SLIGHT BY AND THROUGH SLIGHT v. EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co.

979 F. Supp. 433
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. West Virginia
DecidedSeptember 23, 1997
DocketCivil Action 2:97-0088, 2:97-0089, 2:97-0090, 2:97-0091
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 979 F. Supp. 433 (SLIGHT BY AND THROUGH SLIGHT v. EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
SLIGHT BY AND THROUGH SLIGHT v. EI Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 979 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.W. Va. 1997).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HADEN, Chief Judge.

Pending are (1) Plaintiffs’ motions to remand; (2) Defendants Fred Winterkamp, Norman Merkosky, Total Distribution, Inc., and Max Blair’s motions to dismiss them as parties to the action; (3) Defendant DuPont’s motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens; (4) Plaintiffs’ motions to rule on the motions to remand before ruling on DuPont’s motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens; (5) Plaintiffs’ motions for leave to file late response to Defendants, forum non conveniens motions to dismiss; (6) Defendants’ motions to strike Plaintiffs’ Memoranda in Response to Defendants’ forum non conveniens motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, for leave to file surreply in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motions to remand; and (7) Plaintiffs’ motions for hearing on the forum non conveniens dismissal motion.

The Court (1) DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions to remand; (2) GRANTS Defendants Winterkamp, Merkosky, Total, and Blair’s motions to dismiss them as parties to the action; (3) DENIES Defendant DuPont’s motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens; (4) DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions to rule on the motions to remand before ruling on DuPont’s motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens; (5) GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motions for leave to file late response to Defendants’ forum non conveniens motions to dismiss; (6) DENIES Defendants’ motions to strike Plaintiffs’ Memoranda in Response to Defendants’ forum non conveniens motions to dismiss, but GRANTS Defendants leave to file surreply in opposition to Plaintiffs’ motions to remand; and (7) DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions for hearing on the forum non conveniens dismissal motion. 1

Below the Court below discusses the reasons for its rulings on motions (1), (2), and (3).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are British subjects residing in England. They allege serious birth defects caused by the inhalation, ingestion or dermal absorption of Benlate, a fungicide they used in their home gardens. Benlate, which is the DuPont trademark for the product, contains inert ingredients and the active ingredient benomyl. Plaintiffs allege the benomyl contained in the Benlate they used in their gardens was formulated by DuPont at its Belle, West Virginia plant.

At this early stage of the litigation it is not known whether the assailed product in fact was Benlate. However, it appears that Ben-late available for garden use in England during the relevant time period was packaged, labeled, marketed and sold by an English agrochemical company, Imperial Chemical Industries PLC (“ICI”). Beginning in 1983, ICI had entered an exclusive agreement with DuPont (U.K.) Limited to market and sell Benlate for home garden use. ICI also was responsible for maintaining the necessary registrations and approvals for the product in Great Britain.

Plaintiffs filed this civil action in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, West Virginia. Named Defendants include DuPont, a Delaware corporation, Fred Winterkamp, Norm Merkosky, Total Distribution, Incorporated, and Max Blair. Save DuPont, all Defendants are West Virginia residents or domiciliaries. Defendants removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) on grounds of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In the No *436 tice of Removal, Defendants asserted Winterkamp, Merkosky, Total and Blair were fraudulently joined by Plaintiffs in an attempt to render the case nonremovable. See 28 U.S.C. 1441(b) (stating an “action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.”).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Subject matter jurisdiction must be bottomed on a finding that the non-diverse Defendants, Winterkamp, Merkosky, Total and Blair, were fraudulently joined. A party wishing to establish fraudulent joinder must establish either:

[t]hat there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court; or that there has been outright fraud in the plaintiffs pleading of jurisdictional facts. The burden on the defendant claiming fraudulent joinder is heavy: the defendant must show that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim against the non-diverse defendant even after resolving all issues of fact and law in the plaintiffs favor. A claim need not ultimately succeed to defeat removal; only a possibility of a right to relief need be asserted.

Watson v. Appalachian Power Co., 934 F.Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.W.Va.1996) (Haden, C.J.) (quoting Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232-33 (4th Cir.1993) (citations omitted)). Because Defendants have made no attempt to prove outright fraud in Plaintiffs’ pleadings, they must show there is no possibility Plaintiffs could establish a cause of action against them in a West Virginia court.

Defendants have advanced compelling arguments that Winterkamp, Merkosky, Total and Blair were fraudulently joined. Plaintiffs did not contest these arguments as to the joinder of Merkosky, Total and Blair. Through silent acquiescence, Plaintiffs abandoned any contention that those three Defendants are proper parties. Plaintiffs devoted their entire response brief to the propriety of their joinder of Mr. Winterkamp. Defendants counter that no possibility of liability against Winterkamp exists because (1) the Complaint is based on Plaintiffs’ use of Ben-late from 1986-87, but that Winterkamp ceased his involvement with the plant that manufactured Benlate in 1980; (2) Plaintiffs’ theory of liability is based on design defects in Benlate, while Winterkamp had no involvement in the development, design, or safety testing of the product; (3) Plaintiffs’ first theory of Winterkamp’s liability—that corporate officers can be liable for the torts of their corporations—fails because (a) Winterkamp was not an officer of DuPont, and (b) as Plaintiffs concede, English law will apply in resolving the case, 2 and Plaintiffs have identified no comparable English law theory of liability against Winterkamp; and (4) Plaintiffs’ second theory of liability against Winterkamp—that an employee is not immune from liability for his own tortious acts—-must fail because (a) Plaintiffs have not alleged tortious conduct by Winterkamp, and (b) Plaintiffs have identified no English Law theory of liability against Winterkamp.

The Court agrees with Defendants and holds all, except DuPont, were fraudulently joined as Defendants. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants Winterkamp, Merkosky, Total, and Blair’s motions to dismiss and DENIES Plaintiffs’ motions to remand.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
979 F. Supp. 433, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/slight-by-and-through-slight-v-ei-du-pont-de-nemours-co-wvsd-1997.