Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res Jun 27 2013, 9:10 am judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
STEVEN J. HALBERT GREGORY F. ZOELLER Carmel, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KATHERINE MODESITT COOPER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
S.L., ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A02-1211-JV-937 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores, Judge The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, Magistrate Cause No. 49D09-1202-JD-456
June 27, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge Case Summary
S.L. appeals his juvenile adjudication for child molesting, which would have been
a Class B felony if committed by an adult. We affirm.
Issue
S.L. raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly excluded
certain evidence during the fact-finding hearing.
Facts
In October 2011, sixteen-year-old S.L. had sex with twelve-year-old J.W. in the
restroom of a church in Indianapolis. On February 23, 2012, the State alleged that S.L.
committed what would have been Class B felony and Class C felony child molesting if
committed by an adult. On September 25, 2012, a fact-finding hearing was held.
During J.W.’s cross-examination, the following exchange took place between
defense counsel and J.W.:
Q. Ok, now before I talk to about the statements, this incident about [S.L.] that you claimed happened, this wasn’t reported in October was it?
A. No sir.
Q. As a matter of fact you got in trouble at your school is that right?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And you have a principal named Mr. Amos?
Q. Ok, and at school I believe is that Warren Township Middleschool?
2 A. Yes sir.
*****
Q. . . . . And it wasn’t until you got in trouble with a boy named Tyrone I think at Warren Central . . .
Tr. pp. 19-20. At that point, the prosecutor objected, arguing that this evidence was
unrelated to this matter. Defense counsel explained that it was “very related . . . because
there comes a time where it’s advantageous for her to make up something about [S.L.]
after she got in trouble at Warren Central.” Id. at 20. The trial court overruled the State’s
objection.
Defense counsel then asked J.W., “Essentially there was a boy names [sic] Tyrone
that you supposedly had sex with at school?” Id. The prosecutor objected based on the
Rape Shield law and Indiana Evidence Rule 412. Defense counsel responded, “I’m not
admitting this for the truth of whether she had sex with Tyrone it has to do with the fact
that she was in trouble and she saw it advantageous to make up a story. It goes to motive
and making up a story.” Id. at 21. The trial court sustained the objection and explained
“if you want to talk about trouble in its’ [sic] general sense I don’t know if the nature . . .
of the trouble is relevant to what we’re doing.” Id. Defense counsel responded, “[f]air
enough you’re [sic] Honor.” Id.
Defense counsel then questioned J.W. as follows:
Q. But at, so at some point you went to talk to the principal?
3 Q. And then at some point not long after that you changed your story about [S.L.]?
Id. Defense counsel then began questioning J.W. about her statement to police.
Later, defense counsel questioned J.W. as follows:
Q. Alright, and you denied any involvement with [S.L.], nothing happened correct?
Q. And you continued to do that for over a month?
Q. Ok, until you got in trouble?
Id. at 28.
On re-direct, the prosecutor questioned J.W. about talking to the principal as
follows:
Q. Did Mr. Amos ever specially say [S.L.’s] name to you?
Q. How did he, how did Mr. Amos find out about [S.L.]?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Did you give Mr. Amos any information about what happened with [S.L.]?
A. No sir, no mam [sic].
Q. Did you ever tell him anything later about [S.L.]?
4 A. Yes mam [sic].
Q. And why did you tell him?
A. Because he asked me a question about that happened?
Id. at 30-31.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered a true finding as to the
Class B felony allegation.1 S.L. now appeals.
Analysis
On appeal, S.L. argues that the trial court improperly excluded evidence regarding
J.W.’s motive to lie. “The admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and we review for an abuse of discretion.” Conley v. State,
972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 2012). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.”
Id. “The trial court’s decision will not be disturbed absent a requisite showing of abuse.”
Id.
S.L. argues that he sought to introduce testimony regarding J.W. being called into
the principal’s office at school to support his theory that she fabricated the incident to get
out of trouble at school. S.L. asserts that the nature of this testimony was not the sexual
conduct of J.W. and that defense counsel explicitly stated he was not offering this
evidence to prove whether J.W. had sexual relations with another boy.
1 The trial court merged the Class C felony allegation into the Class B felony allegation. 5 Our review of the record shows that the trial court overruled the prosecutor’s
initial objection to this line of questioning. At that point, defense counsel began
questioning J.W. about having sex with someone else. When the prosecutor objected
again, the trial court sustained the objection and explained to defense counsel that he
could question J.W. about trouble at school in a general sense. Thus, although the trial
court did not allow defense counsel to question J.W. about past sexual conduct, the trial
court did permit defense counsel to question J.W. about getting in trouble in school as a
reason to lie about her allegations against S.L. And in fact, defense counsel questioned
S.L. about changing her story after she talked to the principal and did not make an offer
of proof regarding any excluded testimony.
Thus, to the extent defense counsel wanted to further question J.W. about getting
in trouble at school generally, there is no indication that the trial court would have
prohibited that. To the extent the trial court may have erred in its ruling, S.L. has not
shown how that error prejudiced his substantial rights because defense counsel did
question J.W. about changing her story after talking to the principal. See Ind. Trial Rule
61 (“No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect
in any ruling or order in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is
ground for granting relief under a motion to correct errors or for setting aside a verdict or
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res Jun 27 2013, 9:10 am judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
STEVEN J. HALBERT GREGORY F. ZOELLER Carmel, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
KATHERINE MODESITT COOPER Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
S.L., ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 49A02-1211-JV-937 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Marilyn A. Moores, Judge The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither, Magistrate Cause No. 49D09-1202-JD-456
June 27, 2013
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BARNES, Judge Case Summary
S.L. appeals his juvenile adjudication for child molesting, which would have been
a Class B felony if committed by an adult. We affirm.
