Smith v. Sandersville Production Credit Ass'n

Supreme Court of Georgia

Smith v. Sandersville Production Credit Ass'n

189 S.E.2d 432, 229 Ga. 65, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 500

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedApril 20, 1972

Docket27065

StatusPublished

Cited by26 cases

This text of 189 S.E.2d 432 (Smith v. Sandersville Production Credit Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Smith v. Sandersville Production Credit Ass'n, 189 S.E.2d 432, 229 Ga. 65, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 500 (Ga. 1972).

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Opinions

Hawes, Justice.

The appeal here is from the final order of the trial court sustaining defendant’s motion for a summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint. In her complaint the plaintiff prayed for a decree that certain notes and security deeds executed by her are void and that the same be canceled. Plaintiff alleged that she executed the said notes and security deeds to secure the repayment of money loaned to her husband and that under the provisions of Code § 53-503, as it stood at the time, said notes and security deeds were ineffective to convey any interest in, or bind her separate estate, and that the deeds constitute a cloud upon her title which she is entitled to have canceled. The defendant denied the material allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint and alleged that she executed the notes and security deeds in ' question as a joint obligor with her husband. The defendant made a motion for a summary judgment. Attached thereto were copies of the security deeds in question, [66]*66each of which recited that: It was executed "in consideration of the agreement of Sandersville Production Credit Association, hereinafter called lender, to lend to Billy S. Smith and Mary U. Smith, hereinafter called borrower. . .” the sum set forth therein. Each deed was signed by Billy S. Smith and Mary U. Smith. Also attached to the motion were copies of applications for loans which were signed by "Billy S. Smith and Mary U. Smith” as applicants. The plaintiff also moved for a summary judgment and in support thereof, and in opposition to the defendant’s motion, attached an affidavit in which she verified the allegations of her complaint and averred that the realty described therein was her separate estate; that the loan applications, notes, bills of sale and security deeds signed by the plaintiff were not her original undertakings, jointly with her husband or otherwise; that she did not receive any of the proceeds of said loans; that in each case the execution of the documents by her was done in aid of her husband in obtaining loans for himself and constituted a pledge of her separate estate as security for her husband’s debts, and that said transactions were colorable schemes designed to conceal the fact that the plaintiff was encumbering her separate estate to secure her husband’s indebtedness. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. Held:

A summary judgment should not be rendered unless there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and unless the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Code Ann. §81A-156. The burden is upon the movant to affirmatively show that there is no genuine issue and that he is entitled to a summary judgment. The party opposing the motion for a summary judgment is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts in determining whether a genuine issue exists. The evidence must be construed most favorably to the opposing party, and the trial court must give him the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evi[67]*67dence. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 5 (126 SE2d 442); McCarty v. National Life &c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 179 (129 SE2d 408). The affidavit of the plaintiff, as opposed to the facts disclosed by the papers attached to the movant’s motion for a summary judgment, presented an issue as to the intent of the parties in entering into the agreements in question and presented a question as to the credibility of the plaintiff which could only be resolved by submitting the case to a jury. Capital Automobile Co. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 119 Ga. App. 186 (2) (166 SE2d 584). In reaching the conclusion which it did, the trial court evidently took the view that the plaintiff was estopped to deny that she signed the loan applications and the deeds to secure debt in any capacity other than as co-maker. Under the provisions of Code § 53-503 as it stood at the time of the transactions in this case (but see the Act approved March 14, 1969, Ga. L. 1969, pp. 72, 73), there was no estoppel against a married woman to assert that she signed an instrument in a capacity other than as principal maker. T. J. Dunbar & Co. v. Mize, 53 Ga. 435 (2); Rountree v. Rentfroe, 139 Ga. 290 (77 SE 23); Reeves v. Jackson, 158 Ga. 676 (2) (124 SE 135); Lee v. Johnston, 162 Ga. 560 (2a) (134 SE 166). As to such transactions, the rule is that it is always open to a married woman to show by parol evidence the true nature of the transaction and that the question of whether she encumbered her property for her own benefit or in the capacity of a surety is for the jury. Magid v. Beaver, 185 Ga. 669 (196 SE 422). It follows that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for a summary judgment.

