Smith v. Bowen

698 F. Supp. 711, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11886, 1988 WL 119813
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedOctober 24, 1988
DocketNo. 87 C 1398
StatusPublished

This text of 698 F. Supp. 711 (Smith v. Bowen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Bowen, 698 F. Supp. 711, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11886, 1988 WL 119813 (N.D. Ill. 1988).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HART, District Judge.

Benny Smith applied for social security disability benefits. Following other administrative proceedings, a hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (“AU”). The AU applied the standard five-step sequential analysis. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Veal v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 693, 695 n. 2 (7th Cir.1987). He found that Smith had a severe impairment, but that it did not satisfy the requirements of the “Listings.” The AU also found that Smith could not perform his past relevant work. Benefits were denied at “step five” in that the AU found that Smith could perform sedentary work and applying the “Grid” it was found that he could perform other work within the economy. The Appeals Council affirmed the AU’s determination and Smith filed suit in this court. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the motions were referred to a magistrate. In his report and recommendation, the magistrate recommends granting Smith’s motion and denying the Secretary’s. The Secretary has objected to the magistrate’s report. As regards the summary judgment motions, this court must make a de novo determination as to all issues objected to and is also permitted to make further de novo determinations. Delgado v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 79, 81-82 (7th Cir.1986) (per curiam). While the court agrees with the conclusion reached by the magistrate, as discussed below, the court’s analysis differs somewhat from that of the magistrate.

In reviewing the decision of the Secretary, the court is obliged to review all the evidence contained in the record. The court must accept the findings of the Secretary if supported by substantial evidence; the court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Secretary. Still, review must be more than an uncritical rubber stamp. It is expected that the decision of the AU will be based on consideration of all relevant evidence and that the reasons for his conclusions will be stated in a manner sufficient to permit an informed review. Id. at 82-83. “Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence which ‘a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Veal, 833 F.2d at 696 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)).

The principal dispute in this case concerns whether the AU gave proper consideration to Smith’s complaints of pain. If there is “1) evidence of an objectively adduced abnormality and, either 2) objective medical evidence supporting the subjective complaints issuing from that abnormality, or 3) that the abnormality is of a nature in which it is reasonable to conclude that the subjective complaints are a result of that condition,” the AU must give consideration to subjective complaints of pain. Veal, 833 F.2d at 698; Sparks v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir.1986). The AU can still find the complaints to be noncredible, see Walker v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 635, 641 (7th Cir.1987), or the pain of the claimant of an insufficient degree to be disabling, see Meredith v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 650, 654 (7th Cir.1987), but the complaints must have been considered and substantial evidence must support the determination of noncredibility or lack of sufficient severity.

After discussing his determination that Smith was not disabled on the Grid, the AU stated the following:

In making this determination, the undersigned has considered the claimant’s complaints of pain and their effect on his ability to perform basic work related functions. While the claimant probably does have some discomfort, it should not prevent the performance of sedentary work activities. In this regard, it is noted that the claimant did not appear to be in any significant distress when he was seated at the hearing. He answered questions alertly and there were no indi[713]*713cations of interference with his ability to concentrate or respond as a result of pain. The claimant carries 210 pounds on a 6'2" frame and he has obviously not suffered the severe weight loss which usually accompanies unrelenting pain. The objective medical evidence fails to document the existence of any condition which would cause pain severe enough to prevent the performance of sedentary work.

In his formal findings, the AU stated the “complaints of severe disabling pain are not credible.” Also, in concluding Smith did not satisfy any of the criteria of the Listings, the AU stated the following:

In a report dated September 2, 1985, Dr. Baltasar stated x-rays did reveal levosco-liosis of the cervical spine. The claimant’s head had a slight tilt to the left and he had a reduced range of motion of 50 percent of his cervical spine. He also experienced pain on movement with pa-ravertebral muscle spasms (Exhibits 17, 22, and 32). An arthritic report submitted on April 3, 1985, confirmed cervical spondylosis. The claimant did have normal reflexes and was able to walk unassisted. He did have diminished flex-ion on movement of his neck, however (Exhibit 21). Irma [sic] Melnicof, DO, submitted a report on October 22, 1985, stating the claimant had evidence of cervical strap muscle spasm and a seronega-tive arthritis. However, the latter was not concluded to interfere with his functional capacity. He did have a slight left tilt to his head and a reduced range of motion of his cervical spine to 35 degrees on extension and flexion. Rotation to the left was 70 degrees and rotation to the right was 75 degrees. His laboratory tests were within normal limits (Exhibit 37). Consequently, the objective medical evidence and the claimant’s credible testimony at the hearing revealed that he has had a long history of cervical spine syndrome but is fully ambulatory and is able to walk unassisted. He does have some restricted range of motion of his cervical spine but there is no evidence of any other limitation of his ability to walk, stand or sit.

The magistrate has provided an extensive discussion of the medical evidence that favors a finding that Smith cannot perform sedentary work. It is unnecessary to repeat that discussion. It is sufficient to point out that there is objective medical evidence that Smith has cervical abnormalities, including chronic cervical strain, osteoarthritis of the neck, and muscle spasms. There is also medical evidence that such conditions can cause severe neck pain and headaches. Further, there is evidence of limited neck flexion which is consistent with pain, as well as evidence of swelling. Smith testified that pain in his neck and head affected his ability to sit and concentrate.1

There is objective medical evidence supporting the testimony of pain. It was therefore necessary for the AU to consider that testimony.

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698 F. Supp. 711, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11886, 1988 WL 119813, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-bowen-ilnd-1988.