Smith v. KELLY-MOORE PAINT CO., INC.

307 S.W.3d 829, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1367, 2010 WL 682343
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 25, 2010
Docket2-08-198-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 307 S.W.3d 829 (Smith v. KELLY-MOORE PAINT CO., INC.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. KELLY-MOORE PAINT CO., INC., 307 S.W.3d 829, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1367, 2010 WL 682343 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

OPINION

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment in favor of appellee Kelly-Moore Paint Company, Inc. in this asbestos exposure products liability case. 1 In a single *831 issue, appellants Rosemary Smith, Brady Smith, and Donna Hubbard, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Heirs and Estate of Dorman Smith, Deceased (collectively, the Smiths), contend that the trial court erred by granting a no-evidence summary judgment on the ground that the Smiths failed to adduce sufficient evidence that Dorman had been exposed to chrysotile asbestos in Kelly-Moore’s drywall joint compounds in a dose sufficient to have been a substantial factor in causing his mesothelioma.

Background Facts

Dorman began working in the construction business, specifically as a self-employed drywaller finisher using joint compound, around 1955, and he performed the same type of work through the mid 1980s. Doctors eventually diagnosed him with mesothelioma in early 2005. As a result, the Smiths sued several defendants, including Kelly-Moore, in Tarrant County, claiming that exposure to the asbestos in those defendants’ joint compound products proximately caused Dorman’s mesothelio-ma. Dorman died after filing suit, on December 9, 2005.

The ease was transferred to the 11th District Court, the Texas multidistrict litigation pretrial court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 90.010(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009); Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 18, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. tit. 2, subtit. F app. (Vernon Supp. 2009). Before trial, Kelly-Moore moved for both a no-evidence and traditional summary judgment, contending that the Smiths had presented no evidence that Dorman’s exposure to any of Kelly-Moore’s chrysotile asbestos-containing joint compound product caused his mesothelioma, under the test set forth in the supreme court’s opinion in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Flores, 232 S.W.3d 765 (Tex.2007). 2 The 11th District Court granted Kelly-Moore’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment and transferred the remaining claims back to the 153rd District Court in Tarrant County for trial; however, the remaining claims against the other defendants were either settled or dismissed, making the summary judgment final. The Smiths then appealed the summary judgment ruling in favor of Kelly-Moore.

No-Evidence Summary Judgment Standard of Review

After an adequate time for discovery, the party without the burden of proof may, without presenting evidence, move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim or defense. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i). The motion must specifically state the elements for which there is no evidence. Id.; Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex.2009). The trial court must grant the motion unless the nonmovant produces summary judgment evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i) & cmt.; Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex.2008).

*832 When reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment, we examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion. Sudan v. Sudan, 199 S.W.3d 291, 292 (Tex.2006). We review a no-evidence summary judgment for evidence that would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors to differ in their conclusions. Hamilton, 249 S.W.3d at 426 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex.2005)). We credit evidence favorable to the non-movant if reasonable jurors could, and we disregard evidence contrary to the non-movant unless reasonable jurors could not. Timpte Indus., Inc., 286 S.W.3d at 310 (quoting Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex.2006)). If the non-movant brings forward more than a scintilla of probative evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact, then a no-evidence summary judgment is not proper. Smith v. O’Donnell, 288 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Tex.2009).

Issue on Appeal-Specific Causation

The ground raised in Kelly-Moore’s no-evidence summary judgment motion — and therefore the issue on appeal — is whether the Smiths produced sufficient evidence that Dorman was exposed to chrysotile asbestos from Kelly-Moore’s joint compound product at an exposure level or dose sufficient to have been a substantial factor in his developing mesothelioma. According to Kelly-Moore’s no-evidence summary judgment motion, the Smiths did not produce any credible evidence of (1) the amount of chrysotile asbestos from Kelly-Moore products to which Dorman had been exposed, (2) epidemiological studies of similarly situated persons showing that exposure to chrysotile asbestos in any amount would double the risk of developing mesothelioma, or (3) a minimum threshold exposure to asbestos above which an increased risk of developing mesothelioma occurs. Thus, Kelly-Moore contends that the Smiths did not bring forward sufficient evidence of specific causation under the test set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in Borg-Warner v. Flores and applied in a similar fact scenario by the Houston Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Stephens. At oral argument, Kelly-Moore clarified that it was relying on the distinction between chrysotile and other types of asbestos; 3 in other words, Kelly-Moore contends that although the Smiths may have brought forward at least some sufficient evidence that exposure to amphibole or other types of asbestos in the amount to which Dorman was exposed leads to an increased risk of mesothelioma, they brought forward no evidence that exposure to only chrysotile asbestos would amount to such an increased risk. Kelly-Moore further contends that there is no evidence in the record of a minimum threshold of chrysotile above which a person is at increased risk of developing mesothelioma.

Specific Causation in Asbestos Cases

In Borg-Warner v. Flores, an automobile mechanic sued Borg-Warner and others claiming that the dust generated by the grinding of asbestos-containing brake pads caused his asbestosis. 232 S.W.3d at 766. In reviewing the intermediate appel *833

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Bluebook (online)
307 S.W.3d 829, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1367, 2010 WL 682343, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-kelly-moore-paint-co-inc-texapp-2010.