis with the observation that the protection of the Fourth Amendment does not extend to abandoned property.5 Using traditional property law concepts, we find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that any items of garbage placed in a receptable outside the dwelling — and certainly the items removed from the dumpster in the case at bar — are abandoned. In the words of one recent scholar:6
“In the law of property, it has been recognized that the act of abandonment is demonstrated by an intention to relinquish all title, possession, or claim to property, accompanied by some type of activity or omission by which such intention is manifested. As one court has stated:
‘The abandonment of property is the relinquishing of all title, possession, or claim to or of it — a virtual intentional throwing away of it. It is not presumed. Proof supporting it must be direct or affirmative or reasonably beget the exclusive inference of the throwing away.’ ” [Emphasis added by Mascolo].7
[796]*796We view the sequence of an individual’s placing an article in a receptacle, from which routine municipal collections are made, and then withdrawing from the area8 as activity clearly indicative of “an intention to relinquish all title, possession, or claim to property.” 9
A determination that the refuse retrieved by the state troopers in this case was abandoned, however, is not conclusive of the reasonableness of their search. As the United States Supreme Court said in Katz v. United States:
“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L.Ed.2d 312, 315; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 748, 71 L.Ed. 1202, 1204. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, [797]*79780 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L.Ed. 877, 879.” 389 U.S. at 351-352, 88 S.Ct. at 511, 19 L.Ed.2d at 582.
Expanding on this theme in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 899 (1968), the Court added:
“. . . and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ [389 U.S.] at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516 [19 L.Ed.2d at 588] (Mr.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
OPINION
CONNOR, Justice.
Appellant was convicted by a superior court jury of unlawful and felonious possession of heroin in violation of AS 17.10.-010. Three days prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress as evidence all property seized during execution of a search warrant issued September 4, 1970, by district court Judge Dorothy O. Tyner. In that motion appellant alleged that the search [794]*794warrant was issued upon information obtained by three illegal searches. This appeal is based on the denial of that motion.
On or about August 22, 1970, appellant and one Charles Smith occupied Apt. No. 409 of the Caye Ann Apartments, located at 731 B Street in Anchorage. Having received information that Charles Smith was involved in narcotics activities, Investigator Dean Bivens of the Alaska State Troopers instituted on August 22, 1970, a “stakeout” giving 24-hour coverage of the Caye Ann Apartments. This surveillance lasted approximately 12 days.
Investigator Bivens and the state troopers who worked with him operated from a camp trailer across B Street from the Caye Ann Apartments. This vantage point afforded them a view both of the apartment building and of the dumpster garbage receptacle located outside the building, adjacent to the northwest corner of the building, closest to B Street. Bivens specifically assigned the troopers manning the stakeout to remove garbage placed in the dumpster by either Charles Smith or the appellant.
In addition to the dumpster located outside the apartment building, the facilities of the Caye Ann Apartments included an indoor garbage room located on the ground floor, equipped with a 20-gallon garbage hand cart. At the time in question, it was the practice of the resident manager of the apartment building to empty the contents of the 20-gallon hand cart into the dumpster whenever the hand cart became filled up. The dumpster itself was slightly sheltered by an overhang of the building. Municipal refuse collection was made exclusively from the dumpster and not from the indoor garbage room.
On August 22, 1970, Trooper Wes Taylor removed two ba,gs of garbage which he had seen Charles Smith place in the dumpster. On August '31, Trooper Casper Johnsen removed a tan colored plastic garbage bag, which he had seen appellant place in the dumpster. On September 2, Trooper Taylor again removed items from the dumpster which he had seen Charles Smith, accompanied by appellant, place there. Each of the bags or other containers thus obtained was opened by Investigator Bivens and the contents of each provided evidence that occupants of Apt. No. 409 were involved with unlawful drugs.
On the basis of the evidence taken from the dumpster, a search warrant was subsequently issued, and a number of drug-related items were found in the apartment, including marijuana, cigarette papers, hypodermic syringes and, in a paper “slip”, approximately one gram of a brownish powder which chemical analysis proved to be unusually pure heroin. In addition, the troopers found and seized a can of “milk sugar”, a substance commonly used to dilute heroin before use.
Appellant contends that the police activity outlined above constitutes an illegal search. Specifically, she argues that official removal and examination of the contents of various bags and other garbage receptacles placed in the dumpster by herself and Charles Smith violates both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 1 and Article I, Section 14, of the Alaska Constitution.2 In short, appellant reads both constitutions to require that the police should have demonstrated probable cause to an • independent magistrate and secured a search warrant before undertaking the search of Smith’s garbage.3
[795]*795We disagree, and we hold that the trial court’s failure to grant appellant’s motion to suppress does not constitute error. However, inasmuch as we are profoundly-committed to the preservation of personal privacy and deeply sensitive to the dependence of our most cherished rights upon judicial vindication, we are unwilling to announce a general rule sanctioning official gathering and analysis of an individual’s refuse. Accordingly, we limit our holding to the particular facts of the case at bar.4
We commence our analysis with the observation that the protection of the Fourth Amendment does not extend to abandoned property.5 Using traditional property law concepts, we find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that any items of garbage placed in a receptable outside the dwelling — and certainly the items removed from the dumpster in the case at bar — are abandoned. In the words of one recent scholar:6
“In the law of property, it has been recognized that the act of abandonment is demonstrated by an intention to relinquish all title, possession, or claim to property, accompanied by some type of activity or omission by which such intention is manifested. As one court has stated:
‘The abandonment of property is the relinquishing of all title, possession, or claim to or of it — a virtual intentional throwing away of it. It is not presumed. Proof supporting it must be direct or affirmative or reasonably beget the exclusive inference of the throwing away.’ ” [Emphasis added by Mascolo].7
[796]*796We view the sequence of an individual’s placing an article in a receptacle, from which routine municipal collections are made, and then withdrawing from the area8 as activity clearly indicative of “an intention to relinquish all title, possession, or claim to property.” 9
A determination that the refuse retrieved by the state troopers in this case was abandoned, however, is not conclusive of the reasonableness of their search. As the United States Supreme Court said in Katz v. United States:
“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427, 17 L.Ed.2d 312, 315; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 748, 71 L.Ed. 1202, 1204. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, [797]*79780 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L.Ed. 877, 879.” 389 U.S. at 351-352, 88 S.Ct. at 511, 19 L.Ed.2d at 582.
