Smith v. Miller

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided September 5, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-05811·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK OSMONDO DWAYNE SMITH, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-5811 (LTS) SUPERINTENDENT MILLER; JANE DOE ORDER TO AMEND (1); JANE DOE (2), WORKING IN THE MAIL ROOM, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Coxsackie Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights when he was incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility. Named as Defendants are Green Haven Superintendent Miller and two Jane Does who work in the mail room at Green Haven. By order dated July 20, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. 2

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 2 The Court received the complaint in this action on June 30, 2023. On July 24, 2023, the Court received another complaint from Plaintiff that also named Superintendent Miller, among others, as a defendant. Because the second complaint was not accompanied by the filing fees or an IFP application, the Clerk of Court docketed that submission as an amended complaint in this action. On August 21, 2023, the Court received a letter from Plaintiff stating that he intended the complaint received on July 24, 2023, to be opened as a new civil action, rather than docketed as an amended complaint in this action. (See ECF 7.) By order dated August 24, 2023, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to remove the amended complaint from this action, and to docket that submission as a complaint in a new civil action. (ECF 9.) The original complaint (ECF 1) is thus the operative pleading in this action. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that, under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s claims arose while he was incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility.

The following allegations are taken from the complaint. During his previous 13 years of incarceration, Plaintiff has not had issues mailing his legal documents. At Green Haven, however, “[t]he mailroom doesn’t send your mail out every day like it [is] suppose[d] to work, they send[] it out when they get to it.” (ECF 1, at 3.)3 Plaintiff alleges that “the people is stating that they are not getting [his] claim [or] motion on time or at all.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that, unlike other facilities, Green Haven does not provide a certified mail tracking number, preventing Plaintiff from verifying to the court that he sent his legal mail on time. Since November 17, 2020, Plaintiff has been litigating a motion to vacate his conviction under New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.10 in the Bronx County Supreme Court. He alleges that

the judge have give me warrants on barring my claim for my case, to get my freedom back, cause the People claims they don’t get my motion which I send certified mail plus no tracking #s on the Disbursement to proof to the judge I’m send both parties the motion to my claim, on time and together the same date, time, tour. (Id.) Plaintiff also states, in the “relief” section of the complaint and without additional context, “1-4-23 date I got mail dated 12-13-22 from the judge from [B]ronx [S]upreme [C]ourt

3 Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the complaint. All other grammar, spelling, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. Margaret L. Clancy Judge on my case.” (Id. at 6.) He states that his Section 440.10 motion was dismissed on March 31, 2023. (See id. at 2.) Plaintiff dated and mailed a letter regarding an unspecified matter to the Sylvia Rivera Law Project on February 6, 2023, but it was not postmarked until February 7, 2023. (Id. at 3; see also id. at 33.) The letter was returned on February 12, 2023, with a notation stating that it was

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Smith v. Miller, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Smith v. Miller (Smith v. Miller) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bounds v. Smith
430 U.S. 817 (Supreme Court, 1977)
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Thornburgh v. Abbott
490 U.S. 401 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Lewis v. Casey
518 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Christopher v. Harbury
536 U.S. 403 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Bennie Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc.
877 F.2d 170 (Second Circuit, 1989)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Davis v. Goord
320 F.3d 346 (Second Circuit, 2003)
Bourdon v. Loughren
386 F.3d 88 (Second Circuit, 2004)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)