Skellchock v. Kauzie Dean
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Opinion
Appellate Case: 24-1436 Document: 8-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 7, 2025 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court DEREK SKELLCHOCK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 24-1436 (D.C. No. 1:24-CV-00892-LTB-RTG) JUDGE LAURIE KAUZIE DEAN; (D. Colo.) JUDGE SUSAN BLANCO; MAGISTRATE KANDACE MAJOROS; JUDGE JUAN G VILLASENOR; MAGISTRATE JOLSTAD; STATE OF COLORADO,
Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, MATHESON, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Derek Skellchock appeals the dismissal of his pro se action against
the State of Colorado and four state-court judges. The district court
*After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appeal 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-1436 Document: 8-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2025 Page: 2
dismissed the action on several different grounds, including Eleventh
Amendment immunity and absolute judicial immunity. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I
Mr. Skellchock alleged the State of Colorado and several state-court
judges interfered with his benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs
(“VA benefits”). A federal magistrate judge twice directed him to amend his
pro se complaint to cure various pleading deficiencies, and although he
attempted to comply the first time, he refused to do so the second time.
Consequently, another magistrate judge reviewed the amended complaint
and recommended that the action be dismissed. Among other things, the
magistrate judge determined that Eleventh Amendment immunity barred
the claims against the State of Colorado and the state-court judges enjoyed
absolute judicial immunity. Over Mr. Skellchock’s objections, the district
court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the action.
II
We afford Mr. Skellchock’s pro se materials a liberal construction, but
we do not act as his advocate in searching the record and formulating
arguments on his behalf. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425
F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
As an initial matter, Mr. Skellchock has waived appellate review of
2 Appellate Case: 24-1436 Document: 8-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2025 Page: 3
the district court’s dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment because his
brief does not address that issue. See Stein v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct.
of N.M., 520 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding inadequately briefed
arguments are waived).1
As for the district court’s judicial-immunity ruling, our review is de
novo. See Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corr., 846 F.2d 627, 629 (10th Cir. 1988). “A
judge acting in his judicial capacity is absolutely immune from . . . suit[],
unless the judge acts clearly without any colorable claim of jurisdiction.”
Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 686 (10th Cir. 1990). “A judge may act in
excess of his subject matter jurisdiction and still retain absolute judicial
immunity; only in the unusual circumstances of complete and clear absence
of all jurisdiction is absolute immunity inappropriate.” Id. at 694. “[T]he
scope of the judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly when the issue
is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Mr. Skellchock contends the state judges exceeded their jurisdiction
1 Mr. Skellchock cites Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which “creates an exception [to Eleventh Amendment immunity] under which individuals can sue state officers in their individual capacities if the lawsuit seeks prospective relief for an ongoing violation of federal law,” Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Anderson, 119 F.4th 732, 736 (10th Cir. 2024). See Aplt. Br. at 6. But he does not develop any argument as to how this case helps him. See Stein, 520 F.3d at 1189. Neither did he seek prospective relief; the amended complaint sought only retrospective declaratory relief and punitive damages. See R. at 31. 3 Appellate Case: 24-1436 Document: 8-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2025 Page: 4
by garnishing and allocating his VA benefits in contravention of federal law.
But even if they committed legal error, that would not mean they acted in
the clear absence of all jurisdiction such that they would be divested of
absolute immunity for actions taken in their judicial capacity. “A judge does
not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction even if the action he took was
in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Whitesel
v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Indeed, regardless of whether the state judges incorrectly
garnished or allocated his VA benefits in violation of federal law, the salient
question remains whether their actions were taken in their judicial
capacities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991) (“Stump made clear
that whether an act by a judge is a judicial one relates to the nature of the
act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and
to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in
his judicial capacity.” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)). On
that score, the amended complaint indicates the state judges acted solely in
their judicial capacities by entering orders that affected Mr. Skellchock’s
VA benefits. See R. at 29 (alleging judges made “temporary rulings to
extract money from my VA benefits,” “demand[ed] more information about
. . . VA benefit money,” recused, and “order[ed] me to disclose my medical
information to the public in open court”). And Mr. Skellchock’s appellate
4 Appellate Case: 24-1436 Document: 8-1 Date Filed: 07/07/2025 Page: 5
brief confirms “the state judges issued orders affecting veterans[] benefits,
which are exclusively governed by federal law.” Aplt. Br. at 5. These
averments are insufficient to divest the state judges of their absolute
judicial immunity.
III
The district court’s judgment is affirmed. Mr. Skellchock’s motions for
oral argument or for expedited consideration and to file electronically are
denied as moot.
Entered for the Court
Richard E.N. Federico Circuit Judge
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