S.J. v. Hamilton Cnty

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: June 22, 2004
• Docket: 02-3852
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. No. 02-3852 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0188P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0188p.06 Marc D. Mezibov, SIRKIN, PINALES, MEZIBOV & SCHWARTZ, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: David Todd Stevenson, Stephen K. Shaw, HAMILTON UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS COUNTY PROSECUTING OFFICE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants. Marc D. Mezibov, Michael N. Budelsky, FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT SIRKIN, PINALES, MEZIBOV & SCHWARTZ, Cincinnati, _________________ Ohio, for Appellee.

S.J., X _________________ Plaintiff-Appellee, - - OPINION - No. 02-3852 _________________ v. - > BOGGS, Chief Judge. This case presents the question of , whether Hillcrest Training School, a juvenile facility created HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO ; - HILLCREST TRAINING pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.65, is cloaked with - Ohio’s sovereign immunity against a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action SCHOOL; and WILLIAM H. - brought by a former Hillcrest resident. The district court held HAMILTON , - that Hillcrest was not entitled to sovereign immunity. For the Defendants-Appellants. - reasons explained below, we affirm. - N I Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati. Plaintiff S.J., when a minor, was referred to Hillcrest by No. 98-00603—Susan J. Dlott, District Judge. order of the Hamilton County Juvenile Court. His complaint alleges that he was sexually assaulted several times by a Argued: December 9, 2003 fellow resident, R.B., who sneaked into his room at night. The last attack took place on the night after S.J. had informed Decided and Filed: June 22, 2004 a Hillcrest employee about the assaults. R.B. later admitted attacking S.J., and was adjudicated a delinquent. S.J. sued Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; and BATCHELDER and Hillcrest, its superintendent, and Hamilton County under SUTTON, Circuit Judges. § 1983, alleging that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to investigate and prevent sexual abuse, and _________________ failing to train Hillcrest employees adequately. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of COUNSEL sovereign immunity, arguing that Hillcrest is an arm of the State of Ohio because it was created by state law and is ARGUED: David Todd Stevenson, HAMILTON COUNTY overseen by the juvenile court. The magistrate judge PROSECUTING OFFICE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellants. disagreed, and recommended denying the motion. The

1 No. 02-3852 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. 3 4 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. No. 02-3852

district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation in Keller v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. relevant part. 2002). Later, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the II complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, in effect asking the district court to revisit its ruling on sovereign A immunity. 1 The motion argued that dismissal was necessary in light of this court’s unpublished decision in Oswald v. Hillcrest operates within a statutory framework that vests Lucas County Juvenile Det. Ctr., No. 99-3771, 2000 U.S. both the state and Hamilton County with a role in its App. LEXIS 27990 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000), which held that administration. Juvenile training facilities such as Hillcrest a “juvenile detention facility” defined under former Ohio Rev. belong to a broader class of facilities referred to in the Ohio Code § 2151.34 (now Ohio Rev. Code § 2152.41) was “part Code as “single county or joint-county facilities.” Ohio Rev. of the juvenile court, which is an arm of the state,” and Code § 307.021(A) (authorizing board of county therefore was entitled to sovereign immunity. Id. at ** 5-6. commissioners to construct such facilities). The same However, the district court concluded that the “juvenile statutory provision states generally that “the juvenile court detention facility” at issue in Oswald was distinguishable [is] . . . the branch of state government having jurisdiction from Hillcrest, a juvenile facility defined under Ohio Rev. over any such . . . juvenile . . . facilities.” Ibid. Hillcrest’s Code § 2151.652 and it denied the motion to dismiss. specific authorizing statute, Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.65, provides: Defendants timely appealed. Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction over an appeal from a district Upon the advice and recommendation of the juvenile court’s denial of sovereign immunity to a government entity judge, the board of county commissioners may provide that claims to be an “arm of the state.” Puerto Rico Aqueduct by purchase, lease, construction, or otherwise a school and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 . . . or other facilit[y] where delinquent children, . . . (1993); Tenn. v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 326 F.3d dependent children, abused children, unruly children, . . . 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2003). We review de novo the legal or neglected children or juvenile traffic offenders may be question of whether Hillcrest is entitled to sovereign held for training, treatment, and rehabilitation. . . . Such immunity, Timmer v. Mich. Dep’t of Commerce, 104 F.3d . . . facility . . . shall be maintained as provided in 833, 836 (6th Cir. 1997), but accept any pertinent factual Chapters 2151. and 2152. of the Revised Code. [. . . ] findings by the district court unless they are clearly erroneous, The juvenile court shall determine:

