fUSDS SDNY □□ □□ □□□ ae □□ DOCUMENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT | ELECTRONICALLY FILED SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SOOO HE □□ eX Ho OATE FILED: | {23/2020 ! OTE FILED: 1125/2020... SKAT TAX REFUND SCHEME LITIGATION 18-md-2865 (LAK) This paper applies to: 18-cv-5053 (LAK). eee ee tee ee ee ee ee eee ee eee ee tea HH HX
MEMORANDUM OPINION Appearances: William R. Maguire Marc A. Weinstein Sarah L. Cave John T. McGoey HUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP Attorneys for Plaintiff Martin H. Kaplan Kari Parks GUSRAE KAPLAN NUSBAUM PLLC Attorneys for Defendants
LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge. Danish companies are required by law to withhold on account of anticipated Danish tax liability a percentage of dividends distributed to shareholders. The withholding tax may be refunded to some U.S. shareholders in certain circumstances under a double taxation treaty. This is one of more than a hundred cases in which the Kingdom of Denmark claims that the defendants defrauded it of by submitting tax refund claims in which they falsely claimed to own stocks in Danish companies that had paid dividends net of withholding tax. In fact, the complaints allege, the defendants did not own those stocks and had no taxes withheld from any dividends. Nevertheless, the defendants allegedly obtained many millions of dollars in tax refunds from the Danish treasury
under these allegedly false and fraudulent pretenses. This case is before the Court on plaintiff SKAT’s motion to dismiss counterclaims filed by defendants Goldstein Law Group PC 401(K) Profit Sharing Plan (the “Goldstein Plan”) and Sheldon Goldstein (collectively with the Goldstein Plan, “Goldstein”) [DI-113'].
Facts’ The Goldstein Plan is a Florida pension plan exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code.’ Its sole wustee is Sheldon Goldstein.* Mr. Goldstein and the Goldstein Plan allege that the Plan maintained a brokerage account with ED&F Man Capital Markets, a broker-dealer headquartered and registered in England.’ They allege also — though only in the following, indirect sense — that ED&F Man has stated that it traded Danish securities for the benefit of 36 pension plans, including the Goldstein Plan.® A treaty between the United States and Denmark “provides for the refund of tax withheld on dividend payments to shareholders that,” like the Goldstein Plan, “are U.S. pension All docket references are to the master docket, No. 18-md-2865 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y.). Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from Goldstein’s counterclaim and are presume true. Counterclaim { 1-2 [DJ-101]. Id. 3. Id. 6, 28. Id. 434, 46.
3 pla[ntsha aretex] e mfrpotmt axa7t Gioolnd.sa"tlelitenhgi aepttsu rchDaasneisdst how ciktth h e expectthaatwtio ouinrlt ed c etihverese efu n8 dAsc.c ortdoGi onlgd steiMna,nfi lEenDdi& nFe applicfoart irtoeanfuxsn o dnGs o ldsbteehi9an Sl'KAfsT. g rantthfieerd es itg bhudtte nitehde nin1t0I hnG. oldsteitnhi'ss bwteaecslaS luKAisTned g i,s coav e"rsecdwh heemreoe"nb Seya njay Shahhe lfopreedip genn spiloafinnl frsea udutlarexen futcn lda 1i1Gm osl.d satlelitenhgi aehttsa d nothitnodg ow ithS haohrt hsicsh eamntedh SaKAtT 'dse noifia tnlsi nctlhaw iams unl1a2 wful. Althoiuatgl hl engose usp pofartcitnisgat, s se"r[tus]i pnofonrm atainboden l [itehfSa KAtT] commencleidt iaggaatiihnounsndt r eodfUs . Sp.e nspiloanwn ist hbooutth etrioin ngv estigate