Submitted March 13, 1972 Decided April 20, 1972. Casey Thigpen, for appellant.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Nichols, Gunter and Jordan, JJ., who dissent. [68]*68Thomas A. Hutcheson, for appellee.

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Hawes, Justice.

The appeal here is from the final order of the trial court sustaining defendant’s motion for a summary judgment and dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint. In her complaint the plaintiff prayed for a decree that certain notes and security deeds executed by her are void and that the same be canceled. Plaintiff alleged that she executed the said notes and security deeds to secure the repayment of money loaned to her husband and that under the provisions of Code § 53-503, as it stood at the time, said notes and security deeds were ineffective to convey any interest in, or bind her separate estate, and that the deeds constitute a cloud upon her title which she is entitled to have canceled. The defendant denied the material allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint and alleged that she executed the notes and security deeds in ' question as a joint obligor with her husband. The defendant made a motion for a summary judgment. Attached thereto were copies of the security deeds in question, [66]*66each of which recited that: It was executed "in consideration of the agreement of Sandersville Production Credit Association, hereinafter called lender, to lend to Billy S. Smith and Mary U. Smith, hereinafter called borrower. . .” the sum set forth therein. Each deed was signed by Billy S. Smith and Mary U. Smith. Also attached to the motion were copies of applications for loans which were signed by "Billy S. Smith and Mary U. Smith” as applicants. The plaintiff also moved for a summary judgment and in support thereof, and in opposition to the defendant’s motion, attached an affidavit in which she verified the allegations of her complaint and averred that the realty described therein was her separate estate; that the loan applications, notes, bills of sale and security deeds signed by the plaintiff were not her original undertakings, jointly with her husband or otherwise; that she did not receive any of the proceeds of said loans; that in each case the execution of the documents by her was done in aid of her husband in obtaining loans for himself and constituted a pledge of her separate estate as security for her husband’s debts, and that said transactions were colorable schemes designed to conceal the fact that the plaintiff was encumbering her separate estate to secure her husband’s indebtedness. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. Held:

A summary judgment should not be rendered unless there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and unless the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Code Ann. §81A-156. The burden is upon the movant to affirmatively show that there is no genuine issue and that he is entitled to a summary judgment. The party opposing the motion for a summary judgment is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts in determining whether a genuine issue exists. The evidence must be construed most favorably to the opposing party, and the trial court must give him the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evi[67]*67dence. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 5 (126 SE2d 442); McCarty v. National Life &c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 179 (129 SE2d 408). The affidavit of the plaintiff, as opposed to the facts disclosed by the papers attached to the movant’s motion for a summary judgment, presented an issue as to the intent of the parties in entering into the agreements in question and presented a question as to the credibility of the plaintiff which could only be resolved by submitting the case to a jury. Capital Automobile Co. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 119 Ga. App. 186 (2) (166 SE2d 584). In reaching the conclusion which it did, the trial court evidently took the view that the plaintiff was estopped to deny that she signed the loan applications and the deeds to secure debt in any capacity other than as co-maker. Under the provisions of Code § 53-503 as it stood at the time of the transactions in this case (but see the Act approved March 14, 1969, Ga. L. 1969, pp. 72, 73), there was no estoppel against a married woman to assert that she signed an instrument in a capacity other than as principal maker. T. J. Dunbar & Co. v. Mize, 53 Ga. 435 (2); Rountree v. Rentfroe, 139 Ga. 290 (77 SE 23); Reeves v. Jackson, 158 Ga. 676 (2) (124 SE 135); Lee v. Johnston, 162 Ga. 560 (2a) (134 SE 166). As to such transactions, the rule is that it is always open to a married woman to show by parol evidence the true nature of the transaction and that the question of whether she encumbered her property for her own benefit or in the capacity of a surety is for the jury. Magid v. Beaver, 185 Ga. 669 (196 SE 422). It follows that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for a summary judgment.

Submitted March 13, 1972 Decided April 20, 1972. Casey Thigpen, for appellant.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Nichols, Gunter and Jordan, JJ., who dissent. [68]*68Thomas A. Hutcheson, for appellee.

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189 S.E.2d 432, 229 Ga. 65, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 500, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-sandersville-production-credit-assn-ga-1972.

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