UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
) SHAHAWAR MATIN SIRAJ, et al., ) ) Petitioners, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 19-cv-03375 (ABJ) ) UNITED STATES SENTENCING ) COMMISSION, ) ) ) Respondent. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Respondent the United States Sentencing Commission has filed a motion to dismiss
petitioners’ lawsuit against it, pursuant to Federal Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Court will
grant the motion and dismiss the claims without prejudice for lack of mandamus jurisdiction, and
therefore, it need not reach the Commission’s additional bases for dismissal.
BACKGROUND
a. Mr. Siraj
Petitioner Shahawar Matin Siraj, a federal prisoner, is serving a sentence for a May 24,
2006 conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. See
United States v. Siraj, No. 1:05-cr-00104 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006) at ECF No. 166. He was
convicted of conspiring to: (1) damage or destroy by means of an explosive, any building or other
real property used in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(i) and (n); (2) wreck,
derail, set fire to, or disable a public transportation vehicle, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1993(a)(1)
and (a)(8); (3) place a destructive device in a facility used in the operation of a public transportation
vehicle without previously obtaining the permission of the public transportation provider, in
1 violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1993(a)(3) and (a)(8), and; (4) unlawfully deliver, place, discharge, or
detonate an explosive device in a public transportation system with the intent to cause extensive
destruction of such system, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332f(a)(2) and (a)(1)(B). See id. at ECF
Nos. 166 and 182. On January 4, 2007, the court denied Siraj’s motions for judgment of acquittal
and new trial, see United States v. Siraj, 468 F. Supp. 2d 408 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), and he was
sentenced to three 20-year concurrent terms of imprisonment on counts one through three, to be
served concurrently with a 30-year term on count four. See Siraj, No. 1:05-cr-00104 at ECF No.
182.
The conviction was later affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, see United States v. Siraj, 533 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Siraj, No. 07–0224–
cr, 2008 WL 2675826, at *1 (2d Cir. July 9, 2008), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, see
Siraj v. United States, 555 U.S. 1200 (2009). In 2013, Siraj filed his first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition
for habeas relief, which was also denied, see Siraj v. United States, 999 F. Supp. 2d 367 (E.D.N.Y.
2013), and the Second Circuit denied the certificate of appealability, see Siraj v. United States,
Civ. No. 13-4197 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2014) at ECF No. 35. In 2017, the Second Circuit denied Siraj
leave to file a second § 2255 petition. See Siraj v. United States, No. 17-854 (2d Cir. June 28,
2017) at ECF No. 37.
In 2019, Siraj filed a motion for reconsideration, which included a challenge to the denial
of leave to file a successive habeas petition, see Siraj, No. 1:05-cr-00104 (Feb. 12, 2019) at ECF
No. 200, which the sentencing court denied in part, see id. at ECF No. 211 (Feb. 12, 2020). In
that motion, Siraj alleged that his habeas counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issues
raised in the instant litigation, that is, the sentencing court did not address the issue on the merits,
finding that a challenge to habeas counsel's omissions ordinarily do not go to the integrity of the
2 habeas proceedings. See id. at 5 n.2. It left the question of whether Siraj could file his motion as
a third successive § 2255 habeas petition to the Second Circuit, id. at 4–5, and on July 2, 2020, the
Circuit denied Siraj leave to do so, see id. at ECF No. 212.
b. Mr. Hasanoff
Sabirhan Hasanoff is also a federal prisoner, currently serving a sentence arising from his
conviction in 2012, also in the Eastern District of New York. See United States v. Hasanoff, No.
1:10-cr-00162 (June 4, 2012) at ECF Nos. 102, 106. On June 4, 2012, he pled guilty to two-counts:
(1) providing and attempting to provide material support and resources to al Qaeda, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2339B, and; (2) conspiring to provide material support and resources to al Qaeda, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See id. Hasanoff was sentenced to consecutive terms of 180 months
of incarceration on count one and 36 months on count two. See id. at ECF No. 142.
