Smith v. Long

281 P.2d 483, 76 Idaho 265, 1955 Ida. LEXIS 266
CourtIdaho Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 17, 1955
Docket8189
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 281 P.2d 483 (Smith v. Long) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Idaho Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Long, 281 P.2d 483, 76 Idaho 265, 1955 Ida. LEXIS 266 (Idaho 1955).

Opinion

TAYLOR, Chief Justice.

In a previous action between these same parties, each seeking- to quiet title to the *268 same land involved in this action, the court found and decreed that neither party had established title. Referring to the claim of the defendants (respondents here) in the previous action, the court found:

“That every since the 1st day of May, 1947, defendants and cross-complainants have been and now are in the sole and exclusive, quiet, peaceful, open and notorious possession and occupancy of said real property” and “have paid all taxes which have been levied and assessed against said real ■ property.”
“ * * * that none of the parties to this action, or their predecessors in interest, protected said lands by substantial enclosure or cultivation and improved the same until the 1st day of May, 1947; * * * ”

The defendants in that action appealed, and this court affirmed the decree. Smith v. Long, 73 Idaho 309, 251 P.2d 206. In the former action defendants made two claims to the land; one by adverse possession, and the other by accretion. The court found that no part of the land was the result of accretion. Even if it were, their right to it as such would in turn depend upon their right by adverse possession to the adjacent land to which the accretion was claimed to have attached. Adverse possession was, therefore, the foundation of defendants’ claim, and it was necessary for them to prove that such possession continued over a period of five years. §§ 5-207 and 5-210 I.C. Such possession was put in issue by the pleadings and was actually litigated and determined as indicated by the findings above quoted. It was, therefore, conclusively settled as to the parties and their privies that defendants’ adverse possession commenced May 1, 1947. Jensen v. Berry & Ball Co., 37 Idaho 394, 216 P. 1033; Marshall v. Underwood, 38 Idaho 464, 221 P. 1105; Giuffre v. Lauricella, 25 Cal.App. 422, 143 P. 1061; Bijou Irr. Dist. v. Weldon Valley Ditch Co., 67 Colo. 336, 184 P. 382; Dugan v. Wilms, 93 Okl. 89, 219 P. 651; Bowman v. Parks, 166 Iowa 403, 147 N.W. 850; Pontiac Mut. County Fire & Lightning Ins. Co. v. Sheibley, 279 Ill. 118, 116 N.E. 644; Linton v. Omaha Wholesale Produce Market House Co., 8 Cir., 218 F. 331; United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 45 S.Ct. 66, 69 L.Ed. 262; 2 Freeman on Judgments (5th ed.) § 670.

The date of the commencement of this action does not regularly appear from the record, the clerk having omitted from the transcript the date of the filing of the complaint. However, it was acknowledged March 29, 1952, and defendants’ demurrer was filed April 16, 1952, and in a written stipulation between counsel the filing date is referred to as the 1st day of April, 1952. Accepting this as the correct date, it follows that this action was commenced thirty days before the expiration of the fiv.e year period of adverse possession, which otherwise would have matured and per *269 ferite'd defendants’ title. However complete and perfect defendants’ title by adverse possession at the end of the five year period on' May 1, 1952, may be as to others, as to the plaintiffs the period of adverse possession was interrupted by the filing of the complaint herein, and their rights as against the plaintiffs must be determined as of April 1, 1952. Westphal v. Arnoux, 51 Cal.App. 532, 197 P. 395.

Thus, the paramount question is the validity of the title now for the first time asserted by the plaintiffs in this action. In both actions the plaintiffs asserted title on the theory that the land in dispute lies between the government meander line of the Snake River and the high-water mark. They were defeated in the first action because the conveyances, under which they claimed title, described and were limited to specifically numbered lots in a subdivision known as the Sunnyside Orchard Tract. This subdivision, apparently created and recorded in 1909, was laid out, over and upon original government Lots 2, 3 arid 4, in Section 17, Township 10 North, Range 5 West of the Boise Meridian, and other property. The lots created by the subdivision do not purport to extend beyond the water line of the east, or nearest, channel of the Snake River. Hence, it was held that under such conveyances, plaintiffs acquired no title to the land involved herein, which lies west of the east channel of the river and upon an island between the east channel -and; the main channel. ■ . . .

At the time of the creation of the Sunny-side Orchard Tract or subdivision, the Sunnyside Orchard Company, a corporation, was the owner of government Lots 2, 3 and 4, in Section 17. But the plat did not purport to cover and no sale had ever been made by that company of any land lying on the island beyond the east channel of the river.

In December, 1917, the charter of the Sunnyside Orchard Company was forfeited by the state. At that time its entire stock was owned by George M. Waterhouse, August Brockman and A. A. Record. Subsequently to the trial of the prior action, the plaintiffs obtained quitclaim deeds from all of the heirs of all three of the above-named stockholders (deceased). These deeds describe and purport to convey to the plaintiffs all of that portion of Lots 2, 3 and 4, in Section 17, lying between. the west boundary line of the platted lots of the Sunnyside Orchard Tract and the high-water mark of the main channel of the Snake River. Founding their claim upon these deeds the plaintiffs commenced this action to quiet title to that part of the island, lying in Section 17, as a part of the original government Lot 4.

Upon dissolution of a corporation, the corporate property vests in its stockholders, subject to the liabilities of the corporation. Taylor v. Interstate Invest *270 ment Co., 75 Wash. 490, 135 P. 240; Service & Wright Lbr. Co. v. Sumpter Valley Ry. Co., 81 Or. 32, 149 P. 531, 152 P. 262, 158 P. 175; Baldwin v. Johnson, 95 Tex. 85, 65 S.W. 171; Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392; Pontiac Trust Co. v. Newell, 266 Mich. 490, 254 N.W. 178; Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. v. Van Winkle, 6 Cir., 221 F. 590; Late Corporation of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 792, 34 L.Ed. 478; 19 C.J.S., Corporations, § 1730b. The quitclaim deeds from the heirs of the stockholders, who died seized of the property of the Sunnyside Orchard Company, are effective to convey to the plaintiffs whatever title those stockholders and their heirs held in the land involved. Biaggi v. Ramont, 189 Cal. 675, 209 P. 892; Buller v. Buller, 62 Cal.App.2d 694, 145 P.2d 653 ; 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 118. Cf. Crane v. French, 39 Cal.App.2d 642, 104 P.2d 53 (deed by former officers and directors).

The ultimate question then is, whether the respective owners in the chain of title to the original government Lot 4, in Section 17, held title to that portion of the island opposite that lot and across the minor or east channel of the river.

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Bluebook (online)
281 P.2d 483, 76 Idaho 265, 1955 Ida. LEXIS 266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-long-idaho-1955.