whetthheheray"ad n cyo nnectttoih aoeln l eSgheasdhc he13mT eh.ci asas lel eigasem doltnyhg e m. SKAhTe arlel tehgGaeotsl dsfrtaeuidnu lcelnatitlmaryexe d fun dfrso mt hDea nish governmenmti sbrye prtehsiaeottnw tnDieandng i sh1 4I satts oscceklr.atism s afoird aifrnnadgu d, 1 In SrKAeTT aRxe fuSncdh eLmiet3 i5gF6..S , u p3pd3. 0 03,0( 8S .D.N.Ys.e e 2019) Counterclaim ,i,i 41, 65. 8 Counter6c6l.a im ii 9 Id.,i 4 6. 10 Id,i.,i5 3-55. II Id,i ,i5 4-55. 12 Id.,i ,i5 56,1 -62. 13 Id,i. 70.d iffPeurtGe onltdlasylt,le teihgnae ts "SKATt hdeeex ciisdotefed n octnehe a t allegedlyr-efrfusancudhd emumulesme ten attn hn aoUt . pSe.n spiloranin g htfully owne shaorrre esc ediivveiddfr eonmDd asn icsohm panIid.,ie6 s9.." 14 Id,i.,i1 6-17. 4 abettfrianugpd a,y mbeynm ti stuankjeeu,nrs itc hmemnotn,he ayad n rde ceainvndee dg,l igent misrepre1s5N eonltto aantggIio d o,en n.mioetdi boyGn osl dsatnsedii mni sliaturaldtyee fedn dants tod ismSiKAsTss'c ompl1a6 ints. Asn ottehdii,nss o t tho en plryo ceiendvionlGgvo ilndgsa tnSedKAi Tn.G oldstein alletgh"eaSstKA Ti psu rsmuiunlgt aicptliaeon indns v estaiggaai[tnGisootln dsas rtieosiuintn] g oft hseam et ransaicnDt einmoaanrnskud p,o innf ormaatnibdoe nl oitehjfeu,rr isd1i7Tc htei ons." onseu cfohr eipgrno cetehdGaiotnl gd sstpeeicinias fiD easn iasdhm iniasptprieanatvlio vlev ing
SKATa ntdh Geo ldsPtleaGinon.l dsotffeelirinsttd leeta abiotluh tpa rto ceeBdutithn Cigos.u ·r t alrehaaddsey s crioitnb ag e edn elreavIlena lp .r ioopri nIin oontt,eh dma atn oyft hdee fendants itnh miusl tid1tiiis gtatrtoiiaocodktnm inisatprpaefrtaoilmvSs eKA Ts'd etermlienttafietnridsoi nn g thtahtwre oyn gfuclllayi omwende rosfDh ainpis sthoa cnkhd e,n wceer,ne oe tn tittorl eefdu nds prediocnta hteaeisdrs esrtheaodrwn ee rs1h8I ifo pu.ntdh "athtpe r imianfro oytnl yi ss[uitenh e Danisahp peiawslh se]tt hhdeeer fe nd[sa uncathsGs o ldsotweni.en.ds]. h a[ro efDs a nissht ock], oro wnaendld e tnhtet moat hipradrty1 .9" Goldsatlelietnght eahistls a wsauntidht Ge o ldsPtleaDinan'n sit saahxp paerael
15 DeclaorfaS tairLoa.Cnh a vEex,3. ,i ,i5 0-[8D0I -1S1KA4T]'.cs o mplaagianitn st Goldsmtaednieomn e ntoifMo rnS. h ah. 16 Inr eS KAT3,5 F6.S up3pda. 3t 0 6. 17 Counte,ir8 c4l.a im 18 Inr eS KAT3,5 F6.S up3pda. 3t 1 8. 19 Id.a 3t1 9. parallel proceedings. In its view, “SKAT is attempting [in both proceedings] to collect [the] eight refunds” it issued to Goldstein.”? Goldstein alleges also that both matters involve “the same allegations,”! “the exact same conduct,” and even “the same causes of action.” Based on the foregoing allegations, Goldstein filed a counterclaim asserting four claims. Count | asks for a declaration that the decisions of this Court are binding on SKAT in all jurisdictions and venues in the world.”* Goldstein alleges that it “will suffer substantial harm” if it is forced to defend itself in cases involving “the exact same conduct” and that will “give[] rise to likely conflicting outcomes.”” Count 2 asks for an injunction “prohibiting SKAT from taking any action that would impair or otherwise impact matters that SKAT has submitted for determination to this Court.””” The injuries Goldstein seeks to prevent are, as above, the cost of participating in multiple lawsuits and
