Smith v. Department of the Air Force

638 F. App'x 992
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedJanuary 13, 2016
Docket2015-3206
StatusUnpublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 638 F. App'x 992 (Smith v. Department of the Air Force) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Department of the Air Force, 638 F. App'x 992 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Jason Smith appeals the Merit Systems Protection Board’s (“Board”) decision that affirmed the decision by the Department of the Air Force (“Air Force”) to furlough him for six days in July and August 2013 as a result of the sequestration legislation. Because we find no reversible error in the Board’s decision, we affirm.

Background

This case is one of many that arise from the sequestration legislation {ie., the Budget Control Aet of 2011 and the American Taxpayer -Relief Act of 2012) adopted by Congress. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n Fed. Emps., Local 1442 v. Dep’t of the Army, 810 F.3d 1272, 1273-75 (Fed.Cir.2015) (“NFFE”); Einboden v. Dep’t of the Navy, 802 F.3d 1321, 1323 (Fed.Cir.2015). As a result of this legislation, the Department of Defense’s (“DOD”) yearly budget was cut by $37 billion approximately halfway through Fiscal Year 2013. Knowing that its budget would be cut significantly, the DOD took a number of steps to respond to the sequestration. One such step involved notifying most of the DOD’s civilian personnel of the possibility of furloughs. In a May 2013 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense explained that more than $30 billion of the total $37 billion cut would be to operation and maintenance accounts that pay many, but not all, of the DOD’s civilian workers. The memorandum also explained that furloughs of civilian workers would be imposed in every military department, with only limited exceptions for civilians deployed in combat zones, necessary to protect life and property, or excepted for specific mission rear sons. While the DOD originally expected to furlough civilian employees for up to eleven days, it was able to reduce this number of days to six after Congress approved a large reprogramming request DOD made earlier that year, which gave the DOD flexibility to move funds across accounts.

Mr. Smith is a civilian employee at the Space and Missile Systems Center, Los *994 Angeles Air Force Base, and his salary is paid from the Air Force’s Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation program (“RDT & E” or “Program”). Of the sixteen appropriations that fund the Air Force, thirteen were directly impacted by the sequestration, including both the RDT & E program and Operations and Maintenance. Mr. Smith was provided notice of the furloughs and ultimately was furloughed for six days. Mr. Smith filed a timely notice of appeal with the Board, alleging that he was improperly furloughed for several reasons. The Board consolidated his case with several others, and, after a hearing, determined that the Air Force had shown there was cause for the furloughs and that the furloughs promoted the efficiency of the service. Specifically, the Board determined that the Air Force met its burden by showing that the furloughs were a reasonable management solution to the financial restrictions it faced and that it determined which employees to furlough in a fair and even manner. Mr. Smith timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

Discussion

. Our review of the Board’s decisions is limited by statute. We may set aside the Board’s decision only if we find it to be: “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see also Einboden, 802 F.3d at 1324. An agency, such as the DOD, may furlough an employee for lack of work or funds or for other non-disciplinary reasons. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(5), 7512(5); NFFE, 810 F.3d at 1277. Because furloughs of thirty days or less are adverse actions, an agency can only take such action if it “will promote the efficiency of the service.” NFFE, 810 F.3d at 1277 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a)). The “ ‘efficiency of the service’ standard in a furlough case is satisfied by the agency demonstrating ‘that the furlough was a reasonable management solution to the financial restrictions placed on it and that the agency applied its determination as to which employees to furlough in a “fair and even manner.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Chandler v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 120 M.S.P.R. 163, 171 (2013)).

The Board determined that the Air Force met its burden of establishing that Mr. Smith’s furlough promoted the efficiency of the service. Noting that agencies have broad discretion to take action to avoid deficits, the Board found that the Air Force showed that the DOD had to make significant budgetary cuts as a result of the sequestration legislation to avoid a deficit. It also found that the DOD’s response was a reasonable management solution to the financial restrictions and that the DOD decided which employees to furlough in a fair and even manner. We see no reversible error in the Board’s analysis.

On appeal, Mr. Smith argues that his furlough notice only discussed a shortage of funds in Operations and Maintenance funds—not the RDT & E program funds from which he was paid. He argues that, while the Air Force could “reprogram” funds from one RDT & E program element to another program element on its own, any transfer of funds from an RDT & E account requires Congressional approval. Thus, Mr. Smith argues that because his furlough notice only identified shortages in Operations and Maintenance accounts and the Air Force did not request Congressional approval to transfer funds from the specific RDT & E program account that paid his salary, the Air Force failed to establish any need for these funds.

*995 Mr. Smith’s argument fails. The Air Force, like the Department of the Army, “operates under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense.” 10 Ü.S.C. § 8011; see NFFE, 810 F.3d at 1280 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 3011). And, similar to the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for “the effective and timely implementation of policy, program, and budget decisions and instructions of the President or the Secretary of Defense relating to the functions of the Department of the Air Force.” 10 U.S.C. § 8013(e)(3); see NFFE, 810 F.3d at 1280 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 3013(c)(3)). Thus, as explained in NFFE,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Dale v. Department of the Navy
705 F. App'x 990 (Federal Circuit, 2017)
Khol v. Department of Defense
651 F. App'x 970 (Federal Circuit, 2016)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
638 F. App'x 992, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-department-of-the-air-force-cafc-2016.