Sjoroos v. Commissioner

81 T.C. No. 61, 81 T.C. 971, 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 3
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedDecember 15, 1983
DocketDocket No. 29947-81
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 81 T.C. No. 61 (Sjoroos v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sjoroos v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. No. 61, 81 T.C. 971, 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 3 (tax 1983).

Opinion

Featherston, Judge:

Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioners’ Federal income tax for 1979 in the amount of $5,022, and an addition to tax under section 6653(a)1 in the amount of $251. Other matters having been resolved by agreement of the parties, the only issues remaining for decision are:

(1) Whether the Federal income tax exemption provided for in section 912(2) for certain cost-of-living allowances received by Federal employees violates petitioners’ constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws; and

(2) Whether any part of any underpayment of tax for 1979 was due to petitioners’ "negligence or intentional disregard of rules and regulations” within the meaning of section 6653(a).

FINDINGS OF FACT

Petitioners, husband and wife, resided in Juneau, Alaska, at the time their petition was filed. They filed a joint Federal income tax return for 1979 with the Internal Revenue Service Center, Ogden, Utah. Petitioners resided in Alaska also during 1979. Both petitioners worked for private employers; petitioner Gary E. Sjoroos was a heavy equipment operator, and petitioner Shirley A. Sjoroos was an office manager.

In their joint Federal income tax return for 1979, petitioners reported income from wages and salaries in the total amount of $45,752. Twenty percent of this amount, or $9,150, was then deducted as an "Alaska cost of living allowance.” Petitioners prepared the return themselves, and have not shown that they sought professional advice regarding the validity of their "cost of living” deduction.

Respondent disallowed petitioners’ claimed cost-of-living deduction and imposed an addition to tax under section 6653(a).

OPINION

Section 912(2)2 provides that certain cost-of-living allowances received by "civilian officers or employees of the Government of the United States stationed outside the continental United States (other than Alaska)” shall be exempt from the Federal income tax. Because petitioners were not officers or employees of the Federal Government during the period in question, they were clearly outside the scope of the statutory exemption and are not entitled to the claimed deduction.3

Petitioners argue that the granting of an exemption for Federal employees’ cost-of-living allowances, with no comparable exemption for persons employed in the private sector, denies them their constitutional right of equal protection of the laws.4 We hold that section 912(2) does not violate any of petitioners’ constitutional rights.5

It is true that section 912(2) grants to Federal employees in Alaska a right to exclude their cost-of-living allowances from gross income and that no corresponding right has been extended to individuals employed in private industry. We do not think, however, that this disparate treatment deprives petitioners of equal protection of the laws. The constitutional issue is whether limiting to Federal employees in designated areas the right to exclude cost-of-living allowances from their gross income was a reasonable classification, i.e., had some rational basis. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).

"Normally, a legislative classification will not be set aside if any state of facts rationally justifying it is demonstrated to or perceived by the courts.” United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970); see Keeler v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 279 (1978), and cases cited. We think section 912(2) reflects a reasonable legislative classification. The section first came into the law during World War II when rapidly increasing income tax rates and increased living costs were consuming large portions of the allowances provided for Federal civilian employees stationed outside the United States. Instead of increasing the allowances to offset increasing Federal taxes and rising living costs, Congress adopted the alternative of exempting the cost-of-living allowances from taxation.6 That provision has been carried forward as section 912(2) and was expressly extended to Federal employees in Alaska by legislation adopted in I960.7

The legislative classification made by the section thus reflects a policy decision by Congress as to how Federal employees should be recompensed for the added living costs they incurred while assigned to certain locations, i.e., by tax exemption of the cost-of-living allowances rather than by an increase in the amounts thereof. The policy decision that such employees should be so recompensed involved a broader policy decision as to how the administration of the activities of the Federal Government outside the continental United States could be improved and strengthened. We think that decision has a rational basis and that it was well within the constitutional power of Congress to make this distinction between employees paid with Federal funds and employees paid with private funds. The exercise of that power in no way deprives petitioners of equal protection of the laws.

There remains the issue as to the applicability of the additions to tax under section 6653(a).8 That section provides that "there shall be added” to the tax an amount equal to the underpayment if the underpayment is due to "negligence” or "intentional disregard of rules and regulations.” The burden of showing that this addition to tax is not applicable rests with petitioners (Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933)), and they have presented neither evidence nor argument to show that it does not apply.

Excluding or deducting 20 percent of a taxpayer’s income in the absence of any supporting statutory authority is a drastic step. We are convinced that petitioners knew that no statute or regulation authorized the claimed deduction and that they intentionally disregarded the law as written by Congress in claiming the exemption. Certainly, before taking such a drastic step, any reasonable person wishing to abide by the law would have consulted an attorney on the constitutional issue.9 It was negligence for petitioners to fail to take this precautionary step. We are satisfied that no competent attorney would have advised petitioners that the claimed exclusion was allowable. We conclude, therefore, that the section 6653(a) addition to tax must be applied.

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

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2001 T.C. Memo. 20 (U.S. Tax Court, 2001)
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1985 T.C. Memo. 383 (U.S. Tax Court, 1985)
Smith v. Commissioner
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Grauvogel v. Commissioner
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Lyman v. Commissioner
1984 T.C. Memo. 115 (U.S. Tax Court, 1984)
Sjoroos v. Commissioner
81 T.C. No. 61 (U.S. Tax Court, 1983)

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Bluebook (online)
81 T.C. No. 61, 81 T.C. 971, 1983 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 3, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sjoroos-v-commissioner-tax-1983.