Smith 213317 v. Unknown Parties

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJanuary 19, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-02113
StatusUnknown

This text of Smith 213317 v. Unknown Parties (Smith 213317 v. Unknown Parties) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Smith 213317 v. Unknown Parties, (D. Ariz. 2023).

Opinion

1 KM 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Floyd Smith, No. CV 22-02113-PHX-JAT (CDB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Unknown, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 Plaintiff Floyd Smith, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis, 16 has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an 17 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The Court will dismiss the Complaint 18 with leave to amend. 19 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 20 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 21 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $22.97. The remainder 23 of the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income 24 credited to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 25 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate 26 government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 27 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 28 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 1 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 2 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 3 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 4 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 5 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 6 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 7 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 8 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 9 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 10 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 11 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 12 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 13 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 14 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 15 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 16 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 17 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 18 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 19 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 20 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 21 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 22 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 23 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 24 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 25 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 26 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 27 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 28 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 1 Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but because it may 2 possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend. 3 III. Complaint 4 Plaintiff names Correctional Officers John Doe 1 through 5 as Defendants in his 5 two-count Complaint and seeks money damages. 6 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges Defendants, who are members of the Tactical 7 Security Unit (TSU) used excessive force on him, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 8 Plaintiff claims that on April 27, 2022, Defendants carried him to the back of the dorm 9 building, “slammed” Plaintiff’s face and chest into the dry, rocky ground, shoved 10 Plaintiff’s face in the dirt, and left Plaintiff handcuffed on the ground for at least 45 11 minutes. Plaintiff claims Defendants’ actions were malicious “because (a) one of the five 12 defendants told [Plaintiff] they were treating [him] as described to teach ‘us’ a lesson; and 13 (b) [Plaintiff] was not threatening or aggressive to any prison staff.” Plaintiff claims he 14 suffered extreme dehydration, scrapes, and bruises, his leg and shoulder injuries were 15 exacerbated, and he has increased anxiety, depression, and “PTSD.” 16 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that on August 12, 2022, Defendants violated his 17 Fourth Amendment rights when they took Plaintiff’s property while they were searching 18 his dorm. Plaintiff claims he lost his TV, fan, headphones, towels, and shoes. 19 IV. Failure to State a Claim 20 A. Count One 21 When an inmate claims that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights 22 by using excessive physical force, the relevant inquiry is “whether force was applied in a 23 good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause 24 harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). However, the Supreme Court has 25 made it clear that not every use of physical force violates the Eighth Amendment: 26 That is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard 27 gives rise to a federal cause of action. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d [1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973)] (“Not every push or 28 shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights”). 1 Id. at 9. 2 Plaintiff’s allegations in Count One are too vague to state a claim. Plaintiff does 3 not describe the incidents leading up to the use of force and it is unclear whether Plaintiff 4 complied with Defendants’ orders and whether Defendants used force to maintain or 5 restore discipline or for the purpose of causing harm. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state 6 a claim in Count One. 7 B. Count Two 8 The Fourth Amendment does not protect an inmate from the seizure of his property. 9 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 n.8 (1984); see also Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 10 806 (9th Cir. 1989) (no Fourth Amendment claim arose from seizure, conversion, and 11 destruction of inmate’s assets).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hudson v. Palmer
468 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Daniels v. Williams
474 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Hudson v. McMillian
503 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
James F. Taylor v. MacE Knapp
871 F.2d 803 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
United States v. Anthony Bruce Cannon
15 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 1994)
Andre Dennison v. Charles Ryan
522 F. App'x 414 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Smith 213317 v. Unknown Parties, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/smith-213317-v-unknown-parties-azd-2023.