Expanding on this theme in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1873, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889, 899 (1968), the Court added:
“. . . and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ [389 U.S.] at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516 [19 L.Ed.2d at 588] (Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring), he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” (Citation in brackets added.)
The nourishment we derive from these two propositions is this: if appellant can be said to have harbored a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the dumpster, then the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment extends to that receptacle and the warrantless search is illegal.
The question presented by this case, in short, is how to determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists here. Our touchstone is Justice Harlan’s separate concurrence in Katz:
“My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’. Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.” 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516, 19 L.Ed,2d at 587-588.
On the record before us, we are not satisfied that either test has been met.
First, appellant’s and Charles E. Smith’s activities of depositing garbage in the dumpster and withdrawing from the area, described in Investigator Biven’s Affidavit for Search Warrant,10 were clearly exposed to plain view. The dumpster was located outside the building, appurtenant to the corner of the building nearest the street. The trips were made during daylight hours. Any passerby could havé easily observed appellant’s or Smith’s various trips'. No attempt was made to empty the bags or boxes or to commingle their contents with the collective mass of garbage. Any person later emptying refuse in the dumpster could easily segregate the items placed therein by the Smiths. Had they wished to keep their activities to themselves, the Smiths could easily have left any items of garbage in the 20-gallon hand cart located in the indoor garbage room. On these facts, we are satisfied that appellant harbored no “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”.11
But even assuming arguendo that the facts overwhelmingly indicated appellant’s subjective expectation of privacy, this court is unable to hold that “society is prepared to recognize [such an expectation] as ‘reasonable,’ ” at least in the case at bar.
To be sure, the question is very close. A review of several recent garbage can search cases 12 reveals a basic core of factors to be considered in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. These factors are:
1. Where the trash is located,
2. Whether the dwelling is multiple or single unit,
[798]*7983. Who removed the trash,
4. Where the search of the trash takes place.
One may readily arrange these factors to form a continuum. At one end of the continuum is trash located close to a single-family dwelling, on the same property as the dwelling, and searched by police officers at that location. We observe, without so deciding, that this would be a strong case for holding the expectation of privacy to be reasonable. At the other end of the continuum is trash located off the premises of a multiple-unit dwelling, and searched by a person authorized to remove it. In such a case we would be unable to hold that the expectation of privacy was reasonable.
The instant case presents an on-premises search by police officers of a multiple-dwelling trash receptacle from which municipal collections were made. We note at the outset that almost every human activity ultimately manifests itself in waste products and that any individual may understandably wish to maintain the confidentiality of his refuse. As the California Supreme Court stated in People v. Edwards:
“We can readily ascribe many reasons why residents would not want their castaway clothing, letters, medicine bottles or other telltale refuse and trash to be examined by neighbors or others, Half truths leading to rumor and gossip may readily flow from an attempt to ‘read’ the contents of another’s trash.” 80 Cal.Rptr. 633, 638, 458 P.2d 713, 718 quoted in, 96 Cal.Rptr. 62, 68, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268.
Understandable as this desire for confidentiality may be, it is not conclusive of society’s willingness to recognize an expectation of privacy in a garbage receptacle as reasonable. Turning to the dumpster in the case at bar, we are impressed with the combination of several factors. To begin with, this dumpster accommodated several apartments. Therefore many people living in the building — and certainly the superintendent — would conceivably have occasion to look into it and scavenge about in the collective heap. Secondly, all municipal pickups were made from this dumpster. Therefore, any tenant in the Caye Ann Apartments could be sure that periodically a group of third persons would look into the dumpster and possibly scavenge items therefrom. Thirdly, the dumpster was located outside the building in the parking area. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect trash to be accidentally removed from the dumpster by running children, passing cars, stray dogs, or even a visitor of another tenant in the building. Taking these various factors together, we are unable to conclude that appellant could have harbored an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the dumpster.13
We are urged, however, to adopt a concept of differential expectations of privacy. We are cited to State v. Stanton, 490 P.2d 1274 (Or.App.1971), in which the Court of Appeals of Oregon stated:
“We recognize that while it may not be objectively reasonable for a person to expect privacy as to one class of persons or persons with one purpose, he may reasonably expect privacy as to the same or other classes with other purposes. A person may not expect privacy in his open field or backyard as against children at play or parents looking for lost or tardy children. Yet he may subjectively expect and objectively be entitled to expect privacy as against policemen making a ‘dragnet’ search of a whole group of private fields or a whole neighborhood of backyards in the assumption that if they search long enough and far enough they will find some evidence of some crime.” 490 P.2d at 1279.14
[799]*799That view we decline to adopt in this case. In our opinion, the reasoning which would openly countenance scavenging in the dumpster by an indeterminate number of third persons, freely admit a constant invitation to the public authorities of the municipality to remove the contents, yet require the police to secure a search warrant before pursuing their investigation is too attenuated. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress did not constitute error.
Affirmed.
FITZGERALD, J., did not participate.