S.M., Etc. v. Board of Education of the Township of Monroe in the County of Middlesex

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: May 18, 2026
• Docket: A-1256-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1256-23

S.M. o/b/o H.M.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF MONROE IN THE COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX, ROBERT GOODALL, ANTHONY GAMBINO and DANIEL LEE,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

J.H., S.H., and A.H.,

Defendants. ________________________________

Argued October 8, 2025 – Decided May 18, 2026

Before Judges Smith and Jablonski.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-2756-17. William Bloom argued the cause for appellants (Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys; William Bloom, on the briefs).

R. Armen McOmber argued the cause for respondent (McOmber McOmber & Luber, PC, attorneys; R. Armen McOmber, of counsel and on the brief; Austin B. Tobin, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Monroe Township Board of Education ("Board") appeals

from an August 11, 2023, order denying its motion for a new trial. The

underlying dispute involved allegations that plaintiff H.M., 1 a student in the

Board's district, was subjected to harassment based on his sexual orientation

by another student, J.H., that escalated into a physical altercation in a school

locker room. Following a lengthy charge conference, the trial judge crafted a

single jury question to allow the jury to consider the plaintiff's claim under the

New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and awarded damages. The

trial court denied defendant's request for a new trial. We affirm.

1 We use initials to protect plaintiff's and minors' privacy. See R. 1:38- 3(a)(2). A-1256-23 2 I.

Plaintiff sued the Board, Robert Goodall, Anthony Gambino, and Daniel

Lee ("Board defendants"), J.H. (a fellow student) and his mother S.H. 2

Plaintiff asserted causes of action against the Board defendants for hostile

classroom environment and retaliation in violation of the NJLAD, negligence,

negligent supervision, negligent training, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. Plaintiff's claims against J.H. and S.H. included assault,

battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dispositive motion

practice in February 2021 reduced the number of claims presented at trial to:

hostile classroom environment; gender/sexual orientation discrimination; and

negligence allegations. Trial began in May 2021.

The evidence revealed that plaintiff and J.H. attended Monroe Township

schools together from sixth through tenth grade. H.M. encountered repeated

harassment from J.H., beginning in middle school, such as physical

intimidation, derogatory slurs including being called "gay" and "f****t," and

isolated incidents of assault. H.M. complained frequently to the school's staff.

His mother corroborated his testimony, stating that he spoke to her on several

2 At the time the complaint was filed, plaintiff H.M. and defendant J.H. were minor children. By the time of trial in May 2023, both plaintiff and defendant were adults. A-1256-23 3 occasions about J.H.'s harassment throughout middle school. She testified that

she addressed J.H.'s harassment of her son to his math teacher during parent -

teacher conferences, and in response, the teacher acknowledged the school was

aware of the harassment because it often occurred during class. The school

never tried to remediate the situation.

The harassment persisted into high school. In tenth grade, both students

were enrolled in driver's education and gym classes. J.H.'s harassment

escalated. He threw objects at plaintiff, verbally abused him, and physically

assaulted him. J.H. and his friends would bar plaintiff from entering class,

saying "gay people aren't allowed in the classroom."

A physical altercation between plaintiff and J.H. occurred in the gym

locker room in November 2015. At that time, J.H. directed homophobic

epithets at plaintiff and plaintiff's friend. Conflicting testimony was presented

as to the circumstances and precipitating actions. However, the exchange was

captured on cell phone video and was shown to the jury at trial.

The video begins with plaintiff on his knees smiling at J.H., offering oral

sex to him and asking him to expose his penis. In response, J.H. repeatedly

asked plaintiff to stop, becoming more visibly agitated, and warning that if

plaintiff continued, J.H. would hit him. Plaintiff repeated his statements as

A-1256-23 4 J.H. came closer to him. J.H. then punched plaintiff several times in the face.

Other students separated the two. However, after J.H. was pulled to the other

side of the room, plaintiff stood up and moved towards J.H. to re-engage in the

altercation. The recording shows J.H. punching plaintiff who subsequently fell

over a bench onto the ground. Notably, no teaching staff were present in the

locker room during the incident.

