Smith v. Beasley

946 F. Supp. 1174, 1996 WL 673301
CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedSeptember 27, 1996
DocketCivil Action 3:95-3235-O, 3:96-0003-O
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 946 F. Supp. 1174 (Smith v. Beasley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174, 1996 WL 673301 (D.S.C. 1996).

Opinion

ORDER

Presently before the Court are two cases, which have been consolidated for trial by this three-judge panel, because each case challenges on constitutional grounds certain election districts for the South Carolina General Assembly. In Smith, et al. v. Beasley, et al., Civil Action No. 3:95-3235-O, the challenge involves three Senate election districts, and in Able, et al. v. Wilkins, et al., Civil Action No. 3:96-0003-O, the challenge is to nine House of Representative election districts. The contested senatorial districts were created by act of the General Assembly on the *1176 11th day of May, 1995, and approved by the United States Department of Justice after review under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act on the 30th day of May, 1995. The contested House districts were created by act of the General Assembly on the 14th day of May, 1994 and approved by the United States Department of Justice after section 5 review on the 31st day of May, 1994. The plaintiffs in these actions allege that the challenged districts were drawn with race as the predominant factor in violation of Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993) (“Shaw I ”), and Miller v. Johnson, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). After consolidating these cases, we delayed commencing the trial until the Supreme Court decided Shaw v. Hunt, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (“Shaw II ”), and Bush v. Vera, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1941, 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996) on June 13, 1996.

The trial of this matter came before this court on August 12, 1994. After hearing over two weeks of testimony, reading numerous depositions, considering scores of exhibits and maps, and reviewing the voluminous stipulations, we make the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

I.JURISDICTION

1. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to '28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(4), and 2201(a), and the suit is authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The three-judge panel has been properly appointed by the Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284. South Carolina is a covered jurisdiction under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

II.PARTIES

2. The plaintiffs in the Senate case include at least one registered voter from each of the challenged senatorial districts, being Districts 29, 34, and 37. The plaintiffs in the House case include at least one registered voter from each of the challenged House districts, being Districts 12, 41, 54, 76, 82, 91, 103, 118, and 121. Some of the plaintiffs are African-American, and others are Caucasian.

3. Defendant David M. Beasley is the Governor of South Carolina, and Defendant Robert L. Peeler is the Lieutenant Governor. They are being sued in their representative capacities. Defendant David H. Wilkins is the Speaker of the South Carolina House of Representatives and is a defendant in both suits in his representative capacity to facilitate whatever remedial action may be required.

4. Defendant Marshall Williams was, at the time the Senate action was commenced, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. He died after commencement of the action and has been replaced by his successor, John Drummond.

5. In the House case, the court allowed registered voters from each of the challenged House districts, who are represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), to intervene as defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(2) in order to defend the challenged House districts. In addition, in the Senate case, the court allowed a registered voter from Senate district 37, who is also represented by the ACLU, to intervene so as to defend the challenged Senate districts.

6. On May 3, 1996, the court granted the motion of the United States of America, acting through its Department of Justice, to intervene in the House case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2.

III.SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY

7. The South Carolina General Assembly is a bicameral legislative body made up of a 124-member House of Representatives and a 46-member Senate. The term of a Senator is four years and of a Representative two years. Members of both the Senate and the House are elected from single-member districts. During regular elections for both the Senate and the House, every seat is at issue, because there are no staggered terms in either body.

8. Normally, it is the responsibility of the General Assembly, subject to the ap *1177 proval of the Governor, 1 to redistrict the State Senate and the State House of Representatives. S.C. Const. art. III, § 3. Only when a legislature fails to redistrict according to the federal Constitution and applicable federal statutes in a timely fashion does judicial relief become appropriate. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-95, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 2354-55, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973).

IV. HISTORY OF STATE LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT

9. Prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), which established the “one person, one vote” principle, 2 the county lines of South Carolina’s 46 counties defined the electoral districts for both houses of the General Assembly. In the Senate, each county was entitled to one senator. S.C. Const. art. III, § 6. In the House, representatives were apportioned to the counties based on population, but each county, regardless of size, received at least one representative. S.C. Const. art. III, §§ 3, 4.

10. Shortly after Reynolds v. Sims, the South Carolina Constitution’s method of apportioning the General Assembly was invalidated as violating the one person, one vote principle. O’Shields v. McNair, 254 F.Supp. 708, 711 (D.S.C.1966). Thereafter, the General Assembly divided the state along county lines into twenty-seven election districts to be represented by fifty senators. This plan was attacked, and in State ex rel. McLeod v. West, 249 S.C.

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Bluebook (online)
946 F. Supp. 1174, 1996 WL 673301, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-v-beasley-scd-1996.