1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MEGHAN SILVA, No. 2:17-cv-00876-TLN-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 MEDIC AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., 15 Defendant. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Medic Ambulance Service, Inc.’s 18 (“Defendant”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff Meghan Silva 19 (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 16.) Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 20.) For the 20 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On March 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed a class action in the Superior Court of California, County of 3 Solano. (ECF No. 1 at 13–25.) Plaintiff was previously employed by Defendant in Solano County as 4 an Emergency Medical Technician (“EMT”) from June 2013 to June 2014. (Id. at 14.) The 5 Complaint alleges Defendant violated: (1) California Labor Code § 226.7 and Industrial Welfare 6 Commission Wage Order No. 4 by failing to provide its employees with adequate rest breaks; (2) 7 California Labor Code § 226 by failing to provide regular accurate itemized wage statements; and (3) 8 California Labor Code §§ 201–203 by failing to pay rest break compensation to Plaintiff and class 9 members who were not given rest breaks. (Id. at 7, 9–10.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendant violated 10 California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., by violating the aforementioned Labor 11 Code sections which gave it “an unfair competitive advantage over law-abiding employers and 12 competitors.” (Id. at 10–11.) 13 On April 25, 2016, Defendant removed the action to this Court. (ECF No. 1.) In the notice of 14 removal, Defendant asserted the Court has subject matter jurisdiction because “one or more of 15 Plaintiff’s claims is completely preempted by” § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“§ 16 301”). (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff moved to remand on June 29, 2017. (ECF No. 6.) This Court denied 17 Plaintiff’s motion to remand on October 12, 2017, finding that removal was proper because § 301 18 preempted Plaintiff’s state law claims. (ECF No. 11 at 5.) 19 Defendant filed the instant motion on February 23, 2018, raising various substantive and 20 procedural grounds for dismissal. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 22, 2018. 21 (ECF No. 16.) Defendant filed a reply on March 29, 2018. (ECF No. 20.) On November 11, 2018, 22 Defendant filed a notice of supplemental authority, citing the Emergency Ambulance Employee 23 Safety and Preparedness Act, California Labor Code §§ 880, et seq. (“Proposition 11”), which was 24 enacted while Defendant’s motion was pending.1 (ECF No. 22.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s 25 primary claim is that Defendant employed her as an EMT and required her to remain “on call” during 26 her rest breaks. (Id. at 3.) Defendant argues Proposition 11 expressly provides that the alleged “on 27 1 Proposition 11 was approved November 6, 2018 and became effective December 19, 28 2018. Cal. Lab. Code § D. 2, Pt. 2, Ch. 7, art. 4, Refs & Annos. 1 call” rest period practice was allowable under existing law and further provides that the practice is 2 now required of all EMTs working for emergency ambulance providers. (Id.) As such, Defendant 3 argues Proposition 11 completely resolves Plaintiff’s rest period claims and derivative claims and 4 provides additional grounds to dismiss Plaintiff’s case with prejudice. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff responded 5 to Defendant’s notice of supplemental authority and argued, among other things, that Proposition 11 6 has no effect on this case because it does not apply retroactively. (ECF No. 23 at 1.) 7 On April 2, 2020, this Court issued a minute order directing the parties to show cause as to 8 why this action and the determination of Defendant’s motion should not be stayed pending the 9 Ninth Circuit’s decision in Appeal No. 15-56943, Stewart v. San Luis Ambulance, Inc., 878 F.3d 10 883 (9th Cir. 2017). (ECF No. 24.) This Court explained that it expects a ruling in Stewart may 11 be dispositive of the instant matter because the Ninth Circuit had recently ordered the parties in 12 Stewart to file supplemental briefs regarding the effects of Proposition 11 and its retroactivity. 13 Both parties filed written responses to this Court’s order to show cause. (ECF Nos. 25, 14 26.) Defendant agrees the interests of judicial economy and efficiency would be well-served by a 15 stay pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Stewart. (ECF No. 26 at 2.) Plaintiff, on the other 16 hand, opposes a stay. (ECF No. 25.) Notably, Plaintiff does not contest that the issues currently 17 before the Ninth Circuit in Stewart bear on the merits of her claims. Instead, Plaintiff argues this 18 Court will not reach the merits of her claims because “the sole issue before this Court is whether 19 Silva’s claims are preempted by § 301.” (Id. at 2, 5.) More specifically, Plaintiff argues the 20 Court has only two options at this juncture: (1) reverse its preemption finding and remand the 21 action to state court due to lack of jurisdiction; or (2) uphold its preemption finding and grant the 22 pending motion because she failed to exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedures of the 23 collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) before bringing her claims.2 (Id. at 2.) 24 /// 25