In addition to other fact and expert witnesses, plaintiff called Edward

Dragan, Ed.D., who opined on applicable standards of care in school settings.

Dr. Dragan concluded that deficiencies in the Board's response constituted a

"major breach" of its professional duty. Dr. Dragan further emphasized the

school's awareness of J.H.'s problematic history, as corroborated by evidence

of disciplinary infractions dating back several years, including bullying, bias

incidents, and sexual harassment. School principal Robert Goodall testified

that he was not informed of J.H.'s disciplinary background.

After each party rested, the trial judge convened a charge conference that

was held over two days in May 2023. Plaintiff submitted a proposed charge

fashioned from the New Jersey Model Civil Jury charges, including the

NJLAD-based claims, the negligence causes of action, and the customary

instructions regarding damages, the burden of proof and, the roles of the judge

A-1256-23 5 and jurors. Defendants initially objected to the jury charge but, according to

plaintiff, later withdrew the objection in writing. 3

Plaintiff prepared a draft jury verdict form that, in addition to

negligence-based claims, included a specific section asking the jury to

consider the following three questions about plaintiff's NJLAD claims:

1. Do you find that [plaintiff] was subjected to discrimination and harassment at the Monroe Township High School?

....

2. Do you find that [plaintiff] suffered emotional distress as a result of the discrimination and harassment?

3. What amount of money do you find [plaintiff] is entitled to for emotional distress as a result of the discrimination and harassment?

Defendants objected to these questions and alternatively requested these

seven be presented to the jury:

1. Has [p]laintiff proved that the claimed harassment against him by [J.H.] actually occurred?

3 The record before us does not include that correspondence. A-1256-23 6 2. Has [p]laintiff proved that the harassment occurred because of perceived sexual orientation?

3. Has [p]laintiff proved that [ ] defendant Monroe Township Board of Education knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take effective remedial measures to stop it?

4. Has [p]laintiff proved that defendant Monroe Township Board of Education was negligent by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the harassment from occurring?

5. Has defendant Monroe Township Board of Education proved that it exercised reasonable care to prevent harassment in school by having in place appropriate policies and complaint mechanisms and that [p]laintiff negligently failed to take advantage of such policies and complaint mechanisms provided by defendant?

6. Has [p]laintiff proved that the harassment was severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable person believe that the conditions of his schooling were altered and that the school environment was hostile?

A-1256-23 7 7. What amount of money would fairly and reasonably [compensate] [p]laintiff for pain, suffering, disability, impairment, and loss of enjoyment of life due to the harassment[?]

Defendants contend that a more robust set of interrogatories was

necessary to break down the elements of the NJLAD and the prongs of

defendants' affirmative defenses. After considering both submissions, and

over the defendants' objection, the trial judge reduced the NJLAD issue to a

single question:

1. Do you find [plaintiff H.M.] has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Monroe Township Board of Education defendants subjected [H.M.] to discrimination and harassment while a student at the Monroe Township High School?

The verdict sheet was presented to the jury along with a fifty-three-page

jury charge.

The jury deliberated for seventy-five minutes and returned a unanimous

verdict for plaintiff, and awarded $500,000 in compensatory damages.

The Board moved for a new trial, arguing the jury verdict sheet

regarding the NJLAD claim was deficient and misleading and the jury verdict

was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion,

stating:

A-1256-23 8 [T]he law is clear, that a [c]ourt's oral instruction is sufficient to convey an understanding of the elements. Here the jury charge -- here, the [c]ourt charged the jury in the applicable law, and even provided them with a copy of the jury charge, to reference while completing the verdict sheet.

Therefore, the jury was not confused and mislead about the elements of the claim they considered [on the verdict] before it was even presented to the jury. Therefore, the request for a new trial on a deficient verdict sheet is denied.

