Rosalind M. Mouser, Special Justice.
In this appeal from a decision of the Faulkner County Chancery Court finding the firearms policy of the University of Central Arkansas facially void and violative of substantive due process and setting aside the three-year suspension of appellee Heather A. Denton, a UCA student, the appellants — the University of Central Arkansas and members of its administration and Board of Trustees1 — raise four points for reversal.
UCA argues that (1) the court had no power to set aside UCA’s disciplinary action against Ms. Denton, unless the university’s action was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law; (2) UCA’s decision to suspend Ms. Denton was neither arbitrary nor capricious; (3) UCA’s decision to suspend Ms. Denton was not contrary to law; and (4) Ms. Denton received procedural due process. These four questions can be grouped more coherently under two broad issues: whether Ms. Denton received (1) procedural due process and (2) substantive due process. Although the chancellor did not address the former topic, we have determined, on de novo review, that Ms. Denton was denied procedural due process. We uphold the decision of the chancery court when it reaches the right result, even if it did not enunciate the right reason. Cawood v. Smith, 310 Ark. 619, 839 S.W.2d 208 (1992). It is unnecessary for us to address the substantive due process issue,
Ms. Denton requested and was denied damages and attorney’s fees. On cross-appeal, she contends that the chancellor erred in finding that the actions of UCA and its agents did not exempt them from their immunity and in denying her damages and attorney’s fees. We agree with the chancery court’s findings and affirm its decisions on both the appeal and the cross-appeal.
Facts
In December 1992, after several firearms incidents on its campus, UCA issued a revised firearms policy, which provided that:
Any student possessing, storing, or using a firearm on University controlled property or at University sponsored or supervised functions, unless authorized by the University, will be suspended from UCA for a period of not less than three years unless a waiver of the suspension is granted by the President upon the recommendation of the Vice President for Student Affairs.
A copy of the amended firearms policy was delivered to every student organization and residence-hall room and was published on January 11, 1993, in the student newspaper.
On the morning of Saturday, February 13, 1993, Heather A. Denton, a UCA freshman honors student on a full academic scholarship with no disciplinary record, loaned her automobile to a friend, Victor Smith, a non-student. The vehicle was returned to her later in the day.
That evening, Ms. Denton, Eric Patterson, a UCA student, and a mutual friend, Rita Patel, went “cruising” off-campus in Ms. Denton’s car, with Mr. Patterson driving. While they were stopped in downtown Conway, a confrontation occurred with unknown occupants of a pickup truck. During the incident, a third vehicle arrived on the scene, and, reportedly, an unidentified person in that car waved a handgun.
Soon after these events, Mr. Patterson drove Ms. Denton’s car back to the UCA campus. A Conway police officer, who had received a report about the incident (including the brandished weapon), located and followed Ms. Denton’s vehicle to the campus and then stopped and searched it. An unloaded semi-automatic weapon was found in a backpack-style book bag beneath the passenger seat. Ms. Denton, Mr. Patterson, and Ms. Patel denied knowledge of the presence of the gun, though Mr. Patterson stated that it was owned by Victor Smith. Mr. Patterson was arrested and removed from the scene of the stop. No action was taken against either Ms. Denton or Ms. Patel by law enforcement officials.
After becoming aware of the incident, appellant Dr. John Smith, UCA Vice-President for Student Affairs, interviewed Ms. Denton on Monday, February 15, 1993. During the interview, Dr. Smith advised her that she was being charged with a violation of the firearms policy and was being suspended pending a determination by the Student Judicial Board. Dr. Smith ordered Ms. Denton to leave the campus immediately. No written notice of the charge was given to Ms. Denton prior to this meeting, nor did Dr. Smith simultaneously document the interview.
