Smith v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.

2025 Ohio 3122

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 2, 2025
• Docket: E-24-049
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Smith v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 2025-Ohio-3122.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ERIE COUNTY

Kelly Smith Court of Appeals No. E-24-049

Appellant Trial Court No. 2021 CV 0440

v.

Norfolk Southern Railway Company DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellee Decided: September 2, 2025

*****

Florence A. Murray and Joseph A. Galea, for appellant.

David A. Damico and Edwin B. Palmer, for appellee.

MAYLE, J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Kelly Smith, appeals the September 10, 2024 judgments

of the Erie County Court of Common Pleas, precluding testimony from Smith’s expert

witnesses and granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Norfolk

Southern Railroad Co. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court judgment. I. Background

{¶ 2} Kelly Smith filed an action against his former employer, Norfolk Southern

Railway Co., under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. 51-60. He

claimed that high-intensity vibration of the power and pneumatic tools he used in his

employment caused him to develop severe and debilitating carpal tunnel in both wrists,

requiring surgery and ultimately rendering him occupationally disabled. Smith alleged

that he suffered these injuries as the result of the railroad’s breach of its duty to maintain

a safe workplace. More specifically, he alleged that the railroad failed to provide

sufficient administrative controls to reduce the risk of carpal tunnel caused by the use of

power and pneumatic tools; failed to monitor him for development of carpal tunnel

syndrome; failed to properly train him to avoid wrist and hand injuries; required him to

perform job duties in an unergonomic manner; and failed to provide training for

performance of job duties in an ergonomic manner.

{¶ 3} On March 31, 2022, the court entered a civil trial order setting pretrial

deadlines, including a deadline for disclosing expert witnesses:

EXPERT WITNESSES (other than treating physicians): Each counsel shall exchange with all other counsel, medical and expert witnesses expected to testify in advance of Trial. Plaintiff expert disclosure with reports shall be completed by October 31, 2022. Defendant’s expert disclosure with reports shall be completed by December 30, 2022.

{¶ 4} Upon Smith’s motion, the court extended the deadline for “expert reporting”

to December 15, 2022. Upon motions by the railroad, it extended the railroad’s “expert

disclosure deadline” to February 13, 2023, and then again to February 28, 2023.

2. {¶ 5} Although the record does not reflect any further extensions for disclosing his

experts, Smith filed his expert disclosure on January 31, 2023, identifying biomechanics

expert, Lloyd R. Wade, Ph.D., and treating physicians, Scott Ciaccia, D.O. and Laurie

Ann Rousseau, D.O. The disclosure indicated that Dr. Wade would testify regarding

liability and his report would be provided when available. It indicated that Drs. Ciaccia

and Rousseau were both treating physicians who would testify regarding liability and

causation and reminded that their “chart[s] ha[d] been provided to Defendant.”

{¶ 6} On February 28, 2023, Smith moved to vacate the civil trial order and extend

the deadlines for completing expert discovery and filing dispositive motions. That same

day, the railroad filed (1) its expert disclosure, attaching their experts’ reports as exhibits;

(2) an opposition to Smith’s motion to vacate; and (3) a motion for summary judgment.

{¶ 7} Both the railroad’s opposition to the motion to vacate and its motion for

summary judgment were premised on Smith’s failure to provide reports from his expert

witnesses. Its summary-judgment motion alleged that expert testimony was required to

prove Smith’s claims, and Smith had failed to provide his experts’ reports despite passage

of the deadline for doing so. The railroad offered its own experts’ opinions that (1)

Smith’s carpal tunnel syndrome was attributable to comorbidities, including elevated

body mass, age, and long-standing diabetes, and (2) Smith’s job duties did not increase

the risk for developing carpal tunnel syndrome.

{¶ 8} Smith replied that he had not been able to comply with the expert deadlines

because Dr. Wade was experiencing a family illness and the treating physicians refused to

provide further reports. He maintained that because the Ohio saving statute was

3. unavailable to him—thus there was no option to voluntarily dismiss and refile—equity

required that a continuance be granted. Smith also moved for a continuance to respond to

the railroad’s motion for summary judgment under Civ.R. 56(F).

{¶ 9} The trial court granted Smith’s motion to vacate, and a new civil trial order

was issued. The order set a new deadline for dispositive motions. With respect to expert

witnesses, it provided:

EXPERT WITNESSES: Each counsel shall exchange with all other counsel, medical and expert witnesses expected to testify in advance of Trial. Plaintiff expert disclosure with reports shall be completed by October 9, 2023. Defendant’s expert disclosure with reports shall be completed by December 1, 2023.

Dr. Wade’s report was disclosed to the railroad on October 9, 2023. On February 9, 2024,

the railroad filed a renewed motion for summary judgment and a motion in limine to

preclude Dr. Ciaccia’s testimony.

{¶ 10} As to its motion for summary judgment, the railroad acknowledged that

under Civ R. 26(B)(7), “[a] witness who has provided medical . . . care may testify as an

expert and offer opinions as to matters addressed in the healthcare provider’s records.” It

maintained, however, that “[o]pinions as to the causation of Plaintiff’s injuries are not

addressed in the records of his healthcare providers,” thus an expert report summarizing

and explaining his opinions was still needed. The railroad claimed that Smith could not

avoid the requirement to disclose his experts’ opinions merely by characterizing the

witnesses as “treating physicians” or “occurrence” witnesses. Because all deadlines for

providing expert reports had passed, yet Smith had failed to disclose a report or opinions

of any expert or treating physician establishing that Smith’s carpal tunnel syndrome was

4. caused, in whole in or part, by his employment for the railroad, the railroad insisted that

summary judgment should be granted in its favor. It also highlighted the fact that during

discovery, it propounded an interrogatory seeking Smith’s experts’ opinions and the bases

for those opinions, to which Smith responded: “Plaintiff will supply requested

information in accordance with the rules and orders of the court regarding the disclosure

of witnesses.”

{¶ 11} As to the motion in limine, the railroad anticipated that Smith would

attempt to elicit testimony regarding medical causation from Dr. Ciaccia during his

upcoming videotaped trial deposition. It contended that because Smith had failed to

disclose Dr. Ciaccia’s expert causation opinions and the bases for those opinions as

required by the case management orders and under Ohio law, the opinions were

inadmissible. As such, it argued, justice required that Smith be precluded from

proceeding with the video deposition of Dr. Ciaccia. The railroad argued that preparing

for and participating in the deposition would be a waste of judicial resources and would

subject it to undue burden and expense.

{¶ 12} Smith sought another Civ.R. 56(F) continuance, which the railroad

opposed. Smith opposed the railroad’s motion in limine, claiming that neither the Ohio

Civil Rules of Procedure nor the court’s scheduling order required that expert reports be

obtained from his treating physicians. Specifically, he argued that under Civ.R.