On the issue of miscarriage of justice, . . . [t]he [c]ourt finds that a miscarriage of justice did not occur here, as there was ample basis upon which the jury could rule in plaintiff's favor. [Defendants] argue[] that plaintiff's testimony was not credible. However, plaintiff's testimony was not the only factor presented and considered by the jury. And even if it was, jury verdicts can be based on the testimony of a single witness. The jury heard testimony from the plaintiff, teachers, administrators from the high school, and experts. They reviewed [J.H.'s] disciplinary record, that show[ed] a history of aggressive behavior, reports from [plaintiff's expert], and watched a video of the physical altercation that took place between the students.

Since defendant[s] never actually put on their own case, the jury only had plaintiff's testimony, with nothing to refute it, other than defendant[s]' attempt to challenge [ ] plaintiff's truthfulness. The jury still must have determined that plaintiff was credible.

A-1256-23 9 In November 2023, the trial court entered a total judgment of

$1,397,487.60, representing the jury award and attorney fees.

Defendants appeal the denial of its new trial motion, asserting that the

trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the jury verdict

sheet was so deficient as to produce an unjust result.

II.

Rule 4:49-1 directs the court "shall grant [a] motion [for a new trial] if,

having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the

credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was

a miscarriage of justice under the law." The standard of review on appeal from

a decision on a motion for a new trial is the "same governing the trial judge -

whether there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." Risko v. Thompson

Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 522 (2011); see also Hayes v.

Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 386 (2018); R. 2:10-1. "[A] 'miscarriage of justice'

can arise when there is a 'manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to

support the finding,' when there has been an 'obvious overlooking or under -

valuation of crucial evidence,' or when the case culminates in a 'clearly unjust

result.'" Hayes, 231 N.J. at 386 (quoting Risko, 206 N.J. at 521-22). A motion

for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and jury verdicts

A-1256-23 10 are entitled to considerable deference. Id. at 385; Lindenmuth v. Holden, 296

N.J. Super. 42, 48 (App. Div. 1996). As such, we must not only consider

whether the trial judge misapplied discretion, but also scrutinize the record to

ascertain whether a "miscarriage of justice" occurred. Pressler & Verniero,

Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, cmt. 4 on R. 2:10-1

(2026).

It is axiomatic that jury verdicts should be set aside in favor of a new

trial sparingly and only in cases of clear injustice. Dutton v. Rando, 458 N.J.

Super. 213, 223-24 (App. Div. 2019). A jury's verdict, including an award of

damages, is "cloaked with a 'presumption of correctness.'" Cuevas v.

Wentworth Grp., 226 N.J. 480, 501 (2016) (quoting Baxter v. Fairmont Food

Co., 74 N.J. 588, 598 (1977)).

The purpose of a verdict sheet and jury interrogatories, is "'to require the

jury to specifically consider the essential issues of the case, to clarify the

court's charge to the jury, and to clarify the meaning of the verdict and permit

error to be localized.'" Ponzo v. Pelle, 166 N.J. 481, 490-91 (2001) (quoting

Wenner v. McEldowney & Co., 102 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1968)).

They should be tailored to avoid confusion on the part of the jury. Id. at 492.

"'The framing of [jury] questions in clear and understandable language cannot

A-1256-23 11 be overemphasized.'" Id. at 491 (alteration in the original) (quoting Benson v.

Brown, 276 N.J. Super. 553, 565 (App. Div. 1994)). Errors in interrogatories

given to the jury are not grounds for reversal unless they were "misleading,

confusing, or ambiguous." Id. at 490 (quoting Sons of Thunder v. Borden,

Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 418 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]n

reviewing an interrogatory for reversible error, we . . . consider it in the

context of the charge as a whole [because a]n accurate and thorough jury

charge often can cure the potential for confusion that may be present in an

interrogatory." Id. at 491.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new trial because the trial

judge's use of a single, generalized interrogatory contained on the jury verdict

sheet to consider defendant's liability under the NJLAD was improper and

produced an unjust result. We disagree and conclude the trial judge's jury

charge was sufficient to provide the jury with a sufficient understanding of the

applicable law and each element plaintiff was required to prove and the verdict

sheet properly articulated the proper legal standard to be assessed and

permitted the jury to decide the issue accordingly.

