Smarthealth Incorporated v. Chemotechnique MB Diagnostics AB, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 16, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00115
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Smarthealth Incorporated, No. CV-25-00115-PHX-JJT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Chemotechnique MB Diagnostics AB, et al.,

13 Defendants.

14 15 At issue is Defendant Chemotechnique MB Diagnostics AB’s Motion to Dismiss 16 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and Joinder in Dormer Laboratories Inc.’s Motion 17 (“Motion to Dismiss”) (Doc. 12, Mot.), to which Plaintiff Smarthealth Incorporated 18 responded (Doc. 45, Resp.), Chemotechnique replied (Doc. 51, Reply), and both parties 19 sur-replied. (Docs. 56–57). The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without 20 oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies 21 Chemotechnique’s Motion to Dismiss. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 Smarthealth, also known as “SmartPractice,” is an Arizona entity that manufactures 24 and sells patch tests to diagnose allergic contact dermatitis. (Doc. 36, FAC, ¶¶ 6, 33, 36.) 25 Generally, patch tests are comprised of an allergen, also called a “hapten,” and a chamber 26 that is applied to the skin and directly delivers the allergen. (Id. ¶ 29.) Chemotechnique, a 27 Swedish entity, manufactures its own allergens and chambers for patch testing. (Id. ¶¶ 2– 28 3.) Allergens must be licensed by the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”) to be legally 1 sold and distributed in the United States. (Id. ¶ 31.) Smarthealth’s products are licensed by 2 the FDA (id. ¶ 33, 36), but Chemotechnique’s products are not (id. ¶¶ 2–4). 3 Chemotechnique maintains no place of business in the United States. (Doc. 12-1, 4 Def. Decl., ¶ 5.) It has no employees, bank accounts or property in the United States. (Id. 5 ¶¶ 5–6.) It does not pay taxes, register to do business, or maintain sales contracts with 6 anyone in the United States. (Id.) Its products are distributed to the United States by a 7 Canadian-based distributor, Dormer, which also distributes the products in Canada. (Id. 8 ¶ 9.) In addition to distributing Chemotechnique’s products, Dormer also markets the 9 products at trade shows, on its interactive website, and in publications. (See FAC ¶¶ 42, 10 45, 50, 53, 58, 60, 70, 72, 74, 76.) 11 Chemotechnique’s business developer, David Alsheimer-Niklasson, avers that 12 Chemotechnique has no involvement in or control over Dormer’s marketing materials and 13 website that Dormer uses to sell its products. (Def. Decl. ¶¶ 10–13.) Chemotechnique’s 14 only independent marketing efforts, according to Mr. Alsheimer-Niklasson, include 15 maintaining a passive, informational website, circulating a quarterly e-newsletter to 16 subscribers around the world, and posting on social media accounts. (Id. ¶ 15.) 17 Mr. Alsheimer-Niklasson also acknowledges that, in the last decade, Chemotechnique’s 18 staff attended eight trade shows held in major U.S. cities where members of industry- 19 leading groups meet and lecturers share relevant research. (Id. ¶ 16.) At these trade shows, 20 Chemotechnique “distributes its yearly product catalogue and leaflet to international 21 participants,” examples of which are attached to Mr. Alsheimer-Niklasson’s declaration. 22 (Id. ¶ 18; see id. at 11–112, 128–34.) 23 Smarthealth sued Chemotechnique and Dormer on three claims: (1) false 24 advertising under the Lanham Act; (2) common law unfair competition; and (3) tortious 25 interference with contractual relations. (FAC ¶¶ 101–17.) The crux of Smarthealth’s claims 26 is that Chemotechnique and Dormer are using false or misleading statements in their 27 advertisements that give consumers the wrong impression that Chemotechnique’s products 28 are licensed by the FDA for sale in the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 1–5.) Chemotechnique now 1 moves to dismiss Smarthealth’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule 2 of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 For a federal court to adjudicate a matter, it must have jurisdiction over the parties. 5 Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982). 6 There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. General jurisdiction is 7 not at issue here. (See Resp. at 13–14 (Smarthealth conceding that there is no general 8 jurisdiction over Chemotechnique in Arizona).) Neither is specific jurisdiction within a 9 particular state at issue. (See id. at 2 n.2 (Smarthealth conceding that Chemotechnique has 10 no contacts with Arizona).) Rather, Smarthealth argues that this Court has nationwide 11 specific jurisdiction over Chemotechnique pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 4(k)(2), known as the “federal long-arm statute.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 13 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006). 14 Rule 4(k)(2) establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the following three 15 conditions are met: (1) the claims arise under federal law; (2) the defendant is not subject 16 to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and (3) exercising jurisdiction 17 comports with due process. Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). 18 Due process requires that a non-resident, non-consenting defendant have sufficient 19 minimum contacts with the forum so that “maintenance of the suit does not offend 20 traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 21 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation modified). The focus of this analysis is “on the relationship 22 among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 23 750 (9th Cir. 2025). Whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum1 24 turns on three elements. Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017). 25 First, the defendant “must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some 26 transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he

27 1 The due process analysis under Rule 4(k)(2) “is nearly identical to traditional personal jurisdiction analysis but rather than considering contacts between the defendant and the 28 forum state, we consider contacts with the nation as a whole.” Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). 1 purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby 2 invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Id. Second, “the claim must be one which 3 arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Id. And third, “the 4 exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be 5 reasonable.” Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two elements while the 6 defendant bears the burden of negating the third. Id. All three elements are required for 7 jurisdiction to lie. Id. 8 At the motion to dismiss stage, “the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that 9 the court has jurisdiction” and “need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional 10 facts to withstand the motion” when, as here, no evidentiary hearing is held. In re W. States 11 Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 741 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. 12 Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015). The facts alleged in the complaint are 13 generally accepted as true unless controverted by affidavit. Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. 14 Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977). But when facts contained in the parties’ 15 affidavits conflict, that conflict must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Rio Props., Inc. v. 16 Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 17 III. ANALYSIS 18 Neither party contests that the first two conditions of Rule 4(k)(2)—that the claims 19 arise under federal law and that Chemotechnique is not subject to any state court’s 20 jurisdiction—are met.2 Rather, the parties sharply contest whether jurisdiction meets the 21 due process standard under the minimum contacts test. 22 A. Purposeful Direction 23 To meet the first element of the minimum contacts test, the plaintiff must show the 24 defendant “either (1) purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities 25 2 Even if they had, this action plainly arises under federal law—the Lanham Act—and the 26 record indicates that Chemotechnique is not subject to the general jurisdiction of Arizona or anywhere else in the United States. (See Def. Decl. ¶¶ 4–7.) Chemotechnique could 27 avoid Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction only by designating a suitable state forum in which Smarthealth could have sued, but it does not attempt to do so at all. Fitbit, Inc. v. 28 Koninklijke Philips N.V., 336 F.R.D. 574, 582 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 1 in the forum, or (2) purposefully directed his activities towards the forum.” Pebble Beach 2 Co., 453 F.3d at 1155 (citation modified). When, as here, a plaintiff’s claims sound in tort, 3 courts apply the purposeful direction test. Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., 72 F. 4 4th 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2023) (applying the purposeful direction test to false advertising 5 and tortious interference claims). 6 To determine whether the defendant’s actions constitute purposeful direction, courts 7 apply the “effects” test developed in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984). The 8 Calder test requires that “the defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an intentional 9 act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is 10 likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 11 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation modified). “The proper question is not where the 12 plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct 13 connects [it] to the forum in a meaningful way.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014). 14 In other words, the relationship between the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation 15 “must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum State” and not 16 just “the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id. at 284–85 (emphasis in 17 original). Mere foreseeability that the forum will be affected is insufficient to satisfy the 18 Calder test—rather, there must be “something more.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin 19 Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 805 (9th Cir. 2004); Herbal Brands, Inc., 72 F.4th at 1092; 20 accord Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 111 (1987) 21 (plurality opinion). 22 Smarthealth lists many examples of what it believes to be Chemotechnique’s 23 contacts with the United States. The Court will address only one. Mr. Alsheimer-Niklasson 24 declared that Chemotechnique’s staff “distributes its yearly product catalogue and leaflet” 25 at trade shows held in the United States. (Def. Decl. ¶¶ 16–18.) Chemotechnique has 26 attended eight of these trade shows in the last decade (id. ¶ 16), some of which are led by 27 the American Contact Dermatitis Society (“ACDS”) whose membership, according to 28 Smarthealth’s evidence, is almost exclusively based in the United States (Resp. at 4–5; 1 Doc. 45-3 ¶¶ 3–11). The product catalogue and leaflet clearly market Chemotechnique’s 2 products, indicate distribution capability to the United States and, most importantly, bear 3 the same purportedly false or misleading language that form the basis for Smarthealth’s 4 claims, including the phrases “high quality,” and “most advanced.” (Compare FAC ¶ 58 5 with Def. Decl. at 13, 134; compare FAC ¶ 74 with Def. Decl. at 131.) These are precise 6 phrases that, according to Smarthealth, deceived professionals in the United States into 7 purchasing Chemotechnique’s products “believing them to have the same approvals, and 8 to have undergone the same rigorous safety and efficacy testing, as [Smarthealth’s] FDA- 9 approved and cleared products.” (FAC ¶ 93.) According to Smarthealth, it lost revenue and 10 market share because of Chemotechnique’s marketing. (Id. ¶¶ 94–95.) Smarthealth alleges, 11 and Chemotechnique does not controvert, that Chemotechnique was “informed of the false 12 and misleading nature of their advertisements and the unfair nature of their competition 13 against SmartPractice.” (Id. ¶ 97.) 14 The first Calder element3 requires that an act is intentional, which “has a specialized 15 meaning” in the context of specific personal jurisdiction and refers “to an intent to perform 16 an actual, physical act in the real world, rather than an intent to accomplish a result or 17 consequence of that act.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806. Chemotechnique admits that 18 its staff physically distributed material that contained the allegedly false or misleading 19 statements in the United States, so the act was plainly intentional. 20 Under the second Calder element, “[t]he proper question is not where the plaintiff 21 experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him 22 to the forum in a meaningful way.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 290. Here, Chemotechnique’s staff 23 traveled to the United States almost every year for the last decade and physically distributed 24 its own marketing material at major industry events. The evidence demonstrates that some 25 of these events are led by a group of predominantly U.S.-based medical professionals. (See

26 3 Neither party directly applies the Calder elements to Chemotechnique’s distribution of product catalogs and leaflets specifically; they focus on many other purported contacts that 27 Chemotechnique has with the United States. Still, it was Chemotechnique that verified this activity and attached an example of its marketing material to its’ business developer’s 28 declaration. Consideration of that activity and that material is fairly before the Court, and both parties have had a full and fair opportunity to address it. 1 Doc. 45-3 ¶¶ 3–11.) Chemotechnique’s nearly annual distribution of advertisements at 2 major meetings and events held by a predominantly U.S.-based group enables 3 Chemotechnique to directly market its products to an audience that is acutely interested in 4 contact dermatitis diagnostic tools in the United States. This conduct is intentional, 5 meaningful, and directly connects Chemotechnique to the United States. 6 The third Calder element requires the act to cause harm that Chemotechnique knew 7 was likely to be suffered in the United States. First, Chemotechnique clearly knew its staff 8 distributed marketing materials while physically present in the United States; 9 Mr. Alsheimer-Niklasson admits as much in his declaration. (Def. Decl. ¶ 18.) Second, the 10 marketing materials manifestly contain statements that Smarthealth alleges are false or 11 misleading. (See, e.g., id. at 13, 131, 134.) Third, Smarthealth alleges, and Chemotechnique 12 does not refute, that Chemotechnique was notified that statements used in its marketing 13 material were false or misleading. (FAC ¶ 97.) Data Disc., 557 F.2d at 1284 (holding that 14 the facts alleged in the complaint are generally accepted as true unless contradicted by 15 affidavit). It is reasonable to infer from these facts that Chemotechnique knew that 16 consumers who received marketing material in the United States may rely upon false or 17 misleading statements of Chemotechnique’s products. This is precisely the harm that 18 Smarthealth allegedly suffers because of, in part, Chemotechnique’s marketing at these 19 trade shows. 