26(B)(7)(c) and (d), he could offer expert opinions from his treating physicians without

providing an expert report. And, he pointed out, the trial court’s order required expert

witnesses to provide reports but did not require medical witnesses to do so. Smith

5. maintained that the purpose for disclosing reports is to prevent prejudice and unfair

surprise, and insisted that there was no prejudice or unfair surprise here because the

railroad had ample opportunity to discover and cross-examine Dr. Ciaccia about any

causation opinions he holds.

{¶ 13} The trial court denied Smith’s Civ.R. 56(F) motion and set deadlines for

Smith’s opposition brief and the railroad’s reply in support of its motion for summary

judgment.

{¶ 14} Smith timely filed his opposition brief. He argued, substantively, that the

deposition testimony of Drs. Ciaccia and Wade created genuine issues of material fact

preventing summary judgment. In reply, the railroad argued again that the failure to

timely disclose expert opinions prevented him from relying on Dr. Ciaccia’s testimony to

defeat summary judgment. It also claimed that by denying Smith’s motion for a

continuance, the court had precluded him from offering Dr. Ciaccia’s deposition

testimony to oppose the railroad’s summary-judgment motion.

{¶ 15} As to the substance of Dr. Ciaccia’s opinions, the railroad claimed that Dr.

Ciaccia’s proffered testimony failed to meet the applicable standards for admission of

expert opinion evidence under Evid.R. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). It also contended that Dr. Wade’s deposition

testimony was inadmissible for these reasons, and it indicated that it would be filing a

motion in limine to exclude Dr. Wade’s opinions. It filed that motion in limine

approximately three weeks later, arguing that Dr. Wade’s opinions were not based on

scientifically reliable principles and methodology and would not assist the jury in

6. determining facts and evidence at issue. Smith opposed the motion to exclude Dr.

Wade’s opinions.

{¶ 16} On September 10, 2024, the trial court ruled on the outstanding motions. It

granted the motions in limine to preclude Drs. Ciaccia and Wade’s opinions, and it

granted summary judgment to the railroad.

{¶ 17} As to the exclusion of Dr. Ciaccia’s opinions, the court reasoned:

Plaintiff has failed to disclose Dr. Ciaccia’s expert causation opinions in this matter as required Ohio Civ.R. 26 and this court’s order after being given multiple extensions of time. Although Ohio Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(d) allows a treating physician to “testify as an expert and offer opinions as to matters addressed in the healthcare provider’s records”, Dr. Ciaccia admits that his medical records concerning Plaintiff do not address the cause of Plaintiff carpal tunnel syndrome. As Dr. Ciaccia’s preferred (sic) testimony in this matter involves testimony regarding matters not addressed in his records, this Court finds said testimony is inadmissible for failure to satisfy the requirements of Ohio Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(d).

{¶ 18} As to the exclusion of Dr. Wade’s opinions, the court reasoned:

This Court finds that Dr. Wade failed to employ a reliable scientific methodology for the assessment of the Plaintiff’s workplace exposures to ergonomic risk factors for carpal tunnel syndrome.

Dr. Wade failed to establish a foundational basis to make his conclusions. For example, in Dr. Wade’s deposition, Dr. Wade admitted that he only reviewed one three-page document from Norfolk Southern Railway Company; failed to conduct a comprehensive audit of Norfolk Southern Railway Company’s ergonomic program or review any employee training manuals. Dr. Wade conceded that he had no information regarding the frequency, forces and postures associated with performing the job tasks of a railroad machinist.

Further, the methodology supporting Dr. Wade’s causation opinion fails to meet the criteria for reliability and admissibility under Evid.R. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

{¶ 19} And as to the motion for summary judgment, the court reasoned:

7. This Court has previously granted Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company’s motion in limine to exclude the Expert Report and Testimony of Lloyd R. Wade, Ph.D. as well as [to] exclude the Testimony of Dr. Scott Ciaccia for the reasons stated in said Orders.

Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to properly disclose the report and/or opinions of any expert or treating physician establishing that Plaintiff’s alleged carpal tunnel syndrome is caused, [in] whole or in part, by his employment for Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company. Therefore, this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendant’s liability and summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Defendant.

{¶ 20} Smith appealed and assigns the following errors for our review:

1. The trial court abused its discretion by excluding the causation testimony of Dr. Scott Ciaccia for failing to provide an expert report where Dr. Ciaccia’s complete chart had been produced.

2. The trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of Dr. Lloyd “Chip” Wade on the basis of Evid.R. 702 and Daubert.

3. The trial court erred by granting the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

II. Standard of Review

{¶ 21} As to the trial court’s decisions excluding Drs. Ciaccia and Wade’s

opinions, “the determination of the admissibility of expert testimony is within the

discretion of the trial court” and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

Valentine v. Conrad, 2006-Ohio-3561, ¶ 9, citing Evid.R. 104(A). An abuse of discretion

connotes that the trial court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). An unreasonable decision is one

that lacks sound reasoning to support the decision. Hageman v. Bryan City Schools,

2019-Ohio-223, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.). “An arbitrary decision is one that lacks adequate

8. determining principle and is not governed by any fixed rules or standard.” Id. quoting

Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, LLP v. Frutta del Mondo, Ltd., 2008-Ohio-3567, ¶ 11

(10th Dist.). And an unconscionable decision is one “that affronts the sense of justice,

decency, or reasonableness.” Id. “A trial court will [also] be found to have abused its

discretion when its decision is contrary to law, unreasonable, not supported by the

evidence, or grossly unsound.” State v. Nisley, 2014-Ohio-981, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.), State v.

Boles, 2010-Ohio-278, ¶ 16-18 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 22} As for the trial court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of the

railroad, appellate review of a summary judgment is de novo, Grafton v. Ohio Edison

Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996), employing the same standard as trial courts. Lorain

Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts., 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 129 (9th Dist. 1989). The motion may

be granted only when it is demonstrated:

(1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 67, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978), Civ.R. 56(C).

{¶ 23} When seeking summary judgment, a party must specifically delineate the

basis upon which the motion is brought, Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112 (1988),

syllabus, and identify those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). When a

properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, an adverse party may not rest

on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must respond with specific facts

9. showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Civ.R. 56(E); Riley v. Montgomery,

11 Ohio St.3d 75, 79 (1984). A “material” fact is one which would affect the outcome of

the suit under the applicable substantive law. Russell v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 135 Ohio

App.3d 301, 304 (6th Dist. 1999); Needham v. Provident Bank, 110 Ohio App.3d 817,

826 (8th Dist. 1996), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

III. Law and Analysis

{¶ 24} Smith assigns error in the trial court’s decision granting the railroad’s

motions to exclude opinions from Dr. Ciaccia, Smith’s treating physician, and Dr. Wade,

an ergonomist and biomechanics expert retained by Smith. Smith had relied on these

witnesses to establish both liability and causation. Smith also assigns error in the trial

court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of the railroad insofar as that

decision was premised on the allegedly-improper exclusion of the opinions of his expert

witnesses.

