Singh v. Garland

Opinion

19-3030 Singh v. Garland BIA Thompson, IJ A205 928 500 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of March, two thousand twenty-two.

PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., REENA RAGGI, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

BALBIR SINGH, Petitioner,

v. 19-3030 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Esq., Richmond Hill, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Carl McIntyre, Senior Litigation Counsel; Brooke M. Maurer, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

Petitioner Balbir Singh, a native and citizen of India,

seeks review of an August 23, 2019 decision of the BIA

affirming a November 14, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge

(“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and

humanitarian asylum. In re Balbir Singh, No. A 205 928 500

(B.I.A. Aug. 23, 2019), aff’g No. A 205 928 500 (Immig. Ct.

N.Y.C. Nov. 14, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity

with the underlying facts and procedural history.

We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions

“for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The

applicable standards of review are well established. See

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195

(2d Cir. 2014) (reviewing factual findings for substantial

2 evidence and questions of law de novo).

Where, as here, the agency concludes that an asylum

applicant suffered past persecution, the applicant is

entitled to a presumption of future persecution. 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.13(b)(1) (asylum), 1208.16(b)(1)(i) (withholding of

removal). The burden then shifts to the Government to show,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that there has been a

fundamental change in circumstances in the country of removal

or that the applicant could safely relocate within the country

of removal to avoid future persecution. 8 C.F.R. §§

1208.13(b)(1) (asylum), 1208.16(b)(1)(i) (withholding of

removal); Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2010).

We find no error in the agency’s conclusion that the

Government demonstrated that Singh could internally relocate.

Singh was threatened or attacked by Congress Party

members in 2012 and 2013 near his home in Bhadas, Punjab.

Singh testified that he feared persecution from the Congress

Party due to his Sikh religion and membership in the Mann

Party, but he also acknowledged that the Mann Party had

branches in states across India, that there were large Sikh

populations outside of Punjab, and that the Congress Party

3 did not control the federal government or a large number of

state governments. Singh argues that he would face

persecution across the whole of India due to tenant

registration systems that would track his movement and allow

police and Congress Party members to locate and harm him.

But the evidence he relies upon—a 2013 report from the

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada—states that tenant

registration “varies from state to state” and “largely it is

non-existent in most cities and states.” Certified

Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 760. Moreover, there is no

indication that Indian authorities use the registration

system to track or persecute Sikhs or Mann Party members.

See Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2021). By

contrast, a 2015 report issued by the United Kingdom concluded

that although Sikhs were attacked in the 1980s and may suffer

lingering distrust in some areas, “there is little

discrimination” or “no discrimination” against Indian Sikhs

in the modern day. CAR at 275; see also Singh v. Garland,

11 F.4th at 118 (“An Indian citizen such as Singh is unlikely

to face persecution for his Sikh beliefs and his membership

in [the Mann Party,] and any threat faced by [such an

4 applicant] in India is not country-wide.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Singh has identified no contradictory

country-conditions evidence.

Given evidence that Singh could safely relocate, and that

it would be reasonable to expect him to do so, see Singh v.

Garland, 11 F.4th at 117 (identifying no relocation

difficulties for Sikhs living in India), the agency

reasonably concluded that the Government rebutted the

presumption of future persecution. This finding is

dispositive of Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and CAT relief. See 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), 1208.16(b)(1)(i)(B); Lecaj v.

Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010).

Singh also requested humanitarian asylum, which may be

granted in the absence of a well-founded fear of persecution

if the applicant demonstrates either “compelling reasons for

being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising

out of the severity of the past persecution” or “a reasonable

possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon

removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii); see also Matter of

Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 19 (B.I.A. 1989). Humanitarian

5 asylum is granted only “in certain rare cases,” Mirzoyan v.

Gonzales, 457 F.3d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 2006), and in “the

decision-maker’s discretion,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii).

The agency’s denial of this relief is “conclusive unless

manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.”

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D); see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii); Wu Zheng Huang v. INS, 436 F.3d 89, 96–

97 & n.9 (2d Cir. 2006). We find no abuse of discretion in

the agency’s decision on this record to deny humanitarian

relief.

For humanitarian asylum based on the severity of past

persecution, the applicant must establish both “severe harm

and the long-lasting effects of that harm.” Jalloh v.

Gonzales, 498 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Singh asserts that his beatings were “severe

past harm” entitling him to humanitarian asylum and that he

has suffered long-lasting pyschological effects. But in

considering whether the severity of past persecution is

sufficient to warrant granting humanitarian asylum, the

agency considers the “degree of harm suffered by the

applicant” and “the length of time over which the harm was

6 inflicted.” In re N-M-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 312, 326 (B.I.A.

1998). Singh reported only two physical altercations with

members of the Congress Party, neither of which produced

lasting physical injury. Accordingly, the agency did not

abuse its discretion in concluding that neither the degree

nor duration of Singh’s harm were of a severity that warranted

humanitarian asylum. See, e.g., Hoxhallari v. Gonzales, 468

F.3d 179, 182, 184 (2d Cir. 2006) (harm not sufficiently

“atrocious” where supporter of Albanian Democratic Party was

beaten and harassed on six occasions).

Finally, Singh alleges that he will suffer “other serious

harm” if he returns to India because of the likely

psychological effects stemming from the harm inflicted on him

in the past. Although Singh provided a social worker’s

evaluation of his condition, which concluded that he had

“symptoms consistent with” post-traumatic stress disorder and

“would suffer severe detriment to his psychological,

emotional, and physical functioning, possibly resulting in a

suicide attempt,” CAR at 210-11, we defer to the agency in

its decision to accord this evidence limited weight. See Y.C.

v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013). The agency’s

7 finding that the social worker’s conclusion was speculative

is not clearly erroneous and does not rest on a legal error

because, inter alia, the record is unclear as to the extent

of Singh’s contact with the social worker, and there is no

indication of suicidal ideation in her report or elsewhere in

the record. Apart from three or four conversations with the

social worker prior to preparation of the report, Singh had

not sought any treatment for his psychological issues.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court