Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner

42 B.T.A. 1287, 1940 BTA LEXIS 875
United States Board of Tax Appeals·Decided November 26, 1940·No. Docket No. 99519.·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

[1297] OPINION.

Disney:

There are left for our consideration only two questions: (1) Whether the petitioner is entitled to dividends paid credit, and (2) whether it is entitled to deduction of attorneys’ fees as ordinary and necessary expenses. Other issues have been eliminated and will be reflected in decision under Rule 50.

1. There is little, if any, dispute about the facts on the question as to whether the petitioner is entitled to dividends paid credit under section 27 of the Revenue Act of 1936. In sum, the pertinent facts may be stated as follows: Being in arrears for several years upon payment of dividends upon its $7 cumulative preferred stock, the arrears amounting to $45.50 per share in the taxable year, and having earned in the taxable year substantial amounts which were, however, desired for use in operating and expanding the business, the petitioner, with the primary object of relieving itself from the burden of the arrears in dividends on the preferred stock, entered into a recapitalization. The effect of the recapitalization was that the holders of the preferred stock surrendered same with the understanding that they were also surrendering their rights to accumulated undeclared and unpaid dividends, all in consideration of the receipt of 1.4 shares of a new issue of new preferred stock (which differed from the old in some respects and incident rights), plus $5.50 per share in cash, for each share of the old preferred. Out of 5,632 shares of preferred stock so held, all stockholders, except the holders of 79 shares, participated, surrendered their old stock, and received the new stock; that is, the holders of 5,553 old shares received 7,774.2 shares of the new preferred stock, and $5.50 per share in cash for each of the 5,553 shares. The holders of 79 shares refused to take stock and received $45.50 cash per share, and contention as to them has been abandoned by the respondent. The old preferred stock was of no par value, but was by amendment of certificate of incorporation converted into class A preferred stock of $100 par value (which will, however, be hereinafter referred to as the old stock). The petitioner contends that when the holders of the old preferred stock (as changed) received 1.4 shares and $5.50 cash for each of the old shares, they in effect received a dividend of $40 for the .4 share received and $5.50 in cash, or a total dividend of $45.50, in the same way as did the nonparticipating holders of the 79 shares, amounting to $222,120; that such constituted a “dividend paid” within the language of section1 27 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1936,1 and the petitioner is therefore entitled to dividends paid credit in the amount of $222,120. The earnings of the taxable year were more than that amount. Although [1298] the respondent contends that, considering the fact of deficits in earlier years and their absorption by the application of capital thereto, there were in fact and in effect not sufficient earnings against which to charge the alleged dividend in the taxable year, it is not necessary, in view of the conclusion to which we have come, to consider that phase of the matter.

The petitioner must show that under section 27 of the Revenue Act of 1936 there was a dividend and that it was paid, and, under subsection (h) of the statute,2 that it was a “taxable dividend.” There was in fact no payment in this case, but the petitioner contends that the effect is the same as if a dividend had been paid. Although attention was upon brief paid to the question of stock dividend, that question is not before us, since at trial it was stated by petitioner’s counsel that there was no contention that a stock dividend was paid, and evidence was not adduced to show the fair market value of such stock dividend. We therefore confine ourselves to the question as to whether the transaction which took place should be given the effect of a cash dividend, taxable and paid. The petitioner’s idea is, in effect, that, since the primary object of the recapitalization was to eliminate the arrears in unpaid accumulated dividends upon the preferred stock, and since the petitioner had the current earnings with which to pay them, the stockholders simply surrendered their rights to $45.50 per share dividends in consideration of the .4 per share of new stock which was a capitalization of $40 of earnings and $5.50 cash; and that therefore they in effect received a dividend of $45.50. The respondent allowed the dividends paid credit in the amount of $5.50 per share, but disallowed it as to the $40. He contends in substance that the transaction was what it was called in, the plan, a recapitalization, and therefore a reorganization under the definition laid down in section 112 (g) (1) (D): that sections 112 (b) (2) and (3) and (c) (1) of the Revenue Act of 19363 apply; that under the provisions thereof there was no [1299] recognition of gain or loss upon the exchange of stock for stock in the same corporation, except upon the cash received; that therefore under section 27 (h) of the Revenue Act of 1936 the distribution was not a “taxable dividend”; and that therefore dividends paid credit can not be allowed.

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Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1287, 1940 BTA LEXIS 875 (bta 1940).

42 B.T.A. 1287 (Skenandoa Rayon Corp. v. Commissioner) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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