Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner

42 B.T.A. 1287, 1940 BTA LEXIS 875
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedNovember 26, 1940
DocketDocket No. 99519.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 42 B.T.A. 1287 (Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1287, 1940 BTA LEXIS 875 (bta 1940).

Opinion

[1297]*1297OPINION.

Disney:

There are left for our consideration only two questions: (1) Whether the petitioner is entitled to dividends paid credit, and (2) whether it is entitled to deduction of attorneys’ fees as ordinary and necessary expenses. Other issues have been eliminated and will be reflected in decision under Rule 50.

1. There is little, if any, dispute about the facts on the question as to whether the petitioner is entitled to dividends paid credit under section 27 of the Revenue Act of 1936. In sum, the pertinent facts may be stated as follows: Being in arrears for several years upon payment of dividends upon its $7 cumulative preferred stock, the arrears amounting to $45.50 per share in the taxable year, and having earned in the taxable year substantial amounts which were, however, desired for use in operating and expanding the business, the petitioner, with the primary object of relieving itself from the burden of the arrears in dividends on the preferred stock, entered into a recapitalization. The effect of the recapitalization was that the holders of the preferred stock surrendered same with the understanding that they were also surrendering their rights to accumulated undeclared and unpaid dividends, all in consideration of the receipt of 1.4 shares of a new issue of new preferred stock (which differed from the old in some respects and incident rights), plus $5.50 per share in cash, for each share of the old preferred. Out of 5,632 shares of preferred stock so held, all stockholders, except the holders of 79 shares, participated, surrendered their old stock, and received the new stock; that is, the holders of 5,553 old shares received 7,774.2 shares of the new preferred stock, and $5.50 per share in cash for each of the 5,553 shares. The holders of 79 shares refused to take stock and received $45.50 cash per share, and contention as to them has been abandoned by the respondent. The old preferred stock was of no par value, but was by amendment of certificate of incorporation converted into class A preferred stock of $100 par value (which will, however, be hereinafter referred to as the old stock). The petitioner contends that when the holders of the old preferred stock (as changed) received 1.4 shares and $5.50 cash for each of the old shares, they in effect received a dividend of $40 for the .4 share received and $5.50 in cash, or a total dividend of $45.50, in the same way as did the nonparticipating holders of the 79 shares, amounting to $222,120; that such constituted a “dividend paid” within the language of section1 27 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1936,1 and the petitioner is therefore entitled to dividends paid credit in the amount of $222,120. The earnings of the taxable year were more than that amount. Although [1298]*1298the respondent contends that, considering the fact of deficits in earlier years and their absorption by the application of capital thereto, there were in fact and in effect not sufficient earnings against which to charge the alleged dividend in the taxable year, it is not necessary, in view of the conclusion to which we have come, to consider that phase of the matter.

The petitioner must show that under section 27 of the Revenue Act of 1936 there was a dividend and that it was paid, and, under subsection (h) of the statute,2 that it was a “taxable dividend.” There was in fact no payment in this case, but the petitioner contends that the effect is the same as if a dividend had been paid. Although attention was upon brief paid to the question of stock dividend, that question is not before us, since at trial it was stated by petitioner’s counsel that there was no contention that a stock dividend was paid, and evidence was not adduced to show the fair market value of such stock dividend. We therefore confine ourselves to the question as to whether the transaction which took place should be given the effect of a cash dividend, taxable and paid. The petitioner’s idea is, in effect, that, since the primary object of the recapitalization was to eliminate the arrears in unpaid accumulated dividends upon the preferred stock, and since the petitioner had the current earnings with which to pay them, the stockholders simply surrendered their rights to $45.50 per share dividends in consideration of the .4 per share of new stock which was a capitalization of $40 of earnings and $5.50 cash; and that therefore they in effect received a dividend of $45.50. The respondent allowed the dividends paid credit in the amount of $5.50 per share, but disallowed it as to the $40. He contends in substance that the transaction was what it was called in, the plan, a recapitalization, and therefore a reorganization under the definition laid down in section 112 (g) (1) (D): that sections 112 (b) (2) and (3) and (c) (1) of the Revenue Act of 19363 apply; that under the provisions thereof there was no [1299]*1299recognition of gain or loss upon the exchange of stock for stock in the same corporation, except upon the cash received; that therefore under section 27 (h) of the Revenue Act of 1936 the distribution was not a “taxable dividend”; and that therefore dividends paid credit can not be allowed.

That the transaction was a recapitalization can not be denied in view of the repeated use of that expression throughout the documents by which the plan is evidenced. Thus, in the letter to the stockholders proposing the plan it is stated that the board of directors has given consideration to the desirability of presenting to the stockholders “a plan of recapitalization of the Corporation * * and in effect the same expression is again more than once used. Likewise it can hardly be denied and in fact is not denied that there was an “exchange”, for in the same letter and in the same paragraph just referred to the “plan of recapitalization of the Corporation” was stated as: The preferred stock “may be exchanged for a new Cumulative Prior Preferred Stock, 5% Convertible Series and an adjustment of the unpaid dividends on the present Convertible Preferred Stock may be effected.” The expression “exchange” is thereafter repeatedly used. It thus appears to be incontrovertible that at least within the language of section 112 (b) (2) and (3) “preferred stock in a corporation is exchanged * * * for preferred stock in the same corporation”, and that under section 112 (c) (1), since the exchange was not solely for stock, $5.50 in cash being received upon each share, gain or loss was limited to recognition of the cash received. The respondent further relies upon the language of section 115 (h) of the Revenue Act of 1936,4 pointing out that a distribution [1300]*1300by a corporation “ox its stock or securities * * * shall not be considered a distribution of earnings or profits * * * if no gain to such distributee from the receipt of such stock or securities was recognized by law, * * that therefore section 112 (b) (2) and (3), having provided that there shall be no such recognition of gain to the distributee, the distribution can not be considered one from earnings or profits and therefore is not a dividend within the definition of section 115 (a) providing that a dividend “means any distribution made by a corporation * * * out of its earnings or profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or ⅜ * * out of earnings or profits of the taxable year * *

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Bluebook (online)
42 B.T.A. 1287, 1940 BTA LEXIS 875, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/skenandoa-rayon-corp-v-commissioner-bta-1940.