Cogswell v. Cogswell

2 Edw. Ch. 231
CourtNew York Court of Chancery
DecidedJanuary 28, 1834
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 2 Edw. Ch. 231 (Cogswell v. Cogswell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cogswell v. Cogswell, 2 Edw. Ch. 231 (N.Y. 1834).

Opinion

The Vice-Chancellor:

I. The first question raised by the bill in this cause, upon which the complainants ask the advice and direction of the court is: from what time Mrs. Cogswell, the widow, is entitled to the dividends on the three thousand pounds sterling British government three per cent, stock.

I infer, from the manner in which this is mentioned in the [237]*237will, that the testator possessed the particular stock at the time of his death. He does not direct the trustees to make an investment for that purpose, as in other instances where he is desirous of creating an income for annuities ; but the bequest is specifically of the interest or dividends upon three thousand pounds sterling British Government three per cent, stock, which the trustees are to permit the widow to take during her natural life. I am of opinion, as the will takes effect from the death of the testator, the widow is, from that time, entitled to the dividends, that is to say, the dividends which may accrue or be declared or become payable at any time after the death of the testator.

II. Next, as to her annuity of one thousand dollars. This is to arise, not from an investment airead}' made, but one to be made in stock of the United States or of this State or of some oank ; and as the testaior has not appointed the time within which the investment should be made, I think the executors may take one year for the purpose, in analogy to the time allowed by lawfor paying legacies : 2. R. S. 90. §. 43. The gross sum to be set apart to produce the yearly income of one thousand dollars is considered in the light of a legacy payable by law at the end of a year: 1 Roper on Leg. 588.% and consequently, the widow can only demand the income to accrue from it as commencing at that time, and she will be entitled to receive such interest or income quarterly, half-yearly or annually thereafter as dividends are declared. This, I think, is the plain meaning of the will.

III. The same may be said of the investment of one thousand dollars directed by the codicil to be made in like manner for the use of the two nieces Louisa and Ann W. Cogs-well ; and the like rule must be adopted with respect to the commencement of the interest payable to them. There is no difference in principle.

IV. Then, as to the two mortgages existing on parts of the real estate. The question is, who are to bear the burthen of them, and in what proportions and how and by whom are the principal and interest of such mortgages to be satisfied 1

By the R. S., 1. vol. ,749. §. 4., the devisee of real estate, subject to a mortgage executed by the testator, is bound to satisfy and discharge it out of his own property, without re[238]*238sorting to the executor, unless there be an express direction in the will to the contrary. Here there is no such direction. A life estate in the house and lot in Cedar street (encumbered by a mortgage of ten thousand dollars, being one of the the houses there situated of which the testator died seized) is given, under the trusts of the will, to the widow of the testator and to his brother Jonathan and sister Lois in equal thirds; and by the residuary clause, an estate in fee in remainder in the same property is given to the two nieces Mary and Elizabeth L. Cogswell, subject to the contingency of their dying without issue. The same is the case with respect to the ten vacant lots on Front street, which are under a mortgage of .two thousand six hundred and ninety dollars. Now, as between the tenants for life and those entitled in remainder, the former are bound to keep down the interest on the mortgage debts, and they must contribute alike out of their respective, shares of the rents and profits during life to pay the interest on those sums. As the life-estates fall in, the principal sums remain a charge upon the inheritance and must be borne by those who succeed to it. The tenants for life are not bound to extinguish the incumbrances. They are only to keep down the annual interest: 4. Kent’s Com. (1. Ed.) 72. 73.; and as a consequence of this rule, in case the mortgagees should call in their money or if it should be found expedient to pay them off out of the residuary personal estate belonging to the nieces Mary and lElizabeth, they will be permitted to stand in the place of the ¡mortgagees so far as to collect the interest payable by the 'tenants for life.

It appears that the executors have already paid off the mortgage of ten thousand dollars. The life-estates must bear the interest which accrued upon it from the death of the testator to the time of such payment; and they must continue to be charged with the interest on the principal sum in the same manner as if the mortgage remained. And the same rule must be observed with respect to the two thousand six hundred and ninety dollars whenever that mortgage shall be paid.

V. As regards the contract for the purchase of the lot in Chapel street: by whom is it to be completed and out of [239]*239what fund is the balance of the purchase money to be paid I

Upon the principle that equity considers that as done which is agreed to be done and that from the time of entering into an effectual contract for the sale of lands the purchaser is looked upon as the owner, so that in the event of his death the land descends to his heir or may be devised in his will: the change being as complete under a contract in the view of a court of equity as though the legal title had been conveyed: Jeremy’s Eq. Jur. 44ti, there can be no doubt but this lot is included in the devise of the life-estates before mentioned and of the remainder to the same two nieces. The balance of the purchase money unpaid stands as a debt against the testator which the executors must pay out of the personal assets like any other debt, unless it shall be found most advantageous to those interested in this part of the estate to rescind the contract with the vendor if he will consent. But I see nothing to prevent the tenants for life from insisting that the purchase shall be completed for their benefit. The title will, of course, be taken to the executors in trust for the purposes of the will. The circumstance that the old store house which stood upon this lot has been destroyed by fire since the death of the testator, does not give the tenants for life a right to have it rebuilt at the expense of other parts of the estate : because the lot as vacant is proved to be as valuable as it was with that building standing upon it.

VI. Another question is: whether any and what improvements are to be made upon the Chapel Street lots, the lots in Front Street and those in Charles Street; and if so, out of what funds ? Most of these are vacant lots. Such buildings as are standing upon any of them are of little value, and the property, in its present condition, is bringing very little income. Still, this affords no sufficient reason for applying the residuary personal estate to the erection of new buildings or the making of improvements on the lots for the benefit of the life-tenants. The testator has given no directions to this effect; and the parties must be content to take the property in the condition in which it happens to be at the death of the testator. They are at liberty to make leases for their lives, and to do any thing they please with the property for their own benefit not amounting to waste or inju[240]*240ry to the inheritance—and this too without requiring any direction or authority from the court for the purpose.

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Bluebook (online)
2 Edw. Ch. 231, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cogswell-v-cogswell-nychanct-1834.