Smith v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.

269 So. 2d 605, 1972 La. App. LEXIS 6067
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 21, 1972
DocketNo. 5364
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 269 So. 2d 605 (Smith v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 269 So. 2d 605, 1972 La. App. LEXIS 6067 (La. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

CHASEZ, Judge.

Plaintiff, June Theriot Smith, individually and as administratrix of the estate of her minor children, Georgia Lee Smith and Debra Kay Smith, filed this action against defendant, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, seeking to recover workmen’s compensation benefits allegedly due as a result of the demise of George Smith, plaintiff’s husband.

After trial on the merits judgment was rendered by the lower court in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. From this adverse judgment defendant sus-pensively appealed to this court.

George Smith was employed by defendant as a pot operator in its Chalmette plant. On May 1, 1970 he began work at 7:00 A.M. and progressed through his normal duties. Entailed in this work is the sweeping of 18 pots used for melting ore and tapping the metal on 11 pots. In sweeping out the pots or furnaces an operator will cause ore to descend a chute into a pot. Once the pot is properly filled with ore a wire broom weighing approximately four pounds is utilized by the operator to sweep the grates over a pot and remove the excess ore thus sweeping the deck plate clean and pushing ore against an anode. In tapping a pot a metal check is taken by punching a hole in the crust of the bath found in a pot. The hole is produced by means of a “T-bar” weighing approximately six pounds or a larger bar or rod that weighs approximately 20 to 25 pounds if resistance is met. Once a hole is made, a metal rod is inserted into the bath, from this a sample is given showing how much metal and how much bath is contained in each pot. For each exercise an operator must lean over an open doored pot to accomplish his task. Temperatures of these pots being worked on vary from 950 degrees centigrade (approximately 1742 degrees Fahrenheit) to over 1000 degrees centigrade (1832 degrees Fahrenheit) in some pots.

The sweeping and tapping of these pots is usually accomplished within an hour’s time. From the evidence contained in the record it does not appear that the deceased met with any unusual difficulty that day.

After finishing his work Smith took his break in an air conditioned lunchroom where he purchased a carton of milk and some doughnuts from a vending machine. At about 8:10 A.M. or ten minutes after finishing his work, plaintiff had a sudden heart attack and died immediately.

It appears from the record that no outward manifestations symptomatic of a heart attack were exhibited by Smith. By this we mean that no complaint of vascular associated pain was ever uttered by the deceased. He appeared outwardly to exhibit a good nature and appetite. We do note that Smith was perspiring profusely and, as one witness described it, more than usual. He also arrived in the lunchroom displaying signs of rapid breathing or shortness of breath. It is, however, inconclusive as to whether or not these facts were symptomatic of on-going heart distress, or were in fact attributable to the work just previously performed. Consid[607]*607ered in the light most favorable to the defendant, it certainly indicates the strenuous nature of the duties performed by the deceased and the heat Smith was subjected to during his labor.

There is disagreement as to the temperatures plaintiff worked in as no exact measurements are made on a daily basis. Measurements taken by defendants work safety supervisor indicate that temperatures will vary anywhere from 82 degrees Fahrenheit to 120 degrees Fahrenheit. Humidity also fluctuates, but measurements showing humidity are based on averages of the temperatures and thus are not truly reflective of conditions present. However, we note that overall humidity readings were from 21% to 40% when the relative humidity outside the plant was estimated at an average of 52% and the temperature gauge at 77 degrees Fahrenheit.

Weather bureau reports indicate that on May 1, 1970 the temperature at the New Orleans Airport ranged from 70 degrees to 82 degrees from 6:00 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. and the relative humidity was from 93% to 67%, indicating that on the day of Smith’s demise it was hotter and the humidity was higher than when defendant’s employee obtained his measurements.

An autopsy revealed severe atherosclerosis with the deceased’s major coronary arteries 80% to 90% occluded. The disease had advanced over a long period of years to the point where Smith was only receiving ten to twenty percent of the normal amount of blood his heart needed to function. There was also evidence of chronic lack of blood to various areas of the heart over a lengthy period of time. This is evident by multiple and repeated microscopic infarctions which the deceased himself might not have been aware of during his lifetime.

Medical evidence in this case reflects the uncontroverted fact that atherosclerosis is a degenerative disease which in itself is not caused or accelerated by a man’s work. While the disease created the problem, Smith’s ultimate demise was attributed to ventricular fibrillation.

The issue germane to this case, as it is in most workmen’s compensation cases involving heart failure, is whether or not the work deceased was performing aggravated his condition or accelerated his death. In most cases of this nature, there arises conflicts in medical testimony proffered to the court. One or more doctors declare that the work led to heart failure, while an equal number state that the work did not aggravate the diseased condition. In this seemingly inescapable dilemma the courts are partially aided over the maelstrom by past decisions wherein guidelines are established. The crux of the problem, as in most cases of this type, is the medical interpretation of the objective facts.

Plaintiff’s expert witness contends that decedent’s activities of sweeping and tapping of the aluminum pots, involving physical exertion while leaning over very hot pots, aggravated and accelerated the preexisting congestive heart failure and produced ventricular arrhythmia, which became progressively worse with the ultimate occurrence of ventricular fibrillation. The basis of this conclusion is the fact that excessive heat, coupled with physical exertion, causes an increase in cardiac output and workload and thus the deceased’s heart, already strained by disease, was denied the necessary amount of blood needed for its sustenance. Accordingly, irregularity of the heart beat (arrhythmia) developed.

Defendant’s expert contends that the deceased died from the natural course of the disease. In his opinion, no stimulus was needed to produce the fibrillation, especially in view of the facts that Smith died ten minutes after stopping work and had been working at this particular job for over 18 years. The principal ingredient being Smith’s acclimatization which would accordingly mean he was under less stress, thereby reducing the heart’s workload. The deceased’s lack of symptoms was also [608]*608felt to indicate that his death was not work related.

The trial court judge was convinced that plaintiff had carried the burden of proof necessary to establish her claim. We find no manifest error in this conclusion. Courts must interpret the significance of medical testimony in light of the degrees of certainty required to establish by legal standards the right of compensable recovery. Much is written of the difficulty in proving causal connexity between the duties of employment and resultant disability, or death, from vascular diseases. In Bertrand v. Coal Operators Casualty Company, 253 La. 1115, 221 So.2d 816, 828 (1969), it was noted:

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Bluebook (online)
269 So. 2d 605, 1972 La. App. LEXIS 6067, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-kaiser-aluminum-chemical-corp-lactapp-1972.