Issue
S.L. raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court properly excluded
certain evidence during the fact-finding hearing.
Facts
In October 2011, sixteen-year-old S.L. had sex with twelve-year-old J.W. in the
restroom of a church in Indianapolis. On February 23, 2012, the State alleged that S.L.
committed what would have been Class B felony and Class C felony child molesting if
committed by an adult. On September 25, 2012, a fact-finding hearing was held.
During J.W.’s cross-examination, the following exchange took place between
defense counsel and J.W.:
Q. Ok, now before I talk to about the statements, this incident about [S.L.] that you claimed happened, this wasn’t reported in October was it?
A. No sir.
Q. As a matter of fact you got in trouble at your school is that right?
A. Yes sir.
Q. And you have a principal named Mr. Amos?
Q. Ok, and at school I believe is that Warren Township Middleschool?
2 A. Yes sir.
*****
Q. . . . . And it wasn’t until you got in trouble with a boy named Tyrone I think at Warren Central . . .
Tr. pp. 19-20. At that point, the prosecutor objected, arguing that this evidence was
unrelated to this matter. Defense counsel explained that it was “very related . . . because
there comes a time where it’s advantageous for her to make up something about [S.L.]
after she got in trouble at Warren Central.” Id. at 20. The trial court overruled the State’s
objection.
Defense counsel then asked J.W., “Essentially there was a boy names [sic] Tyrone
that you supposedly had sex with at school?” Id. The prosecutor objected based on the
Rape Shield law and Indiana Evidence Rule 412. Defense counsel responded, “I’m not
admitting this for the truth of whether she had sex with Tyrone it has to do with the fact
that she was in trouble and she saw it advantageous to make up a story. It goes to motive
and making up a story.” Id. at 21. The trial court sustained the objection and explained
“if you want to talk about trouble in its’ [sic] general sense I don’t know if the nature . . .
of the trouble is relevant to what we’re doing.” Id. Defense counsel responded, “[f]air
enough you’re [sic] Honor.” Id.
Defense counsel then questioned J.W. as follows:
Q. But at, so at some point you went to talk to the principal?
3 Q. And then at some point not long after that you changed your story about [S.L.]?
Id. Defense counsel then began questioning J.W. about her statement to police.
Later, defense counsel questioned J.W. as follows:
Q. Alright, and you denied any involvement with [S.L.], nothing happened correct?
Q. And you continued to do that for over a month?
Q. Ok, until you got in trouble?
Id. at 28.
On re-direct, the prosecutor questioned J.W. about talking to the principal as
follows:
Q. Did Mr. Amos ever specially say [S.L.’s] name to you?
Q. How did he, how did Mr. Amos find out about [S.L.]?
A. I don’t know.
Q. Did you give Mr. Amos any information about what happened with [S.L.]?
A. No sir, no mam [sic].
Q. Did you ever tell him anything later about [S.L.]?
4 A. Yes mam [sic].
Q. And why did you tell him?
A. Because he asked me a question about that happened?
Id. at 30-31.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered a true finding as to the
Class B felony allegation.1 S.L. now appeals.
Analysis
On appeal, S.L. argues that the trial court improperly excluded evidence regarding
J.W.’s motive to lie. “The admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and we review for an abuse of discretion.” Conley v. State,
972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 2012). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.”
Id. “The trial court’s decision will not be disturbed absent a requisite showing of abuse.”
Id.
S.L. argues that he sought to introduce testimony regarding J.W. being called into
the principal’s office at school to support his theory that she fabricated the incident to get
out of trouble at school. S.L. asserts that the nature of this testimony was not the sexual
conduct of J.W. and that defense counsel explicitly stated he was not offering this
evidence to prove whether J.W. had sexual relations with another boy.
1 The trial court merged the Class C felony allegation into the Class B felony allegation. 5 Our review of the record shows that the trial court overruled the prosecutor’s
initial objection to this line of questioning. At that point, defense counsel began
questioning J.W. about having sex with someone else. When the prosecutor objected
again, the trial court sustained the objection and explained to defense counsel that he
could question J.W. about trouble at school in a general sense. Thus, although the trial
court did not allow defense counsel to question J.W. about past sexual conduct, the trial
court did permit defense counsel to question J.W. about getting in trouble in school as a
reason to lie about her allegations against S.L. And in fact, defense counsel questioned
S.L. about changing her story after she talked to the principal and did not make an offer
of proof regarding any excluded testimony.
Thus, to the extent defense counsel wanted to further question J.W. about getting
in trouble at school generally, there is no indication that the trial court would have
prohibited that. To the extent the trial court may have erred in its ruling, S.L. has not
shown how that error prejudiced his substantial rights because defense counsel did
question J.W. about changing her story after talking to the principal. See Ind. Trial Rule
61 (“No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect
in any ruling or order in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is
ground for granting relief under a motion to correct errors or for setting aside a verdict or
for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order or for reversal on
appeal, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice.”); Ind. Evidence Rule 103(a) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected . . . .). To
6 the extent S.L. wanted to question J.W. regarding her past sexual conduct with someone
else, S.L. did not make an offer of proof sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal, and
the issue is waived. See State v. Wilson, 836 N.E.2d 407, 409 (Ind. 2005) (“[A]n offer of
proof must be sufficiently specific to allow the trial court to determine whether the
evidence is admissible and to allow an appellate court to review the correctness of the
trial court’s ruling and whether any error was prejudicial.”).
Conclusion
S.L. was permitted to question J.W. about changing her story after getting in
trouble at school and has not established that the trial court’s ruling regarding his cross-
examination of J.W. prejudiced his substantial rights. We affirm.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.