Skolnick v. Wainer

CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedFebruary 8, 2021
Docket3:13-cv-01420
StatusUnknown

This text of Skolnick v. Wainer (Skolnick v. Wainer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Skolnick v. Wainer, (D. Conn. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JACKSOPNla NinAtTifIfONAL LIFE INSURANCE CO. Civil No. 3:19cv1205 (JBA) v. ,

February 8, 2021

EMELIN PAGAN, MARYA OSORIO A/K/A MAYRA LOZADDA,e TfeAnRdAan OtsSORIO, AND NATALIE OSORIO

. MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

On October 26, 2020, this Court held a one-day, four-witness virtual bench trial on Plaintiff’s interpleader claim to resolve Defendants’ competing claims to Adalberto Osorio’s life insurance policy proceeds. Mayra Osorio Lozada, Decedent’s first wife, claimed she was the beneficiary of the policy, as did Emelin Pagan, Decedent’s wife at the time of his death. Based on the trial evidence, the Court finds that Mayra Lozada is the primary beneficiary of DecIe. dent’sF liinfed iinnsgusr oanf cFea pcto licy and that she is therefore entitled to receive the proceeds. On July 1, 1999, Adalberto Osorio (“Decedent”) applied for a $150,000 life insurance policy with Jackson National Company, formerly known as Valley Forge Life Insurance Company, naming his wife Mayra Osorio Lozada as the primary beneficiary and his eldest daughter Tara Osorio as the contingent beneficiary. (Valley Forge Life Insurance Application, Ex. 1 to Lozada’s Trial Mem. [Doc. # 63-1].) Decedent’s application was approved, and his policy was issued on December 7, 1999. (Valley Forge Life Insurance Policy, Ex. 2 to Lozada’s Trial Mem. [Doc. # 63-2].) At the time the policy was issued, Lozada and Decedent had been married for twenty-two years and had three children together. On May 3, 2001, Ms. Lozada and Decedent divorced. In 2008, Decedent married National received Decedent’s application for a Request for Change of Beneficiary Form (“the Form”), which Jackson National provided to him, along with instructions for the Form’s completion. Jackson National received Decedent’s completed Form on December 29, 2017. (Letter from Jackson National, Lozada’s Ex. 4.) The Form was filled out, naming Natalie Osorio, another of Decedent and Ms. Lozada’s children, and Pagan as primary beneficiaries of the Policy, designating them to receive fifty-five and forty-five percent of the Policy benefits, respectively. (Form, Lozada’s Ex. 1.) The Form contains a blocIkd .at the bottom of the page for the policyholder and beneficiaries to sign and date. ( ) Decedent’s hand-printed name and signature appeaIrd, . twice, above the line designated for the policyholder and are both dated 12/26/2017. ( ) Ms. Pagan’s printed name and signature appear below the line designated for the policyholder’s spouse, and Natalie Osorio’s printIedd. name and signature appear above the line designated for the irrevocable beInde.f iciary. ( )Below the signature block is a space for a notary to notarize any signatures. ( )The space contIadi.ns a notary stamp with the name “Damien Vasseur” which appears below his signature. ( ) BIedl.ow the notary stamp is the date, 12/26/17, and the inscription “for Adalberto Osorio.” ( ) Natalie testified that the signature beside her name is not hers. Ms. Pagan did not dispute this, testifying that Decedent signed Natalie’s name himself. When asked if she knew who signed her name on the Form, Natalie testified that she did not recognize the handwriting as her father’s and, “if [she] had to guess, [she] would [say it] was Emelin’s.” In a letter mailed to Decedent dated January 9, 2018, Jackson National responded to the receipt of Decedent’s Form by requesting that Decedent provide “a completed request form with,” a “valid policy number,” and a clarification of whether Natalie was to be an “irrevocable beneficiary” on the policy. (Letter from Jackson National, Lozada’s Ex. 4.) On the Form Decedent had submitted, a digit was missing from his policy number and Natalie Osorio was listed as a revocable beneficiary in one place, but as an irrevocable beneficiary in another place. (Form, Lozada’s Ex. 1.) The January 9 letter expressly stated that Jackson National “must have the following information to complete your request” to change the beneficiary of Decedent’s life insurance policy. (Letter from Jackson National, Lozada’s Ex. 4.) Natalie testified that when her father was ill, she visited him regularly, both at home and at the hospital. She testified that in the months leading up to his death that Decedent instructed her several times “not to trust anybody,” and that “his life insurance was in [her] mother’s and sister’s name,” and that her sister was the “cobeneficiary or the contingent beneficiary.” Natalie testified that, at the time, Decedent’s relationship with Ms. Pagan “wasn’t working out” and that he told her that he wanted to separate from Ms. Pagan. Decedent died on February 4, 2019, having never had further contact with Jackson National about his change of policy beneficiary request and having never supplied the requested information. Upon his death, the death benefit under Decedent’s policy became payIaIb. le to Fthined bienngesf iocfi aLraiews by its terms.

The sole issue at trial was who is the legal beneficiary of Decedent’s life insurance policy. Under Connecticut state law, even when an insurance policyholder does not comply strictly with a policy’s requirements for changing beneficiaries of their life insurance policy, the doctrine of sEunbgstleamntaianl vc.o mCopnlniaencctiec udte tGeernm. iLniefes wInhs.e tChoer the change should nonetheless bEen gglievmeann effect. ., 240 Conn. 287, 295 (1997). In , the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the owner of a life insurance policy will have effectively changed the beneficiary if “(1) the owner clearly intended to change the beneficiary and to designate the new beneficiary; and (2) theI do.wner has taken substantial affirmative action to effectuate the change in the beneficiary.” Saete 2 N9e8w. Britain Real Estate & Title CInot.e vn. tH iasr dtfeotredr mAcinceepdt abny cpee Croforrpm. ing a contextual analysis. , 153 A. 658, 659 (Conn. 1931) (“[T]he construction to be accorded the instrument is dictated by the intent of the parties . . . in light of the Ecinrgculemmsatnances under which it was executed.”) (internal citation omitted). For example, in , a policyholder was found to have substantially complied with her policy’s requirements when she discussed changing her beneficiaries with her insurance agent and Eann galtetmoranne, y and wrote a letter to her insurance company looking to effectuate the change. 240 Conn. at 290. Each of those facts was considered by the Connecticut Supreme Court in its conclusion that “it was [the insured’s] intention to change thIde. beneficiary, and that there was no evidence that she had ever abandoned that intention.” When a policyholder abandons his or her intention to chaSnegee A tehten ab eLnifeef iIcniasr. yC,o t.h ve. sHuabrsttfoarndt iNala ct.o Bmapnlkia &n cTer udsotc Ctroi.ne no longer governs the analyAsiest. na , 146 Conn. 537, 542 (1959). In , the insured contacted the insurer and requested to cIhda. nge the beneficiary of her insurance policy “effective immediately” to the defendants. at 540. ITdh. e insurer responded by mailing the insured the forms necessary to effectuate the change. After receiving the forms, the insured decided that she no longeIdr. wished to change the beneficiary and communicated as much to her insuranIdc.e agent. The insurance agent then returned the unsigned forms to the insurer’s agent. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors found that because the insured chose not to sign the form and therefore ”had not done all that it was in her power to do to make the change effecItdiv. e,” that the initial letter requesting the change of beneficiary could not be given effect. at 543. The situation here is analogous. Although Decedent may have initially intended to change the beneficiary of his life insurance policy, his subsequent actions indicate thSaete h e aEbnagnledmoanned that intention andA ientnstaead sought to preserve the original beneficiaries. , 240 Conn.

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Related

Aetna Life Insurance v. Hartford National Bank & Trust Co.
153 A.2d 448 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1959)
New Britain Real Estate & Title Co. v. Hartford Acceptance Corp.
153 A. 658 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1931)
Engelman v. Connecticut General Life Insurance
690 A.2d 882 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1997)

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Bluebook (online)
Skolnick v. Wainer, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/skolnick-v-wainer-ctd-2021.