18-3131 Singh v. Garland BIA Criss, IJ A206 469 181 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 6th day of May, two thousand twenty-one. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 8 Chief Judge, 9 DENNY CHIN, 10 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 CHARANJEET SINGH, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 18-3131 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, Esq., New York, NY. 25 1 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant 2 Attorney General; Song Park, 3 Acting Assistant Director; Siu P. 4 Wong, Trial Attorney, Office of 5 Immigration Litigation, United 6 States Department of Justice, 7 Washington, DC.
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
9 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
10 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
11 is DENIED.
12 Petitioner Charanjeet Singh, a native and citizen of
13 India, seeks review of a September 27, 2018 decision of the
14 BIA affirming a July 26, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge
15 (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of
16 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
17 (“CAT”). In re Charanjeet Singh, No. A 206 469 181 (BIA.
18 Sept. 27, 2018), aff’g No. A 206 469 181 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C.
19 Jul. 26, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
20 underlying facts and procedural history.
21 We have considered the IJ’s decision as supplemented and
22 modified by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268,
23 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are
24 well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Paloka v.
25 Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014); Gjolaj v. Bureau of
2 1 Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 468 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir.
2 2006); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513, 516 (2d Cir.
3 2009).
4 For asylum and withholding of removal, “the applicant
5 must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership
6 in a particular social group, or political opinion was or
7 will be at least one central reason for persecuting the
8 applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); id.
9 § 1231(b)(3)(A); see also Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec.
10 341, 348 (BIA 2010). There may be “more than one motive for
11 mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for the
12 mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.” Acharya
13 v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal
14 quotation marks omitted). An applicant “must provide some
15 evidence of [a persecutor’s motives], direct or
16 circumstantial.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483
17 (1992).
18 Particular Social Group
19 As an initial matter, the BIA erred in stating that
20 Singh’s proposed social group of “those who enter marriage
21 without parental permission or in violation of a societal
22 norm” was not socially distinct because he had not shown that
3 1 individuals in the group “would socialize and organize around
2 this trait.” Establishing membership in a particular social
3 group does not require showing that group members socialize
4 or organize around a particular trait. Koudriachova v.
5 Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 260–62 (2d Cir. 2007). But the agency
6 did not otherwise err in concluding that Singh’s proposed
7 group was not cognizable. To be cognizable, a social group
8 must be “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable
9 characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and
10 (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”
11 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014). The
12 “social distinction” requirement is satisfied where the
13 society in question perceives individuals to have a shared
14 characteristic as a group. See Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196.
15 Singh testified that he feared returning to India because
16 his in-laws (or people acting on their behalf) had harmed him
17 in the past, and he fears becoming a victim of an honor
18 killing because he and his wife married without permission.
19 Singh did not claim that he feared anyone other than his in-
20 laws, or that his in-laws or assailants seek to harm any other
21 person “who entered marriage without parental permission or
22 in violation of a societal norm.” For a group to be
4 1 cognizable, it must be perceived as a group by the society,
2 not just the persecutors, and a proposed group fails this
3 test when harm is motivated by criminal ends or a personal
4 vendetta. See id.; Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73
5 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When the harm visited upon members of a group
6 is attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary
7 criminals rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped
8 away from considering those people a ‘particular social
9 group.’”); In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74–75
10 (BIA 2007) (denying claim where “underlying motivation” for
11 harm “stem[med] from common crime and/or personal
12 vengeance”). Additionally, Singh’s evidence of honor
13 killings does not lead to the conclusion that “those who enter
14 marriage without parental permission in violation of a
15 societal norm” is a discrete group, because a group cannot be
16 defined solely by the persecution it suffers. See Paloka,
17 762 F.3d at 196 (“[W]hat matters is whether society as a whole
18 views the group as socially distinct, not the persecutor’s
19 perception.”).
20 Political Opinion
21 Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s
22 determination that Singh failed to show that his political
5 1 opinion “was or will be one central reason” for his harm. 8
2 U.S.C.
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18-3131 Singh v. Garland BIA Criss, IJ A206 469 181 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 6th day of May, two thousand twenty-one. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 8 Chief Judge, 9 DENNY CHIN, 10 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 11 Circuit Judges. 12 _____________________________________ 13 14 CHARANJEET SINGH, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 18-3131 18 NAC 19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 _____________________________________ 23 24 FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, Esq., New York, NY. 25 1 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant 2 Attorney General; Song Park, 3 Acting Assistant Director; Siu P. 4 Wong, Trial Attorney, Office of 5 Immigration Litigation, United 6 States Department of Justice, 7 Washington, DC.
8 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
9 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
10 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
11 is DENIED.
12 Petitioner Charanjeet Singh, a native and citizen of
13 India, seeks review of a September 27, 2018 decision of the
14 BIA affirming a July 26, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge
15 (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of
16 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
17 (“CAT”). In re Charanjeet Singh, No. A 206 469 181 (BIA.
18 Sept. 27, 2018), aff’g No. A 206 469 181 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C.
19 Jul. 26, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
20 underlying facts and procedural history.
21 We have considered the IJ’s decision as supplemented and
22 modified by the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268,
23 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are
24 well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Paloka v.
25 Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014); Gjolaj v. Bureau of
2 1 Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 468 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir.