2 The Court notes Plaintiff made a similar argument in her opposition to the instant motion. 26 (ECF No. 16 at 19.) While this was not one of Defendant’s initial arguments, Defendant did 27 point out in its motion that Plaintiff was required to exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedures of the CBA. (ECF No. 14-1 at 9.) In reply, Defendant agreed that Plaintiff’s failure 28 to exhaust is grounds for dismissal. (ECF No. 20 at 18.) 1 II. STANDARD OF LAW 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides “[a]fter the pleadings are closed — but 3 early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. 4 P. 12(c). The issue presented by a Rule 12(c) motion is substantially the same as that posed in a 5 12(b) motion — whether the factual allegations of the complaint, together with all reasonable 6 inferences, state a plausible claim for relief. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 7 1047, 1054–1055 (9th Cir. 2011). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 8 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 9 for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 11 In analyzing a Rule 12(c) motion, the district court “must accept all factual allegations in 12 the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving 13 party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, a court “need not 14 assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. 15 Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). “A judgment on the pleadings is 16 properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the 17 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 18 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2010).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MEGHAN SILVA, No. 2:17-cv-00876-TLN-CKD 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 MEDIC AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC., 15 Defendant. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Medic Ambulance Service, Inc.’s 18 (“Defendant”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff Meghan Silva 19 (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 16.) Defendant filed a reply. (ECF No. 20.) For the 20 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion. 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 On March 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed a class action in the Superior Court of California, County of 3 Solano. (ECF No. 1 at 13–25.) Plaintiff was previously employed by Defendant in Solano County as 4 an Emergency Medical Technician (“EMT”) from June 2013 to June 2014. (Id. at 14.) The 5 Complaint alleges Defendant violated: (1) California Labor Code § 226.7 and Industrial Welfare 6 Commission Wage Order No. 4 by failing to provide its employees with adequate rest breaks; (2) 7 California Labor Code § 226 by failing to provide regular accurate itemized wage statements; and (3) 8 California Labor Code §§ 201–203 by failing to pay rest break compensation to Plaintiff and class 9 members who were not given rest breaks. (Id. at 7, 9–10.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendant violated 10 California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., by violating the aforementioned Labor 11 Code sections which gave it “an unfair competitive advantage over law-abiding employers and 12 competitors.” (Id. at 10–11.) 13 On April 25, 2016, Defendant removed the action to this Court. (ECF No. 1.) In the notice of 14 removal, Defendant asserted the Court has subject matter jurisdiction because “one or more of 15 Plaintiff’s claims is completely preempted by” § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“§ 16 301”). (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff moved to remand on June 29, 2017. (ECF No. 6.) This Court denied 17 Plaintiff’s motion to remand on October 12, 2017, finding that removal was proper because § 301 18 preempted Plaintiff’s state law claims. (ECF No. 11 at 5.) 19 Defendant filed the instant motion on February 23, 2018, raising various substantive and 20 procedural grounds for dismissal. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 22, 2018. 21 (ECF No. 16.) Defendant filed a reply on March 29, 2018. (ECF No. 20.) On November 11, 2018, 22 Defendant filed a notice of supplemental authority, citing the Emergency Ambulance Employee 23 Safety and Preparedness Act, California Labor Code §§ 880, et seq. (“Proposition 11”), which was 24 enacted while Defendant’s motion was pending.1 (ECF No. 22.