On Wednesday, February 17, 1993, some four days after the incident, the Student Judicial Board conducted a hearing. Various witnesses gave testimony, including Victor Smith, who admitted that he was the owner of the. gun and that he had borrowed Ms. Denton’s car to go shooting at targets with Mr. Patterson and his brother. He said that after they had finished, he put the gun in the book bag and placed it in the floorboard behind the passenger seat without Ms. Denton’s knowledge or permission.
The Board found Ms. Denton not guilty of the charge, declaring its belief that she “did not have knowledge that the weapon was in the car,” and recommended that no action be taken against her. Dr. Smith, however, rejected the Student Judicial Board’s finding and determined that Ms. Denton should be suspended. Ms. Denton then appealed Dr. Smith’s decision to the University Discipline Committee, which found her guilty of a violation of the firearms policy but recommended that the sanction be reduced. Dr. Smith, to whom the recommendation had been referred, withdrew from further consideration of the case.
As a result, Ms. Denton appealed the decision to appellant Dr. Winfred L. Thompson, President of UCA, who upheld the University Discipline Committee’s guilt determination but rejected its recommendation of a reduced sanction. Dr. Thompson then imposed the three-year suspension provided for in the UCA firearms policy.
On March 11, 1993, Ms. Denton filed a petition for a temporary restraining order in the Faulkner County Chancery Court, requesting that the court stay or enjoin her suspension from UCA. The following day, the chancellor entered a temporary injunction. Subsequently, on March 31, 1993, Ms. Denton filed an amended petition for a permanent injunction, asserting that UCA’s firearms policy failed, on its face, to provide substantive due process and that UCA’s actions failed to provide procedural due process. An expedited hearing was held on April 8 and 16, 1993. The chancery court converted the temporary restraining order into a permanent restraining order, finding that:
the UCA gun policy violates the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, in that it is violative of substantive due process; that is, the policy is void on its face and violates basic principles of democracy. The policy is hereby struck and any attempts to enforce the said policy against any student subsequent to April 16, 1993, will be sanctioned by the inherent contempt authority of the Court.
Having found that the firearms policy was facially void, the chancery court declared the procedural due process issue moot and declined to issue a ruling on the question. The court also found that the actions of UCA and its agents did not remove their immunity and, therefore, that Ms. Denton was not entitled to damages and attorney’s fees.
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Rosalind M. Mouser, Special Justice.
In this appeal from a decision of the Faulkner County Chancery Court finding the firearms policy of the University of Central Arkansas facially void and violative of substantive due process and setting aside the three-year suspension of appellee Heather A. Denton, a UCA student, the appellants — the University of Central Arkansas and members of its administration and Board of Trustees1 — raise four points for reversal.
UCA argues that (1) the court had no power to set aside UCA’s disciplinary action against Ms. Denton, unless the university’s action was arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law; (2) UCA’s decision to suspend Ms. Denton was neither arbitrary nor capricious; (3) UCA’s decision to suspend Ms. Denton was not contrary to law; and (4) Ms. Denton received procedural due process. These four questions can be grouped more coherently under two broad issues: whether Ms. Denton received (1) procedural due process and (2) substantive due process. Although the chancellor did not address the former topic, we have determined, on de novo review, that Ms. Denton was denied procedural due process. We uphold the decision of the chancery court when it reaches the right result, even if it did not enunciate the right reason. Cawood v. Smith, 310 Ark. 619, 839 S.W.2d 208 (1992). It is unnecessary for us to address the substantive due process issue,
Ms. Denton requested and was denied damages and attorney’s fees. On cross-appeal, she contends that the chancellor erred in finding that the actions of UCA and its agents did not exempt them from their immunity and in denying her damages and attorney’s fees. We agree with the chancery court’s findings and affirm its decisions on both the appeal and the cross-appeal.
Facts
In December 1992, after several firearms incidents on its campus, UCA issued a revised firearms policy, which provided that:
Any student possessing, storing, or using a firearm on University controlled property or at University sponsored or supervised functions, unless authorized by the University, will be suspended from UCA for a period of not less than three years unless a waiver of the suspension is granted by the President upon the recommendation of the Vice President for Student Affairs.
