OPINION
EASTAUGH, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
An amended accusation issued by the Alaska Department of Law charged Paul Skvorc, an employee of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G), with twenty-three violations of the Alaska Executive Branch Ethics Act.1 The Alaska Personnel Board found twenty-two violations, imposed a $10,-000 fine, and recommended terminating Skvorc’s employment. The superior court affirmed. The amended accusation did not charge Skvorc with twenty specific acts found by the board to be violations of the prohibition on misuse of state time and equipment. We therefore remand for determination of whether lack of notice prejudiced Skvorc, and if so, for dismissal or retrial of those charges. We otherwise affirm, because we find either no merit or no prejudice in Skvorc’s other claims of error.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Paul Skvorc was an ADF&G employee specializing in the use of sonar to count fish. While so employed, Skvorc became involved in several personal business enterprises entailing the use of sonar, and engaged in four activities relevant to this appeal.
While he was an ADF&G employee, Skvorc formed a private business, Acoustic Research and Technology (ART). Skvorc applied on ART’s behalf for a grant from the Alaska Science & Technology Foundation. He hoped to develop “a fisheries management tool using pattern recognition for ID of individual fish.... ” He did not disclose these activities to his supervisors.
As an ADF&G employee, Skvorc also reviewed a letter sent to ADF&G discussing [1196]*1196the use of broadband sonar to identify fish. Its author, Patrick Simpson, sought to interest the state in his ideas for improving fish recognition technology in the hope that the state would hire him or fund his work. Skvore told Simpson the state would not hire him or fund his work. Skvore told Simpson that ADF&G was not a funding source. Skvore and Simpson then met privately and formed Scientific Fisheries Systems, Inc. (SFS) in order to seek federal and state grants to develop new fish identification technology.
SFS applied for a grant from the Alaska Science & Technology Foundation. Although the grant application contained statements suggesting that ADF&G supported the project, Skvore asked the Foundation not to share the application with ADF&G partly because he feared reprisal.
In early 1993 the Canadian Division of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) in British Columbia contacted Skvore at ADF&G. DFO asked Skvore to look at potential sonar sites on the Fraser River and to offer his advice about sonar placement. Skvore flew twice to British Columbia for this purpose. On both occasions, the Canadian government paid Skvorc’s travel expenses and provided a $100 (Canadian) honorarium.
Skvore subsequently signed a contract with DFO to provide consulting services on the Fraser River. Skvore signed the contract at ADF&G and had a subordinate at ADF&G witness his signature. Skvore did not disclose these activities to ADF&G.
Finally, DFO contacted Skvore at ADF&G and asked him to conduct a seminar on hy-droacoustics in Winnipeg. Skvore traveled to Winnipeg at Canadian government expense and learned of a project on the Arctic Red River. Skvore bid on the project on behalf of ART. DFO awarded Skvore the contract and paid him approximately $7,500 (Canadian).
After Skvorc’s supervisors lodged an ethics complaint with the Alaska Department of Law reporting some potential violations, the Alaska Department of Law, Office of the Attorney General, sent Skvore a letter informing him that it had received an Ethics Act complaint against him. The letter discussed his alleged activities concerning ART and SFS. Apparently paraphrasing the complaint from Skvorc’s department, the letter stated that Skvore may have violated the Ethics Act by misusing his official position, soliciting compensation for the performance of official duties from an entity other than the state, using state facilities to benefit personal and financial interests, and engaging in incompatible outside employment. The letter informed him that the attorney general had accepted the ethics complaint “as a complaint for purposes of initiating an investigation.” After investigating, the Department of Law filed a twenty-count accusation against Skvore with the Alaska Personnel Board in April 1995. An amended accusation filed in July 1995 included three more counts.
The personnel board hearing officer heard the case in November 1995 and issued proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations. The hearing officer found twenty-three violations of the Ethics Act; he recommended assessing fines exceeding $66,-000 and terminating Skvorc’s employment. The hearing officer found that Skvore was “not a credible witness,” having found that Skvore had been untruthful in his hearing testimony, at his deposition, and in dealing with ADF&G supervisors. The hearing officer also found that the violations were “most serious” and that Skvore had shown no remorse.
After a public hearing, the personnel board adopted the hearing officer’s recommendations, but reduced the fine to $10,000 and eliminated Count XXI. The board recommended Skvorc’s termination.
