1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SIMON JOSE MANUEL OSORIO No. 1:26-cv-01085-DC-CSK (HC) ORTEGA, 12 Petitioner, 13 ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S v. MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 14 RESTRAINING ORDER CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., 15 (Doc. No. 8) Respondents. 16
17 This matter is before the court on Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order 18 (Doc. No. 8), filed in conjunction with his petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 22 19 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his ongoing detention. (Doc. No. 1.) For the reasons explained below, 20 the court will grant the motion for a temporary restraining order. 21 BACKGROUND 22 A. Factual Background 23 Petitioner Simon Jose Manuel Osorio Ortega is a Venezuelan national. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 1.) 24 Petitioner entered the United States on or about July 7, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 25.) On April 1, 2021, 25 Petitioner submitted an I-821 – Application for Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) to U.S. 26 Citizens and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), pursuant to the 2021 designation of TPS for 27 Venezuela (“2021 TPS Designation”). (Doc. No. 1-5 at 1.) Petitioner was employed as a 28 1 construction worker pursuant to his TPS-authorized employment. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 27.) Petitioner 2 is married to a legal permanent resident and has a child who is a U.S. citizen, whom he provides 3 for. (Id.) 4 On September 27, 2021, Petitioner received a notice that USCIS approved Petitioner’s 5 application for TPS. (Doc. No. 1-5 at 1.) The notice indicated Petitioner’s TPS was valid through 6 September 9, 2022. (Id.) 7 On September 19, 2022, Petitioner submitted a second I-821 to re-register for TPS. (Id. at 8 5.) On July 20, 2023, Petitioner received notice that USCIS approved Petitioner’s re-registration 9 application. (Id.) The notice indicated Petitioner’s TPS was valid through March 10, 2024. (Id.) 10 On January 14, 2024, Petitioner submitted a third I-821 to re-register for TPS. (Id. at 2.) 11 On July 22, 2024, Petitioner received notice that USCIS approved Petitioner’s re-registration 12 application. (Id.) The notice indicated Petitioner’s TPS was valid through September 10, 2025. 13 (Id.) 14 On January 10, 2025, Petitioner submitted a fourth I-821 to re-register for TPS after the 15 2021 and 2023 Venezuela TPS designations were extended by 18 months—through October 2, 16 2026. (Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶ 34; 1-4 at 3.) On November 20, 2025, Petitioner’s case status reflected 17 that Petitioner’s TPS designation and employment authorization had been terminated. (Id.) 18 On January 18, 2026, while allegedly in pursuit of a different individual during an 19 ongoing investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents stopped to question 20 Petitioner while he was on his way to get haircut. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 28.) ICE agents took Petitioner 21 custody, and he remains detained at the California City Correctional Center. (Id. at ¶ 29.) 22 B. Procedural Background 23 On February 8, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 24 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner asserts the following claims against Respondents 25 Christopher Chestnut, Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, Todd Lyons, and Sergio Albarran: (1) 26 violation of the INA – 8 U.S.C. § 1254a; and (2) violation of the due process clause of the Fifth 27 Amendment to the Constitution. (Id. at ¶¶ 54–60.) 28 On February 11, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. 1 No. 8.) In that motion, Petitioner seeks immediate release from custody. (Id. at 11.) On February 2 13, 2025, rather than filing an opposition to Petitioner’s motion as ordered, (Doc. No. 9), 3 Respondents filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order and 4 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 11.) On February 17, 2025, Petitioner filed a reply 5 and opposition to Respondents’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 12.) 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 8 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 9 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). The standard governing the issuing of a temporary 10 restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. 11 Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To 12 obtain either form of injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on 13 the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of preliminary 14 relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the moving party; and (4) that an injunction 15 is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The likelihood of success on the merits is 16 the most important Winter factor. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th 17 Cir. 2017). 18 A party seeking injunctive relief must make a showing on all four prongs of the Winter 19 factors to obtain injunctive relief. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th 20 Cir. 2011); see Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A preliminary injunction 21 is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a 22 clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’”) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 23 972 (1997)). A district court may consider “the parties’ pleadings, declarations, affidavits, and 24 exhibits submitted in support of and in opposition to the [motion for injunctive relief].” Cal. Rifle 25 & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 745 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2024); 26 see also Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). Any evidentiary issues 27 “properly go to weight rather than admissibility.” Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los 28 Angeles, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 1 ANALYSIS 2 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 3 1. TPS Statutory and Regulatory Framework 4 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1254, the DHS Secretary “may designate a foreign state for TPS 5 when nationals of that state cannot return there safely due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or 6 other ‘extraordinary and temporary conditions.’” Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000, 1010 7 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(c)). This designation is permitted unless the 8 Secretary “finds that permitting the [noncitizens]1 to remain temporarily in the United States is 9 contrary to the national interest of the United States.” Id.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SIMON JOSE MANUEL OSORIO No. 1:26-cv-01085-DC-CSK (HC) ORTEGA, 12 Petitioner, 13 ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S v. MOTION FOR TEMPORARY 14 RESTRAINING ORDER CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., 15 (Doc. No. 8) Respondents. 16
17 This matter is before the court on Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order 18 (Doc. No. 8), filed in conjunction with his petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 22 19 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his ongoing detention. (Doc. No. 1.) For the reasons explained below, 20 the court will grant the motion for a temporary restraining order. 21 BACKGROUND 22 A. Factual Background 23 Petitioner Simon Jose Manuel Osorio Ortega is a Venezuelan national. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 1.) 24 Petitioner entered the United States on or about July 7, 2016. (Id. at ¶ 25.) On April 1, 2021, 25 Petitioner submitted an I-821 – Application for Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) to U.S. 26 Citizens and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), pursuant to the 2021 designation of TPS for 27 Venezuela (“2021 TPS Designation”). (Doc. No. 1-5 at 1.) Petitioner was employed as a 28 1 construction worker pursuant to his TPS-authorized employment. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 27.) Petitioner 2 is married to a legal permanent resident and has a child who is a U.S. citizen, whom he provides 3 for. (Id.) 4 On September 27, 2021, Petitioner received a notice that USCIS approved Petitioner’s 5 application for TPS. (Doc. No. 1-5 at 1.) The notice indicated Petitioner’s TPS was valid through 6 September 9, 2022. (Id.) 7 On September 19, 2022, Petitioner submitted a second I-821 to re-register for TPS. (Id. at 8 5.) On July 20, 2023, Petitioner received notice that USCIS approved Petitioner’s re-registration 9 application. (Id.) The notice indicated Petitioner’s TPS was valid through March 10, 2024. (Id.) 10 On January 14, 2024, Petitioner submitted a third I-821 to re-register for TPS. (Id. at 2.) 11 On July 22, 2024, Petitioner received notice that USCIS approved Petitioner’s re-registration 12 application. (Id.) The notice indicated Petitioner’s TPS was valid through September 10, 2025. 13 (Id.) 14 On January 10, 2025, Petitioner submitted a fourth I-821 to re-register for TPS after the 15 2021 and 2023 Venezuela TPS designations were extended by 18 months—through October 2, 16 2026. (Doc. Nos. 1 at ¶ 34; 1-4 at 3.) On November 20, 2025, Petitioner’s case status reflected 17 that Petitioner’s TPS designation and employment authorization had been terminated. (Id.) 18 On January 18, 2026, while allegedly in pursuit of a different individual during an 19 ongoing investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agents stopped to question 20 Petitioner while he was on his way to get haircut. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 28.) ICE agents took Petitioner 21 custody, and he remains detained at the California City Correctional Center. (Id. at ¶ 29.) 22 B. Procedural Background 23 On February 8, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 24 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner asserts the following claims against Respondents 25 Christopher Chestnut, Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, Todd Lyons, and Sergio Albarran: (1) 26 violation of the INA – 8 U.S.C. § 1254a; and (2) violation of the due process clause of the Fifth 27 Amendment to the Constitution. (Id. at ¶¶ 54–60.) 28 On February 11, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. (Doc. 1 No. 8.) In that motion, Petitioner seeks immediate release from custody. (Id. at 11.) On February 2 13, 2025, rather than filing an opposition to Petitioner’s motion as ordered, (Doc. No. 9), 3 Respondents filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order and 4 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. No. 11.) On February 17, 2025, Petitioner filed a reply 5 and opposition to Respondents’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 12.) 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 8 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 9 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). The standard governing the issuing of a temporary 10 restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. 