A. Exclusion of Dr. Ciaccia’s Opinions

{¶ 25} The trial court granted the railroad’s motion to exclude opinions from Dr.

Ciaccia on the basis that Dr. Ciaccia’s proffered testimony “involves testimony regarding

matters not addressed in his records.” In his first assignment of error, Smith argues that

this was error. He maintains that by its plain language, Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(c) permits a

treating healthcare provider to offer opinions as to matters addressed in his records

without having to provide an expert report—it does not require the opinions themselves

to be contained within the records, as advocated by the railroad. We agree with Smith.

10. {¶ 26} Civ.R. 26(B)(7) was overhauled in 2020 to include the provisions

applicable to this issue. Under Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(c), “[o]ther than under subsection (d),” an

expert witness may not testify or provide opinions unless he or she provides a report

disclosing “a complete statement of all opinions and the basis and reasons for them as to

each matter on which the expert will testify.” Under Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(d), however, a

treating physician “may testify as an expert and offer opinions as to matters addressed in

the healthcare provider’s records.” Those records “shall be provided to opposing counsel

in lieu of an expert report in accordance with the time schedule established by the Court.”

{¶ 27} No Ohio appellate court has interpreted this rule as amended, but under the

plain language of the rule, unlike an expert report, which must contain the experts’

“opinions” along with the “basis” for those opinions, the health care records of a treating

physician who is disclosed as an expert need only “address” the “matters” about which

the provider will offer opinions. There is nothing in this rule that requires the opinions

themselves to be set forth in the health care records.

{¶ 28} Here, it is not disputed that Smith’s pertinent medical records were timely

provided to the railroad. Those records “address” the diagnosis and treatment of Smith’s

carpal tunnel syndrome, and they also allude to a potential cause for Smith’s condition:

The patient presents today for evaluation of his bilateral upper extremities. He describes numbness and tingling on a daily basis. This is clearly worse in the workplace. He works as a machinist. He uses some type of an impact gun that causes repetitive vibration to the hands. This bothers him immensely. He has had ongoing symptoms on and off for years of numbness and tingling. He describes symptoms on the left that are equal to those on the right. He has numbness and tingling involving the radial three digits to the bilateral hands. He has symptoms that wake him

11. from sleep at nighttime. He has functional issues during the day. He presents today for evaluation and treatment. (Emphasis added.)

The contents of Dr. Ciaccia’s records sufficiently “address” the “matters” about which he

offered opinions.

{¶ 29} As previously stated, we review a decision admitting or excluding expert

witness testimony under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Akron Bar Assn. v. Shenise,

2015-Ohio-1548, ¶ 13. “A trial court will be found to have abused its discretion when its

decision is contrary to law, unreasonable, not supported by the evidence, or grossly

unsound.” Nisley, 2014-Ohio-981, at ¶ 15 (3d Dist.), Boles, 2010-Ohio-278, at ¶ 16-18

(2d Dist.). Given that Smith’s disclosures complied with the requirements of Civ.R.

26(B)(7)(c) and (d), we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion—and acted

contrary to law—when it excluded Dr. Ciaccia’s opinions on the basis that he testified

regarding matters not addressed in his records.

{¶ 30} In addition to arguing that Dr. Ciaccia’s opinions were inadmissible

because Smith failed to timely disclose them, the railroad also argues that Dr. Ciaccia’s

proffered testimony, even if admissible, does not create a jury question because his

deposition testimony made clear that he could not say with any degree of medical

certainty that Smith’s railroad employment caused his injuries.

{¶ 31} First, this was not the basis for the railroad’s motion to exclude Dr.

Ciaccia’s opinions in the trial court, thus we need not consider it. See Ohio Edison Co. v.

Franklin Paper Co., 18 Ohio St.3d 15, 18 (1985), fn. 2 (declining to consider appellee’s

argument raised on appeal because it was not raised in its motion in the trial court).

12. Second, this court has recognized that while “[m]edical testimony evidence in a FELA

case must have some reasonable basis and have some degree of certainty,” an expert

“does not need to testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty in order to be

admissible.” Taylor v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 2020-Ohio-2657, ¶ 21 (6th Dist.). See

also Steveson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 91 F.3d 144 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[B]ecause of the relaxed

standards applied in FELA and Jones Act suits, a medical expert need not be able to

articulate to a ‘reasonable degree of medical certainty’ that the defendant’s negligence

caused the plaintiff’s injury.”). Third, Dr. Ciaccia did provide causation opinions to a

reasonable degree of medical certainty.

{¶ 32} Dr. Ciaccia testified that Smith was a “hands-on grip squeezing kind of guy,

running tools and pneumatic gun (sic)[.]” He recalled that Smith worked as a machinist

and used an impact gun, causing repetitive vibration to the hands. Dr. Ciaccia testified

that “those who do engage in repetitive gripping have a higher incidence rate of carpal

tunnel[,] [a]nd specifically, the vibratory stuff is an absolute irritant.” He said that “for a

guy who sees a fair bit of carpal tunnel to say the least, it is a pretty classic presentation

that [Smith] had,” and he “felt like he knew what [he was] dealing with.” He confirmed

that all his opinions were provided to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

{¶ 33} Counsel for the railroad sought to challenge Dr. Ciaccia’s opinions

concerning the cause of Smith’s carpal tunnel syndrome. Counsel asked if his medical

records stated that Smith’s injuries were caused by his job. Dr. Ciaccia asked: “Do I

state that it caused his carpal tunnel syndrome? No. Do I believe it did? Yes.” Dr.

Ciaccia acknowledged that obesity can contribute to the development of carpal tunnel

13. syndrome, but he countered that while Smith is overweight, “it’s the activities in the

workplace that are making his symptoms severely worse.”

{¶ 34} In Henry v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2012 WL 1365649, *9 (S.D.Ohio Apr. 19,

2012), the plaintiff’s medical expert opined that his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was

related to his work with the railroad. The doctor explained:

Patient has been employed many years on the railroad. Has been very physical in his nature of work which also requires repetitive motions of the hand and wrists. He also has included the use of a jackhammer at times and with this long extensive history and numbness and tingling of his hands, I strongly feel that this is directly related to his course of employment.

The district court observed that “the FELA imposes a relaxed standard of proof with

respect to the element of causation,” and it found this statement sufficient to support

causation. Id.

{¶ 35} Dr. Ciaccia articulated opinions substantially similar to those expressed by

the medical expert in Henry. Moreover, Dr. Ciaccia confirmed that he held his opinions

to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. His causation opinions were sufficient to

meet the standard of proof with respect to the element of causation.

