Smith (ID 121420) v. Vieyra

• Court: District Court, D. Kansas
• Decided: April 16, 2025
• Docket: 5:25-cv-03047
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

ANTONIO T. SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 25-3047-JWL

ROBERT VIEYRA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff Antonio T. Smith is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint that are discussed herein. I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is incarcerated at the El Dorado Correctional Facility in El Dorado, Kansas. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court assessed an initial partial filing fee in the amount of $20.00, calculated under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The initial fee is due April 28, 2025, and the failure to pay by the deadline may result in dismissal of this matter without further notice. Plaintiff alleges as Count I that he was denied due process at his disciplinary proceedings. (Doc. 1, at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that his disciplinary report (“DR”) should have been thrown out for lack of evidence. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he appealed, and the facts he stated were ignored by Defendants Davis and Vieyra. Id. Plaintiff states that his conviction was upheld. Id. at 5. As Count II, Plaintiff alleges false imprisonment. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that he has been sitting in restrictive housing for over four and a half months based on the DR that should have been thrown out for lack of evidence. Id. Plaintiff names as defendants: Robert Vieyra, Deputy Warden; and Meghan Davis, CMII. Plaintiff seeks $40,000 for “mental anguish, and for costing [him] his college education.”

Id. at 5. Plaintiff attaches a letter to his Complaint dated February 11, 2025. (Doc. 1–1.) The letter, signed by Plaintiff, states that on December 5, 2024, he was written a DR by Cpl Brown for dangerous contraband “I.E. homemade stabbing device altered state fan and a nasal spray bottle with an unknown liquid inside.” Id. Plaintiff states that the DR “never states that any photographs were taken of any of the evidence talked about in DR nor the disposition of evidence[.] [The] DR was served by CS1 Richards who never presented any photographs of any of the evidence spoken of in the DR.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that after he appealed the guilty conviction, a photograph was then added to the appeal. Id.

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th

Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007). A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the

line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff alleges that he was denied due process at his disciplinary proceedings and was falsely imprisoned when he was placed in restrictive housing based on the DR conviction.

Challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings must be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Abdulhaseeb v. Ward, 173 F. App’x 658, 659 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (petitions under § 2241 are used to attack the execution of a sentence, including the deprivation of good-time credits and other prison disciplinary matters); Brown v. Smith, 828 F.2d 1493, 1495 (10th Cir. 1987) (“If [the petitioner] can show that his due process rights were violated in the subject disciplinary proceedings, then § 2241 would be the appropriate remedy to use to restore his good time credits.”); see also Gamble v. Calbone, 375 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2004) (inmates were entitled to habeas relief on grounds that revocation of their earned credits resulting from unsupported disciplinary convictions violated due process), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 818–19 (10th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff may not challenge prison disciplinary actions and the loss of good time in this civil rights action, but may only do so by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In addition, Plaintiff cannot seek damages under § 1983 until his disciplinary conviction

has been invalidated. Section 1983 is not applicable to “challenges to punishments imposed as a result of prison disciplinary infractions,” unless the disciplinary conviction has already been invalidated. Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has made clear that “a state prisoner’s claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if ‘a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,’ unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated.” Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)). This rule applies not only when the prisoner challenges his conviction but also when he challenges punishments imposed as a result of prison disciplinary

infractions. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648. Plaintiff has not alleged that his disciplinary conviction has been invalidated. In fact, he states that it was upheld on appeal. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to dictate where he is housed. Liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a particular security classification or to be housed in a particular yard. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2005) (increase in security classification does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship because “a prisoner has no constitutional right to remain incarcerated in a particular prison or to be held in a specific security classification”)). The Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty

interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221–22 (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225 (no liberty interest arising from Due Process Clause itself in transfer from low-to maximum-security prison because “[c]onfinement in any of the State’s institutions is within the normal limits or range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose”). “Changing an inmate’s prison classification . . . ordinarily does not deprive him of liberty, because he is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty in prison.” Sawyer v. Jefferies, 315 F. App’x 31, 34 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 369 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225)). Plaintiff has not alleged that his assignment imposed any atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Cf. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223–24 (finding atypical and significant hardship in assignment to supermax facility where all human contact prohibited, conversation not permitted, lights on 24-hours-a-day, exercise allowed for only one hour per day in small indoor room, indefinite placement with annual review, and disqualification of otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration). Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to dictate where he is housed, whether it is which facility or which classification within a facility. See Schell v. Evans, 550 F. App’x 553, 557 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228–29; Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1197–98 (10th Cir. 2007). Moreover, jail officials are entitled to great deference in the internal operation and administration of the facility. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547–48 (1979). IV. Response Required Plaintiff is required to show good cause why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Failure to respond by the deadline may result in

dismissal of this matter without prior notice. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff is granted until May 19, 2025, in which to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated April 16, 2025, in Kansas City, Kansas. S/ John W. Lungstrum JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE