JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a personal jurisdiction case. We conclude that Idaho does not have personal jurisdiction over a Missouri administrative agency and its employees in a suit seeking injunctive relief prohibiting certain child support collection activities.
I.
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Martin Smalley (the father) is a resident of Kootenai County, Idaho. An Idaho court awarded the father custody of his child (the child). Later, the child went to live with her mother (the mother) in Missouri. A Missouri court granted the mother custody of the child and ordered the father to pay child support (the Missouri support order). The mother requested the assistance of the Missouri Department of Social Services Division of Child Support Enforcement (the department) in enforcing the Missouri support order against the father.
The department sent the father a letter advising him of the methods it could employ in attempting to collect child support, including sending the child support debt information to a credit bureau. The father advised the department that the Missouri support order was invalid and unenforceable because the Missouri court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. Pursuant to federal law, the department sent the father a notice that it was required by federal law to report to consumer reporting agencies information about parents who owe $1,000 or more in past-due support. The notice stated that the department’s records showed that the father owed $4,880 in past due support. The department caused there to be placed in the records of the Coeur d’Alene Credit Bureau in Kootenai County, Idaho (the credit bureau), a report (the report) that the father was delinquent in the payment of child support. The department also issued a wage attachment to the father’s employer in the state of Washington. The father alleges that he has suffered a loss of his creditworthiness as a result of the actions of the department and its employees.
The father brought suit in Idaho against the department and its employees seeking an injunction declaring the Missouri child support order void and unenforceable and prohibiting the department and its employees from (1) seeking to enforce the Missouri child support order, (2) reporting the alleged delinquency, and (3) attempting to intercept the father’s earnings. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction. An attorney for the department and its employees filed a notice of appearance. Later, the department and its employees moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, and, in the alternative, for failure to join an indispensable party-
The trial court dismissed the case based upon lack of personal jurisdiction. The father appealed.
II.
THE FATHER DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPEAL THE QUESTION CONCERNING WAIVER OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION.
The father asserts that the department and its employees waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction because of the general appearance by their attorney. We do not address this issue because the father failed to preserve the issue for appeal by [912]*912failing to present it to the trial court. Ordinarily, we will not consider on appeal an issue that was not presented in the trial court. One exception to this rule is that we will consider the lack of subject matter jurisdiction that is raised for the first time on appeal Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Turner, 130 Idaho 190, 191, 938 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1997). This case concerns personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we do not address the waiver issue.
III.
FOR IDAHO TO EXERCISE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEPARTMENT AND ITS EMPLOYEES WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.
The father asserts that the trial court should have ruled that there is personal jurisdiction over the department and its employees in Idaho. We conclude that it would violate due process for Idaho to exercise personal jurisdiction over the department and its employees.
In Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Washington, 123 Idaho 739, 852 P.2d 491 (1993), the Court restated the criteria we must employ in addressing the issue presented here:
In order for an Idaho court to exert jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, two criteria must be met; the act giving rise to the cause of action must fall within the scope of our long-arm statute and the constitutional standards of due process must be met.
Id. at 742, 852 P.2d at 494.
The father alleged that the report the department and its employees caused to be placed in the records of the credit bureau injured his creditworthiness. These allegations are sufficient to subject the department and its employees to personal jurisdiction under our long-arm statute. Id. at 743, 852 P.2d at 495 (reaffirming that an allegation that an injury has occurred in Idaho in a tortious manner is sufficient to invoke the long-arm statute).
We must next consider whether there are sufficient minimum contacts to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the department and its employees. Western States Equip. Co. v. American Amex Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994). In doing so, we adhere to the following standards:
In Houghland Farms[, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 803 P.2d 978 (1990)], the Court noted that I.C. § 5-514 [the long-arm statute] provides for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, and therefore the “suit for which jurisdiction is sought must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with Idaho.” Not just any contacts with Idaho will suffice to sustain the exercise of jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has described the idea of minimum contacts as “some act by which the defendant purposefiilly avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” For specific personal jurisdiction, the ensuing litigation must arise out of or relate to the contacts. Whether there have been sufficient contacts must be determined on a case by case basis.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Western States, the Court also pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the contacts must be sufficient that the defendants could “ ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court’” in the forum state. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287, 100 S.Ct. 559, 562, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)).
The only contacts the department and its employees had with Idaho were: (1) a letter and a notice sent to the father warning him of the actions that would be taken in order to collect delinquent child support, and (2) the report they caused to be placed in the records of the credit bureau.
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JOHNSON, Justice.
This is a personal jurisdiction case. We conclude that Idaho does not have personal jurisdiction over a Missouri administrative agency and its employees in a suit seeking injunctive relief prohibiting certain child support collection activities.
I.
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Martin Smalley (the father) is a resident of Kootenai County, Idaho. An Idaho court awarded the father custody of his child (the child). Later, the child went to live with her mother (the mother) in Missouri. A Missouri court granted the mother custody of the child and ordered the father to pay child support (the Missouri support order). The mother requested the assistance of the Missouri Department of Social Services Division of Child Support Enforcement (the department) in enforcing the Missouri support order against the father.
The department sent the father a letter advising him of the methods it could employ in attempting to collect child support, including sending the child support debt information to a credit bureau. The father advised the department that the Missouri support order was invalid and unenforceable because the Missouri court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. Pursuant to federal law, the department sent the father a notice that it was required by federal law to report to consumer reporting agencies information about parents who owe $1,000 or more in past-due support. The notice stated that the department’s records showed that the father owed $4,880 in past due support. The department caused there to be placed in the records of the Coeur d’Alene Credit Bureau in Kootenai County, Idaho (the credit bureau), a report (the report) that the father was delinquent in the payment of child support. The department also issued a wage attachment to the father’s employer in the state of Washington. The father alleges that he has suffered a loss of his creditworthiness as a result of the actions of the department and its employees.
The father brought suit in Idaho against the department and its employees seeking an injunction declaring the Missouri child support order void and unenforceable and prohibiting the department and its employees from (1) seeking to enforce the Missouri child support order, (2) reporting the alleged delinquency, and (3) attempting to intercept the father’s earnings. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction. An attorney for the department and its employees filed a notice of appearance. Later, the department and its employees moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, and, in the alternative, for failure to join an indispensable party-
The trial court dismissed the case based upon lack of personal jurisdiction. The father appealed.
II.
THE FATHER DID NOT PRESERVE FOR APPEAL THE QUESTION CONCERNING WAIVER OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION.
The father asserts that the department and its employees waived the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction because of the general appearance by their attorney. We do not address this issue because the father failed to preserve the issue for appeal by [912]*912failing to present it to the trial court. Ordinarily, we will not consider on appeal an issue that was not presented in the trial court. One exception to this rule is that we will consider the lack of subject matter jurisdiction that is raised for the first time on appeal Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Turner, 130 Idaho 190, 191, 938 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1997). This case concerns personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, we do not address the waiver issue.
III.
FOR IDAHO TO EXERCISE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE DEPARTMENT AND ITS EMPLOYEES WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.
The father asserts that the trial court should have ruled that there is personal jurisdiction over the department and its employees in Idaho. We conclude that it would violate due process for Idaho to exercise personal jurisdiction over the department and its employees.
In Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Washington, 123 Idaho 739, 852 P.2d 491 (1993), the Court restated the criteria we must employ in addressing the issue presented here:
In order for an Idaho court to exert jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, two criteria must be met; the act giving rise to the cause of action must fall within the scope of our long-arm statute and the constitutional standards of due process must be met.
Id. at 742, 852 P.2d at 494.
The father alleged that the report the department and its employees caused to be placed in the records of the credit bureau injured his creditworthiness. These allegations are sufficient to subject the department and its employees to personal jurisdiction under our long-arm statute. Id. at 743, 852 P.2d at 495 (reaffirming that an allegation that an injury has occurred in Idaho in a tortious manner is sufficient to invoke the long-arm statute).
We must next consider whether there are sufficient minimum contacts to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the department and its employees. Western States Equip. Co. v. American Amex Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 158, 868 P.2d 483, 486 (1994). In doing so, we adhere to the following standards:
In Houghland Farms[, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 803 P.2d 978 (1990)], the Court noted that I.C. § 5-514 [the long-arm statute] provides for the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction, and therefore the “suit for which jurisdiction is sought must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with Idaho.” Not just any contacts with Idaho will suffice to sustain the exercise of jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has described the idea of minimum contacts as “some act by which the defendant purposefiilly avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” For specific personal jurisdiction, the ensuing litigation must arise out of or relate to the contacts. Whether there have been sufficient contacts must be determined on a case by case basis.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Western States, the Court also pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the contacts must be sufficient that the defendants could “ ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court’” in the forum state. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 287, 100 S.Ct. 559, 562, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)).
The only contacts the department and its employees had with Idaho were: (1) a letter and a notice sent to the father warning him of the actions that would be taken in order to collect delinquent child support, and (2) the report they caused to be placed in the records of the credit bureau. By the letter and the notice neither the department nor its employees purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Idaho, nor could they reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in Idaho. They were only carrying out the requirements of federal [913]*913and Missouri law to communicate possible collection procedures to the father. Causing the report to be placed in the records of the credit bureau, however, is more problematic.
In considering a request to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, both the trial court and this Court must consider the facts asserted in the light most favorable to the father and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn in favor of the father from these asserted facts. Houghland Farms, 119 Idaho at 74-75, 803 P.2d at 980-81. Applying this standard to the contact the department and its employees had with Idaho by causing the report to be placed in the records of the credit bureau, we conclude that this is a sufficient minimum contact to subject the department and its employees to personal jurisdiction in Idaho concerning the father’s request to enjoin them from reporting falsely to third parties that the father was delinquent in paying child support. The same is not true of the father’s request that the Idaho court declare the Missouri support order void and unenforceable or to prohibit the department and its employees from seeking to intercept the father’s wages and tax refunds or from similar collection activities. By this ruling we do not intend to indicate the validity of the father’s contention that the report was false, but only to indicate that causing the report to be placed in the records of the credit bureau was sufficient to demonstrate that the department and its employees had availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities within this state so that they should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court here.
Our analysis of the due process implications of subjecting the department and its employees to Idaho’s jurisdiction on this one claim does not end here, however. In Wesiem States, we pointed out the next stage of the analysis:
The due process analysis is a two-step process. Once a court determines that the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state exist, the court must then consider the contacts in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” This analysis permits the court to consider:
“the burden on the defendant,”
“the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,”
“the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,”
“the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,” and
the “shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”
125 Idaho at 158-59, 868 P.2d at 486-87 (citations omitted).
Considering these factors, we conclude that the assertion of personal jurisdiction by an Idaho court would not comport with fair play and substantial justice. The father’s underlying allegation that the report is false because it states that the father is delinquent in the payment of child support will depend on the validity of the Missouri support order. Missouri and not Idaho is the proper forum for this determination. The department’s authority to assist the mother in collection of support is granted by Missouri law. Federal law specifies certain procedures the department must follow. Idaho’s only interest in the validity of the Missouri order is that the father lives here. This is an insufficient interest when balanced against the burden to the department and its employees to defend in Idaho, the efficient resolution of the controversy over the validity of the Missouri order, and the shared interest of several states in furthering the fundamental substantive social policy of collecting child support for the benefit of children. Therefore, we conclude it would violate due process to subject the department and its employees to Idaho’s jurisdiction even on the limited issue of enjoining them from reporting falsely to third parties that the father is indebted for child support.
IV.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the case.
[914]*914We award the department and its employees costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal.
TROUT, C.J., and SILAK and WALTERS, JJ., concur.