{¶ 36} We find Smith’s first assignment of error well-taken.

B. Exclusion of Dr. Wade’s Opinions

{¶ 37} In his second assignment of error, Smith argues that the trial court erred

when it granted the railroad’s motion in limine to preclude it from offering opinions from

his retained ergonomics expert, Dr. Wade. He claims that the trial court’s criticisms of

Dr. Wade’s opinions—that they lacked a foundational basis, that he did not conduct a

14. comprehensive audit of the railroad’s ergonomic program or review any employee

training manuals, and that he lacked information regarding the frequency, forces and

postures associated with the railroad machinist job—do not affect the reliability of Dr.

Wade’s opinions. Rather, he maintains, they go to the weight of his opinions. Smith

contends that Dr. Wade’s opinions rest on sound scientific methodology and his

conclusions reliably rest on known and observable data. He argues that in concluding

otherwise, the trial court exceeded its role as gatekeeper and abused its discretion.

{¶ 38} The railroad responds that the methodology supporting Dr. Wade’s opinions

does not meet the criteria for reliability and admissibility under Evid.R. 702 and Daubert

v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). It complains that he failed to

utilize a proper scientific method, lacked a factual basis for his opinions, and did not

perform an acceptable methodology in reaching conclusions.

{¶ 39} Before considering the parties’ arguments concerning the admissibility of

Dr. Wade’s opinions, we briefly summarize the deposition testimony of Smith and Dr.

Wade.

1. The Deposition Testimony

a. Smith

{¶ 40} Smith testified that his carpal tunnel syndrome developed over time. He

first noticed the symptoms at the end of 2018, or beginning of 2019. His hands would

throb and become completely numb and his fingers would tingle. This happened

consistently when working with air guns, air ratchets, air impacts, and any other tool that

vibrated his hands. When he stopped using the gun, this feeling would last for an hour-

15. and-a-half to two hours, but would come back at night when he tried to sleep. Smith did

not know what the feeling was at first—he thought it was fatigue. Smith’s supervisor told

him it was carpal tunnel, but he also told Smith that he could either do his work or find

another job. Eventually, the situation became so bad that Smith went to Dr. Ciaccia, a

hand surgeon.

{¶ 41} Smith’s employment with the railroad began in 1997. He became a

welding instructor in 2010, as part of a federally-mandated program, but the railroad

stopped this program because it did not have sufficient personnel to work on locomotives.

He returned to the yard in 2017. “Yard work,” he explained, meant answering service

calls to work on locomotives. Because of massive layoffs, the locomotives were kept in

the yard and serviced there instead of being brought into “the pit.” Smith explained the

different tasks he performed, both as a welding instructor and as a yard worker, and he

described the various tools he used to perform those tasks.

{¶ 42} Between 2017 and 2019, welding instruction comprised about 25 percent of

Smith’s time. After 2020, he performed some, but very little, welding instruction. As a

welding instructor, Smith taught out-of-position welds and in-position welds. He

explained that out-of-position welds are performed in an overhead, vertical position,

whereas in-position welds are performed flat. At first, students received one week of

welding training, but with personnel shortages, it was reduced to one day so they could

get workers back on the floor.

{¶ 43} As a welding instructor, Smith used a Bantam Bully, which is an air chisel

that runs pneumatically and is used to get the slag out of a weld to strengthen it. He also

16. used a scaler for this task and an air hand tool to clean welds and to remove carbon on the

exhaust assemblies. The Bantam Bully was more efficient and powerful than a scaler, fits

in the palm of the hand, and weighs very little. He held it in his right hand and would

move it up and down along the path of the weld. As a welding instructor he used the air

chisel and scalers every day, usually for a minute at a time over the length of the weld.

The number of times he used this tool depended on the number of students he was

instructing.

{¶ 44} On the floor or in the shop, Smith performed the normal duties of a

machinist. He would remove power assemblies, change brake shoes, break down

equipment, brake riggings, and air boxes, and repair wrecks. Smith said that there was

not much downtime during the day because if he was waiting on parts for one job, he was

expected to work on the next job. He got a ten-minute break at 9:00 a.m. and a 20-

minute lunch.

{¶ 45} A spline gun, which vibrated and caused problems to his hands, was used to

remove crab bolts from a power assembly. It would usually take a continuous five

minutes to remove one bolt. There are four bolts. The entire process of removing a

power assembly varied, but he estimated a half day. He had to do this several times a

month, whenever they came in and needed to be repaired.

{¶ 46} Air wrenches were used to remove air boxes and also caused him

symptoms. Removing the air box was the first step in removing the power assembly. He

used the tool to remove clamping and break bolts. He had to remove snap rings, the air

box, crabs, “and everything.”

17. {¶ 47} Air impacts were used to remove fasteners on a unit—i.e., nuts and bolts.

The amount of time it takes to remove a nut varies; sometimes they would be locked in

and this would take more time. He couldn’t say how many nuts and bolts needed to be

removed from a power assembly, but it could take half a day to remove them. In a

normal situation, he would have to use the tool half the time, but there were times he

would be using the tool almost all the time.

{¶ 48} Removing break rigging required him to “cut the trucks out,” take the air

off, and remove the brake shoe, the key, and a pin in the back. He would have to knock

the pin off the back with air then do the same with the front. These were laid on boards

on a raised rail track, above floor level in a pit. He described cutting air valves out,

which required “turning an angle cock.” In removing brake shoes, he would have to

remove the pin, knock the brake shoe back, reach “way up in,” knock the key out—

which, he said, never comes out easily—then pull the brake shoe off. The key is knocked

out with a miniature sledgehammer that weighs around two pounds and can be performed

in less than a couple of minutes. “Two giant nuts” had to be removed from the brake

rigging and the brake arm with air tools. Some were easy to remove, some were difficult,

so the time it took to do this varied. Easy ones took around one to two minutes. For

more difficult ones, he would work on them for as long as two days before just deciding

to cut them off. He described that use of the tool was not necessarily constant—“you’d

take heat, put it on the nut, use an impact. Heat on the nut, impact, and this went on, and

if [he] didn’t get it done, it’d go to the next shift.” Often the next shift would skip the

unit, so it would be there for Smith again when he returned. The air impact was the main

18. tool used to get the nuts off. He could not provide an accurate estimate of how much

time he would use the air impact.

{¶ 49} Smith described the process of removing brake rigging, which involved

tools that caused pain to his hands. A unit would be derailed and he would have to get

underneath it and weld the gear case cover up and put it all back. If they didn’t have the

brake rigging in stock, he would straighten out the brake rigging. He would have to

replace the brake hanger bushings, which hold the brake shoe. The hanger has a big pin

with other pins in it, which would have to be torn apart. It would twist around, so he’d

have to remove and straighten them because they didn’t keep them in stock. This was

done in the case of derailment, which didn’t happen a lot but seemed to happen more

after layoffs.