A copy of the amended firearms policy was delivered to every student organization and residence-hall room and was published on January 11, 1993, in the student newspaper.
On the morning of Saturday, February 13, 1993, Heather A. Denton, a UCA freshman honors student on a full academic scholarship with no disciplinary record, loaned her automobile to a friend, Victor Smith, a non-student. The vehicle was returned to her later in the day.
That evening, Ms. Denton, Eric Patterson, a UCA student, and a mutual friend, Rita Patel, went “cruising” off-campus in Ms. Denton’s car, with Mr. Patterson driving. While they were stopped in downtown Conway, a confrontation occurred with unknown occupants of a pickup truck. During the incident, a third vehicle arrived on the scene, and, reportedly, an unidentified person in that car waved a handgun.
Soon after these events, Mr. Patterson drove Ms. Denton’s car back to the UCA campus. A Conway police officer, who had received a report about the incident (including the brandished weapon), located and followed Ms. Denton’s vehicle to the campus and then stopped and searched it. An unloaded semi-automatic weapon was found in a backpack-style book bag beneath the passenger seat. Ms. Denton, Mr. Patterson, and Ms. Patel denied knowledge of the presence of the gun, though Mr. Patterson stated that it was owned by Victor Smith. Mr. Patterson was arrested and removed from the scene of the stop. No action was taken against either Ms. Denton or Ms. Patel by law enforcement officials.
After becoming aware of the incident, appellant Dr. John Smith, UCA Vice-President for Student Affairs, interviewed Ms. Denton on Monday, February 15, 1993. During the interview, Dr. Smith advised her that she was being charged with a violation of the firearms policy and was being suspended pending a determination by the Student Judicial Board. Dr. Smith ordered Ms. Denton to leave the campus immediately. No written notice of the charge was given to Ms. Denton prior to this meeting, nor did Dr. Smith simultaneously document the interview.
On Wednesday, February 17, 1993, some four days after the incident, the Student Judicial Board conducted a hearing. Various witnesses gave testimony, including Victor Smith, who admitted that he was the owner of the. gun and that he had borrowed Ms. Denton’s car to go shooting at targets with Mr. Patterson and his brother. He said that after they had finished, he put the gun in the book bag and placed it in the floorboard behind the passenger seat without Ms. Denton’s knowledge or permission.
The Board found Ms. Denton not guilty of the charge, declaring its belief that she “did not have knowledge that the weapon was in the car,” and recommended that no action be taken against her. Dr. Smith, however, rejected the Student Judicial Board’s finding and determined that Ms. Denton should be suspended. Ms. Denton then appealed Dr. Smith’s decision to the University Discipline Committee, which found her guilty of a violation of the firearms policy but recommended that the sanction be reduced. Dr. Smith, to whom the recommendation had been referred, withdrew from further consideration of the case.
As a result, Ms. Denton appealed the decision to appellant Dr. Winfred L. Thompson, President of UCA, who upheld the University Discipline Committee’s guilt determination but rejected its recommendation of a reduced sanction. Dr. Thompson then imposed the three-year suspension provided for in the UCA firearms policy.
On March 11, 1993, Ms. Denton filed a petition for a temporary restraining order in the Faulkner County Chancery Court, requesting that the court stay or enjoin her suspension from UCA. The following day, the chancellor entered a temporary injunction. Subsequently, on March 31, 1993, Ms. Denton filed an amended petition for a permanent injunction, asserting that UCA’s firearms policy failed, on its face, to provide substantive due process and that UCA’s actions failed to provide procedural due process. An expedited hearing was held on April 8 and 16, 1993. The chancery court converted the temporary restraining order into a permanent restraining order, finding that:
the UCA gun policy violates the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, in that it is violative of substantive due process; that is, the policy is void on its face and violates basic principles of democracy. The policy is hereby struck and any attempts to enforce the said policy against any student subsequent to April 16, 1993, will be sanctioned by the inherent contempt authority of the Court.
