Smith v. Homes for the Homeless

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 7, 2021
Docket1:20-cv-10710
StatusUnknown

This text of Smith v. Homes for the Homeless (Smith v. Homes for the Homeless) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Homes for the Homeless, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RICHARD SMITH, Plaintiff, 20-CV-10710 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND HOMES FOR THE HOMELESS, Defendant. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws, alleging that his employer discriminated against him based on his race and color. The Court construes the complaint as also asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. By order dated December 28, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court

must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings his claims using the court’s Employment Discrimination Complaint form. He checks the box to assert that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of his race and color. The “facts” section of the complaint form states in its entirety: “On several occasion[s] I was called a racist term, written up false[ly], harassed and terminated due to false allegations. Employment laws and rights were violated.”1 (ECF No. 2, at 5.) Plaintiff checks boxes on the form to indicate that he filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and that the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue, but he does not provide the dates that he filed the charge or received the Notice,

and he does not attach the Notice to the complaint. He seeks money damages. DISCUSSION A. Title VII Pleading Requirements Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Section 1981 prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts, including employment contracts, “on account of [a person’ s] race, ancestry, or ethnic characteristics.” Zemsky v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1987).

These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at

1 The complaint is written with irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization. work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly

allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim under Title VII or § 1981. He does not allege facts suggesting that his employer took adverse action against him because of a protected characteristic. Plaintiff alleges that he was called a racist term on several occasions, but he does not state who used the derogatory term or when those incidents occurred. Nor does

Plaintiff identify his race. He further asserts that he was written up and terminated due to “false allegations,” but he alleges no facts suggesting that his employer took these actions because of race. B.

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Smith v. Homes for the Homeless, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-homes-for-the-homeless-nysd-2021.