20 Chemotechnique argues that its attendance at trade shows is insufficient to establish 21 personal jurisdiction and cites to Holland American Line, Inc. v. Wartsila North America, 22 Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 460 (9th Cir. 2007). In Holland, the plaintiff sued defendants for 23 negligent inspection of the plaintiff’s ship that was destroyed in an engine fire off of Tahiti. 24 Id. at 453–54. The only connection that the defendants had to the United States was that 25 they “occasionally visited cruise ships” and advertised in publications that “incidentally” 26 made their way into the forum. Id. at 460. But these contacts were completely disconnected 27 from the claims at issue. Here, Chemotechnique’s contacts are distinguishable. It did not 28 merely attend trade shows; rather, it intentionally distributed advertisements containing 1 allegedly false or misleading statements that are the crux of the claims while it attended 2 trade shows. This clear and meaningful connection between the act, the forum, and the 3 claims at bar was missing in Holland, but it is present here. 4 Chemotechnique also implies that personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) needs to 5 be “sufficiently extensive to warrant invoking this exceptional rule.” (Mot. at 5–6.) But 6 this Circuit imposes no higher standard for a non-resident’s minimum contacts than what 7 is traditionally applied in the specific jurisdiction analysis. Ayla, LLC, 11 F.4th at 978 n.1. 8 Having met each element of the Calder test, Chemotechnique’s contact with the 9 United States is the “something more” that is required for the purposeful direction test. 10 Accordingly, Smarthealth meets the first element of the minimum contact test. 11 B. Nexus 12 To meet the second element of the minimum contacts test, “the claim must be one 13 which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Morrill, 873 F.3d 14 at 1142. This inquiry does not demand “proof of causation—i.e., proof that the plaintiff’s 15 claim came about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. 16 Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S. 351, 362 (2021). While “[t]he first half of that 17 standard asks about causation . . . [] the back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some 18 relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.” Id. Still, the “relate to” 19 standard “does not mean anything goes,” and “relatedness requires a close connection 20 between contacts and injury.” Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 506 (9th Cir. 21 2023) (citation modified). In the Ninth Circuit, claims sufficiently relate to a defendant’s 22 forum contacts “if similar injuries will tend to be caused by those contacts” or “the 23 defendant should have foreseen the risk that its contacts might cause injuries like that of 24 the plaintiff.” Id. at 505–06. 25 As Chemotechnique itself asserts, “[t]his case is about alleged false advertising.” 26 (Reply at 2.) Smarthealth alleges that Chemotechnique made several statements in 27 advertisements that led physicians and medical professionals to believe Chemotechnique’s 28 products are: “(1) legally sold in the United States; (2) proven to be safe and effective; and 1 (3) that the physician and medical personnel legally can seek federal reimbursement for 2 [the] products if prescribed for Medicare patients.” (FAC ¶ 86.) The relevant statements 3 include: (1) the haptens are “high quality” (id. ¶ 58); and (2) the chambers are the “most 4 advanced” (id. ¶ 74). These statements appear in the product catalog and leaflet that 5 Chemotechnique admittedly distributes in the United States at major industry events. This 6 act clearly arises out of and relates to Smarthealth’s false advertising claims. Smarthealth 7 satisfies the second element of the minimum contact test. 8 C. Reasonableness 9 Because Smarthealth satisfies the first two prongs of the minimum contacts test, the 10 burden shifts to Chemotechnique to demonstrate a “compelling case” that exercising 11 jurisdiction over it is unreasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 12 (1985). Courts weigh seven factors to determine the reasonableness of jurisdiction over a 13 non-resident defendant. 14 The first factor considers the “the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection 15 into the forum state’s affairs.” Doe v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 157 F.4th 16 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2025). The Ninth Circuit has found this factor to be “analogous to the 17 purposeful direction factor.” Ayla, LLC, 11 F.4th at 984. Chemotechnique fails to address 18 this factor. In the absence of Chemotechnique’s argument otherwise, the Court finds that 19 Chemotechnique purposefully interjected itself into the affairs of the United States by 20 virtue of purposefully directing activity at the United States. This factor weighs in favor of 21 jurisdiction. 22 The second factor, which considers “the burden on the defendant of defending in 23 the forum” Doe, 157 F.4th at 1113, weighs against jurisdiction, but only slightly. 