Having found that the firearms policy was facially void, the chancery court declared the procedural due process issue moot and declined to issue a ruling on the question. The court also found that the actions of UCA and its agents did not remove their immunity and, therefore, that Ms. Denton was not entitled to damages and attorney’s fees. From that order, this appeal and cross-appeal arise.
Standard of review2
As the Administrative Procedure Act is not applicable to this case, we consider the evidence presented at trial on a de novo basis. The avenue for judicial review of the substance of academic decisions is narrow. See Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). There is a general policy against intervention by the courts in matters best left to school authorities. Henderson State University v. Spadoni, 41 Ark. App. 33, 848 S.W.2d 951 (1993).
It is undisputed that UCA is a state-supported institution of higher learning which may delegate to its administration disciplinary power over non-academic offenses. A chancery court has no power to interfere in the exercise of a state-supported university’s discretion in the promulgation and implementation of disciplinary measures unless it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the university abused its discretion. See Springdale Board of Education v. Bowman, 294 Ark. 66, 740 S.W.2d 909 (1987); Williams v. Board of Marianna School District, 274 Ark. 530, 626 S.W.2d 361 (1982); Safferstone v. Tucker, 235 Ark. 70, 357 S.W.2d 3 (1962). We hold that there was clear and convincing evidence, outlined in the discussion below, that UCA’s actions constituted an abuse of the university’s discretion.
Procedural due process
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives rights to a student who faces suspension or expulsion for misconduct at a tax-supported college or university. Henderson State University v. Spadoni, supra, citing Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). A student facing suspension is entitled, at the very minimum, to some kind of notice and some kind of hearing. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
The UCA “Standards of Student Conduct” promulgates disciplinary procedures governing the enforcement of university regulations. The student handbook notes that “the University strives to protect the rights of students involved in the disciplinary process by providing specific due process procedures, including appeals, to insure fair and just hearings.” (Emphasis added.) The Vice President for Student Affairs is charged with the responsibility of overseeing the disciplinary process and is assisted by several committees and hearing officers who are assigned specialized functions. The Student Judicial Board, comprised of eleven voting student members and the Dean of Students or a designee in an advisory capacity, hears serious, suspendable offenses. Appeals may be made to the University Discipline Committee, UCA’s chief appellate body, which consists of three faculty members, three administration representatives, and three students.'
The disciplinary process is initiated by the filing of a written report of an alleged incident of non-academic misconduct with the Office of Vice President for Student Affairs. Thereafter, according to the “Standards of Student Conduct”:
The Dean of Students will receive incident reports and assign discipline cases to the appropriate council and/or hearing officer as needed. The Student Judicial Board [or other appropriate council or hearing officer] make their recommendations to the Vice President for Student Affairs. Disciplinary action shall be taken only after a hearing is held and the Vice President for Student Affairs has reviewed the action and made a final decision.
(Emphasis added.) The hearings are conducted informally, without strict adherence to the rules of evidence.
A notice provision is set forth in the “Standards”:
The student(s) accused shall be notified, in writing, of the alleged charge and of the date, time and place of the hearing. Notice of hearing will be mailed to the student(s) or delivered to the residence hall room, if the student(s) lives on campus, at least three (3) days prior to the hearing.
(Emphasis added.) The accused and complainant are afforded the right to be present at the hearing, to present evidence by witness, affidavit, or deposition, to bring an advisor to the hearing, and to question all witnesses.
Appeals are assigned to the University Discipline Committee and must be made in writing to the Vice President for Student Affairs within three days after a disciplinary decision is rendered. One or more of the following reasons may serve as the basis of an appeal:
1. Inadequate opportunity to prepare defense;
2. Inadequate evidence to justify decision; or
3. Sanction not in keeping with gravity of wrong-doing.
The Vice President for Student Affairs is vested with the authority to make the final decision regarding all disciplinary concerns.