Skvore appealed to the superior court, raising various claims of procedural error and challenging the legal or factual basis for each violation. The superior court upheld the personnel board’s decision on all grounds. Skvore appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Several different standards of review apply to this case. We accord no deference to the decision of the superior court because [1197]*1197it acted as an intermediate court of appeal.2 However, we apply four different standards of review to the administrative decisions.
The “substantial evidence” test is used for questions of fact. The “reasonable basis” test is used for questions of law involving agency expertise. The “substitution of judgment” test is used for questions of law where no expertise is involved. The “reasonable and not arbitrary” test is used for review of administrative regulations.[3]
Many of the issues presented to this court concern the personnel board’s factual findings, which we would normally review under the substantial evidence test.4 Skvore argues, however, that we should substitute our judgment and accord no deference to the board’s or hearing officer’s findings in deciding whether the record supports the factual findings, because, he argues, the hearing officer and board adopted findings proposed by the attorney general rather than, drafting their own findings.
We disagree. Alaska Statute 39.52.360(g) authorizes a hearing officer to “direct either or both parties to submit proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation” upon the conclusion of a hearing. This provision implicitly authorizes use of parties’ proposed findings in formulating findings and conclusions.
The same is true of the board’s findings. After considering the hearing officer’s decision and the parties’ written and oral arguments, the board accepted most of the hearing officer’s findings. There is no indication the board abdicated its responsibility to fully consider the issues before it; the board’s reduction of the recommended penalties and rejection of Count XXI suggest otherwise.5
Accordingly, we review the board’s findings of fact under the substantial evidence test. Substantial evidence is “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”6
B. Adequacy of Notice
The accusation and amended accusation the attorney general filed with the personnel board alleged Ethics Act violations not specified in the complaint ADF&G sent to the attorney general. Skvore argues that this procedure violated the Ethics Act and his right to procedural due process. According to him, the Act and due process invariably require a mandatory two-stage process in which a complaint served on the employee must allege a particular violation before that alleged violation can be asserted in an accusation.
The first stage, according to Skvore, requires a complaint, an investigation, and a probable cause finding as to each violation charged. He argues that the complaint gives the employee an opportunity to respond while the Department of Law is still investigating. He reasons that the Department of Law may decide not to proceed to the accusation stage, permitting the investigation and complaint to remain confidential, or possibly permitting a negotiated settlement. He claims that the attorney general’s probable cause finding must be made on the basis of the charges alleged in the complaint. If the attorney general’s investigation, as here, reveals a basis for new charges, Skvore would require that any new charges be alleged in a new complaint. This would allow the employee to respond to the new charges, and would require an investigation and a probable cause determination for each new charge.
The second stage begins with the formal accusation and leads to a personnel board hearing.7 Skvore argues that this second stage can be taken only after the Department of Law finds probable cause to believe that there has been a knowing violation of [1198]*1198charges set out in a complaint; he thus argues that the state was required to serve him with a complaint containing the additional charges.
The text of the Ethics Act does not invariably require the two-stage process Skvorc advocates. Certainly the investigation and accusation process may begin with a complaint either received or initiated by the attorney general.8 But that is not the only way the accusation process can begin. If the attorney general determines that “there is probable cause to believe that a knowing violation [of the Act] has occurred,” AS 39.52.350(a) provides that the attorney general “shall initiate formal proceedings by serving a copy of an accusation” on the “subject of the accusation.”9 That determination does not necessarily require that there be a prior complaint, much less an amended complaint charging all violations revealed upon investigation.
In contrast, two other clauses in AS 39.52.350(a) permit accusations in situations that appear to contemplate prior complaints. One clause permits an accusation if there is probable cause to believe that there is “a violation that cannot be corrected under AS 39.52.330,” a statute that refers to the “subject of a complaint.”10 The other clause permits an accusation if “the subject of a complaint” has failed to comply with a recommendation for corrective or preventive action.11 Even these two clauses do not require that the complaint be amended in the event of later-revealed violations. If they did, the pleading and investigation process would have to begin all over again, at least as to any new charges. The Act does not intimate any such requirement. And because the attorney general must find probable cause before serving the accusation, the accusation process itself requires a preliminary probable cause finding and gives the employee notice of the charges. The Act does not require, or imply, that violations discovered during an investigation must be included in an amended complaint before they can be alleged in an accusation. And the statute specifying the content of complaints does not require amendment.12
[1199]*1199The benefits of Skvorc’s proposed procedure seem dubious, and are not mandated by the Act or due process. Thus, allowing an employee to respond to the accusation is equivalent to allowing a response to an amended complaint. Requiring an amended complaint does not seem likely to make accusations materially more accurate, and any marginal inaccuracy can be attacked at or before the hearing. Reinvestigating after the accused responds to an amended complaint would be of little utility, given that the attorney general must find probable cause before filing an accusation; that finding likewise minimizes the justification for, or the importance of, confidentiality. And serving the accusation does not preclude the attorney general and the employee from negotiating terms that might avoid a hearing.
We agree with Skvorc that it is important for an employee to have notice of all violations to be heard. Although Skvorc was not told at the complaint stage of all of the charges finally alleged, the July 1995 amended accusation charged all twenty-three counts heard in November 1995. Except possibly with respect to Count XXII, which we discuss below in Part III.D.7, the amended accusation gave Skvorc adequate and timely notice of the charges against him. Skvorc also had an opportunity to respond to the accusation, and therefore had an adequate opportunity to be heard and to contest all the charges, except, possibly, those encompassed by Count XXII. Due process does not require the procedure he proposes.
We are unpersuaded by Skvorc’s assertion that we should analogize to criminal procedure. The superior court correctly reasoned that “a proceeding under the Ethics Act is more akin to other administrative proceedings than to a criminal proceeding, and therefore, amendment of the accusation should be permitted upon probable cause and in the absence of prejudice.”
Skvorc relies on Linstad v. Sitka School District13 as support for his assertion that the accusation cannot go beyond the complaint. But there we simply recognized that the district could not deviate from the original bill of particulars either at the administrative hearing or on appeal.14 Except as to Count XXII, discussed below, Skvorc is not claiming that the state deviated at the hearing from the charges asserted in the accusation.15
C. Ethics Disclosure
Skvorc filed an ethics disclosure form in early May 1993. His supervisor, Jeffery Koenings, drafted a memorandum to Skvorc stating that he recommended disapproval. Koenings did not send the memorandum, but instead recommended that the deputy commissioner file a complaint with the attorney general. The Attorney General’s Office notified Skvorc in December 1993 that it had received a complaint in June 1993.
Skvorc asks us to dismiss some charges because ADF&G did not respond to his ethics disclosure.16 He asserts that the Act required ADF&G to respond to him in writing,17 and that departmental guidelines required response within twenty working days. Based on employee testimony that the department typically does not respond to ethics disclosures, Skvorc argues that he reason[1200]*1200ably interpreted the department’s silence to indicate approval. He claims that its failure to respond was tacit approval that invalidated all charges based on his subsequent actions.
We agree that the department should have responded to Skvorc’s disclosure.18 But silence does not privilege his violations or relieve him of his obligation to comply with the Act.
The Act requires an employee involved in activities potentially barred by the Act to “refrain from taking any official action relating to the matter until a determination is made under this section.”19 Approval is a prerequisite to entering into any otherwise prohibited contract.20 Silence is not approval.
The statute did not give Skvorc the option of entering into contracts for outside employment without state approval. He was responsible for obtaining approval, and should not have acted without it. ADF&G’s failure to respond to Skvorc’s disclosure does not justify dismissal of any charges.
D. Challenges to the Board’s Findings
1. Use of official position for personal gain (Counts I-III)
The board found that Skvorc used his official position for personal gain, committing the acts charged in Counts I-III of the-amended accusation, and violating AS 39.52.120.21 These counts alleged three events: Skvorc used the information in Patrick Simpson’s letter to ADF&G to form a private business with Simpson; Skvorc converted Winnipeg DFO’s request for ADF&G assistance into a private consultancy; and Skvorc converted British Columbia DFO’s request for ADF&G assistance into a private consultancy.
Skvorc does not deny that these events took place. Rather, he argues that there is no proof he took “official action” as the Act defines that term.22 But the statute prohibiting use of official position for personal gain does not require “official action.”23 It is enough that employees use their “official position” for personal gain or to seek employment. Paragraph 61 of the amended accusation describes the conduct charged in these three counts and repeatedly refers to “official position.” The next paragraph is also part of the three counts; although it refers once to “official action,” it also correctly cites AS 39.52.120(b)(1). Given the specific averments of the prior paragraph, this drafting discrepancy is not significant. The hearing officer and board concluded that these acts were a misuse of “official position.” And in any event, the findings and conclusions would also satisfy the statutory definition of “official action.” We affirm with respect to Counts I-III.