On February 11, 2020, Hasanoff’s petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and his petitions for audita querela and coram nobis were
also denied. See United States v. Hasanoff, Nos. 10-CR-162 (KMW) & 14-CV-7892 (KMW),
2020 WL 635576, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2020). Hasanoff raised the same issue that is the
subject of the instant litigation, but the sentencing court did not reach the issue on the merits,
finding that it needed to be raised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See id. at *1–2.
c. The Instant Litigation
Petitioners, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this matter jointly on November
6, 2019. See generally Pet., ECF No. 1. After correcting certain noted pleading deficiencies, see
Dec. 3, 2019 Ord. for Leave to Amend, petitioners filed an amended petition (“Am. Pet.”), ECF
No. 8, on January 6, 2020, which remains operative. Petitioners sued the United States Sentencing
Commission (“the Commission”). On May 5, 2020, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss,
3 ECF No. 19, and memorandum in support (“Mot.”), ECF No, 19-1. Petitioners then filed an
opposition (“Opp.”), ECF No. 27, and the Commission filed a reply (“Reply”), 1 ECF No. 28. This
matter is now fully briefed for consideration.
Petitioners allege that, since 1994, the Commission has failed to properly implement a
specific provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines” and
“Guidelines”). See Am. Pet. ¶¶ 1–3. In Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress created the
Commission, an independent agency within the judicial branch, see 28 U.S.C. § 991, and gave it
the authority to promulgate Sentencing Guidelines and policy statements to be used in the
sentencing process, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1). The Guidelines are published in the Commission’s
Guidelines Manual (“Manual”). Mot. at 4. Application of the Guidelines begins with establishing
the base offense level assigned to the particular offense involved. See 28 U.S.C. § 994; United
States v. Berry, 618 F.3d 13, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2010), citing Manual § 1B1.1; see also Am. Pet.
Memorandum in Support (“Am. Pet. Mem.”), ECF No. 8-3, at 4. The level can be adjusted
upwards or downwards based on specific aggravating or mitigation characteristics of the offense
of the defendants. See Berry, 618 F.3d at 14–15, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and Manual Ch. 5, Pt.
1 Petitioners also submitted a surreply (“Surreply”), ECF No. 29, on October 9, 2020. Even though neither the D.C. Local Rules nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the right to file a surreply, and petitioners did not seek leave to file, the Court accepted and has considered the filing. See Oct. 13, 2020 Min. Ord. In the surreply, petitioners argue that the Commission’s reply was untimely and asks that it be stricken from the record. Surreply at 1. The Court denies this request, finding that the reply was, in fact, timely; the Court set a reply deadline for September 15, 2020, see Jul 13, 2020 Min. Ord., and the Commission filed its reply on September 4, 2020, well prior to the expiration of that deadline. Petitioners also request that the Court issue an order requiring FCI Otisville to amend its current process of regulating and distributing legal mail. See Surreply at 2–3. The Court will also deny this request, as it has no relevance to the subject matter of this lawsuit, and petitioners have provided no authority by which this Court may take such action or exercise applicable jurisdiction and venue. Furthermore, they indicate that they are in the process of exhausting their administrative remedies in this regard, see id. at 3, so any judicial action is likely premature. 4 A. Once the total offense level has been determined, the recommended sentencing range is found
by using a grid that also takes a defendant’s criminal history into account. See id. Relevant to
this matter is an aggravating factor, or an “upward adjustment,” for felony offenses that involved
or were intended to promote terrorism (“terrorism adjustment”). See Mot. at 4, citing Manual §
3A1.4.
In 1993, Congress directed the Commission to “amend its sentencing guidelines to provide
an enhancement for any felony, whether committed within or outside of the United States, that
involves or is intended to promote international terrorism, unless such involvement or intent is
itself an element of the crime.” Mot. at 4, quoting the Violent Crime Control & Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 (“VCCLEA”), Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 120004, 108 Stat. 1796, 2022 (1994); see Am.
Pet. ¶ 2, 10, 18.
In response, the Commission removed an existing upward adjustment provision for
offenses “in furtherance of terroristic action,” previously found at Manual § 5K2.15, replacing it
with a new adjustment provision, published at Manual § 3A1.4 (“International Terrorism”), which
dictated that, “[i]f the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, international
terrorism, increase by 12 levels; but if the resulting offenses level is less than 32, increase to level
32[,]” Mot. at 4–5, quoting Manual App. C, amend. 526 (effective Nov. 1, 1995); Manual § 3A1.4
(1995); see also Am. Pet. ¶ 10; Am. Pet. Mem. at 1–2. “International terrorism” was defined by
reference to the definition at 18 U.S.C. § 2331. Mot. at 5, quoting Manual § 3A1.4, comment (n.1)
(1995). In addition to an “increase of 12, and a floor of 32,” Manual § 3A1.4 also required a
defendant’s criminal history be considered, see id.; see also Am. Pet. ¶ 10; Am. Pet. Mem. at 1–2.
