Smith v. Auburn Police Department Officers

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 26, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00079
StatusUnknown

This text of Smith v. Auburn Police Department Officers (Smith v. Auburn Police Department Officers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith v. Auburn Police Department Officers, (W.D. Wash. 2023).

Opinion

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 RONALD A. SMITH, CASE NO. 2:23-cv-00079-TL 12 Plaintiff(s), ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH v. LEAVE TO AMEND 13 AUBURN POLICE DEPARTMENT 14 OFFICERS et al, 15 Defendant(s). 16

17 This is a case alleging civil rights violations by local authorities under the Fifth and 18 Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter comes 19 before the Court on its own motion. Having considered the complaint and the relevant record, the 20 Court DECLINES to issue summons, DISMISSES the Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 21 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and GRANTS LEAVE for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, as 22 explained below. 23 24 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff Ronald A. Smith sues Defendants “Auburn Police Department Officers,” “Child 3 Protective Services,” and “King County Courts (R.J.C.)” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged 4 violations of his constitutional due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of

5 the U.S. Constitution. Dkt. No. 5 at 5. In essence, Mr. Smith alleges that his child was 6 wrongfully removed from his care by Child Protective Services and the Auburn Police 7 Department over false allegations from Mr. Smith’s former partner and other parent of the child, 8 which has resulted in the child being exposed to abuse and neglect. Id. at 7. Mr. Smith seeks: 9 (1) injunctive relief, including “overturning” a King County Superior Court determination 10 (seemingly related to issuing a protective order for Mr. Smith’s child’s care) and dismissing the 11 case as well as obtaining full custody of his child; (2) $5 million in damages from each of the 12 three Defendants for his mental and emotional pain and suffering; (3) and punitive damages. Id. 13 at 10. 14 Mr. Smith proceeds pro se, or without legal representation. The Honorable Brian A.

15 Tsuchida, United States Magistrate Judge, granted Mr. Smith in forma pauperis status with a 16 recommendation that the complaint be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) before 17 issuance of summons. Dkt. No. 4. No summons has yet issued. 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 A court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it is “frivolous or malicious,” 20 “fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 21 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 22 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis 23 complaints . . . .”). To state a claim for relief, a complaint must contain a short and plain

24 statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim 1 showing that the claimant is entitled to relief, and a demand for the relief sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 8(a). 3 The standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. 4 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

5 See, e.g., Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive Rule 12(b)(6), the 6 plaintiff must provide factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 7 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 8 570 (2007)). 9 This Court liberally construes pleadings filed by pro se litigants and holds them “to less 10 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 11 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Even so, a court should “not supply essential elements 12 of the claim that were not initially pled.” E.g., Henderson v. Anderson, No. C19-789, 2019 WL 13 3996859, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 23, 2019) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bruns v. Nat’l 14 Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Khalid v. Microsoft Corp.,

15 409 F. Supp. 3d 1023, 1031 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (“[C]ourts should not have to serve as advocates 16 for pro se litigants.” (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987))). 17 Finally, “[a] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend 18 unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 19 amendment.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schucker v. 20 Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)) (district court erred by failing 21 to explain deficiencies of a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint and dismissing without leave to 22 amend). 23

24 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Mr. Smith brings a claim against certain local authorities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 3 (“Section 1983”) for violating his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 4 of the U.S. Constitution. “To state a claim under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

5 violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that 6 the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Ochoa v. 7 Pub. Consulting Grp., Inc., 48 F.4th 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 8 42, 48 (1988)). Assuming without deciding that Defendants satisfy the second prong, Mr. Smith 9 still fails to show that Defendants’ conduct deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or 10 federal law. 11 First, Mr. Smith’s claims against Defendant “King County Courts (R.J.C.)” must be 12 dismissed on grounds of judicial immunity. Courts have “long recognized judicial immunity, a 13 ‘sweeping form of immunity’ for acts performed by judges that relate to the ‘judicial process.’” 14 Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Forrester v. White,

15 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988)); see also Meek v. Cnty. of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 16 1999) (“It is well settled that judges are generally immune from civil liability under [S]ection 17 1983.”).

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