Smith v. . Lansing

22 N.Y. 520
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 5, 1860
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 22 N.Y. 520 (Smith v. . Lansing) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. . Lansing, 22 N.Y. 520 (N.Y. 1860).

Opinions

[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *Page 522 The Oliver Lee Co's Bank, at the times the defendant acquired titles in his individual capacity to the several parcels of real estate in question, had no board of directors, and it does not appear that it had, at any time since its organization, any such directors. The defendant was one of its stockholders, its president, and general managing agent and financial officer, during the period covering and including all the transactions mentioned in the pleadings and evidence in this case. He occupied, therefore, the place and possessed all the powers of such directors, and could legally do and perform all acts which they, at a regular meeting, had power to transact. It is to be intended that he derived these powers from the shareholders. The general banking law confers upon associations formed under it the powers, among other things, to carry on the business of banking,c., by discounting bills, notes, and evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by loaning money on real and personal security; and by exercising such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on such business; to choose one of their number as president, and to appoint such other officers and agents as their business may require, c. (Laws of 1838, ch. 260, § 18.) It is proper, therefore, to consider the questions presented in the same light as if there had been a regular board of directors, and the acts done by the *Page 523 defendant had been done in pursuance of resolutions of such directors, adopted at a regular meeting thereof.

Suppose, then, that this bank had been managed by a board of directors, and, at a regular meeting, such directors had adopted a resolution authorizing their president to apply for and receive on deposit any portion of the revenues of the State, and had authorized him to procure other persons to join with him in a bond to the State conditioned to account for and pay over the moneys so deposited; and, in pursuance of such resolution, the president had become personally liable, by a proper bond, to account and pay over, c., and had procured others, not connected with the bank as officers or stockholders, to become jointly bound with him as obligors in such bond, and the bank had thereupon received and used the moneys of the State: can there be any doubt that the bank would have been legally bound to indemnify and save harmless the obligors in such bond from loss or damage in consequence of their becoming parties to it? It seems to me not. And it seems equally clear that it would have been competent in such case for the bank, at any time after such bond had been given, to assign or transfer to the president, or to him and the other obligors so procured by and bound with him, any property or means in their power, sufficient for that purpose, to indemnify him or them against such bond, provided such assignment or transfer was not made in contemplation of insolvency. The same would be true, as it seems to me, if, instead of the president, with others not connected with the bank, becoming personally obligated, the directors had all united in a like personal obligation to secure the State, and had, at the same time, or afterwards, and while the bank was solvent, by resolution duly made, set apart in due form any of the assets or securities belonging to the bank, to a reasonable amount or value, for their indemnity against such personal liability. If provision could thus be made, through the action of a board of directors, for the security of depositors in a bank, and for indemnifying the sureties to such depositors, it is difficult to perceive why the same things might not be done by and through the agency of a president, clothed *Page 524 with powers equal to such as are possessed by a board of directors, especially in the case of a bank which has no board of directors. If the defendant, in the case at bar, had been obliged, in order to protect the other obligors in the bonds, to pay any portion of the moneys deposited by the State with the bank, from his individual resources, there could be no question of his right to take and retain, upon the first opportunity, from the cash funds of the bank, sufficient to reimburse himself. Such a case might well occur with a bank having large transactions with the public, discounting freely upon the basis of such deposits and the reasonable expectation of prompt payments by its debtors, should the deposits be afterwards suddenly demanded, and there be a general failure on the part of such debtors to meet their engagements. It is not, perhaps, extravagant to suppose a banking institution, in a perfectly sound and solvent condition, finding itself unable to meet the demands made upon it at a time of a sudden commercial panic; but, as soon as public confidence, which is the soul of our banking system, should be restored, be able to resume its accustomed course of business and transactions.

It is insisted, however, on the part of the plaintiff, that the character and position of the defendant, as agent and financial officer of this bank, was incompatible with his right to purchase the property in question in his own name, with the purpose of holding the same for his individual security or benefit. It is, undeniably, a well settled general rule that where one acts as agent, trustee, guardian, executor or administrator, in the purchase or sale of property, or in the transaction of other business, in a fiduciary relation, the law will not permit him, in such purchase, sale or transaction, to act in his own name and for his individual benefit. This rule has been established in consequence of the liability of mankind to be influenced by the motive of selfishness, which would, in most cases, lead the agent, c., to give an undue prominence to his own interest, to the injury of that of his principal, c. "This rule," says Judge STORY, "is founded on the plain and obvious consideration that the principal bargains, in the employment, for the exercise *Page 525 of the disinterested skill, diligence and zeal of the agent, for his own exclusive benefit. It is a confidence necessarily reposed in the agent, that he will act with a sole regard to the interests of his principal, as far as he lawfully may; and, if impartiality could possibly be presumed on the part of the agent, where his own interests were concerned, that is not what the principal bargains for; and, in many cases, it is the very last thing which would advance his interests." (Story on Agency, §§ 210, 211, and authorities there cited.) In the case of Moore v.Moore (1 Seld., 256), Judge GARDINER uses the following language: "The law does not stop to speculate upon the probabilities that the agent has resisted temptation; it removes the temptation by proclaiming in advance that he shall not acquire the property." The rule is a most reasonable and wholesome one, and has been too long settled to require the approbation of this court to commend it to the judgment and conscience of every intelligent mind for its support." If, therefore, the present case falls within the influence of this principle, the judgment of the general term of the Superior Court should be affirmed.

In my opinion, however, the case can be extricated from the force and operation of the rule. The question is not embarrassed by any consideration of fraud or want of good faith on the part of the defendant, nor of the contemplation of insolvency on the part of the bank, in the acquisition by the defendant of the property in question. Neither of these is averred in the complaint, proved on the trial, or found by the justice before whom the cause was tried.

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Bluebook (online)
22 N.Y. 520, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-lansing-ny-1860.