20 Counterclaim § 72. 21 Id. 474. 22 Id. 985. 23 Id. 1 86. 24 Id. 479. 25 Id. 9,85. 26 Id. 486. 27 14.991.
the risk of being subject to conflicting judgments.”* Count 3 is captioned “Recovery of Denied Claims.” Goldstein alleges only that it is entitled to recover the ninth tax refund because SKAT “improper[ly]’” refused to disburse it.” Count 4 rests on alleged promissory estoppel. Goldstein claims that “for years, SKAT refunded Danish tax paid to all U.S. pension plans that submit[ted] the documentation requested by SKAT™® and that Goldstein purchased shares of Danish companies and submitted reclaim applications “[i]n reliance on SKAT’s practice of paying all properly-documented claims.” Goldstein likewise refers to the U.S.-Denmark treaty that it believes makes it exempt from paying tax on dividends paid on Danish stock.” After stating these points, Goldstein asserts that SKAT should be “estopped from demanding that the Goldstein Plan pay tax on the dividends.” It asserts also that SKAT must disburse the ninth tax refund.™
28 Id. □□ 88-89. 29 Ta. 99 93-94. 30 Id. 4%. 31 Id. 997-98. 32 Id. 100. 33 Id. $101. 34 Id. 102.
Discussion L Common Law Claims Counts 3 and 4 seek relief under common law. SKAT is based in Denmark and the counterclaim implies that its relevant conduct took place there. Goldstein is based in Florida and invested through ED&F Man, which is based in England. Although none of the facts giving rise to these counterclaims has any apparent connection to New York, both parties assume that New York law applies. Therefore I apply the law of the forum — New York.*°
A. “Recovery of Denied Claims” Stating an actionable claim in federal court requires more than demanding relief. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a party must “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A plaintiff's entitlement to relief depends on the existence of both material facts and a legally enforceable right — i.e., a right of action. Count 3 is captioned “recovery of denied claims.” The remedy Goldstein demands is clear: it wants SKAT to disburse the ninth tax refund. But Goldstein has not explained why it has aright to this remedy. Neither its counterclaim nor its opposition to this motion cites any provision
35 SKAT does so explicitly and only for the purposes of this motion. See SKAT Mem. 16 n.12 (assuming New York law applies without conceding the point and reserving its right to litigate the issue at a later time). Goldstein does so implicitly by citing to New York cases in stating a rule for promissory estoppel. Goldstein Mem. 19-20. 36 See Johnson y. Priceline.com, Inc., 711 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[C]ourts sitting in diversity may properly rely on the forum state’s law where neither party asserts that another jurisdiction’s law meaningfully differs.”). 37 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (emphasis added).
8 ofl aowjr u didceicailis Nnie owYn o,r okre lsewrheecroeg,an c iazuiosnfaeg c tfoiro" nr ecovery odfe ncileadi Ima sl.r"eh aadviyenf ormGeodl dsatnaedlit lnhp ,ea rittnihi eMssD Lt,h atCtohiusrt "insor te quaidnrd eoden,so p tr optoods ote h,[e p arhtoimeesw'foo]rtr hke amns dc o[utrhl ea]w fora p rovtihsmaiatooy nrm anyo etn t[itthlteeaom [fa ] v ordaebclie"s 3i8G oonl]d.sh tasesti ant ed ac labiumnt,o o tn uep ownh ircehl ciabenefgr antgeidvi etpnsr esfoermn.t Goldsatregtiuhneia stct sl asihmo suurvlidvn eo netbheeclaeunusdsseeR r,u l8oe f thFee deRrualolefC s i vPirlo ce"dapu lreea,nd eieondng l' yg itvhdeee fendfaainnrot t oifwc hea t