A-1256-23 12 A.

A cause of action exists under the NJLAD "for student-on-student

harassment . . . if the school district's failure to reasonably address that

harassment has the effect of denying to that student any of a school's

'accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges.'" L.W. ex rel. L.G. v.

Toms River Reg'l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 381, 402 (2007) (quoting

N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1)). At the same time, however, "[a] school cannot be

expected to shelter students from all instances of peer harassment," such as

"isolated schoolyard insults or classroom taunts." Id. at 402, 406.

To state a claim under the NJLAD against a school:

an aggrieved student must allege [(1)] discriminatory conduct that would not have occurred "but for" the student's protected characteristic, [(2)] that a reasonable student of the same age, maturity level, and protected characteristic [(3)] would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive school environment, and [(4)] that the school district failed to reasonably address such conduct.

[Id. at 402-03.]

When developing this test, the L.W. Court decided not to adopt the U.S.

Supreme Court's "deliberate indifference" standard for Title IX claims from

Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641 (1999). Instead, it used

A-1256-23 13 the Lehmann standard 4 to hold a school district is responsible for harassment if

it knew or should have known about it, but did not take reasonable steps to

stop it. L.W., 189 N.J. at 390.

B.

Although defendants did not ultimately object to the jury charges, they

did object to the jury questions presented to assess plaintiff's NJLAD claim.

Defendants argue the proffered questions prohibited the jury from considering

each specific element of the NJLAD claim. Additionally, defendants argue the

question was flawed because the trial judge did not follow Model Jury Charge

2.21. As a result, the verdict sheet asked only if defendant "subjected"

plaintiff to harassment, instead of breaking the claim into specific elements.

The trial judge overruled the objection and stated the single question would be

adequate because the jury would receive a printed copy of the jury charge.

Following our review of the record, we conclude the trial judge's jury

instruction was both thorough and accurate. The interrogatory presented to the

4 The Lehmann standard, established in Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993), is a four-prong test for hostile work environment sexual claims. The court held that to state a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must allege: the complained-of conduct (1) would not have occurred but for the employee's gender; and it was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable woman believe that (4) the conditions of employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive . Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 603-604. A-1256-23 14 jury properly encapsulated the elements of NJLAD in order to permit the jury

to consider defendants' liability. It was not so misleading, confusing, nor

ambiguous that it was clearly capable of producing an unjust result to require a

new trial. R. 2:10-2.

In the instructions that accompanied the jury verdict sheet, the trial judge

clearly, meticulously, and explicitly explained to the jury that it was required

to find each element of plaintiff's NJLAD claim by a preponderance of the

evidence to vest liability on defendants. The judge also gave a detailed

explanation on each of the issues the jury had to decide in reaching the verdict

on the NJLAD claim. Notably, defense counsel provided his own explanation

on the applicable law and what it means in his closing statement with the

purpose of aiding the jury in its deliberations.

Defendants' claim that the jury instruction was vague or misleading is

belied by the record. The jury was encouraged to ask any questions that might

arise during deliberations. They did not, and unanimously returned a verdict in

plaintiff's favor. Additionally, following the announcement of the jury verdict,

the court polled the jury and every member agreed with the decision.

In sum, when considered with the jury charge and instructions as a

whole, the verdict sheet was not "clearly capable of producing an unjust

A-1256-23 15 result." Ponzo, 166 N.J. at 490; R. 2:10-2. As a result, the verdict sheet did

not constitute reversible nor plain error. Mogull v. CB Commercial Real

Estate Grp., Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 467-68 (2000). Therefore, defendants have not

established "clearly and convincingly . . . that there was a miscarriage of

justice under the law." R. 4:49-1(a).

To the extent we have not addressed any of defendants' remaining

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merits to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-1256-23 16