In 1996, Congress ordered the Commission to “amend the sentencing guidelines so that the
. . . adjustment relating to international terrorism only applies to Federal crimes of terrorism, as
5 defined in section 2332b(g) of title 18, United States Code.” Mot. at 5, quoting the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104–132, § 730, 110 Stat. 1214,
1303 (1996). The directive in the AEDPA instructed the Commission to “amend the sentencing
guidelines so that the . . . adjustment relating to international terrorism only applies to Federal
crimes of terrorism, as defined in section 2332b(g) of title 18, United States Code.” Mot. at 5, 18,
quoting the AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104–132.
In response, the Commission amended Manual § 3A1.4, see Am. Pet. Mem. at 3, specifying
that the terrorism adjustment now applied to a “federal crime of terrorism” as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332b(g)(5), Mot. at 5, quoting Manual App. C, amend. 565 (effective Nov. 1, 1997) (re-
promulgating as permanent Amendment 539, which had been adopted on an emergency basis) and
Manual § 3A1.4. Section 2332b(g)(5) defines a “federal crime of terrorism” as “an offense that is
(A) calculated to influence or affect the conduct of the government by intimidation or coercion, or
to retaliate against government conduct” and, (B) is a violation of one of a set of enumerated
provisions, see 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5).
Both petitioners were convicted of offenses that are among those enumerated at Section
2332(b)(g)(5); Siraj was convicted of an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2332f(a)(2) (bombing of public
places and facilities), see Am. Pet. ¶ 5(a); Mot. at 18, and Hasanoff was convicted of an offense
under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (providing material support to terrorist organizations), see Am. Pet. ¶
6(a); Mot. at 18–19.
In the amended petition, Siraj and Hasanoff allege that the Commission exceeded its
statutory authority by discontinuing the application of the previous terrorism adjustment, which
was defined based on the 1994 directives from VCCLEA. See Am. Pet. ¶¶ 10–19; Am. Pet. Mem.
at 2–4. They maintain that, where terrorism “involvement or intent is itself an element of the
6 [predicate] crime,” VCCLEA, 108 Stat. 1796, 2022 (1994), the terrorism adjustment should still
nonetheless be inapplicable to sentencing, regardless of the subsequent 1996 amendments to the
definition as directed by the AEDPA. See Am. Pet. ¶¶ 1–3, 10, 18–19; Am. Pet. Mem. at 3–4.
Because the petitioners were sentenced pursuant to the most recent amendment to the Guidelines,
Siraj contends that he is “serving more than 400% of what his [sentencing] guideline would have
been without” imposition of the upward adjustment, Am. Pet. ¶ 5(b), and Hasanoff states that,
without the upward adjustment, he would have been sentenced to a lesser guideline range of 57 to
71 months, id. ¶ 6(b).
Petitioners demand injunctive relief pursuant to federal mandamus, see 28 U.S.C. 1361,
and request that Section 3A1.4 be amended and reverted to solely include the version of the
terrorism adjustment defined by the VCCLEA. See id. ¶¶ 3, 12, 15, 17(a), 20–1; Am. Pet. Mem.
at 1–2. They demand that this amendment then be applied “retroactively” to all sentences
calculated pursuant the terrorism adjustment as defined by AEDPA amendments, at least where
involvement or intent were elements of a defendants’ offenses of conviction. See Am. Pet. ¶¶ 3,
10, 12, 15–17, 20–21. They state that, thereafter, all affected defendants, themselves included, can
seek a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Manual § 1B1. See id. ¶¶ 3, 7,
11, 13, 16–17.
LEGAL STANDARD
a. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
Under Rule 12(b)(1), a petitioner bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); Shekoyan
v. Sibley Int'l Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63 (D.D.C. 2002). Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and the law presumes that “a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v.