1 (A) The children to be admitted to any school . . . or The district co urt pro perly construed this late-filed motion as a other facility maintained under this section; “suggestion” that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Such a filing may be made at any time. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (h)(3); Von D unser v. Aronoff, (B) The period such children shall be trained, treated, and 915 F.2d 1071, 10 74 (6th Cir. 1990). rehabilitated at such facility; (C) The removal and transfer of children from such 2 facility. W e will henceforth refer to H illcrest, and other facilities under § 2151.65 , as “juvenile training facilities,” to distinguish them from the “juvenile detention facilit[ies]” authorized by § 2152.41. No. 02-3852 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. 5 6 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. No. 02-3852

Thus, by the terms of the statute, the initial request to create instrumentalities,” Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Doe, 519 U.S. a facility such as Hillcrest originates from the juvenile court, 425, 429 (1997), or, in other words, to those government which is a division of the Ohio Court of Common Pleas. entities that act as “arm[s] of the State.” Mt. Healthy City Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.08. The county possesses the Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). discretion to grant or refuse this initial request. However, if However, it “does not extend to counties and similar the county agrees, the facility must “be maintained as municipal corporations.” Ibid. provided in [Ohio Rev. Code §§] 2151. and 2152.” Ibid. These sections authorize the juvenile court to demand funds Because Ohio counties lack sovereign immunity, see ibid. from the county that are reasonably necessary to operate (holding that an Ohio school board lacked immunity because Hillcrest, as part of the court’s annual appropriation for it was “more like a county” than an arm of the state); Alkire “administrative expenses.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.10. The v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 811 (6th Cir. 2003), we affirm, county must provide the funds requested if they are without further discussion, the portion of the district court’s “reasonably necessary to meet . . . [the] administrative order denying immunity to defendant Hamilton County. expenses of the court” and its facilities. Ibid.; see § 2151.13; State ex rel. Wilke v. Hamilton County Bd. of Comm’rs, 734 The difficult issue is determining whether the same is true N.E.2d 811, 818 (Ohio 2000) (county must pay court’s of Hillcrest itself – and, derivatively, of its superintendent, funding request unless it can prove that request is an abuse of Mr. Hamilton, since for the purpose of sovereign immunity discretion). The statutory scheme also authorizes the juvenile “individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes court to appoint Hillcrest’s superintendent and to determine of the entity they represent.” Alkire, 330 F.3d at 811; see his compensation. Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.70. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).3 Hillcrest presents a two-step argument in support of its claim of Hillcrest receives the large majority of its funding from sovereign immunity. It contends that the Hamilton County Hamilton County. It also receives some funds from the Ohio Juvenile Court is itself an arm of the state, and that Hillcrest Department of Youth Services and the Ohio Department of is sufficiently bound to the Juvenile Court to count as “a part Mental Health, and it is subject to standards promulgated by the Department of Youth Services. B 3 In theory, M r. Hamilton m ight be immune, eve n if Hillcrest is not, if he was personally acting as an “arm of the state” in connection with the The text of the Eleventh Amendment explicitly refers to the alleged conduct described in S.J.’s co mplaint – in effect, if his actions or immunity of the states from suits “commenced or prosecuted omissions giving rise to S.J.’s claim were prompted by a state statute. See . . . by Citizens of another State.” U.S. Const., amend. XI. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552 , 563 (6th Cir. 19 99). However, the Supreme Court has made clear that the However, the standard to e stablish such a defense is rigorous, and Mr. sovereign immunity of the states “neither derives from nor is Hamilton does not satisfy it. A local actor who “makes conscious policy decisions,” and does not simply “mechanically adopt and enforce . . . a limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment,” Alden v. state policy,” cannot claim to have been acting as an arm of the state Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999), and that it extends to unde r this theory. Id. at 565. actions brought against a state by its own citizens, Hans v. Here, while Mr. Hamilton was authorized by statute to supervise the Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). Sovereign immunity juvenile facility at Hillcrest, the statute d id not instruct him abou t how to applies not only to the states themselves, but also to “state exerc ise that authority. See Ohio Rev. Cod e § 2151 .70. His entitlement to sovereign immunity thus stand s or falls with that of H illcrest. No. 02-3852 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. 7 8 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. No. 02-3852