2. Improper use of information (Counts TV-VI)
The board found that the activities forming the bases for Counts I-III also constituted instances of improper use of information gained in the course of official duties.24 The board determined that “the [1201]*1201information Canadian officials and Mr. Simpson were seeking, hydroacoustic assistance, was never disseminated to the public.” Skvorc contends that the state offered no evidence satisfying its burden of proving that the information had not been publicly disseminated.
The state showed that Skvorc obtained the information (Simpson’s letter and the DFO inquiries) in the course of his official duties and that he then used it to his benefit. Simpson testified that the recipient of his white paper was not allowed to share it and that Skvorc told him after he and Simpson agreed to join forces that he was going to hold on to the document “and make sure it wasn’t, you know, circulated.” Given the way Simpson and DFO transmitted their information to ADF&G, and Skvorc’s intended treatment of Simpson’s paper, the board could permissibly infer that the contents of Simpson’s paper and the substance of DFO’s inquiries were not in fact publicly disseminated. These facts support the board’s finding that “[t]he information that Canadian officials and Mr. Simpson were seeking, hydroa-coustic assistance, was never disseminated to the public.” The board did not err in finding three violations of AS 39.52.140(a).
The state argues that a regulation narrowly and explicitly defines the phrase “disseminated to the public.”25 Because this regulation did not go into effect until after Skvorc’s 1993 actions giving rise' to the charges, we cannot rely on it directly in assessing the validity of the charges against him. But we note tangentially that the definition is consistent with the Act’s stated statutory purpose26 and constructional mandate.27 They seem to reflect a legislative intent consistent with reading the statutory phrase “disseminated to the public” narrowly. The definition is also consistent with prior executive branch interpretation of the dissemination requirement. The state quotes a special assistant to the attorney general who, in testimony during legislative hearings on the proposed Act, explained the Act’s purpose in terms of equalizing the ability of public employees and the public to take advantage of information that the state possesses. That testimony supports a restrictive interpretation of “dissemination.” We affirm with regard to Counts IV-VI.
3. Use of official position for personal gain (Counts VII-IX)
The board found that Skvorc had improperly solicited and received private compensation for performance of official duties.28 The board found that Skvorc provided assistance (for compensation) to his private clients and his business that should have been provided as part of his official duties. Thus, Skvorc (1) proffered information assistance for an SFS grant application in expectation of compensation; (2) offered advice to DFO in British Columbia in exchange for travel and lodging and later solicited a contract for additional work; and (3) offered assistance and information to DFO in Winnipeg for monetary compensation.
Skvorc argues that he did not accept, solicit, or receive compensation for these activities. But the Act defines “compensation” as “any money, thing of value, or economic benefit conferred on or received by a person in return for services rendered or to be ren[1202]*1202dered by the person for another.”29 Seeking or receiving expense reimbursement and a contract from DFO satisfied the Act. The Canadian government paid his airfare and lodging. He received compensation because he received “thing[s] of value ... in return for services rendered....”30 Skvorc also received over $7,500 (Canadian) for work done on the Arctic Red River.
The record contains evidence showing that Skvorc participated in the grant application expecting a $72,000 annual salary if the grant were awarded, and that he would not be employed by ADF&G when performing his grant work. The statute covers this prospect of future economic benefit. The statute does not require actual or present receipt of money; solicitation of compensation, including prospective or contingent economic benefits, suffices.31
Skvorc also claims that he did not misuse his official position because his ADF&G duties did not include traveling to Canada or seeking a grant. But his Canadian work required him to apply state-derived hydroacoustic expertise for someone other than his employer. One of his job duties was to provide advice to the public and other governmental agencies, including foreign governments. It does not matter that he traveled on annual leave. And his grant application relied on information he derived from his state employment. It also resulted from his relationship with Simpson, formed after he learned through his employment of Simpson’s solicitation to the state.
Substantial evidence supports the findings of these violations. We affirm as to Counts VII-IX.
4. Solicitation of employment while taking official action (Count X)
The board found that Skvorc sought employment through use of state action when he allowed the SFS grant application to suggest that ADF&G would support the SFS project.32 The application stated that “we [SFS] will be working closely with ADF&G,” and estimated the value of ADF&G’s involvement at $360,000.
