Sinha v. State of California

Opinion

RAJESH K. SINHA, Case No. 24-cv-00046-HSG

Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS v. Re: Dkt. No. 67 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Defendants.

Pending before the Court is Defendant State of California’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 67. The Court finds this matter appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss. This is California’s second motion to dismiss. Although pro se Plaintiff Rajesh K. Sinha has since filed a third amended complaint, Dkt. No. 64 (“TAC”), the underlying facts are largely the same as before. A. Factual Background As with Plaintiff’s other filings, the TAC is dense and at times difficult to follow. But from what the Court can discern, Plaintiff continues to challenge the manner in which his child support payments were calculated as a non-custodial parent. See generally TAC. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the formula used to calculate his payments is outdated and did not properly account for his basic living expenses. See, e.g., id. at 10–14, 20–25, 53. He also suggests that in California, custody decisions—and the resulting child support payments—unfairly discriminate Plaintiff was unable to keep up with his child support payments, and although he no longer owes any ongoing child support, he cannot pay the child support arrears. See id. at 10–12. Plaintiff currently owes approximately $70,000. Id. at 8, 37. Because he is behind on his child support in excess of $2,500, Plaintiff has been unable to renew his passport with the federal government. See id. at 30. Plaintiff alleges that this has only exacerbated his inability to pay his child support because he previously ran an exports business, which “came to a standstill” because he could not travel internationally without a passport. See, e.g., id. at 36. Plaintiff details the personal and financial hardships he has suffered as a result of the unpaid child support, including the loss of his business and housing. See id. at 7–9, 30, 36–38, 57–58, 60. He was also unable to return to India when his father and brothers-in-law passed away. See id. at 30–31. In short, Plaintiff explains that his child support arrears are preventing him from recovering personally and financially, and from contacting his children. Id. at 9. Plaintiff further explains that because interest on his child support arrears continues to grow, he will never be able to pay all he owes. Plaintiff asks the Court to allow him to renew his passport, citizenship card, and business licenses. See id. at 60. He also asks for damages in the amount of $4,073,404. Id. Plaintiff brings several causes of action for: (1) violations of his First, Fifth, and Fourteenth amendment rights, relating to the calculation of “inappropriate child support amounts” and unfair consequences for his inability to pay, TAC at 20–31; (2) violations of his First Amendment right to religious freedom and right to petition the government for redress of grievances, seemingly relating to his passport revocation, id. at 31; (3) violations of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, relating to his passport revocation, id. at 31–36; (4) violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment for “deprivation of life, liberty, and property,” again seemingly related to his passport revocation as well as his inability to meaningfully participate in the legislative process to update the State’s child support policies, id. at 36–49; and (5) violations of the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, relating to his lack of participation in the legislative process, id. at 49–57. owes $70,000 in arrears arising from child support orders issued by the Sonoma County Superior Court between 2016 and 2022. These arrears have led to Plaintiff’s passport revocation, the loss of his business, the accumulation of debt, and other personal hardships. Plaintiff argues that the State’s child support laws, on which his child support orders were based, are unlawful and unconstitutional. Plaintiff further urges that he was denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in the legislative process to remedy these issues. Plaintiff therefore urges the Court to declare the State’s child support laws unconstitutional and in violation of federal laws and regulations, and award Plaintiff millions of dollars in monetary damages and restore his passport, citizenship card, and business licenses. B. Procedural Background Plaintiff initially filed this case in January 2024 against the State of California. See Dkt. No. 1. Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Dkt. No. 4. However, Judge Kim screened Plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Dkt. Nos. 4, 8. On March 8, 2024, Judge Kim issued an order directing that the case be reassigned to a district judge with a report and recommendation that the action be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 8. Judge Kim reasoned that Plaintiff’s lawsuit was barred by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See id. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court declined to adopt the report and recommendation, and directed the U.S. Marshal to serve the complaint on the State of California. See Dkt. No. 19. Defendant State of California then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. Dkt. No. 27. The Court granted the motion to dismiss, but granted Plaintiff one opportunity to amend the complaint. Dkt. No. 49. In December 2024, Plaintiff filed the TAC. In addition to providing additional allegations against the State of California, Plaintiff also added several new federal and state Defendants to the TAC: Antony Blinken in his capacity as the U.S. Secretary of State; Xavier Becerra in his capacity as the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services; Merrick Garland in his capacity as the U.S. Attorney General; California Department of Child Support Services (“CDCSS”); April Thoma, David Kilgore, Shannon Richards, and Selis Martin Hoshino in his capacity as Administrative Director of the JCC.1 See id. at 2. Currently, the State of California is the only Defendant that has been served. Section 1915(e)(2) mandates that the Court review an in forma pauperis complaint before directing the United States Marshal to serve the complaint. Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234, & n.7 (9th Cir. 2015). The Court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–31 (9th Cir. 2000)). The Court must therefore review the TAC to determine whether it states a claim against any of the newly added Defendants. Defendant State of California has also filed a second motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 67. The Court first reviews the State’s motion and then considers whether Plaintiff has stated a claim against any of the newly- added Defendants. A. Rule 12(b)(1) Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss based on the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Subject matter jurisdiction can never be forfeited or waived and federal courts have a continuing independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.” See Leeson v. Transam. Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 975, n.12 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). The party invoking subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that such jurisdiction exists. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). B. Rule 12(b)(6) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain

1 The Court notes that since the TAC was filed, the U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). Additionally, “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation omitted). However, even a “liberal interpretation of a . . . complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[P]ro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure,” Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995), which require “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A. State of California Plaintiff substantially revised the TAC in response to the Court’s prior order, and in his legal theory that would shield him from the financial and personal hardships that he has faced as a result of his child support arrears. But the State of California once again identifies several grounds warranting dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against it. See Dkt. No. 67. i. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine To the extent Plaintiff is seeking to challenge the underlying custody arrangement or resulting child support calculations from Sonoma County Superior Court, such claims are still barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As this Court has already explained, under the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, a federal district court has no authority to review state court decisions. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923). The doctrine applies to “‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Mothershed v. Justs. of Supreme Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 606 (9th Cir. 2005), as amended on denial of reh’g (July 21, 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). As relevant here, “[t]he doctrine bars a district court from exercising jurisdiction not only over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also over the ‘de facto equivalent’ of such an appeal.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012). To determine whether a plaintiff is bringing such a de facto appeal, the Court must “pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.” Id. (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). “It is a forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker–Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Id. at 778. As the Ninth Circuit has recently clarified, “Rooker-Feldman applies only when the federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks as her remedy relief from the state court judgment.” See Miroth v. Cnty. of Trinity, -- F.4th --, No. 23- 15759, 2025 WL 1338067, at *8 (9th Cir. May 8, 2025) (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). which custody decisions are made and child support is calculated and collected in California. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 69 at 5–9. As such, Plaintiff explains that he is no longer asking this Court to recalculate his prior child support payments or arrears. See id. He explicitly states that he is “not challenging the state court decision of child support amounts which they ordered by using that [challenged] formula.” See id. at 9; see also id. at 18 (“[T]he calculator is unconstitutional.”). Instead, he is seeking over $4 million in “tax exempt” compensation for losses incurred because of these state court orders, including “[l]oss of income,” “[l]oss of business structure, setup, and customers of fifteen years,” “loss of health and family hardship,” “[e]ducation expenses, and “[b]usiness expenses and compensation and reestablishment.” See TAC at 60. Although Plaintiff previously sought to set aside the state court orders, the TAC on its face no longer seeks such relief. See Miroth, 2025 WL 1338067, at *8, *11–14 (concluding that Rooker-Feldman did not apply where the plaintiffs dropped their requests for relief from the state court judgments and instead sought monetary damages). The Ninth Circuit has concluded that “seeking relief from a state court judgment, which can implicate Rooker-Feldman, is not the same thing as seeking relief that would ameliorate the effects of an adverse state court judgment.” Id. at *11 (cleaned up). Accordingly, that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for the consequences he has faced as a result of the state custody and child support orders does not itself implicate Rooker- Feldman.2 Cf. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing between as- applied versus facial challenge in Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486–87); Canatella v. State of California, 304 F.3d 843, 849, n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that Rooker-Feldman “would likely not bar” a plaintiff’s claims where complaint “d[id] not request review” of plaintiff’s own suspension or probation and instead sought “only prospective relief”). Still, the Court notes that some ambiguity remains in Plaintiff’s requested relief. Plaintiff still appears, at least in part, to be arguing that the state court custody and child support orders