11 Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To 12 obtain either form of injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on 13 the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of preliminary 14 relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the moving party; and (4) that an injunction 15 is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The likelihood of success on the merits is 16 the most important Winter factor. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th 17 Cir. 2017). 18 A party seeking injunctive relief must make a showing on all four prongs of the Winter 19 factors to obtain injunctive relief. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th 20 Cir. 2011); see Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A preliminary injunction 21 is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a 22 clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’”) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 23 972 (1997)). A district court may consider “the parties’ pleadings, declarations, affidavits, and 24 exhibits submitted in support of and in opposition to the [motion for injunctive relief].” Cal. Rifle 25 & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 745 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2024); 26 see also Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). Any evidentiary issues 27 “properly go to weight rather than admissibility.” Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los 28 Angeles, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 1 ANALYSIS 2 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 3 1. TPS Statutory and Regulatory Framework 4 Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1254, the DHS Secretary “may designate a foreign state for TPS 5 when nationals of that state cannot return there safely due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or 6 other ‘extraordinary and temporary conditions.’” Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000, 1010 7 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(c)). This designation is permitted unless the 8 Secretary “finds that permitting the [noncitizens]1 to remain temporarily in the United States is 9 contrary to the national interest of the United States.” Id. The DHS Secretary selects the TPS 10 designation period for a foreign state for a period of between six and eighteen months. Nat’l TPS 11 All., 150 F.4th at 1010 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(2)). “Such a designation permits certain 12 nationals of the foreign state, who have continuously resided in the United States since the 13 effective date of designation, to register for employment authorization and protection from 14 deportation for the duration of the TPS period.” Nat’l TPS All., 150 F.4th at 1010 (citing 8 U.S.C. 15 § 1254a(a)(1), (b)(2)). 16 On March 9, 2021, then DHS Secretary Mayorkas designated Venezuela for TPS, 17 effective March 9, 2021, through September 9, 2022, citing “severe political and economic crisis” 18 in Venezuela. Nat'l TPS All., 150 F.4th at 1011 (citing Designation of Venezuela for Temporary 19 Protected Status and Implementation of Employment Authorization for Venezuelans Covered by 20 Deferred Enforced Departure, 86 Fed. Reg. 13574, 13574 (Mar. 9, 2021)). On September 8, 2022, 21 Secretary Mayorkas extended the Venezuelan TPS for eighteen months, from September 10, 2022 22 through March 10, 2024. Nat'l TPS All., 150 F.4th at 1011 (citing Extension of the Designation of 23 Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status, 87 Fed. Reg. 55024, 55024 (Sept. 8, 2022)). The 24 extension allowed beneficiaries of the 2021 TPS Designation to extend work authorization and 25 protection from removal. Id. On October 3, 2023, Secretary Mayorkas redesignated Venezuela for 26
27 1 This opinion uses the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory term “alien,” in keeping with recent preferred nomenclature. Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 527 n.1 (9th Cir. 2023) 28 (collecting cases). 1 TPS (“2023 TPS Designation”) and extended the 2021 TPS Designation by eighteen months. 2 Nat'l TPS All., 150 F.4th at 1011 (citing Extension and Redesignation of Venezuela for 3 Temporary Protected Status, 88 Fed. Reg. 68130, 68130 (Oct. 3, 2023)). Beneficiaries of the 2021 4 TPS Designation could extend their status through September 5, 2025, and eligible Venezuelan 5 nationals—those who resided in the United States continuously since July 31, 2023—could 6 register for the 2023 TPS Designation (“2025 TPS Extension”). Id. The registration period for the 7 2023 TPS Designation began on October 3, 2023. Id. The 2023 TPS Designation was in effect 8 through April 2, 2025. Id. Secretary Mayorkas issued a notice on January 17, 2025, that 9 consolidated the two TPS filing tracks and allowed beneficiaries of both the 2021 and 2023 TPS 10 Designation to re-register for an eighteen-month extension that was in effect through October 2, 11 2026. Nat'l TPS All., 150 F.4th at 1012 (citing Extension of the 2023 Designation of Venezuela 12 for Temporary Protected Status, 90 Fed. Reg. 5961–62 (Jan. 17, 2025)). 13 On February 3, 2025, current DHS Secretary Kristi Noem issued a notice to vacate the 14 former DHS Secretary’s extension of the 2023 TPS Designation and the consolidation of the two 15 filing tracks for 2021 and 2023 Designations. Nat'l TPS All., 150 F.4th at 1012 (citing Vacatur 16 Notice, 90 Fed. Reg. 8805, 8806). On February 5, 2025, Secretary Noem issued a notice of 17 termination of the 2023 TPS Designation, effective 60 days later on April 7, 2025. Nat'l TPS All., 18 150 F.4th at 1012 (citing Termination Notice, 90 Fed. Reg. at 9040). 