{¶ 50} If the pilot on a wrecked train was damaged, Smith would use air tools to

weld it. He would air arc the crack out, weld the braces on the back, and use an air chisel

to get the slag out. This required use of the Bantam Bully. If the stairs were crushed and

he couldn’t get a torch in, he would use an air tool to remove the nuts to remove the

staircase. The air tools are used to take things apart or put things back together. No air

tools were used for welding except that the Bantam Bully needed to be used on each

weld. Some of the welds were five or six feet tall. He couldn’t say how long he would

use the Bantam Bully in these situations except to say that a wreck could take one to two

weeks to repair. The length of time he would use the air tools varied. To remove the slag

from one weld takes three or four minutes. To make a weld could take up to 45 minutes,

depending on the length of the crack and the thickness of the material.

19. {¶ 51} During the last three years of his employment, Smith worked on derailed

locomotives quite a bit—at least monthly. Brake rigging would most commonly need to

be repaired on a derailed locomotive, so the brake rigging needed to be removed. A

laborer would occasionally be assigned to help him. The laborer would hold a big giant

wrench against the rail so it wouldn’t fly off and they would get new parts if they were in

stock. If the parts weren’t in stock, they would either wait for the part or repair the

broken part. The laborers did not use air tools.

{¶ 52} Smith described that he worked on the drop table, using air tools to remove

brake rigging to drop traction motors. He worked on the wheel cutting machine which

used air tools to pull the centers and caps off to put hydraulic centers in to lift the

locomotive up to cut the wheels. There was a drop bar for the bearing housings for the

traction motor, holding them in place. He had to take two big nuts off of the bar and

swing it out of place to bring the traction motor down out of the spring packs. This took

approximately ten to 15 minutes. The frequency of this task varied. It took about 30

minutes to remove wheel centers with three-quarter inch impact guns. There were six or

eight circular bolts, an inch-and-a-quarter or an inch-and-an-eighth. He would have to

take those out, flip the wheel cover up, put another bolt in to hold it up, and then put the

hydraulic center in. The center would go in and it would lift the locomotive so he could

cut the wheels. He would have to do this on both sides. He would have to adjust the

wheel sets in the truing machine using big hammers and wrenches. It took a half-hour to

45 minutes per wheel to adjust the wheel sets on the machine. To cut the wheel with the

machine would take one to three hours, depending on how much had to come off the

20. wheel. Once the machine was set up, it just involved pressing a button, but the machine

needed to be adjusted to each wheel.

{¶ 53} Smith feels that the air guns contributed to his carpal tunnel. He’s always

used air guns, but did not start feeling symptoms until 2017, when he started working on

the floor. The pain started in his pinkies and ring fingers and spread to his hands. He

experienced tingling. His hands eventually became numb. He went to Dr. Ciaccia in

May of 2020. He had injections at first, but eventually proceeded to surgery. Smith is

diabetic and was on weight loss pills for three months. He is five feet, eight inches and

246 pounds. After the surgery, he went back to work for some time, but he did not want

to do the work because he lacked hand strength.

{¶ 54} As to the railroad’s commitment to safety, Smith does not believe that

safety was an important issue for the railroad. There were quotas on the number of

locomotives that needed to leave the shop. Supervisors received bonuses based on how

many units they got out. If quotas weren’t met, the supervisors were not happy. Workers

were pressured to make repairs quickly and told to go “faster, faster.” They would be

asked “what’s taking so long?” Because of the pressure on the supervisors to get units

out, it was impossible to follow all the rules, and supervisors “looked the other way.”

There was not sufficient personnel, so the railroad mandated overtime, usually eight

hours, so they could get the required number of locomotives out of the shop.

{¶ 55} Smith said that he was trained to do his job safely—he watched safety films

and went to safety classes—but he denied that he received ergonomics training. He was

trained to work within his capacity and not to overexert, but claimed that “they did away

21. with the safety program.” Although they were trained to request assistance when

needed, there was never the personnel for assistance. The railroad provided personal

protective equipment, including gloves, but they did not provide anti-vibration gloves. In

fact, Smith did not even know they made anti-vibration gloves.

{¶ 56} Smith described several situations where he complained to supervisors

about safety-related issues. He was doing an air change on his shoulder and he told his

supervisor that his shoulder was bothering him. The supervisor asked if he needed to go

to the hospital, and he said no. The supervisor told Smith it was his job to keep Smith

working. Smith complained that Track 4 was not designed for performing air changes

and he could not lay on his back and lift 70 pounds, but his supervisor refused to help.

This happened near the end of his employment. He complained that two-man jobs

became one-man jobs. Another instance occurred toward the end of Smith’s

employment, after the railroad laid off many workers and had inadequate personnel. He

was expected to work on top of a locomotive to change a leaking radiator. He

complained to a supervisor that he couldn’t do it because he couldn’t feel his hands. He

was told to do it or go home. He almost fell off the locomotive. Another time he was

told to get on the locomotive, but he almost fell off the rungs because his hands were

numb, so the supervisor gave him a different job.

{¶ 57} Smith testified that he was furloughed in the fall of 2020, due to a reduction

in force and went on disability in May or June of 2021, because of shoulder problems and

a lack of hand strength. He confirmed that his claim in this case is limited to his carpal

tunnel syndrome.

22. b. Dr. Wade

{¶ 58} Dr. Wade is an ergonomist and a biomechanist. He has an undergraduate

degree in risk management and insurance, a master’s degree in biomechanics and human

movement, a post-doctorate degree in biomechanics, and Ph.Ds. in biomechanics and

finance. Although he has published numerous papers, Dr. Wade confirmed that he would

not be relying on any of his own peer-reviewed publications or presentations in support

of his opinions. He conceded that none of his research has focused on the use of hand

tools, carpal tunnel, or the work of railroad shop employees.

{¶ 59} When Dr. Wade looks at a job as part of his research or to assess a job for

the presence of ergonomic risk factors, he takes into account human factors,

environmental factors, and work factors, does a personal assessment or a demographic

assessment of the workers, and then does a biomechanical assessment of the job tasks.

He explained that the job tasks can be repetitive jobs or single-use jobs. In performing a

demographic assessment, he looks at personal factors, such as height, weight, medical

issues, anthropometrics, work histories, and other things that relate to the individual from

a human standpoint. When he does biomechanical assessments, he tries to mimic an

environmental situation and watch an individual conduct activities in that environment as

he measures biomechanical factors, forces, muscle activity, and kinematics. But

observation isn’t always feasible, so he relies on historical or similar observations in the

literature, previous assessments, direct recall from an individual, or historic evaluations

of how people walk, move, lift, or lower a hand tool.

