Smith v. Shartle

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided November 18, 2020·No. 4:18-cv-00323·Unknown

Opinion

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9 Sabrina Smith, No. CV-18-00323-TUC-RCC

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 John T Shartle, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is the United States of America’s Motion for “Attorneys’ 16 Eyes Only” Provision in Stipulated Protective Order. (Doc. 122.) The parties agree that 17 certain disclosure should be deemed confidential but disagree whether a provision for 18 “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” (“AEO”) is appropriate. The Government would like certain 19 materials designated AEO, including “(i) videos showing the inside of the [SHU] at USP 20 Tucson and two documents describing the video content; (ii) SHU Post Orders (which 21 document in detail practices and procedures employed by BOP staff within the SHU); and 22 (iii) staff rosters for USP Tucson.” (Doc. 126 at 5.) The Government argues that disclosure 23 beyond the attorneys’ eyes “will compromise the safety and security of Bureau of Prisons 24 (“BOP”) correctional facilities, its staff, and inmates.” (Id. at 2.) Counsel for the individual 25 Defendants agrees to the AEO provision. (Id. at 5, n.2.) 26 Plaintiff Sabrina Smith believes that the protections in the stipulated protective order 27 are adequate, and so an AEO provision would be unnecessary and “unprecedented.” (Doc. 28 124 at 2.) As it now stands, either party may designate certain discovery “confidential,” 1 upon which the party receiving the discovery may not distribute the information to 2 unauthorized persons. (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff argues she is not an incarcerated inmate, so 3 the precaution is unwarranted. She believes the Government’s last-minute motion 4 insinuates Plaintiff Sabrina Smith is “untrustworthy.” (Id. at 3.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts 5 she will be prejudiced if the disclosure is withheld because her counsel will be unable to 6 share work product because it would need to be highly redacted. (Id. at 14.) 7 The district courts have broad discretion “to decide when a protective order is 8 appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. 9 Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Seattle Times Co. v. 10 Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984)). However, a party requesting a protective order must 11 show specific harm will occur in the absence of the protective order. Foltz v. State Farm 12 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003). 13 First, it is true Plaintiff Sabrina Smith is not incarcerated; however, given the 14 allegations in the suit, the Court is concerned because it appears Mrs. Smith has not 15 followed court orders in the past. She disregarded a court order (albeit directed towards her 16 incarcerated husband) that prevented contact between her husband Clinton Smith and his 17 victim – their daughter. Mrs. Smith encouraged contact over the phone, which ultimately 18 led to Mr. Smith’s move to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) and his untimely death. 19 (Doc. 64-2 at 12.) Plaintiff’s assertions that the contact condition was not imposed upon 20 her nor was it applicable until Mr. Smith was on supervised release are unpersuasive. (See 21 Doc. 124 at 6-7.) Furthermore, Mrs. Smith continues to have connections to current 22 inmates. (See Doc. 123-1 at ¶ 5.) Moreover, the parties agree the information that would 23 be subject to the AEO is highly sensitive and presents a severe security risk if disseminated. 24 The safety of correctional facilities is of the utmost importance. Goldman v. 25 McRoberts, No. 2:17-cv-14093, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2155, at *3-4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 26 2019). On balance, the Court finds that the substantial risk of harm and Plaintiff Sabrina 27 Smith’s history outweigh Mrs. Smith’s need to view disclosure. The Government has 28 shown good cause to attach an AEO provision to certain disclosure; it has met its burden || of showing specific harm that may occur if the confidential information were erroneously || released, including creating a risk of harm to BOP staff and inmates alike. (See Doc. 126 || at 3.) Mrs. Smith retains access to most of the discovery, and the materials subject to the AEO are limited specifically to those that pose a specific risk to the BOP. 5 IT IS ORDERED United States of America’s Motion for “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” 6|| Provision in Stipulated Protective Order is GRANTED. (Doc. 122.) IT IS FURTHER || ORDERED the Protective Order including the “Attorneys’ Eyes Only” provision attached 8 || herein shall be the operative Protective Order in this case. 9 Dated this 17th day of November, 2020. 10 11 4] 12 Lp p — ST (rl - 13 Honorable Raner C. Collins 14 senior United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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9 Sabrina Smith, No. CV-18-00323-TUC-RCC

10 Plaintiff, PROTECTIVE ORDER

11 v.

12 John T Shartle, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 16 Disclosure and discovery activity in this action are likely to involve production of 17 confidential, proprietary, and/or private information subject to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 18 § 552a, for which special protection from public disclosure and from use for any purpose 19 other than prosecuting this litigation may be warranted. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Estate of 20 Clinton Dewayne Smith and Sabrina Smith (“Plaintiffs”) and Defendant the United States 21 of America (“Defendant”) (collectively, the “Parties”), hereby stipulate to and petition 22 the Court to enter the following Protective Order (“Order”). The Parties acknowledge 23 that this Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to 24 discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends only to 25 the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment under the 26 applicable legal principles. 27 28 1 2. DEFINITIONS 2 2.1. Agency Counsel: Attorneys who are employees of the Federal Bureau of 3 Prisons, as well as their support staff. 4 2.2. “ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY” Information or Items: Information 5 (regardless of how it is generated, stored, or maintained) or tangible things, including, but 6 not limited to, documents, portions of documents, answers to interrogatories, responses to 7 requests for admissions, trial testimony, deposition testimony, and transcripts of trial 8 testimony, and depositions, data, summaries, and compilations derived therefrom, that 9 shall be disclosed only to Counsel of Record (including the paralegal, clerical, and 10 secretarial staff employed by such counsel), to the Court and Court personnel, and to 11 consultants, experts, and their staff retained by the Parties or their Counsel for purposes 12 of this litigation, but shall not be disclosed to any third party or to any Party to this action, 13 other than the disclosing party, except by written stipulation of the Parties or by court 14 order. 15 2.3. Challenging Party: A Party or Non-Party that challenges the designation of 16 information or items under this Order. 17 2.4. “CONFIDENTIAL” Information or Items: Information (regardless of how 18 it is generated, stored, or maintained) or tangible things, including, but not limited to, 19 documents, portions of documents, answers to interrogatories, responses to requests for 20 21 admissions, trial testimony, deposition testimony, and transcripts of trial testimony, and 22 depositions, data, summaries, and compilations derived therefrom, that is deemed to be 23 confidential information by any party to which it belongs.

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