thpel aintcilfaifiassmn t dh gero undusp ownhi cihrtes3t9sB .uG"to' ldshtanesoi gtni vSeKAnT notoiftc hege r ouunpdowsnh iictchsl ariems "tAsp .l eatdhisanttga atc elsafo irrm e lmiuesft cont.a.ai.s n h oartnp dl asitna teomfthe ecn ltas ihmo wtihntaghpt el eaidesen rt ittrole el4di0 ef" Apparceonntcleyid tfaisin lgtu oir dee natr iifygo hfat c tGioolnd,s atregtiuhnea st itcsl asihmo suulrdvb ievceai u"tse ex ps]e t"ch tda[it s cowvirelerylv ceaaulos fae cst foir"o unn just enrichmmeonnthe,ay ad n rde cebirveeoadfcc, oh n tbrraecoatftc, hh ce o veonfga onotfad i tahn d faidre alainnndeg g,l i"4g1Te hneccseae.u osafec st airnoeona t s seirttneh cdeo unterancdle aviemn,
38 Inr eS KAT3,5 F6.S up3pda. t3 16A.l thoGuoglhd sdteefeinnos'fCes o u3ni tni ts opposmietmioornai ndsdi uffimct uuoln td erisattp apnetdaao,rr sgt uhteah ctel asihmo uld survbievceai uitsn ec ltuhpdehe r "aasaser eIsotuft hiem prdoepneoirfta hlRi esc laim Appliciaents itoinmt"ahd teai mnatggh eGasot l dbsetleiiiesntvh eorsue lcdo Gvoelrd.s tein Mem2.2(q uotCionugn te9r4c)Al.lat lih lmia,rsn gduoaiegbssee t ghs ea muen,a nswered quesotwfih otynh d ee nwiaa"sli mproIiptGse o rl.d"s dtuetyri,an t'thshe tarhnC i osu rt's, tpor opaonas nes twtoeh rqa ute stion. 39 GoldBsrt2.e2(q iu no tSiwnige rkvSi.oe rweN.imAca.z5 , 3U 4. S5.05 61,(3 2 0(0c2ig)t in FERD..C IPV.8. ( a))). 40 FERD..C IPV.8. ( a()e(m2p)h aadsdiesd ). 41 GoldMsetme2.i3 n. 9 ini tmse moraGnodludms htaeosiff ne rneodd e taabioltu hte mId. e cltiocn oen stihdeesre unasstehrteeodrl iieasbb iaolsfoie natyd n e xpecrtaattthiheoaarnln l egoafft aitcohtnia sft ,p roven, wouelndt Giotlldest tore eilni ef.
B. Promissory Estoppel Unl"irkeec oovfde ernyci leadi pmrso,m"i essstoorpyapr eetlah lei oosflry i ability iNne wY or"kAc. a uosfae c tfoirpo rno miessstooryup npdeelr Y oNrlekawr w e qutihprele asi ntiff
tpor otvhreee el eme1na)t csal:ne udan ra mbipgruoomuisrs eea;s o2an)nafo dbr lees ereealbilaen ce ont hparto manids ei3;n) j tuotry h ree lypiartyn agsa r esouftl hrtee li4a2n ce." GoldsatleliengS eKAsT fo trmh aantyy e ahraasdp racotfpi acyeti anxg rteofu nds alUl. S. pentshifiaoltnep drp olpadenorscl umye nctlea4di3 I mts .aallltsehogia e"ttsw aesx empt froma linlc omtea lxe v.i ed. D.e nm[abruykn]"d er bae ttwrteeheaUentn yi tSetdaa tneds Denma4r4kG .oldstein ScKhAaTr'asc tanpedrr aitcUzht.eeiSs c. e- Detnmraearas"kt p yr nmises" ancdl aiirtme sl ointhe edm i nc hootsoii nnvgie nDs atn issthoI catks .s tehrtSasKAt T therefore iess tofrpopmde edm antdhiGanotgl dsptateyhi weni thhtealoxdnt hoet heeirgr hetfuc nlda 4i5 ms.
SKATa'lsl epgreadco tfci ocmep lwyiittnhhgU e . S.-Detnmraerarkte yfu'nsd
42 KayeG rvo.s s2m0Fa2.n 3,d 611,615 (2d Cir. 2000). 43 Counte,rr9 c7l.a im 44 Id.,r 1 00. 45 Jd.,r 1 01. 10 requirement is not a “clear and unambiguous promise.” Goldstein has pointed to no authority, and I am aware of none, holding that a government agency’s pattern of engaging in legally required behavior on the basis of taxpayer submissions that later turn out to be fraudulent constitutes a “promise” for the purposes of a promissory estoppel claim.