of” the court, thereby entitling it to share in the court’s of Mumford’s reasoning, noting that Mumford had not taken immunity. Appellant Br. at 7. into account, as the Supreme Court requires, whether the state would be legally responsible for a judgment against an Ohio To determine whether an entity is an arm of the state, courts court. See Alkire, 330 F.3d at 811. We did not decide have traditionally looked to several factors, including: whether Mumford was correct; instead, we remanded the issue (1) whether the state would be responsible for a judgment so that the federal district court could engage in fact finding against the entity in question; (2) how state law defines the on the question of whether a judgment against the county entity; (3) what degree of control the state maintains over the court would be paid by a county or by the state itself, and entity; and (4) the source of the entity’s funding. Brotherton, could apply the proper arm-of-the-state analysis in the first 173 F.3d at 560 (summarizing past decisions). In an earlier instance. Id. at 813. We have not yet had an opportunity to case whose analysis focused upon state law, we held that an re-examine those facts. Cf. Harmon v. Hamilton County Ct. Ohio Court of Common Pleas was an arm of the state cloaked Of Common Pleas, 83 Fed. Appx. 766, 768 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, with sovereign immunity. Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 2003) (unpublished order) (concluding that it was “not clear,” 264, 269 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Kelley v. Mun. Cts., 97 F.3d in light of Alkire, whether an Ohio court of common pleas had 902, 907-08 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that municipal court was sovereign immunity). a unit of the judicial branch of the state entitled to sovereign immunity); Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Resolving the present case does not require us to decide Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (same); Harris v. Mo. Ct. of App., W. whether one of the several Mt. Healthy criteria has now Dist., 787 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 1986) (same; Missouri state become the sole criterion for determining whether an agency court); cf. Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 418-19 (6th Cir. is a state entity for sovereign immunity purposes. But there 1988) (per curiam) (determining that state court is not a are significant reasons to doubt such a suggestion. The “person” suable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Supreme Court explained in Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994), that the sovereign immunity Our recent decisions have modified this arm-of-the-state doctrine is about money and dignity – it not only protects a framework, in light of Supreme Court opinions that “ha[ve] State’s treasury, but also “pervasively . . . emphasizes the . . . explicitly [stated] that . . . the most important factor integrity retained by each State in our federal system.” Id. at bearing on the Eleventh Amendment question” is “who would 39; see id. at 47 (noting that when immunity factors cut in pay for a damage judgment” against the entity being sued. different directions, “the Eleventh Amendment’s twin reasons Alkire, 330 F.3d at 811 (citing, inter alia, Regents of Univ. of for being remain our prime guide” in arm-of-the-state Calif. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 430 (1997)). The emphasis on inquiry). Indeed, in the important recent case of Fed. “who pays” is substantial: our recent decisions have left open Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 the question of “[w]hether we view as dispositive [the] (2002), the Court renewed that emphasis, declaring: “The emphasis on the State treasury, or [simply] interpret it as preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord placing significant weight on one factor of a multi-factor States the dignity that is consistent with their status as test.” Brotherton, 173 F.3d at 561. sovereign entities.” Id. at 760 (emphasis added). Alkire v. Irving has been our latest word on this evolving Examining the contours of related sovereign immunity legal issue. In Alkire, a § 1983 action against an Ohio county doctrines reinforces the impression that values beyond court, we expressed some doubt about the continued validity guarding the public fisc play a role in the arm-of-the-state No. 02-3852 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. 9 10 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. No. 02-3852