23. {¶ 60} When he writes a publication, Dr. Wade usually goes out and looks at the

work and quantifies exposures when available by evaluating and assessing types of

anatomical movements, joint positions, forces, movement profiles, and repetition. He

uses software to look at joint mechanics, forces, and activities, and may digitize motion.

What he does depends on the accessibility of the activity in the workforce. He may use

more than one assessment tool depending on the situation, but he disagreed that using

more assessment tools provides more accurate data.

{¶ 61} When he publishes literature, Dr. Wade explained that he conducts lab

studies where the environment is controlled and he has the ability to collect as much data

as he wants. When he can’t directly observe the environment, he is more limited in the

type of assessment he can perform, so in that situation, RULA (Rapid Upper Limb

Assessment) is effective for assessing upper extremity musculoskeletal risk. Here, he

could not observe Smith’s work because he is not actively working, and he did not rely

specifically on Smith’s performance of the activities, but rather evaluated the activities as

a whole.

{¶ 62} Usually in researching ergonomic risk factors Dr. Wade would review

documents, including documents describing work-specific task instructions, training

videos, training documents, peer-reviewed publications, academic information, and

NIOSH literature about the task. Often, however, he relies on self-reporting, including

interviews with workers about what they do and how they do it.

24. {¶ 63} Litigation consulting comprises the vast majority of Dr. Wade’s work. He

also teaches, performs research, and does other consulting sporadically. He has done

assessments for carpal tunnel cases, but has never testified in a carpal tunnel case.

{¶ 64} In this case, Dr. Wade reviewed the complaint, depositions, interrogatories,

some of the railroad’s ergonomic documents, and a medical summary. The ergonomic

assessment was a three-page document. It was the only document he reviewed from the

railroad. None of the articles or texts he read in connection with this case address the

biomechanics of railroad work.

{¶ 65} Here, Dr. Wade looked at tasks associated with tools, postures, and forces

that a machinist or welder would be exposed to. He looked specifically at the use of two

types of tools—the spline gun and the Bantam Bully—under RULA. He recalled that

Smith’s use of these tools varied, but they were often used to remove crab nuts, for

instance. He spoke with Smith for about 90 minutes and discussed his deposition. Dr.

Wade’s understanding was that the Bantam Bully is a vibrating scraping tool used to

clean. He didn’t quantify how often Smith used this tool in terms of hours, but

considered it a general use item used in his trade. His understanding was that the tool

was used daily. Dr. Wade looked up the size and weight of the Bantam Bully and spline

gun, but did not document when he did this and did not save the websites. He said the

spline gun ranges from one pound to two-and-a-half pounds. The weight of the Bantam

Bully depends on which chipper or chisel is attached, but the weight is generally one

pound to two-and-a-half pounds. He picked tasks requiring these tools because as

discussed at Smith’s deposition, these tools were commonly used.

25. {¶ 66} As part of his methodology, Dr. Wade first screened for ergonomic factors

based on scientific literature and his knowledge of ergonomics. He looked at the type of

tool, the type of posture that an individual would have to use to operate the tool, and

ergonomic risk factors for grip, repetition, force, weight, and load carriage. A typical

ergonomic assessment requires looking at both the work factors as well as the human

factors and environmental factors that contribute to effective use of a tool, including the

posture an individual would maintain, how an individual would hold a tool, and how an

individual would depress an activation button grip.

{¶ 67} Smith’s postures varied depending on whether he was standing or kneeling

or whether he was in a confined space or not, so Dr. Wade assumed a standing position

during use of the tools—he did not look at bent postures. He looked at hand postures,

which varied based on where the nuts were positioned. This would affect upper

extremity postures in terms of shoulder extension and flexion and elbow extension and

flexion. Wrist postures would vary based on the gun posture. Dr. Wade took a

conservative approach in these assessments and used a neutral posture as opposed to

deviated postures at the wrist or shoulders. He didn’t have access to the spline gun or

Bantam Bully so he did not measure force. He did not watch videos of the use of the

tools, although he has seen the Bantam Bully in use before.

{¶ 68} The second part of Dr. Wade’s methodology was observational analysis.

Because he did not have direct access to the tools or the ability to observe their on-site

use, he assumed neutral postures and did not evaluate deviated postures. If he had

evaluated with deviated postures, the RULA score would have increased.

26. {¶ 69} In his report, Dr. Wade stated that “understanding the job task performed by

Mr. Smith was obtained from his deposition and interview, literature presented by

Purswell and Woldstad and others, and exposure to trackmen working at other locations

throughout the country.” He described that “[a] determination of the presence of

ergonomic risk [was] completed through systematic observations at site inspections

combined with other collected information about Mr. Smith’s job.” Dr. Wade

acknowledged that Purswell and Woldstad—published in 1991—studied trackmen, not

shop employees, and trackmen don’t use a spline gun or Bantam Bully.

{¶ 70} Dr. Wade evaluated general hand postures used in operating battery-

powered pneumatic or electrical tools. He didn’t specifically consider tools other than

the spline gun and Bantam Bully. He has never prepared an expert report involving these

specific tools. He stated in his report that use of the spline gun and Bantam Bully is

similar to the tools used in Purswell and Woldstad. While trackmen work at ground level,

Dr. Wade acknowledged that machinists and welders often work at chest or waist level.

Dr. Wade emphasized, however, that this doesn’t change the hand posture. He also

acknowledged that Purswell and Woldstad was an observational study and not an

ergonomic assessment. He agreed that there has been no study on the risk of carpal

tunnel for machinists and welders.

{¶ 71} The third part of Dr. Wade’s methodology involved biomechanical analysis.

This was the RULA assessment. This is the only assessment tool he used. He

acknowledged that this test hasn’t been validated specific to any job classification, but he

explained that it has been validated as a research tool. He said it is the most widely used

27. upper limb assessment tool in the literature. Use of the tool leads to a quantitative score

indicating whether there is actionable risk involved in a task, but it is not a cause-and-

effect assessment. It is a postural analysis.

{¶ 72} Dr. Wade’s assessment is based on neutral posture and neutral muscle use

and forces based on the weight of the tools. His use of RULA for assessing the spline

gun and Bantam Buddy indicate actionable levels that must be examined in terms of work

assessment and change—it identifies an at-risk or elevated risk posture and activity. It is

not specific to carpal tunnel, but rather to upper extremity musculoskeletal disorders

generally. He acknowledged that posture alone, like obesity, is not the only cause of

carpal tunnel.