I. Claims for Equitable Relief A, Injunctive Relief Goldstein seeks preliminary and permanent injunctions “prohibiting SKAT from taking any action that would impair or otherwise impact matters that SKAT has submitted for determination to this Court.’”*” The parties both describe this as an anti-suit injunction, or one that prevents a party from commencing or pursuing parallel litigation in foreign jurisdictions.”* 46 Elsewhere, Goldstein refers offhandedly to “SK AT’s promise to refund dividend taxes to U.S. pensions” in describing the terms of the U.S.-Denmark treaty. Jd. ]66. According to SKAT’s memorandum, this language qualifies as an allegation that S¢ AT madea clear and unambiguous promise to Goldstein. See Goldstein Mem. 20. Unlike “Beetlejuice,” saying the word “promise” is not enough to make the desired thing appear. It is impossible to infer from the counterclaim that SKAT clearly and unambiguously promised Goldstein that it would refund any taxes to which it was entitled. 47 Counterclaim 4 91. 48 See id. JJ 87-91 (explaining that the need for the injunction arises from the SKAT’s “pursui[t of] its claims in multiple jurisdictions,” the likelihood of “conflicting outcomes,” and the risk of “substantial harm if SKAT pursues these foreign actions while prosecuting its claims before this Court”). One perhaps could characterize this injunction as an anti- enforcement injunction to the limited extent that, in addition to enjoining foreign suits, it might enjoin SKAT from enforcing any judgment it receives in another court (in spite of, one would think, the anti-suit component). Cf Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 2012) (distinguishing between anti-suit and anti-enforcement injunctions). As both parties characterize this as an anti-suit injunction and neither argues that it would have an anti-enforcement component, I do not consider this possibility here. In any event, as explained below, an injunction of any character is inappropriate for several reasons.
11 To begin, the injunction claim is too vague. A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate “(1) irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction and (2) either (a) alikelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the movant’s favor.” Based on Goldstein’s pleading, the Court is uncertain exactly what Goldstein wants to enjoin SKAT from doing. This lack of clarity prevents the Court from meaningfully assessing whether Goldstein has a likelihood of success on the merits or whether sufficiently serious merits questions warrant preliminary relief. To the extent Goldstein is seeking an anti-suit injunction, it additionally must satisfy the factors laid out in the Second Circuit’s China Trade® decision.' First, two threshold requirements must be met: “(1) the parties must be the same in both matters, and (2) resolution of the case before the enjoining court must be dispositive of the action to be enjoined.”** A domestic judgment cannot be “dispositive” of a foreign action unless the foreign court would recognize it.”
49 MyWebGrocer, LLC vy. Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir. 2004). 50 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. MV. Cheong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987). 31 See Inre Millenium Seacarriers, Inc., 458 F.3d 92, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Software AG, Inc. v. Consist Software Solutions, Inc., 323 F. App’x 11, 12 (“A preliminary anti-suit injunction may be entered only if the multi-factor test set forth in [China Trade] and the ordinary test for a preliminary injunction are both satisfied .. . .” (citations omitted)). Courts apply this doctrine when assessing requests for preliminary and permanent anti-suit injunctions. Jn re Millenium Seacarriers, 458 F.3d at 97. $2 China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36. 53 The Second Circuit has not stated this rule explicitly, but two of its leading opinions on anti-suit injunctions presume it to be true. See id. at 37 (implying that the resolution of the
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57 China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36 (quoting Laker Airways Lid. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 58 Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 59 Mr. Goldstein is not a party to the Danish tax appeal, although the Goldstein Plan is. As SKAT does not argue that this difference is in relevant to threshold requirement that the parties be the same, there is no need to reach that question. 60 In re SKAT, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 319 (noting that this appears to be “the primary if not only issue” in Denmark), 61 Goldstein Mem. 25. I express no opinion on whether this assertion is correct. 62 I decline to consider whether forums other than Denmark would recognize a judgment of this Court, as Goldstein has not specified any other forum where an action is pending or may one day be pending between it and SKAT.
14 additional factors counsel strongly against such relief. Goldstein has pointed to no US. policy that would be frustrated by allowing an agency of Denmark to defend itself in a tax appeal in Danish court involving Danish law. Goldstein certainly will not be heard to argue that the tax appeal is vexatious, because Goldstein itself is the appellant.** To whatever extent Goldstein does not concede that the third factor is met here,” I hold that it is not. The Danish appeal poses no threat to this Court’s “in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction,” and there is no indication that the Danish tax court is likely to enjoin this proceeding. On the fourth factor, Goldstein has not argued that any equitable considerations would be prejudiced by the continuation of the tax appeal other than its desire to be free from the cost of litigation. That consideration is weighed appropriately under factor five, which also is of no help to Goldstein. While it always is true that multiple suits create inconvenience and expense, and it is possible (though no evidence so suggests at this time) that the two suits will result in a race to judgment, the ubiquity of these factors means that they are rarely, if ever, determinative under China
63 Goldstein focuses on the fact that the appeal is from SK AT’s determination letters finding that Goldstein was required to return the eight refunds. These letters are not a parallel foreign action that Goldstein is seeking to enjoin. And in any case, “parallel proceedings are ordinarily tolerable.” China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36. 64 See Goldstein Mem. 25 (“[Goldstein’s] request for injunctive relief satisfies the five-factor test, as well. Every factor but the third is present here... .”). Despite this unambiguous concession, the following page of Goldstein’s brief argues that the third factor is not present here. See id. at 26. Goldstein’s arguments on this point are unpersuasive and do not grapple with the problems noted above. 65 Cf China Trade, 837 F.3d at 36-37 (holding the third factor was not met when there was no threat that a foreign court would enjoin the federal district court or prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction).