7 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363
F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an
examination of our jurisdiction.”). “[B]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction is ‘an Art[icle] III as
well as a statutory requirement . . . no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction
upon a federal court.’” Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F. 3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
Further, a court is required to dismiss an action “at any time” if it determines that the subject matter
jurisdiction is wanting. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
When reviewing a challenge pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a court may consider documents
outside the pleadings to assure itself that it has jurisdiction. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735
n.4 (1947); Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding same); see also Artis
v. Greenspan, 223 F. Supp. 2d 149, 152 (D.D.C. 2002) (“A court may consider material outside
of the pleadings in ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of venue, personal jurisdiction or subject-
matter jurisdiction.).” By considering documents outside the pleadings when reviewing a motion
to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a court does not convert the motion into one for summary
judgment; “the plain language of Rule 12(b) permits only a 12(b)(6) motion to be converted into
a motion for summary judgment” when documents extraneous to the pleadings are considered by
a court. Haase, 835 F.2d at 905.
b. Federal Mandamus
Under the Mandamus Act, “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action
in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Jurisdiction under “the
mandamus statute is limited to actions seeking to compel the performance of a nondiscretionary
8 duty.” Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984)). “The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one,
to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances.” Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C.
Cir. 2002), quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980) (quotations
omitted).
A court may provide relief pursuant to mandamus only where (1) a petitioner has a clear
right to relief; (2) a petitioner has a clear duty to act, and; (3) there is no other adequate remedy
available to petitioner. Baptist Mem’l Hosp. v. Sebelius, 603 F.3d 57, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(quotations omitted). “These three threshold requirements are jurisdictional; unless all are met, a
court must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183,
189 (D.C. Cir. 2016). A determination of whether mandamus jurisdiction exists under Section
1361 therefore “merges with the merits.” In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en
banc). Further, “[e]ven when the legal requirements for mandamus jurisdiction have been satisfied
. . . a court may grant relief only when it finds compelling equitable grounds.” In re Medicare
Reimbursement Litig., 414 F.3d 7, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and alteration omitted).
ANALYSIS
At bottom, this case presents a challenge to the manner in which petitioners’ sentences
were calculated: the Commission has operated under the understanding that the AEDPA
amendment superseded the prior VCCLEA definition of a crime of terrorism, Mot. at 18, id. n.11;
Reply at 6–8, and petitioners maintain that they should have been sentenced under the older
Guidelines, Am. Pet. ¶ 10; Am. Pet. Mem. at 3; Opp. at 1–2, 4–6.
A prisoner in federal custody may pursue challenges to the legality of his sentence through
28 U.S.C. § 2255, which states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
9 sentence was imposed in violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States ... or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
Thus, the Court need not, and cannot, reach the merits of this matter because petitioners have failed
to satisfy the elements which would allow for the exercise of mandamus jurisdiction and any
claims for mandamus relief here are prohibited because petitioners’ sole federal remedy is a writ
of habeas corpus See In re Dudley, No. 00-5441, 2001 WL 238168, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 13,
2001) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of mandamus action where petitioner was in essence
challenging his sentence, which must be pursued through habeas corpus), citing Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988).
Petitioners seek to avoid this outcome by explaining that this suit is not meant to be “an
attack on any individual judgments, or convictions, or sentences [,] but is only a suit to require the
Commission to come into compliance 2 with the statutorily ordered directive by Congress.” Am.
Pet. ¶ 4. However, they frequently refer to themselves as “affected parties,” and indicate their
intent to pursue sentence reductions as a result of the relief sought. See id. ¶¶ 3, 7, 11, 13, 16–17;
see also Manual § 1B1.10; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(o), 994(p), 994(u) (the
Commission’s statutory authority to specify in what circumstances and by what amounts the
sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for an offense may be reduced). But not
2 Petitioners do not explicitly cite the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., but the Court notes that the APA generally waives sovereign immunity “to the extent that declaratory judgment or other equitable relief may be available” to a person harmed by agency action. Ballard v. Holinka, 601 F. Supp. 2d 110, 121 (D.D.C. 2009), citing 5 U.S.C. § 702. Here, though, it is of no consequence. With the exception of the “notice and comment” requirements of the APA, “the Commission's rulemaking [is] not subject to any other provision of the APA, including those for judicial review[,]” U.S. v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1991), because the Commission is “part of the judicial branch[,]” Washington Legal Foundation v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 10 withstanding petitioners’ strategy of challenging the Commission instead of the sentencing court,
petitioners are fundamentally attacking the legality of their sentences.