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s 25 primary claim is that Defendant employed her as an EMT and required her to remain “on call” during 26 her rest breaks. (Id. at 3.) Defendant argues Proposition 11 expressly provides that the alleged “on 27 1 Proposition 11 was approved November 6, 2018 and became effective December 19, 28 2018. Cal. Lab. Code § D. 2, Pt. 2, Ch. 7, art. 4, Refs & Annos. 1 call” rest period practice was allowable under existing law and further provides that the practice is 2 now required of all EMTs working for emergency ambulance providers. (Id.) As such, Defendant 3 argues Proposition 11 completely resolves Plaintiff’s rest period claims and derivative claims and 4 provides additional grounds to dismiss Plaintiff’s case with prejudice. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff responded 5 to Defendant’s notice of supplemental authority and argued, among other things, that Proposition 11 6 has no effect on this case because it does not apply retroactively. (ECF No. 23 at 1.) 7 On April 2, 2020, this Court issued a minute order directing the parties to show cause as to 8 why this action and the determination of Defendant’s motion should not be stayed pending the 9 Ninth Circuit’s decision in Appeal No. 15-56943, Stewart v. San Luis Ambulance, Inc., 878 F.3d 10 883 (9th Cir. 2017). (ECF No. 24.) This Court explained that it expects a ruling in Stewart may 11 be dispositive of the instant matter because the Ninth Circuit had recently ordered the parties in 12 Stewart to file supplemental briefs regarding the effects of Proposition 11 and its retroactivity. 13 Both parties filed written responses to this Court’s order to show cause. (ECF Nos. 25, 14 26.) Defendant agrees the interests of judicial economy and efficiency would be well-served by a 15 stay pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Stewart. (ECF No. 26 at 2.) Plaintiff, on the other 16 hand, opposes a stay. (ECF No. 25.) Notably, Plaintiff does not contest that the issues currently 17 before the Ninth Circuit in Stewart bear on the merits of her claims. Instead, Plaintiff argues this 18 Court will not reach the merits of her claims because “the sole issue before this Court is whether 19 Silva’s claims are preempted by § 301.” (Id. at 2, 5.) More specifically, Plaintiff argues the 20 Court has only two options at this juncture: (1) reverse its preemption finding and remand the 21 action to state court due to lack of jurisdiction; or (2) uphold its preemption finding and grant the 22 pending motion because she failed to exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedures of the 23 collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) before bringing her claims.2 (Id. at 2.) 24 /// 25
2 The Court notes Plaintiff made a similar argument in her opposition to the instant motion. 26 (ECF No. 16 at 19.) While this was not one of Defendant’s initial arguments, Defendant did 27 point out in its motion that Plaintiff was required to exhaust the grievance and arbitration procedures of the CBA. (ECF No. 14-1 at 9.) In reply, Defendant agreed that Plaintiff’s failure 28 to exhaust is grounds for dismissal. (ECF No. 20 at 18.) 1 II. STANDARD OF LAW 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides “[a]fter the pleadings are closed — but 3 early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. 4 P. 12(c). The issue presented by a Rule 12(c) motion is substantially the same as that posed in a 5 12(b) motion — whether the factual allegations of the complaint, together with all reasonable 6 inferences, state a plausible claim for relief. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 7 1047, 1054–1055 (9th Cir. 2011). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 8 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 9 for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 10 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 11 In analyzing a Rule 12(c) motion, the district court “must accept all factual allegations in 12 the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving 13 party.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, a court “need not 14 assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. 15 Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). “A judgment on the pleadings is 16 properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as true, the 17 moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 603 F.3d 18 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2010). Courts have the discretion in appropriate cases to grant a Rule 19 12(c) motion with leave to amend, or to simply grant dismissal of the action instead of entry of 20 judgment. See Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Carmen 21 v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 982 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 22 III. ANALYSIS 23 Plaintiff spends much of her opposition vigorously challenging the Court’s previous order 24 denying remand. In denying Plaintiff’s motion for remand, the Court determined that § 301 25 preempts Plaintiff’s state law claims. (ECF No. 11 at 4–5.) Plaintiff argues that unless the Court 26 reverses its preemption decision, the Court must dismiss her claims because she did not exhaust 27 the grievance and arbitration provisions of the CBA before filing suit. (ECF No. 16 at 8.) 