{¶ 73} Again, Dr. Wade’s assessment does not assume deviated postures. If he

assumed deviated postures, the RULA score would go up. Dr. Wade acknowledged that

RULA doesn’t take into account frequency and that it is just one part of a comprehensive

ergonomic assessment. He used the weight of the tools as a muscle use and force

multiplier here. He assumed that posture was mainly static and held for more than one

minute or four times per minute, even though he didn’t have information indicating that

this was the length of time Smith used these tools. He also assumed that Smith worked

on an unstable foot floor, like ballast. This was based on Dr. Wade’s exposure to shops

historically, anecdotal evidence, and time spent at different sites, but this was a neutral,

low-factored issue and a conservative approach to the type of foot-floor interface Smith

would have worked on. Dr. Wade acknowledged that Smith used the spline gun in

variable locations.

28. {¶ 74} Dr. Wade agreed that objective measures would be superior to a subjective

presentation that an employee may give. He did not do a comprehensive review of the

railroad’s health, safety, and ergonomic efforts because he did not have access to this

information.

2. Admissibility of Dr. Wade’s Opinions

{¶ 75} Under Evid.R. 702, a witness may testify as an expert if all the following

apply:

(A) The witness’ testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common among lay persons;

(B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the subject matter of the testimony;

(C) The witness’ testimony is based on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information and the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

{¶ 76} Ohio courts rely on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert in

evaluating the reliability of scientific evidence. There the Court set forth the following

factors to be considered to aid in determining whether the scientific evidence is reliable:

“(1) whether the theory or technique has been tested, (2) whether it has been subjected to

peer review, (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error, and (4) whether the

methodology has gained general acceptance.” Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d

607, 611-12 (1998), citing Daubert at 593-594. But both the U.S. and Ohio Supreme

Courts recognize that “the inquiry is flexible.” Id., citing Daubert at 594. And they

29. emphasize that “[t]he focus is ‘solely on principles and methodology, not on the

conclusions that they generate.’” Id., quoting Daubert at 595.

{¶ 77} It is undisputed that in this case, Dr. Wade applied RULA to screen for the

identification of biomechanical risk factors of the upper extremity. The railroad does not

actually challenge any of the Daubert factors as to the reliability of this assessment

modality, in general. Rather, it argues that Dr. Wade has no knowledge of the underlying

facts necessary to properly perform a RULA screening, and it challenges application of

this screening for assessing risk for carpal tunnel. It also claims that Dr. Wade deviated

from the proper methodology, therefore, producing inaccurate results, and his opinions

are not based on “good grounds” based on what was known to him.

{¶ 78} The Ohio Supreme Court recognized in Valentine v. Conrad, 2006-Ohio-

3561, ¶ 18, that Evid.R. 702(C) requires not only that the underlying data and research

upon which an expert bases his or her opinions are scientifically valid, “but also that they

support the opinion.” It cautioned that while “scientists certainly may draw inferences

from a body of work, trial courts must ensure that any such extrapolation accords with

scientific principles and methods.” Id. If ‘‘‘there is simply too great an analytical gap

between the data and the opinion proffered,’” the expert’s opinions should be excluded as

unreliable. Id., quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).

{¶ 79} Moreover, in addition to assessing the reliability of the methodology, a trial

court’s gatekeeping function “requires it to judge whether an expert’s testimony is

relevant to the task at hand in that it logically advances a material aspect of the proposing

party’s case.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Terry v. Caputo, 2007-Ohio-5023, ¶ 26,

30. citing Valentine v. PPG Industries, Inc., 2004-Ohio-4521, ¶ 30 (4th Dist.), quoting

Daubert at 597. This means that there must be a connection between the scientific

research or test result and the facts at issue. Id.

{¶ 80} As to the absence of a factual basis for his opinion, the railroad claims that

Dr. Wade admitted that he had no information about the frequency of Smith’s work

exposures, the forces involved in the performance of his job tasks, and the hand postures

assumed by Smith when performing his job tasks, yet he concluded that Smith was

subjected to high force, high repetition, and awkward postures during the course of his

work. It also argues that Dr. Wade criticized the railroad’s ergonomic efforts and opined

as to what the railroad knew or should have known even though he did not know what

ergonomic training was provided to Smith, and he did not conduct a comprehensive audit

of the railroad’s safety and ergonomic efforts. Related to this, the railroad is critical that

Dr. Wade relied on Smith’s own description of his job duties instead of using objective

data, which he admitted would be more reliable.

{¶ 81} Although framed as an Evid.R. 702 argument, this is really an issue

governed by Evid.R. 703 and 705. Evid.R. 703 specifically provides that “[t]he facts or

data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be

those perceived by the expert or admitted in evidence at the hearing.” Evid.R. 705

permits the expert to “testify in terms of opinion or inference and give the expert’s

reasons therefor after disclosure of the underlying facts or data. The disclosure may be in

response to a hypothetical question or otherwise.” “As long as evidence admissible at

trial is introduced and admitted through fact witnesses with personal knowledge, an

31. expert witness without personal knowledge of the underlying event is permitted to testify

to an opinion based on admitted facts.” Pennsylvania Lumbermens Ins. Corp. v.

Landmark Elec., Inc., 110 Ohio App.3d 732, 738 (2d Dist. 1996). “In other words,

experts may opine based upon predicate facts otherwise admissible in evidence under

Evid.R. 703.” Id.

{¶ 82} Here, it was appropriate for Dr. Wade to offer opinions based on Smith’s

description of his job duties. See Taylor v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 2020-Ohio-2657, ¶

99 (6th Dist.) (Mayle, J. concurring), citing Warner v. DMAX Ltd., LLC, 2015-Ohio-4406,

¶ 17 (2d Dist.) (Expert’s “opinion was admissible even though the expert did not have

any information about plaintiff’s job duties other than information that the plaintiff

provided herself.”). Dr. Wade was not required to actually watch those duties being

performed. Although Smith was often unable to describe how long he used any particular

tool at a given time, he explained what he did with the tools, gave some testimony about

the frequency of the use of the tools, and described the environment in which these tools

were used. Smith’s descriptions of his use of these tools provided insight about the

postures, repetition, and force required. Dr. Wade simply used the most conservative

possible postures in performing the RULA analysis. In his words, he used “a neutral

posture application of a specific tool or cast” as opposed to a deviated posture.

(Emphasis added.) Clearly, it was not physically possible for Smith to assume an

absolutely neutral position in handling the tools and performing the tasks he described—

no tool can be used with one’s arms at their side and without any extension of the arms or

engagement of the wrists.

32. {¶ 83} As to the railroad’s ergonomic efforts and Dr. Wade’s opinions as to what

the railroad knew or should have known, it appears that there was disparity between the

safety measures as they existed on paper and the safety measures as applied on a day-to-

day basis. Smith described that he received no ergonomic training and over the last

several years of his employment, unreasonable speed, long hours, inadequate manpower,

and excessive overtime plagued the railroad workers and overshadowed anything that

may have been in print in the railroad’s written policies, procedures, or training manuals.