24 Chemotechnique has no agent or office anywhere in the United States. As Chemotechnique 25 contends, it would have to travel between Sweden and Arizona or, alternatively, consult 26 with its counsel across a nine-hour time difference. (Reply at 10.) Litigating in a foreign 27 country is an undeniable inconvenience, but it is mitigated by modern advances in 28 technology and this Court’s frequent use of electronic or telephonic means to conduct most 1 proceedings like scheduling conferences or discovery disputes. See Sinatra v. Nat’l 2 Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[M]odern advances in 3 communications and transportation have significantly reduced the burden of litigating in 4 another country.”); Ayla, LLC, 11 F.4th at 984 (noting that there are “unique burdens placed 5 upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system,” but those “burdens do not 6 outweigh the contacts on which [the plaintiff’s] claims are premised”). 7 The third factor considers “the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the 8 defendant’s state.” Doe, 157 F.4th at 1113. This weighs in favor of jurisdiction. 9 Chemotechnique does not address this factor and the Court is aware of no particular 10 conflict that adjudication in this forum creates with Sweden’s sovereignty. See, e.g., id. at 11 1114 (finding that a plaintiff’s claims predicated on harms arising from a foreign country’s 12 laws conflicts with that country’s sovereignty); Ayla, LLC,11 F.4th at 984 (finding that a 13 plaintiff’s claims involving only laws and activities occurring in the United States did not 14 conflict with a foreign country’s sovereignty). 15 The fourth factor considers “the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute.” 16 Doe, 157 F.4th at 1113. Chemotechnique argues that all Smarthealth’s claims will proceed 17 against Dormer, so the United States’ interest in adjudicating this dispute does not turn on 18 whether this Court exercises its jurisdiction over Chemotechnique. (Reply at 10–11.) The 19 Court disagrees. The United States has an interest in protecting consumers from false or 20 misleading advertisements; hence its Legislature enacting federal law to prohibit that 21 conduct. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The fact that another party may be held accountable does 22 not necessarily satisfy this interest in toto. This factor weighs in favor of jurisdiction. 23 The fifth factor regards “the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy” 24 and “focuses on the location of the evidence and witnesses.” Doe, 157 F.4th at 1114 25 (citation modified). According to Smarthealth, witnesses and evidence regarding customer 26 confusion are located in the United States. (Resp. at 17.) Smarthealth’s First Amended 27 Complaint also reflects this reality, as its claims center around U.S-based physicians’ and 28 medical professionals’ impression of advertisements from Chemotechnique. This factor 1 weighs in favor of jurisdiction, but only slightly because it “is no longer weighed heavily 2 given the modern advances in communication and transportation.” Doe, 157 F.4th at 1114 3 (citation modified). 4 The sixth factor assesses “the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in 5 convenient and effective relief.” Doe, 157 F.4th at 1113. Smarthealth argues that, without 6 jurisdiction here, it must “pursue duplicative litigation in, presumably, a foreign court, and 7 later pursue recognition of any judgment it obtains in order to enforce that judgment back 8 here in the U.S.” (Resp. at 17.) While certainly inconvenient, Smarthealth does not contend 9 that the relief it would be granted in other forums would be any less effective than what it 10 would receive here. This factor weighs in favor of jurisdiction, but only slightly for the 11 same reason that Chemotechnique’s inconvenience of litigating in a country foreign to it 12 would weigh against jurisdiction. 13 Finally, the seventh factor considers “the existence of an alternative forum,” which 14 Smarthealth bears the burden of disproving. Doe, 157 F.4th at 1113. Smarthealth fails to 15 do so and even presumes that it would “pursue duplicative litigation in . . . a foreign court” 16 if this Court declines jurisdiction. In so presuming, Smarthealth alludes to the existence of 17 a viable alternative forum. Accordingly, this factor weighs against jurisdiction. 18 In sum, the second and sixth factors effectively counterbalance each other, leaving 19 only the seventh factor weighing against jurisdiction while factors one, three, four and five 20 weigh in favor of jurisdiction. Chemotechnique fails to make a “compelling case” that 21 jurisdiction is unreasonable here, so Smarthealth meets the third and final element of the 22 minimum contacts test. Accordingly, Smarthealth establishes that subjecting 23 Chemotechnique to an action in the United States “would not offend traditional notions of 24 fair play and substantial justice.” Ayla, LLC, 11 F.4th at 979. 25 IV. CONCLUSION 26 Having met all three conditions of Rule 4(k)(2), this Court can exercise personal 27 jurisdiction over Chemotechnique. The Court will set a scheduling conference pursuant to 28 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 by separate order. 1 IT IS ORDERED denying Defendant Chemotechnique MB Diagnostics AB’s || Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and Joinder in Dormer Laboratories || Inc.’s Motion (Doc. 12). 4 Dated this 16th day of March, 2026. CN

Unifga State#District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-12-