Because the application also stated that “DQt is a conflict of interest to request the use of ADF&G facilities until after Skvorc has left,” Skvorc argues that the application did not indicate that he had already taken official action to obtain ADF&G approval of the grant.
We disagree. The application insinuated that ADF&G endorsed the project, and mentioned that Skvorc was an ADF&G employee and that SFS, through Skvorc, had been coordinating with ADF&G. This was substantial evidence of a violation. We affirm as to Count X.
5. Incompatible outside service or employment (Counts XI-XVI)
The board found that Skvorc had committed six violations of AS 39.52.170(a), which prohibits incompatible outside service or employment.33 The board based the violations on: (1) forming SFS; (2) providing consulting services in Winnipeg in October 1992; (3) providing consulting services in British Columbia in April 1993; (4) purchasing a business license for ART; (5) providing consulting services on the Fraser River in May 1993; and (6) providing consulting ser[1203]*1203vices in Winnipeg in September 1993. Skvore argues that these activities did not interfere with his official duties. The board found that they conflicted with Skvorc’s official duties because (1) he used his state position to facilitate his entry into private business; (2) they were closely related to his responsibilities at ADF&G and were conducted in secret; (3) they took time from his official duties;34 (4) his private enterprises created conflicts of interest with his official responsibilities;35 and (5) his work for the Canadian government compromised his loyalty to Alaska during a period of conflict between the two governments. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the board’s findings that Skvorc’s private activities conflicted with his official duties.
Skvore contends that the conflict of interest created by consulting for DFO was insignificant or conjectural, and therefore not punishable under the Ethics Act.36 DFO hired Skvore as a consultant to count salmon on the Fraser River. Because Alaska and Canada were engaged in a dispute over fisheries management, ADF&G saw this consultancy as a significant conflict.37 Skvore argues that any conflict was conjectural because the state failed to demonstrate a direct conflict between his ADF&G responsibilities and his commitments to DFO.
Skvore provided education and technology which might have been used to count other salmon species more accurately, increasing the credibility of figures Canada might use in its dispute with Alaska. An ADF&G official testified that the United States and Canada were involved in sensitive treaty negotiations and that aiding the Canadians affected a policy issue best decided by higher levels of government. During his deposition, a DFO official in British Columbia testified that Skvorc’s help “was much appreciated and very helpful.” He was also asked whether Skvorc’s help was also useful, apparently in dealing with Native Canadian tribes, in “a certain political sense ... that you had hooked up with experts from Alaska.” After objection, he was asked “wasn’t that helpful in those ways, also?” He answered: “It was certainly helpful in sending information forward that showed there was, as I would call it, an independent outside party that was providing advice to us on the efficacy of this choice.” Substantial evidence supports the board’s finding that the consultancy created a conflict.
Skvore also argues that it is unfair to punish him for purchasing the ART business license while also punishing him for activities stemming from that purchase. Count XIV concerns his license purchase; Counts XV and XVI concern his consultancy work.
The state would justify multiple charges here as notifying employees that they must report outside employment as soon as they enter into any business relationship. It argues that upholding these violations will promote early reporting and prevention of unethical conduct.38 The state did not seek— and the board did not impose — any penalties for Count XIV, since penalties had been imposed for violations committed pursuant to the licenses.
We think the board utilized an overly broad interpretation of the phrases “render services” and “accept employment.” Those terms imply either actual performance of work or an actual agreement to perform [1204]*1204services. Merely purchasing a business license, without more, would not support a charge under subsection .170(a). The state’s rationale of promoting early reporting is unconvincing, because it is not necessary to report non-violations. Failure to disclose unethical activities is punishable; failure to disclose activities that are not actually unethical is not.
It was error to find that purchasing a business license was a violation. But this error is harmless because the hearing officer recommended that no additional fine be imposed for this count and because it appears the board imposed no individual penalty for this charge. We therefore affirm as to Counts XI-XVI.
6. Failure to disclose (Counts XVII-XX)
The board found four violations of AS 39.52.170(b),39 which requires disclosure of outside employment: Skvorc’s failures to disclose the formation of SFS, his DFO business activities, and his intent in purchasing ART’s business license.
Skvorc argues that disclosure was not needed when he purchased the ART business license because it offered only a prospect of future, not current, compensation. But subsection .170(b) does not require current receipt of compensation. It requires disclosure when the employee is “rendering services for compensation, or engaging in employment outside the employee’s agency.” For reasons discussed above in Part III.D.3, Skvorc’s ART activities with DFO met this standard.
We assume for discussion’s sake that merely obtaining a business license, without more, cannot be separately charged under subsection .170(b).40 But Skvorc obtained the license and formed a business with an intention to engage in hydroacoustic-related business activities outside his state employment. They were preliminary but important steps needed to advance his business purposes. Simply forming a business closely related to his state employment created potential conflicts with his state work.41 In any event, the hearing officer recommended no additional fine, and the board imposed no separate penalty for his failure to report his intentions when he purchased a business license.
Skvorc also contends that he fulfilled his duty by submitting his May 3, 1993 disclosure statement. His disclosure form stated:
I hereby officially report my employment or provision of services outside the Department of Fish & Game. These outside duties will in no way affect my usual State duties or duty hours in this Department. This employment or service consists of the following: Consultation services in the field of Fisheries Hydroacoustics, solely outside the State of Alaska and not relating to any activity associated with Alaskan fisheries issues.
This did not satisfy Skvorc’s duty. Because he did not disclose his previous consultation or contracts with DFO, the board did not err in finding that Skvorc failed to fulfill his statutory duty to disclose. We affirm as to Counts XVII-XX.
7. Misuse of state time and equipment (Count XXII)
The board found one violation of AS 39.52.120(b)(3), which prohibits misuse of state time, property, and equipment.42 The board based this violation on twenty-two instances of misuse.
As Skvorc argues, one of these instances, his use of his ADF&G computer to draft a letter to Canada DFO, is relatively [1205]*1205insignificant. Many of the other instances are more serious, and the board reasoned that even if the “insignificant” uses were excluded, the remaining uses “were so extensive” as to warrant maximum penalties. It noted that some, such as the fish kill or exploitation of state employees, would warrant “severe fines and a recommendation of severe discipline.” Although we agree with Skvorc, we find this argument inconsequential because it concerns only one of twenty-two acts that form the basis for this charge. These included, most prominently, use of state employees’ time and state lockers for killing and storing Dolly Varden trout. These acts provided ample support for this charge. Because the attorney general charged only one count of misuse of state equipment and time, the hearing officer recommended a single, but maximum, fine of $5,000. The board imposed a total fine of $10,000 for all twenty-two remaining counts, having concluded that the cumulative fine recommended by the hearing officer was excessive.
Skvorc argues that the complaint’s failure to charge most of these acts violates due process and the Act. Although we concluded in Part III.B that it is not necessary to serve an amended complaint charging all counts later charged in the accusation, Count XXII presents a different, and more serious, notice question. No complaint charged these incidents of misuse. The original accusation charged only one incident (using an ADF&G computer to type a letter). When the state served the amended accusation on Skvorc, it also filed a notice stating that the equipment misuse charge “is a continuing charge, and that evidence exists of more than one instance of use of state equipment for personal business pursuits.” The amended accusation specified that Skvorc had used the computer and telephones, and also broadly asserted that Skvorc had “used state equipment on other occasions for his private business interests.”
We think the amended accusation did not give Skvorc sufficient notice of the specific incidents to be presented to the hearing officer. The record does not reveal whether the state actually gave Skvorc adequate notice of the acts charged through some other means, and whether this procedural deficiency was harmless. We cannot say with assurance that the error was harmless, because the hearing officer considered some of the misuses not charged in the amended accusation to be among the most serious; these uncharged violations may have influenced his penalty recommendation and also may have influenced the board when it imposed penalties and recommended termination. We think remand is necessary, first to determine whether the error was harmless, and if it is not, for reconsideration of the appropriate penalty following dismissal or retrial of Count XXII.
E. Reliance on Unpublished Decision
The hearing officer relied on an unpublished personnel board decision, In re Pearson, in finding violations and recommending penalties. The state gave Skvorc a copy of the decision and entered it into the record. Skvorc argues that the board, which adopted the hearing officer’s findings and conclusions, impermissibly relied on this unpublished decision.
Skvorc has not shown how that reliance harmed him. He has not demonstrated that it caused any improper definition of terms. He does not show that this usage, which is comparable to widely accepted sentencing practices, misguided the legal analysis. He claims that he was disadvantaged by his inability to access unpublished cases favorable to him, but he could have remedied any such prejudice by requesting an opportunity to search. We find no basis for concluding that he was prejudiced.