inquiry. The Eleventh Amendment ordinarily bars all actions As noted above, our inquiry begins by asking who would brought against a State itself, even injunctive actions that be responsible for a judgment against Hillcrest. Hillcrest’s raise no risk of an impact on the treasury. See Pennhurst St. brief concedes (consistent with the magistrate judge’s finding, Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102 (1984). adopted by the district court) that Hamilton County, not the Conversely, it does not ordinarily bar injunctive actions state of Ohio, would pay such a judgment. Appellant Br. at against state officials, even when those actions may have a 18. Thus, this “important” factor weighs against sovereign substantial impact on state finances. See Edelman v. Jordan, immunity. Doe, 519 U.S. at 430. 415 U.S. 651, 667 (1974). The second factor is how state law defines Hillcrest. As we To the extent that considerations of dignity are relevant in have noted, the authorizing statute describes Hillcrest as a determining whether an entity is protected by state sovereign “single-county juvenile facility,” rather than, for example, as immunity, one would expect this factor to weigh heavily in a a state facility. Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.65. However, many suit against a state court. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 of the relevant statutory provisions suggest a significant U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938) (“[T]he constitution of the United connection between the state and Hillcrest. Under Ohio law, States . . . recognizes and preserves the autonomy and it is “a public purpose and function of the state” to “acquire, independence of the states . . . in their judicial departments.”). construct, [and] renovate” training facilities such as Hillcrest. Such courts are the “adjudicative voice” of the state itself. Ohio Rev. Code § 307.021(A). The counties act as “state Harris, 787 F.2d at 429. That is particularly true in the agencies . . . perform[ing] duties of the state” in carrying out context of a court system that, like Ohio’s, is mandated by the such capital improvements. Ibid.4 Moreover, the juvenile state constitution to be uniform and to be supervised by one court, a “branch of state government,” exercises “jurisdiction” supreme court. Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5; Foster, 864 F.2d at over Hillcrest. Ibid. We conclude that the state-law factor 418. While lower state courts may sometimes be funded by somewhat supports extending sovereign immunity to the counties where they sit, separation of powers concerns Hillcrest, though other entities, such as a court itself, would frequently preclude counties and other branches of present a stronger claim to sovereign immunity in this regard. government from denying reasonable funding for the operation of the courts. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Turning to the third factor, state control, we find that Ohio § 307.01(B); State ex rel. Weaver v. Lake County Bd. of exercises some, but limited, control over Hillcrest. The Comm’rs, 580 N.E.2d 1090, 1092 (Ohio 1991); Mumford, Hamilton County Juvenile Court, a part of the Ohio judicial 105 F.3d at 269; cf. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1991 system, controls the admission of juveniles to the facility. n.16 (2004) (observing that “the provision of judicial The court appoints Hillcrest’s supervisor and sets his salary, services” is “an area in which local governments are typically though it does not administer Hillcrest directly. The juvenile treated as arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment court also possesses discretion over the facility’s budget: purposes.”) (punctuation omitted). In the present case, however, we are asked only to determine whether Hillcrest is an arm of the state, not whether 4 the Hamilton County Juvenile Court itself is such. We W e note that this provision, by its terms, applies only to tasks conclude that Hillcrest is not an arm of the state. performed in connection with the acquisition, construction, or renovation of juvenile facilities, and not to the ordinary operations of such facilities, which are the activities that gave rise to S.J.’s claim here. No. 02-3852 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. 11 12 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. No. 02-3852