19 2. Legal Challenge to Secretary Noem’s Vacatur and Termination of the TPS 20 Designation 21 In response to Secretary Noem’s termination of the Venezuela TPS, the National TPS 22 Alliance (“NTPSA”), a nonprofit organization representing Venezuelan TPS holders nationwide, 23 and seven individual TPS holders sued Secretary Noem, DHS, and the United States in the U.S. 24 District Court for the Northern District of California. See Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 798 F. Supp. 3d 25 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2025), aff'd, No. 25-5724, 2026 WL 226573 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026). On 26 September 5, 2025, the court issued an order granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment 27 and denying the Government’s motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss. Id. at 1116. 28 Of particular relevance here are the plaintiffs’ claims under the Administrative Procedure Act 1 (“APA”) challenging Secretary Noem’s vacatur and termination of the Venezuela TPS. Id. The 2 district court found that Secretary Noem (1) lacked the statutory authority to vacate the previous 3 DHS Secretary’s extension of the 2023 TPS Designation; and (2) exceeded her authority when 4 she purported to invalidate documentation that had already been issued pursuant to the extension. 5 Id. at 1144–47. Accordingly, the district court vacated DHS Secretary Noem’s actions under 6 Section 706 of the APA and entered final judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their Venezuela TPS 7 vacatur and termination APA claims, noting the “significant rights of the Venezuelan . . . TPS 8 holders who have lost or will lose status in the absence of relief . . . .” Id. at 1160–62, 64 (also 9 holding APA vacatur of DHS decisions concerning Venezuelan temporary protected status 10 holders were “nationwide in scope” and distinguishing APA vacatur from nationwide 11 injunctions). 12 On October 3, 2025, the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order “pending the 13 disposition of the Government’s appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 14 Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.” Noem v. 15 Nat’l TPS All., 146 S. Ct. 23, 24 (2025). 16 On December 10, 2025, the district court granted plaintiff’s motion for declaratory relief 17 and declared that “(1) the vacatur of the January 17, 2025, TPS extension for Venezuela was 18 unlawful as was (2) the termination of Venezuela’s 2023 TPS designation on February 5, 19 2025.” Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01766-EMC, 2025 WL 3539156, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20 10, 2025). The district court stated that “the declaratory relief issued here may help preserve the 21 pending status quo for individual members of the NTPSA.” Id. The district court stayed the order 22 for two weeks to allow the Government to appeal, which they did, and to request a longer stay 23 from the Ninth Circuit—which they did not. See id. at *1. 24 On January 28, 2026, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s September 5, 2025 25 order on appeal. The Ninth Circuit held 26 that Secretary Noem exceeded her authority under the TPS statute by attempting to terminate Venezuela's TPS, as extended by the 2025 27 Extension. Because the 2025 Extension remains in effect until October 2, 2026, Secretary Noem's attempt to terminate Venezuela's 28 TPS with an effective date of April 7, 2025, violated the plain text of 1 the TPS statute. 2 Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, No. 25-5724, 2026 WL 226573, at *16 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2026). The court 3 further noted that “relief cannot be limited to NTPSA’s members because [p]laintiffs do not 4 simply challenge the application of the vacaturs or termination to them, they challenge the 5 Secretary’s very authority to act,” and that “the proper remedy under APA § 706(2) is to set aside 6 her actions and restore the status quo.” Id. at *17. 7 As of the date of this order, there has not been a petition for a writ of certiorari filed as to 8 the appeal of the district court’s September 5, 2025 order, and the appeal to the Ninth Circuit of 9 the December 10, 2025 order remains pending. With the statutory and regulatory background and 10 the status of the legal challenge to Secretary Noem’s actions in mind, the court turns to 11 Petitioner’s detention. 12 3. Lawfulness of Petitioner’s Detention 13 Petitioner argues that his detention is in violation of Section 1254a of the TPS statute. 14 (Doc. Nos. 1 at 11–14; 8 at 6–8.) Petitioner is a recipient of TPS pursuant to the 2021 TPS 15 Designation, which was valid through September 10, 2025.2 (Doc. No. 1-4 at 1–2.) Petitioner 16 timely sought to extend his TPS, pursuant to the January 17, 2025 extension that was to remain in 17 effect through October 2, 2026. (Doc. No. 1-4 at 3); see also Extension of the 2023 Designation 18 of Venezuela for Temporary Protected Status, 90 Fed. Reg. 5961–62 (Jan. 17, 2025). 19 However, despite timely seeking to extend his TPS, his TPS was terminated due to Secretary 20 Noem’s vacatur of the 2025 TPS Extension. (Doc. No. 1-4 at 3.) 21 As discussed above, Secretary Noem’s vacatur and termination of Venezuela’s TPS has 22 been set aside by the declaratory judgment issued on December 10, 2025 in National TPS 23 Alliance v. Noem, No. 25-cv-01766-EMC, 2025 WL 3539156 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025). In view 24 of that district court’s grant of declaratory relief and Petitioner’s timely re-registration for 25 extension of TPS pursuant to the 2025 TPS Extension, Petitioner likely retains his TPS until 26 2 Though the most recent approval notice has a stated expiration of September 10, 2025 for the 27 TPS granted to Petitioner, the approval notice also states that “[i]f the TPS designation is extended, you must re-register with [USCIS] within the time period designated for re- 28 registration,” which Petitioner did. (Doc. Nos. 1-5 at 2.) 