Singh v. Price

United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas·Decided May 31, 2024·No. 24-03114·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT May 31, 2024 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk HOUSTON DIVISION

IN RE: § § CASE NO: 24-31275 THE TURKEY LEG HUT & COMPANY § LLC, § CHAPTER 11 § Debtor. § § BRENDON DANE SINGH, § § Plaintiff, § § VS. § ADVERSARY NO. 24-3114 § LYNDELL LEROY PRICE, § § Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

As a matter of first impression, Brendon D. Singh, the subchapter V Trustee, acting as plaintiff in this case, brings a complaint against Lyndell Leroy Price for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief on behalf of The Turkey Leg Hut & Company LLC, the Debtor herein. Lyndell Leroy Price, allegedly, is the soon to be ex-spouse of the Debtor’s representative, Nakia Price. At issue, however, is whether a subchapter V trustee is empowered to seek injunctive relief on behalf of a Debtor in possession pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7065 and 11 U.S.C. § 105. Without the need of a hearing, the subchapter V trustee’s complaint against Lyndell Leroy Price for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief on behalf of The Turkey Leg Hut & Company LLC, the Debtor herein is denied. I. BACKGROUND

1. On March 26, 2024, (the “Petition Date”) The Turkey Leg Hut & Company, LLC (“Debtor”) filed for bankruptcy protection under subchapter V, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code1 initiating the bankruptcy case.

2. On March 27, 2024, Brendon D. Singh was appointed subchapter V trustee (the “Subchapter V Trustee”).

3. On May 30, 2024, the Subchapter V Trustee filed the instant “Complaint For A Temporary And Preliminary Injunctive Relief” (the “Complaint”). 2

II. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

This Court holds jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334, which provides “the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.” Section 157 allows a district court to “refer” all bankruptcy and related cases to the bankruptcy court, wherein the latter court will appropriately preside over the matter.3 This court determines that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), this Adversary Proceeding contains core matters, as it primarily involves matters concerning administration of the estate through activities affecting the operation of the Debtor.4 Furthermore, this Court may only hear a case in which venue is proper.5 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a), “a proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 may be commenced in the district court in which such case is pending.” Debtor’s main subchapter V, chapter 11 case is presently pending in this Court and therefore, venue of this adversary proceeding is proper.

1 Any reference to “Code” or “Bankruptcy Code” is a reference to the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C., or any section (i.e.§) thereof refers to the corresponding section in 11 U.S.C. 2 “Bankr. ECF” refers docket entries made in the Debtor’s bankruptcy case, No. 24-31275. Entries made in Plaintiff’s Case number 21-3906 shall take the format of ECF No. __. 3 28 U.S.C. § 157(a); see also In re: Order of Reference to Bankruptcy Judges, Gen. Order 2012-6 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2012). 4 ECF No. 1 at 2-6. 5 28 U.S.C. § 1408. This Court must evaluate whether it has constitutional authority to enter an order in this case. In Stern, which involved a core proceeding brought by the debtor under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), the Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court “lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim.”6 However, Stern concerned final orders entered by the

bankruptcy court and here, the Court need only enter an interlocutory order because the temporary restraining order will not “end the litigation on the merits and leave nothing to do but execute the judgment.”7 If a bankruptcy court does not possess the necessary constitutional authority to enter a final judgment in a proceeding, the court may nevertheless issue interlocutory orders in that proceeding.8 Entering an interlocutory order does not implicate “the constitutional limitations on the Court’s authority to enter final judgments.”9 This order does not decide everything the subchapter V trustee asks this Court to decide, namely whether to grant temporary injunctive relief and impose a preliminary injunction.10 Instead, the Court determines only whether an temporary

restraining order should issue. An order resolving less than all relief requested in a complaint is interlocutory.11 The Court’s authority to enter interlocutory orders is not altered by Stern.12 Accordingly, because the nature of this order is interlocutory, it can be entered without a determination of the Court's constitutional authority to enter a final judgment.

6 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 503 (2011). 7 In re Lieb, 915 F.2d 184, 184 (5th Cir. 1990). 8 Trevino v. HSBC Mortg. Serv. (In re Trevino), 535 B.R. 110, 125 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015). 9 West v. WRG Energy Partners LLC (In re Noram Res., Inc.), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5183, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 30, 2011). 10 ECF No. 4. 11 In re Trevino, 535 B.R. at 125. 12 Id. at 125–26. III. ANALYSIS

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