15 Trade. Goldstein has failed to demonstrate that they create any special urgency here.
B. Declaratory Judgment Count 1 asks for a declaratory judgment stating that “this Court’s decisions in this action arising out of the transactions set forth in the Complaint are binding on SKAT in all jurisdictions and venues [in the world].”*’ This claim fails for at least three reasons. First, Goldstein lacks Article II standing. Federal courts “must be alert to avoid imposition upon their jurisdiction through obtaining futile or premature interventions, particularly where a ruling is sought that would reach far beyond the particular case.” For this reason, a dispute giving rise to a request for declaratory relief “must not be nebulous or contingent[,] but must have taken on fixed and final shape so that a court can see what legal issues it is deciding, what effect its decision will have on the adversaries, and that some useful purpose to be achieved in deciding them.” The injury Goldstein wishes to avoid is contingent upon foreign courts, primarily in actions
66 See id. at 36 (finding that because “vexatiousness” and an expensive “race to judgment” “are likely to be present whenever parallel actions are proceeding concurrently, an anti-suit injunction grounded on these additional factors alone would tend to undermine the policy that allows parallel proceedings to continue and disfavors anti-suit injunctions”); cf e.g., Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974) (Mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury.”). 67 Counterclaim § 79. The heading of Count 1 — though none of the allegations that follow — asks also that the declaration “estop” SKAT from pursuing relief in other courts. This would not be a declaration of rights, but an ant-suit injunction no different than that demanded under Count 2. I reject it for the reasons explained above. 68 Jenkins vy. United States, 386 F.3d 415, 417-18 (2d Cir. 2004) (brackets and ellipsis omitted) (quoting Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243 (1952)). 69 Id. (quoting Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 244).
16 not yet filed, issuing judgments that conflict with judgments that this Court may or may not issue.”° This is far to speculative to warrant declaratory relief. Much for that reason, Goldstein has not demonstrated that a declaration would serve any useful purpose at this time.” Second, Goldstein has not asserted a right of action entitling it to declaratory relief. The Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”)” is “procedural only” and “gives a district court the discretion to ‘declare the legal rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such a declaration.’”’? But this “discretion does not extend to the declaration of rights that do not exist under law.””" This is because a declaratory judgment is aremedy, not aright, and the DJA “does not create an independent cause of action.”” A district court does not have the discretion to issue a
70 Counterclaim { 79. SKAT states in a heading in its opposition memorandum that Goldstein lacks standing to pursue its declaratory and injunctive relief claims, but the entire analysis that follows focuses on standing to seek declaratory judgments. See SKAT Mem. 8-11. The Second Circuit has not explained how to assess standing where a party seeks an anti-suit injunction, although it is at least possible to infer that China Trade’s two threshold factors to some degree overlap with the standing inquiry. Whatever the case, | decline to reach this issue because there are many other reasons for dismissing the anti-suit injunction claim. 92 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. 73 Chevron, 667 F.3d at 244 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a)). Id. 75 Id. (citation omitted); see also Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (“Congress enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend their jurisdiction.”)).