In the present case, UCA failed to adhere to its own expressly enunciated standards for ensuring procedural due process. The procedures provided by the university were not structurally flawed; in terms of actual compliance, however, the letter and spirit of procedural due process were violated. To protect due process, the courts, in matters pertaining to a governmental entity’s observance and implementation of self-prescribed procedures, must be particularly vigilant and must hold such entities to a strict adherence to both the letter and the spirit of their own rules and regulations. See Powell v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 176 (3rd Cir. 1986); Koolstra v. Sullivan, 744 F. Supp. 243 (D. Colo. 1990).3
Here, there was no indication that the Dean of Students' reviewed the charge against Ms. Denton before it was referred to Dr. Smith or before the case was assigned to the Student Judicial Board, as required by the UCA “Standards of Student Conduct.” Instead, Dr. Smith, Vice President of Student Affairs, interviewed Ms. Denton on Monday, February 15, 1993, and verbally advised her that a disciplinary hearing would be held by the board. Having ordered her to leave the campus immediately, he then caused to be delivered to her vacated residence-hall room a written notice, dated February 15, 1993, of the hearing before the Student Judicial Board to be held “at 7:00 p.m., on Wednesday, February 17, 1993.” The notice, which more properly should have been mailed to her permanent address, was sent to the dormitory room two days prior to the hearing rather than three days beforehand, as required by the “Standards.”
Thus, UCA, by the terms of its own self-imposed standards, failed to provide Ms. Denton the promised protection of “specific due process procedures.” Yet not only was there a failure to comport with the letter of procedural due process, there was also a failure to abide by its spirit. Throughout the proceedings, Dr. Smith acted in a variety of often-conflicting capacities. He was at once investigator, prosecutor, witness, and judge. Although Dr. Smith, as Vice President for Student Affairs, clearly held the ultimate authority in disciplinary matters, he overrode the decision of the Student Judicial Board. No provision was made in the UCA handbook for the Vice President for Student Affairs to step aside from a case, yet Dr. Smith did so following the University Discipline Committee’s technical finding of guilt and its recommendation of a reduced sanction.
The matter was submitted for review to UCA President Dr. Winfred Thompson. He retained the three-year suspension because Ms. Denton’s appeal was based only on the lack of adequate evidence and not on the appropriateness of the sanction.
While the severity of the sanction is a stated basis for appeal under the UCA “Standards for Student Conduct,” the fact remains that “[a]ll non-academic discipline hearings are informal,” according to the handbook. To deprive a student of her educational property interest on narrowly formal grounds as exemplified in these circumstances is to violate the spirit of procedural due process. We hold that Ms. Denton was denied the “rudimentary elements of fair play” required by the Due Process Clause. See Henderson State University v. Spadoni, supra, citing Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961).
Under the circumstances, Ms. Denton was denied procedural due process. We therefore affirm the decision of the chancery court, albeit for a different reason than that given by the chancellor. Cawood v. Smith, supra.
Cross-appeal: Attorney’s fees
The Arkansas Constitution prohibits awards of damages in lawsuits against the State of Arkansas and its institutions. Ark. Const. Art.5, § 20. If officers and employees of the State of Arkansas act without malice and within the scope of their employment, they are immune from an award of damages in litigation.
The chancery court specifically found that none of the officers and employees of UCA acted with malice. Likewise, the actions of UCA’s officers and employees fail to rise to “such reckless disregard of the rights of another as to constitute the equivalent of ill will.” Bland v. Verser, 299 Ark. 490, 774 S.W.2d 124 (1989). We affirm the chancery court’s findings on Ms. Den-ton’s cross-appeal.
Based upon the facts as found by the chancery court and the law set forth herein, we affirm the chancery court’s decision in all respects.
Affirmed.
Newbern, J., concurs. Brown, J., dissents. Roaf, J., not participating.