2 California suggests that Plaintiff has not adequately pled a claim challenging the constitutionality of the State’s child support laws or requested proper, prospective relief for such a claim. See Dkt. No. 71 at 3–4. Although this may be a separate reason to grant the motion to dismiss, it does not were wrongly decided and should be overturned. In discussing his requested relief in his opposition brief, for example, Plaintiff suggests that the Court should require California to “erase all child support appears” and “reimburse[] whatever I have paid as child support . . . .” See Dkt. No. 69 at 27. But “erasing” Plaintiff’s child support arrears would necessarily require the Court to reconsider and undo the underlying state court orders, which is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Court therefore GRANTS the motion to dismiss to the extent Plaintiff is still requesting to “erase” or somehow reverse the underlying custody arrangement or child support calculations from Sonoma County Superior Court, but otherwise DENIES the motion on this basis. ii. Sovereign Immunity In its prior order granting the State’s motion to dismiss, the Court concluded that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity, and that none of the immunity exceptions applied. See Dkt. No. 49 at 6–7. California raises this same argument again, see Dkt. No. 67 at 11–12, and the Court once again agrees. “The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought by private citizens against state governments, without the state’s consent.” Nat. Res. Def. Council v. California Dep’t of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14 (1890)). “The Eleventh Amendment’s jurisdictional bar covers suits naming state agencies and departments as defendants, and applies whether the relief sought is legal or equitable in nature.” Brooks v. Sulpher Springs Valley Elec. Co-Op, 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). There are only three exceptions to this immunity: (1) “a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment defense”; (2) “Congress may abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity by acting pursuant to a grant of constitutional authority”; and (3) a plaintiff may seek prospective injunctive relief to remedy violations of federal law, under the Ex Parte Young doctrine. See Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has not explained how any of these exceptions apply here. California has not consented to being sued and instead has explicitly asserted its Eleventh Amendment defense. See Dkt. No. 67 at 11–12. Congress also has not abrogated California’s sovereign immunity as to abrogate the states’ immunity in the legislation itself.” See Douglas, 271 F.3d at 818 (quotation omitted). Plaintiff’s suggestion that there has been some kind of implicit waiver, Dkt. No. 69 at 29–42, is wrong and contrary to law. Plaintiff also suggests that there are policy reasons why the State should not be immune in this context and that monetary damages could “work as a deterrent.” See id. at 38. But such policy considerations simply are not the basis for an exception to the State’s sovereign immunity. The Court therefore GRANTS the motion to dismiss on this basis. iii. Standing Even assuming anything remains of Plaintiff’s claims against the State,3 California argues that Plaintiff lacks standing to (1) challenge the State’s child support laws and (2) request renewal of his passport. See Dkt. No. 67 at 7–10. A plaintiff seeking relief in federal court bears the burden of establishing “the irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). First, the plaintiff must have “suffered an injury in fact.” Id. This requires “an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quotation omitted). Second, the plaintiff’s injury must be “fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. Third, the injury must be “likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61). It is this last requirement—redressability—that the State argues is not met here. See Dkt. No. 67 at 7–10. Child Support Laws. Plaintiff challenges as unconstitutional the “calculator/method” that the State uses to calculate the amount of child support someone owes. See TAC at 20–31. Plaintiff repeatedly states that the State’s formula generates “exorbitant child support amounts” for noncustodial parents such as himself. See id. at 20. He suggests that the amount one owes in child support is high, irrespective of the noncustodial parent’s income and where they live. Id. at 20–25. He also urges that the State’s laws discriminate against men when determining custody arrangements because men are disproportionately given “zero visitation.” See id. at 24, 26–28. Plaintiff contends that he has standing because he continues to owe child support arrears and risks being held in contempt for lack of payment. See Dkt. No. 69 at 19–20. However, as explained above, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents Plaintiff seeking to “undo” the underlying custody arrangement or resulting child support calculations from Sonoma County Superior Court. Although Plaintiff may suffer hardship due to the child support arrearages, the Court cannot recalculate or “erase” them. And Plaintiff has not identified any prospective relief the Court could properly award here that would remedy his alleged injury. Any prospective remedies, such as declaring the State’s child support calculator to be unconstitutional or enjoining the State from using the formula moving forward, would not affect Plaintiff’s past obligations and he does not allege that he will be subject to any new child support orders in future. Passport Renewal. Plaintiff also alleges that the State violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by revoking his passport and failing to grant his request for emergency passport renewal. See TAC at 36–49. Part of Plaintiff’s requested relief is that he be allowed to renew his passport. See id. at 60. As the Court previously explained, however, the State is not the entity that revoked or failed to renew Plaintiff’s passport, and the State has no authority to issue a passport. See Dkt. No. 49 at 5–6. Plaintiff does not appear to have standing, therefore, to seek the specific relief from California that he has requested in the TAC—being “allowed to renew my passport and citizenship card payment . . . .” See TAC at 60. Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss on this issue is difficult to follow. See Dkt. No. 69 at 20–27. There is a disconnect between his asserted claims and requested relief. In his opposition brief, Plaintiff appears to suggest that the Court could somehow order the State to stop notifying the federal government that he owes child support arrearages exceeding $2,500. See id. at 20, 26–27. But it is not clear what authority the Court would have to prevent the State from complying with 42 U.S.C. § 654(31). Plaintiff also suggests that the State should adopt a different process for allowing individuals to challenge passport denials under § 654(31)(A), pointing to the relief in the TAC, but the Court cannot order the State to change its protocols simply because Plaintiff think another state’s protocols are better. iv. Substantive Claims Even if Plaintiff could somehow overcome the procedural problems above, Plaintiff’s extensive allegations—even when liberally construed—still fail to allege a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Plaintiff devotes substantial space in the TAC and his opposition brief to discussing how difficult it has been to pay child support and how existing enforcement policies disfavor those who owe child support. Plaintiff urges reform. But despite Plaintiff’s suggestion otherwise, the policy disagreements he has identified do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. • Plaintiff contends that California’s child support policies are unconstitutional because his fundamental rights are impacted by the amount of child support he owes and his inability to renew his passport as a result. See, e.g., TAC at 20–26, 30–31. But the Ninth Circuit has rejected similar constitutional challenges and explained the importance of prioritizing the financial support of children. See Eunique v. Powell, 302 F.3d 971, 973–75 (9th Cir. 2002). • Plaintiff suggests that he was treated differently in the child support proceedings based on his gender, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See TAC at 26– 29, 31. But the TAC does not offer any support for the suggestion that the State acted with the intent or purpose to discriminate against Plaintiff based on his gender, as is required to support such a claim. See Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194. • Plaintiff suggests that the State violated his due process rights by failing to provide him with a sufficient mechanism to challenge his arrearages and resulting passport revocation. See TAC at 30–32, 36–; Dkt. No. 69 at 21–27. Plaintiff alludes to the also indicates that CDCSS responded to Plaintiff, provided Plaintiff with forms to start the hearing process and responded that there were “several factual allegations” that needed to be addressed. See id. at 31–32, 34, 37. Plaintiff does not suggest that he further pursued this remedy. Rather, Plaintiff’s argument appears to be that the State of Washington has a better process. See id. at 32–36. But Plaintiff’s preference is not enough to state a viable due process claim. • Plaintiff also argues that the State somehow precluded him from meaningfully participating in the process of reforming California’s child support laws. See TAC at 21, 43–49. Plaintiff cites the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Id. The APA, however, “establishes the procedures federal administrative agencies use for ‘rule making,’ defined as the process of ‘formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.’” Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 95 (2015) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(5)). It is thus inapposite. In any event, even accepting Plaintiff’s assertion that he should be provided a means of participating in the legislative process for reviewing the State’s child support laws, the TAC indicates that Plaintiff has done so. The TAC even states that he “effectively communicate[d] with several supporters [of pending legislation].” See TAC at 49. Plaintiff cannot state a constitutional violation simply because the Legislature did not adopt his proposals. Underlying Plaintiff’s claims are myriad policy concerns about the manner in which child support is calculated and enforced in California. But such policy considerations are for Congress and the State Legislature to evaluate. Plaintiff’s purported constitutional claims are not an appropriate basis for the Court to essentially rewrite California’s policies and procedures in this area. * * * For all the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS the State of California’s motion 1 B. New Defendants 2 The Court must next evaluate whether the TAC states a claim as to any of the unserved 3 Defendants. See Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234, & n.7; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2)(B). But 4 Plaintiffs claims against the unserved State and Federal Defendants fail for the same reasons that 5 his claims against the State fail. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiffs claims to the extent 6 he is seeking to “erase” his child support arrearages; the State agencies have sovereign immunity; 7 Plaintiff does not have standing for most of his claims; and any remaining claims are implausible 8 and do not state a viable claim for relief. The Court therefore finds that the case should be 9 dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(2)(B). 11 Plaintiff has had ample opportunity to plead a viable case, but has failed to do so. Given 12 this history and the nature of the deficiencies discussed above, the Court finds that granting leave 13 to amend would be futile. The Court therefore GRANTS the motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 67, and 14 DISMISSES the case without leave to amend. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 15 || 2003) (“Leave to amend should be granted unless the pleading could not possibly be cured by the a 16 || allegation of other facts, and should be granted more liberally to pro se plaintiffs.”) (quotations 17 omitted); Zucco Partners, LLC vy. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here 18 the Plaintiff has previously been granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the 19 requisite particularity to its claims, [t]he district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is 20 particularly broad.” (quotation omitted)). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of 21 Defendants and against Plaintiff and to close the case. 23 Dated: 5/9/2025 24 Raspes L Ud | | HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 25 United States District Judge 26 27 28