1 October 2, 2026, so long as Petitioner remains eligible for TPS. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(1)(A)(i)– 2 (iii); Nat'l TPS All., 2025 WL 3539156, at *2 (“[T]he declaratory relief issued here may help 3 preserve the pending status quo for individual members of the NTPSA.”). 4 Further, in light of Petitioner’s TPS, Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his 5 claim that he is detained in violation of Section 1254a of the TPS statute. Critically, Section 6 1254a of the TPS statute states “[a][] [noncitizen] provided temporary protected status under this 7 section shall not be detained by the Attorney General on the basis of the [noncitizen]’s 8 immigration status in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4). The statute is clear—an 9 individual provided TPS must not be detained based on their immigration status. Id. Respondents 10 provide no other basis or justification for detaining Petitioner, and therefore, Petitioner has shown 11 that his arrest and detention likely violates Section 1254a of the TPS statute. Accordingly, 12 Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that his detention is unlawful. See 13 Gonzalez v. Noem, No. 5:26-cv-00357-JWH-AJR, 2026 WL 332223, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 14 2026); J.G.M.F. v. Wofford, No. 1:26-cv-00068-DJC-CKD, 2026 WL 88985, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 15 12, 2026). 16 B. Irreparable Harm 17 Petitioner will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a temporary restraining order. 18 Broadly speaking, “[d]eprivation of physical liberty by detention constitutes irreparable harm.” 19 Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted.) Further, the Ninth 20 Circuit has recognized the “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration 21 detention” including “the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families as a result of 22 detention . . . .” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017). Indeed, beyond the 23 inherent harm caused by Petitioner’s detention, his ability to maintain his employment and 24 housing and provide for his wife and child are also disrupted. (Doc. No. 8 at 9.) 25 Therefore, the second Winter factor weighs in favor of granting Petitioner’s request for 26 injunctive relief. 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 C. Balance of the Equities and Public Interest 2 The court now turns to the last two Winter factors. The balance of the equities and public 3 interest analyses merge when the government is the opposing party, as is the case in this action. 4 See Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Nken v. Holder, 5 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). 6 “Just as the public has an interest in the orderly and efficient administration of this 7 country’s immigration laws, [ ] the public has a strong interest in upholding procedural 8 protections against unlawful detention.” Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv-5785-PJH, 2020 WL 9 5074312, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Though 10 Respondents have an interest in enforcing immigration laws, Respondents cannot reasonably 11 assert that the public and government will be harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being 12 enjoined from detaining Petitioner in violation of the applicable law, which is the case here. This 13 relief also benefits the public because “neither equity nor the public’s interest are furthered by 14 allowing violations of federal law to continue.” Galvez v. Jaddou, 52 F.4th 821, 832 (9th Cir. 15 2022). Accordingly, the court finds that the balance of equities and public interest weigh in favor 16 of injunctive relief and consequently, all four Winter factors weigh in favor of Petitioner. 17 D. Security 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) permits a court to grant preliminary injunctive relief 19 ‘only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs 20 and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.’” 21 Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c)). 22 “Despite the seemingly mandatory language, ‘Rule 65(c) invests the district court with discretion 23 as to the amount of security required, if any.’” Id. (quoting Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F.3d 906, 24 919 (9th Cir. 2003)). “In particular, ‘[t]he district court may dispense with the filing of a bond 25 when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from enjoining his or 26 her conduct.’” Johnson, 572 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Jorgensen, 320 F.3d at 919). Neither party 27 addresses the issue of security in their briefing. 28 The court finds that no security is required here. Courts regularly waive security in cases 1 | like this one. Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011); Lepe v. Andrews, No. 25-cv- 2 | 01163-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2716910, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 23, 2025); Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25- 3 | cv-05632- RMI-RFL, 2025 WL 1853763, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 4, 2025). 4 CONCLUSION 5 For the reasons stated above: 6 1. Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 8) is GRANTED; 7 2. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from their custody; and 8 3. This matter is referred to the assigned magistrate judge for further proceedings. 9 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. : 11 | Dated: _ February 26, 2026 Qe cs Dena Coggins 12 United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10