17 declaratory judgment unless it “relies on a valid legal predicate,” i.e., a right of action.” Goldstein has not identified — or even attempted to identify — a “valid legal predicate” for its claim.” Even if it had, none of the counterclaims could serve as a valid predicate, as none of them have survived the motion to dismiss.” Third, even if [had the authority to exercise jurisdiction over a claim for declaratory relief, I would exercise my “broad discretion” not to do so.” In weighing whether to order declaratory relief, courts must ask “(1) whether the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying or settling the legal issues involved; and (2) whether a judgment would finalize the controversy and
76 Chevron, 667 F.3d at 244. 71 Goldstein does not purport to rely on its similar claim for injunctive relief. However, it implies — though it does not argue — that Counts 3 and 4 perhaps create the needed predicate. See Goldstein Mem. 15 (arguing Count | should move forward “regardless of whether [Counts 3 and 4] survive,” but not otherwise asserting that these claims are predicates). It would distort the DJA to declare under the facts of this case that SKAT is bound by this Court’s rulings in all jurisdictions worldwide as a remedy for promissory estoppel or “recovery of denied claims.” But as Goldstein has not advanced this theory, I decline to consider it. 78 The Second Circuit’s Chevron opinion does not explain whether a “valid legal predicate” must be asserted in the complaint of the party seeking a declaratory judgment. At least one court in this circuit has suggested that it must be. See Spiteri v. Russo, No. 12-cv-2780 (MKB) (RLM), 2013 WL 4806960, at *19 n.30 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2013) (“A plaintiff cannot maintain a claim for a declaratory judgment where the underlying substantive claim has been dismissed ... .”), aff'd sub nom. Spiteri v. Camacho, 622 F. App’x 9 (2d Cir. 2015). Because Goldstein’s claim fails for several other reasons, and Goldstein has not argued that either a hypothetical cause of action not stated in its counterclaim or one of SKAT’s fraud claims could support its claim for declaratory relief, 1 need not reach this issue here. 79 Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Lid., 346 F.3d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 2003).
18 offerre lfrioemuf n certa80iS notymc.eo" uartssak l "s(ow1 h)e thtehprer oproesmeedid bsye ing usemde rfoerl' ypoc redufernaclio nrag' 'r atcroee j su dic(a2wt)ha e'tht;eh ures o efa d eclaratory
judgmweonuitln dc rfreiacstbeie otwnes eonv erleeigsgaynls toerim msp roepnecrrlooynat chhe domaoifans taotrfoe r eicgonurta ;n (d3 w)h etthheeirras be e totrme orre eff ecrteimvee8d1 y." Iti nso ctl ehaortw h jeu dgmweonuctll da orris fye ttalnery e lelveangitas ls ues. Goldsctoenfuisnin agrlgytu hetasht de e cla"rwaotucillodant r ahitSfy K A.T. i.n tetnoad b[isd]e byt hiCso urt'dse cis82iN oontshi.itn"nh cgeo unteprecrmliaatniis nm fe rtehntachteei rasen r yi sk whatstoheSavKAteT rw ifaliltl do o t haWth.aG to ldsrteeawilannlt iysas d eclatrhaSatKAtiT o n winlolbt ea btlroee olnyafa vorafobrleeij gund gmiiefdtn o ten sop tr evoanii tfrlsa ucdl aiinm s thiCso u8r3 Ats.n otaebdo tvhepi,rs o bilcseo mn jecFtoturhir ssaa lm.re e astohdnee, c laration
wounlodfit n arlelsyot lhcveoe n trboevtewrSesKAeyTn a nGdo ldstein. Thoet htehrrefa ec toarlpslo iinntt h sea mdei recTthieeon ntp.iurp roeso eft he declair"saar t aitcoroene j su dibceactaaGu"os led swtoeuuilsndei t tpo r ecSlKAuTdfr eo mt rying teon forafac veo rfoarbeljieug dng mTehndete .c lawroaultidin ocnrfr eiacstbeie otnwt ehUeenin t ed StaatneDdse nmabrykp reclauD dainniagsg he nfrcoymr elyoinanD ga nijsuhd gmebnatso end DanilsahwAn .d t heirasfe a bre ttreerm eadvya itloGa oblldes wtaeiitfonira:n c go ncdriestpeu te
80 Id. 81 Ida.3t 5 9-(6e0n dotrhsefaiscnetg os reasel) C;sh oe v6r6oF7n. ,3a 2dt4 (5r epeaantdi ng furtheenrd ortshiefanscget ors). 82 GoldMsetme1.i.7 n 83 Seied. ( assetrthtiahntreg i osfkS KAT'nso ncompilssi iagnncibefie ccaaUnu.tsS e. judgmdeonn othtsa vper ecleuffseiicDnvte e n mark). 19 involving conflicting judgments and acting at that time.
Conclusion Plaintiff's motion to dismiss [18-md-2865, DI-113] is granted. SO ORDERED. Dated: January 23, 2020
Lewis A. (, United States Diswict Judge