within reasonable limits, its funding requests for Hillcrest N.E.2d 80, 83 (Ohio 1981). “Common pleas courts and their must be honored by the county. divisions possess inherent authority to order funding that is reasonable and necessary to the court’s administration of its On the other hand, the authorizing statute vests Hamilton business.” Wilke, 734 N.E.2d at 818. In our judgment, the County with discretion over the crucial decision of whether to co-operative scheme created by Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.65 create a facility such as Hillcrest at all. Ohio Rev. Code does not offend these principles. Giving the county a say in § 2151.65. This fact marks an important difference between the initial creation of Hillcrest is not the same as giving it a Hillcrest and the juvenile detention facility at issue in this say in the core functions of the juvenile court. Section court’s unpublished decision in Oswald. Oswald concluded 2151.65 authorizes the creation of a separate, subsidiary that “[u]nder Ohio law, a county juvenile detention center is government entity that is to be partially administered by the part of the juvenile court, which is an arm of the state.” 2000 juvenile court, when the court and the county agree to do so. U.S. App. LEXIS 27990, at *2 (citing former Ohio Rev. Code Once such a facility is created, the sphere of “judicial § 2151.34). We agree with the district court that Oswald is administration” presumably extends to include the new entity, distinguishable from the present case.5 Former § 2151.34, and the statutory scheme accordingly denies the county now Ohio Rev. Code § 2152.41, the provision that authorized discretion in funding Hillcrest’s operations, consistent with the “juvenile detention facility” at issue in Oswald, provides Ohio’s law of separation of powers. See ibid. that the county “shall” create the detention facility upon the recommendation of the juvenile court. Ibid. (emphasis On balance, we conclude that the state control factor favors added); see S.J. v. Hamilton County, No. C-1-98-603, Order sovereign immunity, though not as strongly as it would in the Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, slip op. at 4. Here, case of a juvenile detention facility under § 2152.41 (as in in contrast, § 2151.65 provides only that the county “may” Oswald) or an Ohio court itself. construct a juvenile facility such as Hillcrest, if the juvenile court so recommends. The difference in wording, at a crucial The final factor, the source of Hillcrest’s funding, can be point, in two such closely related statutory provisions as dealt with quickly. The parties have stipulated that the great §§ 2152.41 and 2151.65, clearly vests the county with majority of Hillcrest’s funding comes from Hamilton County, authority to grant or deny the juvenile court’s initial request not the state of Ohio. Hillcrest’s budget in 2000 was to create a facility such as Hillcrest. approximately $9,000,000; approximately $710,000 of this came from state sources, and the rest from the county. In so construing this statutory language, we recognize that Accordingly, this factor weighs strongly against extending Ohio law places limits on the interaction between a legislative sovereign immunity to Hillcrest. entity such as Hamilton County’s Board of Commissioners and a judicial entity such as the Hamilton County Juvenile Thus, of the four factors typically employed in the arm-of- Court. Ohio’s constitution forbids “granting to a legislative the-state inquiry, two (status under state law, and level of body . . . the ‘power of the purse’ over judicial state control) weigh somewhat in favor of sovereign administration.” State ex rel. Johnston v. Taulbee, 423 immunity, and two (responsibility for a judgment, and source of funding) clearly weigh against sovereign immunity. Because our precedents and the Supreme Court’s case law 5 still single out the factor of responsibility for a judgment as As an unp ublished decision o f this court, Oswald also lacks binding the most important (albeit not exclusive) determinant of arm- precedential value. No. 02-3852 S.J. v. Hamilton County, Ohio, et al. 13

of-the-state status, we hold that Hillcrest, as a juvenile training facility under Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.65, is not entitled to assert sovereign immunity as an arm of the state of Ohio. Accordingly, the district court properly denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss S.J.’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. III For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order is AFFIRMED.