2 2006); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513, 516 (2d Cir.
3 2009).
4 For asylum and withholding of removal, “the applicant
5 must establish that race, religion, nationality, membership
6 in a particular social group, or political opinion was or
7 will be at least one central reason for persecuting the
8 applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); id.
9 § 1231(b)(3)(A); see also Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec.
10 341, 348 (BIA 2010). There may be “more than one motive for
11 mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for the
12 mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.” Acharya
13 v. Holder, 761 F.3d 289, 297 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal
14 quotation marks omitted). An applicant “must provide some
15 evidence of [a persecutor’s motives], direct or
16 circumstantial.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483
17 (1992).
18 Particular Social Group
19 As an initial matter, the BIA erred in stating that
20 Singh’s proposed social group of “those who enter marriage
21 without parental permission or in violation of a societal
22 norm” was not socially distinct because he had not shown that
3 1 individuals in the group “would socialize and organize around
2 this trait.” Establishing membership in a particular social
3 group does not require showing that group members socialize
4 or organize around a particular trait. Koudriachova v.
5 Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 260–62 (2d Cir. 2007). But the agency
6 did not otherwise err in concluding that Singh’s proposed
7 group was not cognizable. To be cognizable, a social group
8 must be “(1) composed of members who share a common immutable
9 characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and
10 (3) socially distinct within the society in question.”
11 Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014). The
12 “social distinction” requirement is satisfied where the
13 society in question perceives individuals to have a shared
14 characteristic as a group. See Paloka, 762 F.3d at 196.
15 Singh testified that he feared returning to India because
16 his in-laws (or people acting on their behalf) had harmed him
17 in the past, and he fears becoming a victim of an honor
18 killing because he and his wife married without permission.
19 Singh did not claim that he feared anyone other than his in-
20 laws, or that his in-laws or assailants seek to harm any other
21 person “who entered marriage without parental permission or
22 in violation of a societal norm.” For a group to be
4 1 cognizable, it must be perceived as a group by the society,
2 not just the persecutors, and a proposed group fails this
3 test when harm is motivated by criminal ends or a personal
4 vendetta. See id.; Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73
5 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When the harm visited upon members of a group
6 is attributable to the incentives presented to ordinary
7 criminals rather than to persecution, the scales are tipped
8 away from considering those people a ‘particular social
9 group.’”); In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74–75
10 (BIA 2007) (denying claim where “underlying motivation” for
11 harm “stem[med] from common crime and/or personal
12 vengeance”). Additionally, Singh’s evidence of honor
13 killings does not lead to the conclusion that “those who enter
14 marriage without parental permission in violation of a
15 societal norm” is a discrete group, because a group cannot be
16 defined solely by the persecution it suffers. See Paloka,
17 762 F.3d at 196 (“[W]hat matters is whether society as a whole
18 views the group as socially distinct, not the persecutor’s
19 perception.”).
20 Political Opinion
21 Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s
22 determination that Singh failed to show that his political
5 1 opinion “was or will be one central reason” for his harm. 8
2 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see Acharya, 761 at 297 (“[A]sylum
3 may be granted where there is more than one motive for
4 mistreatment, as long as at least one central reason for the
5 mistreatment is on account of a protected ground.”(internal
6 quotation marks omitted)). Political opinion can be either
7 real or imputed by the persecutor, but in either case, it
8 must be the persecutor’s motivation for the harm. See
9 Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 (2d Cir.
10 2005). As the agency observed, Singh primarily argued that
11 his in-laws targeted him because he had married their daughter
12 without permission. There is no indication that Singh had
13 more than a minimal involvement in politics, he did not
14 testify that his assailants identified his party or their
15 own, and the political difference appeared tangential to his
16 attackers’ desire to harm him on account of his marriage.
17 Accordingly, the agency reasonably concluded on this record
18 that Singh’s harm stemmed from a personal vendetta, rather
19 than his political opinion. See id.; In re J-B-N- & S-M-,
20 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2007)(The protected ground
6 1 “cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or
2 subordinate to another reason for harm.”).
3 Convention Against Torture
4 To receive protection under the CAT, an applicant must
5 “establish that it is more likely than not that he . . . would
6 be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.”
7 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “Torture is defined as any act by
8 which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
9 is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . at the
10 instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of, a
11 public official or other person acting in an official
12 capacity.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(1).
13 The agency reasonably concluded that there was
14 insufficient evidence that Singh would “more likely than not”
15 be tortured because his father-in-law is a police officer who
16 wants to kill him and will prevent the police from protecting
17 him. Apart from his testimony about an attempt to report an
18 attack, his evidence described general corruption in India
19 and instances of honor killings, but no government complicity
20 in honor killings or evidence that the police were working
21 for or against specific political parties. Without more,
22 such evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Singh will
7 1 “more likely than not” be tortured with the consent or
2 acquiescence of public officials. See Mu-Xing Wang v.
3 Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring showing
4 that someone in applicant’s “particular alleged
5 circumstances” would be tortured); Mu Xiang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t
6 of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2005) (requiring
7 “particularized evidence” beyond general country conditions).
8 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
9 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
10 stays VACATED.
11 FOR THE COURT: 12 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 13 Clerk of Court