Smith v. DELAWARE FIRST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION

395 F. Supp. 2d 127, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24827, 2005 WL 2757268
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedOctober 25, 2005
DocketCIV.A. 05-140-JJF
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 395 F. Supp. 2d 127 (Smith v. DELAWARE FIRST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. DELAWARE FIRST FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, 395 F. Supp. 2d 127, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24827, 2005 WL 2757268 (D. Del. 2005).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FARNAN, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant, Delaware First Federal Credit Union’s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (D.I.5). For the reasons discussed the Motion will be granted.

I. Background

The following facts are alleged in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (D.I.4). On December 28, 2004, Plaintiffs filed documents with Defendant to prevent money being removed from their banking account through any debit card transaction submitted by Hertz Corporation. Defendant assured Plaintiffs that they had flagged Plaintiffs’ account and that no money would be transferred to Hertz. On February 11, 2005, without Plaintiffs’ consent, Hertz Corporation debited $5,652.95 to Plaintiffs’ account. When Plaintiffs discovered that the transaction had taken place, they spoke with Defendant’s representatives and were assured that the problem would be corrected once Plaintiffs submitted a letter disputing the transaction. On February 28, 2005, Plaintiffs submitted a *129 letter but were informed that nothing could be done regarding the transaction. Since the Hertz transaction took place, Plaintiffs have been unable to pay bills and have become sick, lost sleep, and suffered from migraine headaches.

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint on March 10, 2005, alleging breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (D.I.l). In response, Defendant filed a Motion To Dismiss, arguing that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs’ claims. (D.I.2). Plaintiffs subsequently amended their Complaint to add a claim for violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (D.I.4). Defendant then filed a Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, this time for failure to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims. (D.I.5). Since then, Plaintiffs have filed a Motion For Summary Judgment. (D.I.9). Because the Court concludes that consideration of Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (D.I.5) also resolves the issues presented by Defendant’s first Motion To Dismiss (D.I.2) and Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment (D.I.9), the Court will address only Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (D.I.5).

II. Parties’ Contentions

By its Motion, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted under the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore, the claim should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). If the Fourteenth Amendment claim is dismissed, Defendant further contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining claims for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and therefore, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

Plaintiffs have not to responded either of Defendant’s motions.

III. Discussion

A. Whether Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of a complaint, not to resolve disputed facts or decide the merits of the case. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir.1993). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and must draw all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255 (3d Cir.1994). The Court is “not required to accept legal conclusions either alleged or inferred from the pleaded facts.” Kost, 1 F.3d at 183. Dismissal is only appropriate when “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted rests on the movant. Young v. West Coast Industrial *130 Relations Assoc., Inc., 763 F.Supp. 64, 67 (D.Del.1991) (citations omitted).

A claim for violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires state action. U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1 (“nor shall any state deprive any person... ”)(emphasis added). “[SJtate action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’ ” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Ath. Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 294, 121 S.Ct. 924, 148 L.Ed.2d 807 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974)). The United States Supreme Court has treated private entities as state actors when an action is the result of coercion from the state, when an entity takes on a traditionally public function, and when an entity is greatly entwined with government policies or control. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296, 121 S.Ct. 924; Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 353 U.S. 230, 231, 77 S.Ct. 806, 1 L.Ed.2d 792 (1957); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966).

Several courts have found that credit unions are not state actors. Francis v. Northeast Cmty. Fed. Credit Union, No.

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395 F. Supp. 2d 127, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24827, 2005 WL 2757268, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-delaware-first-federal-credit-union-ded-2005.