Smith-Jeter v. Scottsdale, City of

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 8, 2022
• Docket: 2:21-cv-00846
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8

Wanda Elaine Smith-Jeter, ) No. CV-21-00846-PHX-SPL ) 9 ) 10 Plaintiff, ) ORDER vs. ) ) 11 ) City of Scottsdale, et al., ) 12 ) 13 Defendants. ) ) 14 )

15 Before the Court is Defendant City Attorney Sherry R. Scott’s (“City Attorney 16 Scott”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) in which she requests that this Court issue an order 17 dismissing her from this case with prejudice. The Motion has been fully briefed and is 18 ready for review.1 (Docs. 21, 29, 30). After reviewing the parties’ briefing, the Court issues 19 the following Order granting Defendant’s Motion. 20 I. BACKGROUND 21 On June 10, 2021, Plaintiff Wanda Elaine Smith-Jeter filed an Amended Complaint 22 (Doc. 6), alleging a violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the field provided 23 for “Defendant No. 1” under Section I(B) of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff listed “City 24 of Scottsdale – City Attorney’s Office.” (Id. at 2). In the field provided for “Job or Title (if 25 known)” in the same “Defendant No. 1” section, Plaintiff listed “Sherry R. Scott, City 26

27 1 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the pending motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f); Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 1 Attorney.” (Id.). Plaintiff listed Al Angelo Company as “Defendant No. 2” and left the 2 fields for “Defendant No. 3” and “Defendant No. 4” blank. (Id. at 2–3). The Amended 3 Complaint asserts claims for (i) discrimination, hate crimes, harassment, and intimidation 4 and (ii) retaliation. (Id. at 5). 5 Under Section III of the Amended Complaint—titled “Statement of Claim”— 6 Plaintiff alleges that she and her husband live in a Scottsdale, Arizona apartment unit 7 managed by Defendant Al Angelo Company. (Id.). Plaintiff and her husband are 8 “Black/African-Americans,” ages 66 and 69 respectively, and living with disabilities and 9 mobility issues. (Id.). Plaintiff refers to “City of Scottsdale” as a Defendant and alleges 10 discrimination related to their relocation to and application for housing in the city. (Id.). 11 II. LEGAL STANDARD 12 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “a 13 short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief” so the 14 defendant is given fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atl. 15 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)). A court may dismiss 16 a complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for two reasons: (1) lack of a 17 cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. 18 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). When deciding a 19 motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and 20 construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 21 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). 22 III. ANALYSIS 23 City Attorney Scott argues that Plaintiff intended to name only two Defendants in 24 this action—Al Angelo Company and the City of Scottsdale—and that the Amended 25 Complaint fails to allege that City Attorney Scott or the Scottsdale City Attorney’s Office 26 played any role in the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Doc. 21 at 2). 27 Thus, City Attorney Scott asserts that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against her and 28 that her motion to dismiss should be granted as a result. (Id. at 4). In the Response, Plaintiff 1 primarily restates City Attorney Scott’s own arguments and fails to otherwise justify or 2 explain her inclusion of City Attorney Scott as a Defendant in this matter.2 (Doc. 29 at 1). 3 After reviewing the Amended Complaint, this Court agrees with City Attorney 4 Scott. Even if Plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, Plaintiff would not be entitled 5 to relief against City Attorney Scott. “The most fundamental requirement of the Federal 6 Rules is that a pleading afford ‘fair notice’ of the claim being asserted and the ‘grounds 7 upon which it rests.’” Hobson v. Temple-Inlet, No. CV 07-1318-PHX-SMM, 2007 WL 8 3101837, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 22, 2007) (citations omitted). “Even pro se litigants must 9 meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is that it 10 allegedly did wrong.” Id. (citing Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 11 1995); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007) (“[T]he 12 complaint must say enough to give the defendant ‘fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim 13 is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”). 14 Here, Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not even mention City Attorney Scott or the 15 City Attorney’s Office in any capacity. (Doc. 6 at 4–6). Plaintiff’s allegations of 16 discrimination thus have nothing to do with City Attorney Scott or the City Attorney’s 17 Office, at least as those allegations are described in the Amended Complaint. Instead, 18 Plaintiff’s allegations relate to actions apparently taken by the Al Angelo Company and 19 the City of Scottsdale, the only two Defendants mentioned in Plaintiff’s Statement of 20 Claims. (Doc. 6 at 5). As a result, City Attorney Scott is left without any notice of the 21 allegations against her and she is dismissed as a party to this action. See Hobson, 2007 WL 22 3101837, at *2 (dismissing case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because complaint failed to 23 2 Confusingly, Plaintiff concludes her Response by stating, “There are no claims 24 against City Attorney Scott in this case and therefore, I the plaintiff (pro se), respectfully 25 disagree with this ‘Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21)’ and ‘Certificate of Conferral (Doc. 21- 1)’; and ask that this ‘Motion to Dismiss’, not be granted by the Court.” (Doc. 29 at 3). 26 The Court is uncertain whether this statement by Plaintiff is an acknowledgement 27 that there are, in fact, no claims against City Attorney Scott—thereby justifying City Attorney Scott’s dismissal from the case—or if this was merely a mistake by Plaintiff in 28 drafting her Response. mention Defendant at all, “let alone provide notice of circumstances which gave rise to a 2| viable claim’); Jones v. Town of Quartzsite, No. CV-13-02170-PHX-DJH, 2015 WL 12551172, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2015) (finding plaintiff failed to state § 1983 claim 4 against defendants where factual allegations of complaint failed to mention defendants at 5 | all); Startup v. Bear Stearns Residential Mortg. Corp., No. SACV 10-01961 JVS (JCGx), 6| 2011 WL 13227926, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011) (If a defendant is not mentioned in 7 | the body of the complaint, the complaint does not state a cause of action against that 8 | defendant.’). 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 Accordingly, 11 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) is granted. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Sherry R. Scott is dismissed from 13 | this action with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs and attorneys’ fees. 14 Dated this 8th day of March, 2022. 15

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