Sloan v. . Baird

56 N.E. 752, 162 N.Y. 327, 1900 N.Y. LEXIS 1254

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 27, 1900
• Status: Published

Opinions

The defendant was the owner of certain lands, buildings and machinery at Trenton, New Jersey, known as the plant of the Hamilton Rubber Company. She entered into a certain contract with the plaintiff by which she agreed to sell and convey the property to him within a time specified for the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). At the time specified the plaintiff tendered performance, but the defendant refused to convey the property to him; but instead, conveyed it to one Skrim. This action was brought to recover the damages which the plaintiff sustained by reason of the defendant's refusal to perform her contract.

The case was tried before a referee, who awarded the plaintiff fifteen thousand five hundred dollars ($15,500) damages, with interest thereon from the date of the breach of the agreement. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by deducting from the damages awarded by the referee the sum of two thousand eight hundred fifty-three dollars and fifty-four cents ($2,853.54) as interest, and also by deducting the sum of one hundred forty-two dollars and sixty-eight cents ($142.68) from the amount awarded as extra allowance in addition to costs, and as so modified the judgment was unanimously affirmed.

We have examined the exceptions raised by the defendant's appeal and are of the opinion that the questions involved were properly disposed of by the Appellate Division. The only question which we shall here discuss arises upon the plaintiff's appeal, in which he claims that the Appellate Division improperly modified the judgment by deducting from the sum awarded the interest from the time of the breach of the contract.

It is true that much has been written upon the subject of awarding interest, and that the authorities are not in entire harmony. But we must regard the question here under consideration as settled by our recent decision in the case of Gray v.Central R.R. Co. of N.J. (157 N.Y. 483). In that case the rule adopted by EARL, J., in White v. Miller (78 N.Y. 393) and by BRADLEY, J., in Mansfield v. N.Y.C. H.R.R.R. Co. (114 N.Y. 331) was approved and followed. The rule as stated in these cases is to the effect that in an action to recover unliquidated damages for a breach of a contract, interest is not allowable unless there is an established market value of the property, or means accessible to the party sought to be charged of ascertaining by computation, or otherwise, the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled. (See, also, McMaster v. State,108 N.Y. 542.) The damages in this case were the difference between the amount which the plaintiff agreed to pay and the value of the property. The property consisted of a parcel of land upon which there were buildings inclosing a quantity of machinery used in the manufacture of rubber. The factory had been operated for a number of years, but at the time of the contract it stood idle and unused. The property was of a special kind fitted for a peculiar business, and its value depended largely upon its location, condition and the demand for the goods which it was designed to manufacture. It appears that the machinery constituted the chief value of the property, and its long use, of necessity, produced a deterioration and impaired its value. The expert witnesses called upon the question of the value of the property widely differed in their judgments. With reference to the machinery their estimates ranged from five thousand dollars to forty-eight thousand dollars, and upon the whole property from thirty-five thousand dollars to one hundred thousand dollars. It is thus apparent that the damages sought to be recovered were not only unliquidated, but that no means were accessible to the defendant of ascertaining the amount which might be awarded by a jury and she called upon to pay. But it is said there was a market value. If so, what was it? Was it thirty-five thousand dollars or one hundred thousand dollars? The market value of property is established when other property of the same kind has been the subject of purchase or sale to so great an extent and in so many instances that the value becomes fixed. Bouvier, in his Law Dictionary, defines market value as a price established by public sales, or sales in the way of ordinary business, as of merchandise. The Century Dictionary defines market price as being the current price. (See, also, Murry v. Stanton,99 Mass. 345, 348.) While evidence was given by experts showing the value of the property, there is no evidence showing that this property had a market value established and fixed by which the defendant could determine the damages which the plaintiff was entitled to recover or compute the interest thereon, and there is no finding by the referee that the property had a market value.

The judgment should be affirmed, without costs to either party.