Dr. Wade’s failure to review all those materials does not render his opinions inadmissible.

{¶ 84} “‘Weaknesses in the factual bases of an expert’s testimony go to the weight

and credibility of the expert’s testimony, not to its admissibility.’” Taylor at ¶ 98 (Mayle,

J. concurring), quoting Dejaiffe v. KeyBank USA Natl. Assn., 2006-Ohio-2919, ¶ 19 (6th

Dist.). “The absence of certain facts, or the failure of proof of others, goes to the weight

and credibility of the [expert] testimony, and not to its admissibility. The burden falls on

the opposing party to discredit or minimize the expert’s testimony through cross-

examination, just as defense counsel attempted to do in this case.” Johnson v. Knipp, 36

Ohio App.2d 218, 220 (9th Dist. 1973). The “deficiencies” pointed out by the railroad

are fodder for cross-examination; they do not render Dr. Wade’s opinions inadmissible.

{¶ 85} Turning to the methodology used, the railroad questions the

appropriateness of Dr. Wade’s use of RULA here, and it maintains that while Dr. Wade

claimed to use a RULA analysis, he analyzed only two of the tools Smith used in

performing his job duties. It complains that Dr. Wade assumed that Smith maintained

neutral postures and that his muscle use and force multipliers were minimal, but it claims

33. that if Dr. Wade had actually made these assumptions in performing his analysis, his

conclusions would have been different. The railroad also criticizes Dr. Wade for

conducting internet research without documenting what he looked at and when he looked

at it. The railroad contends that Dr. Wade’s methods were litigation-driven and that he

failed to employ the same methodology that he uses when he conducts research, writes

peer-reviewed publications, and performs private consulting for companies. And the

railroad faults Dr. Wade because he cited publications that are more than 30 years old,

cited no publications involving examination of railroad welding and machining, and

identified no publications linking carpal tunnel to welding and machining.

{¶ 86} In determining whether an expert’s opinion is reliable, the court must focus

on whether the principles and methods employed by the expert to reach his opinion are

reliable—“not whether his conclusions are correct.” Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio

St.3d 607, 611 (1998). See also Valentine v. Conrad, 2006-Ohio-3561, ¶ 16 (“A court

should not focus on whether the expert opinion is correct or whether the testimony

satisfies the proponent’s burden of proof at trial.”). “[W]e are not concerned with the

substance of the experts’ conclusions; our focus is on how the experts arrived at their

conclusions.” Id.

{¶ 87} Here, Dr. Wade agreed that RULA is a non-specific assessment for upper

extremity musculoskeletal disorders, but opined that it was appropriate for use in carpal-

tunnel cases, as carpal tunnel is a type of upper extremity musculoskeletal disorder. As

we mentioned earlier, we interpret Dr. Wade’s testimony to mean that he used the most

conservative possible postures. It is not physically possible for a person to assume an

34. absolutely neutral position in holding a tool, depressing a trigger to activate the tool, and

performing the tasks Smith described. And in any event, the railroad’s criticisms go to

the weight of Dr. Wade’s testimony and not to its admissibility. Dr. Wade did explain that

he used the internet to look up weights of particular tools and he described his

assumptions with respect to the weights of the tools. His failure to document the source

of these assumptions does not render his opinions inadmissible or unreliable. That the

publications Dr. Wade relied upon are 30 or 40 years old does not mean those

publications are outdated, and his failure to cite literature precisely on point is yet another

topic that goes to the weight of his opinions. Finally, it is to be expected that the scope of

Dr. Wade’s assessments would differ based on whether he is providing opinions in

litigation versus writing a paper or consulting for a company. The breadth of his

assessment understandably would vary based on the objective of the task at hand. This is

again an area for cross-examination—not a deficiency that renders his opinions unreliable

or inadmissible.

{¶ 88} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred when it excluded Dr.

Wade’s expert opinions. We find Smith’s second assignment of error well-taken.

C. Grant of Summary Judgment to the Railroad

{¶ 89} In his third assignment of error, Smith argues that the trial court erred when

it granted summary judgment in favor of the railroad. Smith does not concede that expert

testimony is necessary to establish a jury question on the issue of whether his carpal

35. tunnel syndrome was caused by his employment by the railroad, but he insists that if we

reverse the trial court’s rulings regarding the admissibility of Drs. Ciaccia and Wade’s

testimony, there is sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of fact regarding

causation. The railroad continues to argue that the exclusion of Drs. Ciaccia and Wade’s

testimony means that Smith lacks causation evidence in support of his FELA claim.

{¶ 90} FELA, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51, provides that “[e]very common carrier by

railroad . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is

employed by such carrier . . for such injury . . . resulting in whole or in part from the

negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier . . . .” To prevail

on a FELA claim, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation.

Vance v. Consol. Rail Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 222, 230 (1995).

{¶ 91} FELA’s causation standard is more liberal than the common-law standard,

however, and a plaintiff need only show that the employer’s negligent conduct “played

any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury[.]” (Emphasis in original.) Wilson v.

CSX Trans., Inc., 2025-Ohio-819, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). But despite this less stringent

standard, “unless the connection between the negligence and the injury is a kind that

would be obvious to laymen, expert testimony is required.” Myers v. Illinois Cent. R.

Co., 629 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir.2010), citing Brooks v. Union Pacific R. Co., 620 F.3d

896, 899 (8th Cir.2010).

36. {¶ 92} Here, we have determined that the trial court erred when it excluded the

expert causation opinions of Drs. Ciaccia and Wade. Because we find that their opinions

were improperly excluded, summary judgment on the issue of causation—the only

element at issue on this appeal—was improper and must be reversed.

{¶ 93} We find Smith’s third assignment of error well-taken.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 94} We find Smith’s first assignment of error well-taken. Smith’s treating

physician was not required to provide an expert report. Under Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(d), he was

permitted to offer opinions as to matters addressed in his records. We conclude that his

medical records sufficiently “address” the “matters” about which he offered opinions.

{¶ 95} We find Smith’s second assignment of error well-taken. Smith’s expert

ergonomist utilized a proper scientific method, there existed a factual basis for his

opinions, and an acceptable methodology was used in reaching his conclusions. All of

the railroad’s criticisms of his opinions go to the weight—not the admissibility—of the

expert’s opinions.

{¶ 96} We find Smith’s third assignment of error well-taken. Having found that

the trial court improperly excluded the causation testimony of Smith’s experts, Smith’s

claim does not fail for a lack of evidence on the element of causation, thus summary

judgment was improperly granted in favor of the railroad.

{¶ 97} We reverse the September 10, 2024 judgments of the Erie County Court of

Common Pleas and remand the matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with

37. this decision. Norfolk Southern is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R.

24.

Judgments reversed and remanded.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ Charles E. Sulek, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

38.