Skvorc also challenges reliance on Pearson because the hearing officer disallowed testimony supporting a lighter penalty. Skvorc offered testimony of an ADF&G employee regarding the department’s prior treatment of ethical violations. The hearing officer allowed him to testify that ADF&G had overlooked more egregious violations than Skvore’s, but prevented inquiry into specific acts. The hearing officer excluded this testimony because it was not legal precedent. Because purely evidentiary considerations justify exclusion of this testimony, we [1206]*1206see no reason to attribute it to disparate treatment. There is no comparison between this testimony and an unpublished but clearly documented decision.
F. Assistant Attorney General’s Participation
Skvorc argues that an assistant attorney general’s participation in the board hearing created a conflict of interest. A member of the- Juneau Attorney General’s Office recused herself from this case on the ground it would be a conflict of interest for her to advise the board while another member of the Juneau office prosecuted the accusation against Skvorc. Assistant Attorney General Teresa Williams, of the Anchorage Attorney General’s Office, then attended the hearing but not the deliberations and gave the board advice on procedural matters. Given that Williams worked in an office different from the one prosecuting Skvorc and that she did not attend the deliberations, we conclude that there was no conflict of interest.
The Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct do not address this issue. But the most closely analogous rule permits an inference that Williams’s participation was acceptable. Rule 1.11(c) allows government attorneys to participate in matters from which other members of the same agency are disqualified.43
Our precedent weighs against finding a conflict. The parties dispute whether this case is controlled by Matter of Robson,44 or Stigall v. Anchorage Municipality Police and Fire Retirement Board,45 In Robson we held that the Alaska Bar Association’s executive director could not attend the deliberations of the Bar’s disciplinary board while an attorney from her office prosecuted the case.46 In Stigall we held that an administrative agency’s legal advisor did not improperly act as an advocate by drafting written interrogatories.47
Skvorc’s case is more similar to Stigall, where an assistant municipal attorney represented the Anchorage Municipality Police and Fire Retirement Board while it heard a former employee’s claim for disability benefits.48 Because the claimant had moved Outside and wished to avoid incurring the expense of attending the rehearing in Alaska, he agreed to answer written interrogatories as a substitute for live testimony.49 The attorney drafted the interrogatories, a list of questions for cross-examination.50 The claimant alleged that she had acted both as ah advocate adverse to his position and as an advisor to the board.51 Since she did not participate in the deliberations, we found that there was no conflict.52 Like her, Williams did not attend the deliberations and played a purely advisory role in the board’s determinations. Like the questions for cross-examination drafted by the assistant municipal attorney, the findings drafted by Williams did not taint the decision-making process. Thus, her participation did not create either an actual conflict or the appearance of impropriety.
This conclusion accords with cases elsewhere allowing different members of an attorney general’s office to fulfill the dual roles of advisor and prosecutor.53
[1207]*1207G. Appropriateness of Penalty
Skvorc contends that the penalties imposed were excessive. The hearing officer recommended fines exceeding $66,000 and termination of Skvorc’s employment. Although the board found the fine for each individual count reasonable, it determined that the fines were cumulatively excessive. It reduced the total fine to $10,000, noting that this was approximately twice the amount of remuneration Skvorc received for his conflicting contracts, and recommended termination.
The Ethics Act authorizes civil penalties of up to $6,000 for a violation,54 fines of up to twice the amount of financial gain realized from any violation,55 and dismissal.56 Because the penalties the board assessed bear a financial and mathematical relationship to the amount of profit Skvorc derived from his activities and because they fall well within the range of the penalties authorized by statute, they are reasonable and appropriate.
But because we conclude that Skvorc may have received inadequate notice of some of the acts charged in Count XXII, and because we cannot say that the board’s penalty may not have been affected by the findings of some of the violations encompassed in Count XXII, our remand on that issue may require the board to reconsider the penalty.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM on all issues, except those relating to Count XXII. As to that count, we REMAND so that the board can consider the notice issue. Unless it finds that Skvorc had adequate actual notice of each on the violations found by the board under Count XXII, it must determine whether the lack of notice was harmless, and if it was not, dismiss or retry those misuse acts not charged in Count XXII of the amended accusation. Depending on the outcome of those issues, the board must reconsider Skvorc’s penalty.