Singer v. Gaines
This text of 896 So. 2d 851 (Singer v. Gaines) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Keith SINGER, Appellant,
v.
Patrick GAINES, Mitchell Smith, and Gaines & Smith Financial Group, Inc., Appellees.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
*852 Mintz, Truppman, Clein & Higer and Michael Higer, Miami, for appellant.
Kubicki Draper and Lisa R. Patten (Orlando), for appellees.
Before SHEPHERD, CORTINAS, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
CORTINAS, Judge.
The plaintiff below, Keith Singer, appeals from a non-final order compelling arbitration and staying the action. We affirm.
From September 1996 until April 2001, Keith Singer was employed as a financial advisor with Robert W. Baird and Company and its broker/dealer, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company. In February 2001, Singer executed a written contract of employment with Gaines and Smith Financial Services (GSFS). In April 2001, after completing pending business at Robert W. Baird and Company, Singer joined GSFS and registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) by executing a Form U-4 identifying Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife), GSFS's broker/dealer, as his new broker/dealer. The Form U-4 contained the following arbitration clause:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the [NASD]. . . .
Further, Form U-4 also contained an Arbitration Disclosure Statement that provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
You are agreeing to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between you and your firm, or a customer, or any other person that is required to be arbitrated under the rules of the self-regulatory organizations with which you are registering. This means you are giving up the right to sue a member, customer, or other associated person in court, including the right to a trial by jury, except as provided by rules of the arbitration forum in which a claim is filed.
In May 2002, GSFS changed its broker/dealer from MetLife to Jefferson Pilot Life Insurance Company (Jefferson Pilot), and as a result, Singer executed a new Form U-4 identifying Jefferson Pilot as his broker/dealer. In July 2003, Jefferson Pilot terminated Singer as a registered representative of the company. GSFS also terminated his employment.
Thereafter, Singer filed an amended complaint against GSFS and its principals, Patrick Gaines and Mitchell Smith, alleging that they fraudulently induced him into entering into an employment contract. Specifically, Singer alleged that Gaines and Mitchell falsely represented that they would provide him with ample support staff, significant marketing programs, and guidance from producers who had made more than $2.7 million in revenue in the prior year.
*853 The defendants filed a renewed motion to compel arbitration arguing that Singer's claims were subject to arbitration under the NASD Code of Arbitration because, when registering with the NASD, Singer had executed a Form U-4 that contained a provision requiring such arbitration. In support of the motion, the defendants filed the Form U-4 that Singer had executed identifying Jefferson Pilot as his broker/dealer.
On July 19, 2004, after hearing arguments of counsel, the trial court granted the defendants' renewed motion to compel arbitration and stay the action. Singer's appeal follows.
First, Singer contends that the trial court erred by compelling arbitration because the NASD Code of Arbitration does not provide for arbitration of claims between "associated persons."[1] We disagree.
Rule 10101 of the NASD Code of Arbitration defines "Matters Eligible for Submission," in relevant part, as follows:
[A]ny dispute, claim, or controversy arising out of or in connection with the business of any member of the Association, or arising out of the employment or termination of employment of associated person(s) with any member . . .:
(a) between or among members;
(b) between or among members and associated persons;
(c) between or among members or associated persons and public customers, or others;
(emphasis added).
Singer, who opposes arbitration, urges this court to adopt a narrow construction of NASD Rule 10101. Singer claims that Rule 10101 provides for arbitration between members in subsection (a), between members and associated persons in subsection (b), and between members or associated persons and public customers or others in subsection (c). Singer relies primarily on Wojcik v. Aetna Life Insurance & Annuities Co., 916 F.Supp. 729 (N.D.Ill.1996). When examining a prior version of NASD Rule 10101, the Wojcik court determined that "[it] limits the scope of disputes eligible for arbitration to those between or among members; between or among members and associated persons; or between or among members or associated persons and public customers, or others." Wojcik, 916 F.Supp. at 732. The Wojcik court found that this Rule was unambiguous and concluded that a dispute solely "among associated persons" does not fall within the plain language of the Rule. Wojcik, 916 F.Supp. at 733.
In contrast, the defendants, who seek to compel arbitration, contend that subsection (c) of Rule 10101 should be read more broadly to include claims "among associated persons."[2] The defendants argue that NASD Rule 10101 is ambiguous as to disputes among associated persons and, because it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, any doubts concerning the scope of the arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 927, 941, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). In support of their position, the defendants rely on In re Scott, 100 S.W.3d 575 (Tx.Ct.App.2003), and McDonald v. Mabee, 241 Ill.App.3d 340, 181 Ill.Dec. 519, 608 N.E.2d 592 (holding that claims among associated persons are subject to arbitration under NASD Rule 10101), appeal denied, 151 *854 Ill.2d 566, 186 Ill.Dec. 384, 616 N.E.2d 337 (1993). Because we cannot say that the unambiguous language of NASD Rule 10101 excludes the arbitration of claims among associated persons, we agree with the reasoning in Scott and McDonald and adopt their holdings.
The defendants' contention that NASD Rule 10101 contemplated arbitration among associated persons is also supported by reading this Rule in conjunction with NASD Rules 10201(a)(3)[3] and 10216(f)[4], both of which assume that arbitration claims may be brought among associated persons. We agree that any other reading of Rule 10101 would render Rules 10201(a)(3) and 10216(f) meaningless.
Next, Singer contends that because NASD Rule 10201 limits arbitrable disputes to those that arise out of the business of a member or the employment or termination of employment of an associated person, he is not compelled to arbitrate.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
896 So. 2d 851, 2005 WL 418225, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/singer-v-gaines-fladistctapp-2005.