The law of is clear in this Circuit that petitioners “may not circumvent the procedures for
seeking habeas corpus relief by bringing [a] mandamus petition.” In re Dudley, 2001 WL 238168,
at *1, citing Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 808–10 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(holding that a federal prisoner, even incidentally challenging term of custody by seeking
mandamus relief, must proceed by habeas); see also Taylor v. United States Board of Parole, 194
F .2d 882, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (attack on the constitutionality of the statute under which defendant
was convicted and sentenced is properly pursued by use of 28 U.S.C. § 2255); Fortson v. U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n, 109 Fed. Appx. 437, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal
of mandamus petition against the Commission because it nonetheless represented a collateral
attack on petitioner’s sentence that must be filed with the sentencing court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255).
Because this action attacks, albeit circuitously, the legitimacy of petitioners’ sentences, and
would result in reduction in their terms, petitioners must proceed in their sentencing courts
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. See Davis v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 716 F.3d 660, 666 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (A “prisoner must bring his claim in habeas . . . if success on the merits will ‘necessarily
imply the invalidity of confinement or shorten its duration.’ ”), quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 82 (2005); see also Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500 (“As a matter of Congressional intent,
prisoners mounting a challenge to the lawfulness of their custody are to proceed by means of
habeas.”).
In their opposition, petitioners briefly address the three threshold jurisdictional
requirements for mandamus, and broadly argue that they are entitled to such relief. See Opp. at 3–
11 5. But petitioners fail to cite any legal authority to support this contention, and they focus instead
on their existing factual allegations and claiming, without foundation, that they cannot raise their
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See id.
Section 2255 is a broad remedy and, despite petitioners’ contentions, see Opp. at 3–4, their
habeas petitions may include challenges to the Commission’s interpretation and implementation
of its Sentencing Guidelines as it relates to the execution of their respective sentences. See
Chatman-Bey, 864 F.2d at 807 (“the Supreme Court has steadily eliminated many of the traditional
limitations on the availability of habeas corpus.”). Federal courts have the power and discretion
under federal habeas to fashion a wide-range of appropriate relief. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S.
54, 66–67 (1968). For this reason, a prisoner may be excused from pursuing relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 only when it “appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention[,]” id.
Here, petitioners do not argue that habeas would be an ineffective way to proceed. While
their prior habeas petitions did not result in the relief sought, “[a] petitioner may not complain that
the [habeas] remedies provided him by are inadequate merely because he was unsuccessful when
he invoked them.” Wilson v. Office of the Chairperson, 892 F. Supp. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 1995);
Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 727 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993
(1986).
Additionally, if petitioners failed to raise these issues through habeas, or the sentencing
court did not directly reach the issues, that would not render those habeas proceedings ineffective.
See Chatman–Bey, 864 F.2d at 806. Here, if the Court were to opine on the merits, it would be
offering commentary and causing disruption to the existing dispositions issued by the Eastern
District of New York and the Second Circuit, in excess of its given authority. See id.
12 Because the relief sought in the mandamus 3 petition “falls comfortably within the broad
confines of habeas corpus, mandamus would be inappropriate in this case even if habeas were
simply an available, rather than exclusive, remedy.” Chatman-Bey, 864 F.2d at 806 n.2.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed, this Court lacks mandamus jurisdiction. To seek the relief
sought, Petitioners must either file a § 2255 petition with the Eastern District of New York or seek
leave from the Second Circuit to file a successive § 2255 petition. Accordingly, the Court grants
the United States Sentencing Commission’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition and dismisses this
matter without prejudice. A separate Order will issue.
AMY BERMAN JACKSON Date: March 18, 2021 United States District Judge
3 Petitioners indicate, only briefly in passing, an intention to seek “declaratory relief,” see Am. Pet. at title, introduction, but then make no mention of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, or its requirements, and focus their arguments entirely on federal mandamus, see Am. Pet. at title, introduction, ¶¶ 9(b), 21(A); Opp. at 2–5. The Court nonetheless notes the inapplicability of the Declaratory Judgment Act to these claims, as it is a “well-established rule that the Declaratory Judgment Act is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction. Rather, the availability of [declaratory] relief presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable right.” Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011), quoting C&E Servs., Inc. of Washington v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (other citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, petitioners have not identified an independent source of jurisdiction, thus rendering the Declaratory Judgment Act inapplicable. 13