28 /// 1 Despite Plaintiff’s current insistence that the Court’s preemption decision was incorrect, 2 the Court notes that Plaintiff did not file a properly noticed motion for reconsideration. Nor does 3 Plaintiff raise any intervening grounds for remand. Instead, Plaintiff uses her opposition to repeat 4 essentially the same arguments that were already rejected by this Court. The Court is not 5 persuaded by Plaintiff’s efforts to relitigate her denied motion to remand in this manner. 6 Therefore, the Court declines to revisit its finding that § 301 preempts Plaintiff’s state law claims. 7 Having already found that § 301 preempts Plaintiff’s claims, the issue before the Court is 8 whether Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed for failure to exhaust grievance and arbitration 9 procedures under the CBA. “Prior to bringing suit, an employee seeking to vindicate personal 10 rights under a collective bargaining agreement must first attempt to exhaust any mandatory or 11 exclusive grievance procedures provided in the agreement.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 12 509 F.3d 978, 985–86 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. 13 Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37 (1987)). Therefore, “once a state law claim has been found 14 substantially dependent upon analysis of a CBA . . . most often ‘that claim must either be treated 15 as a § 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law.’” Kobold v. Good 16 Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. 17 Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985)); see also Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 986 (“[I]n the ordinary case, 18 an employee’s failure to exhaust contractually mandated procedures precludes judicial relief for 19 breach of the collective bargaining agreement and related claims.”). 20 Plaintiff did pursue grievance and arbitration procedures against Defendant in 2015 for 21 her termination, but the parties disagree as to whether the resulting settlement agreement in 2016 22 covers her current wage claims. (ECF No. 14-3.) The settlement agreement states the following: 23 (1) Defendant and the Union have a CBA; (2) Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from June 12, 24 2013 until May 21, 2014, when she was terminated; (3) the Union filed a grievance pursuant to 25 the terms of the CBA protesting the termination; (4) the matter proceeded through arbitration 26 before Catherine Harris, who issued her decision on October 16, 2015, reinstating Plaintiff with 27 back pay; (5) disputes arose between the parties regarding the arbitrator’s ordered remedy; (6) the 28 parties desired to compromise and finally settle and resolve all remedial controversies between 1 them; (7) Plaintiff waived reinstatement and released any claims she may have had under the 2 award for reinstatement by Defendant; and (8) Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff a settlement — 3 designated as wages — of all CBA issues raised before the arbitrator including Defendant’s 4 termination of Plaintiff. (Id. at 81–82.) 5 Although Defendant argues Plaintiff released her wage claims in the settlement 6 agreement, nothing in the settlement agreement specifically mentions “on call” rest periods or 7 wage claims. Rather, it appears the settlement agreement only covers claims specifically related 8 to Plaintiff’s termination and reinstatement. But even if the settlement agreement covered 9 Plaintiff’s current wage claims, the agreement states “[a]ny dispute between the parties regarding 10 this settlement agreement shall be resolved through the grievance and arbitration procedure in the 11 CBA.” (Id. at 82.) Therefore, whether or not Plaintiff released her wage claims in the settlement 12 agreement, the result is the same: Plaintiff was required to exhaust the grievance procedures set 13 forth in the CBA. (See id. at 30–31.) Plaintiff repeatedly concedes she failed to do so. (ECF No. 14 16 at 8, 18, 21; ECF No. 25 at 4, 5.) Plaintiff does not argue her failure to exhaust should be 15 excused, she does not request leave to amend, and she does not give the Court any reason to 16 believe she can cure the defective pleading. As such, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s wage 17 claim and derivative claims with prejudice. See Kobold, 832 F.3d at 1034; see also Soremekun, 18 509 F.3d at 986. 19 IV. CONCLUSION 20 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Judgment 21 on the Pleadings (ECF No. 14) and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. The Clerk of 22 Court is directed to close the case. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 DATED: May 12, 2020 25 26 27 28