OPINION
PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice.
Minnesota Statutes section 176.191 was amended in 1995 to provide that equitable apportionment of liability for an injury under this section is not allowed but for certain limited exceptions for settlement and arbitration. The amendment to section 176.191 was made effective for apportionment proceedings instituted after July 1, 1995. The issue we must decide is whether the 1995 amendment to section 176.191 that applies to equitable apportionment proceedings instituted after July 1, 1995 — a Saturday — governs a petition for equitable apportionment that was mailed on Thursday, June 29, 1995, but was not received and filed by the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) until the following Monday, July 3,1995. A compensation judge dismissed the petition on the grounds that the 1995 amendment divested the compensation judge of jurisdiction over this matter. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed the decision of the compensation judge. Concluding that the 1995 amendment does not apply here, we affirm the WCCA.
Respondent Donna M. Silva sustained two work-related back injuries while working for two different employers. The first injury occurred in July 1993 while Silva was working as a -nursing assistant for relator Maple-wood Care Center, which was insured for workers? compensation liability by relator Minnesota Health Care Association/GAB Robins, Inc. (Maplewood). Silva sustained her second back injury in September 1994 while working as a nursing assistant for respondent Beverly Enterprises, d/b/a Greeley Healthcare Center, which was -insured for workers’ compensation liability by respondent Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania/ Constitution State Service Company (Greeley). Greeley admitted liability for this second injury and paid more than $33,574.27 in various workers’ compensation benefits to Silva.
Greeley petitioned for contribution and reimbursement from Maplewood, alleging that “a substantial portion, if not all, of the indemnity benefits and medical expenses [it] paid” .on Silva’s behalf were attributable to the July 1993 injury. Greeley’s attorneys mailed the petition on or about Thursday, June 29,1995, and the petition was received and filed by the Workers’ Compensation Division of DLI on Monday, July 3, 1995. .Maplewood filed an answer in which it denied liability and contended that the payments for which Greeley sought reimbursement were “unreasonable, unnecessary, excessive, and unrelated to any injury sustained during [Silva’s] employment” with Maplewood.
Following a prehearing conference, a compensation judge dismissed Greeley’s petition without prejudice, concluding that Minn.Stat. [568]*568§ 176.191 as amended and made effective after July 1,1995 provided arbitration as the exclusive remedy available to employers and insurers for resolution of disputes in contribution actions. The judge therefore determined that .the amendments to the statute divested the Office of Administrative Hearings of jurisdiction Over this matter. The judge rejected Greeley’s claim that, because July 1, 1995 fell on a Saturday, the amendments should not apply to a petition mailed before July 1 but received and filed by DLI on Monday, July 3. Greeley’s only recourse, according to the compensation judge, was to pursue its claim through arbitration.
On appeal, the WCCA reversed. Relying on its decision in Schmoll v. Washington Scientific Indus., Inc., 55 Workers Comp. Dec. 530 (Minn. Workers’ Comp. Ct.App.1996), the WCCA held that an arbitrator’s role under section 176.191 is limited to determining the percentage of equitable apportionment attributable to each employer and insurer only after liability has been admitted or a compensation judge has decided whether the earlier injury substantially contributed to the. subsequent disability. The WCCA did not address whether the 1995 amendment to section 176.191 governs Greeley’s petition, and remanded the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. Maplewood then petitioned to this court for a writ of certiorari.
Workers’ compensation laws are designed to provide a comprehensive system for compensating injured employees regardless of fault or negligence. Strict liability is imposed on the employer, and the employee’s recovery is limited to a fixed schedule. See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 120-21, 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (1977). The law evolved such that an employer takes an employee with whatever preexisting maladies he or she may have. See, e.g., Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 322, 101 N.W.2d 200, 207 (1960). Consequently, “[wjhen a disability develops gradually, or when it comes as the result of a succession of accidents, the insurance carrier covering the risk at the time of the most recent injury or exposure bearing a causal relation to the disability is usually liable for the entire compensation.” 9 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers Compensation Law, § 95.00 (1998); see also Michels v. American Hoist & Derrick, 269 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Minn.1978) (holding that employee is entitled to prompt payment of full benefits when employment immediately preceding total disability contributed to the disability). The harshness for insurers of this policy of requiring that a single insurer assume the entire cost of any single injury has been tempered in Minnesota and other jurisdictions by a practice that permits apportionment between two carriers when two successive injuries combine to produce the final disability. Larson & Larson, supra, § 95.31.
In Minnesota, common law principles of equitable apportionment have long been applied to permit apportionment between insurance carriers when two or more successive injuries combine to produce the final disability. We have required successive employers and their, insurers each to contribute their proportionate share of the total responsibility for wage loss benefits when those benefits had been awarded on the basis of a single permanency rating of the disability resulting from more than one compensable injury. See, e.g., DeNardo v. Divine Redeemer Mem. Hosp., 450 N.W.2d 290, 292 (1990) (providing for equitable apportionment of wage loss benefits). See also Goetz v. Bulk Commodity Carriers, 303 Minn. 197, 199-200, 226 N.W.2d 888, 890 (1975) (providing equitable apportionment of disability and medical expenses). In 1995, however, the legislature amended Minn.Stat. § 176.191 to add subdivision la, which provides that “[ejquitable apportionment of liability for an injury under this chapter is not allowed,” with certain exceptions for settlement and arbitration. Subdivision la applies to all injuries except occupational diseases, in which case Minn. Stat. § 176.66 continues to allocate liability in multiple employer/insurer cases. See Minn. Stat. § 176.66 (1996).
Under section 176.191, subdivision la, employers and their insurers in a successive injury case may stipulate to an apportionment of liability. ■ Alternatively, under subdivision 5, also added in 1995, they may compel arbitration if $10,000 in medical benefits or [569]
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OPINION
PAUL H. ANDERSON, Justice.
Minnesota Statutes section 176.191 was amended in 1995 to provide that equitable apportionment of liability for an injury under this section is not allowed but for certain limited exceptions for settlement and arbitration. The amendment to section 176.191 was made effective for apportionment proceedings instituted after July 1, 1995. The issue we must decide is whether the 1995 amendment to section 176.191 that applies to equitable apportionment proceedings instituted after July 1, 1995 — a Saturday — governs a petition for equitable apportionment that was mailed on Thursday, June 29, 1995, but was not received and filed by the Department of Labor and Industry (DLI) until the following Monday, July 3,1995. A compensation judge dismissed the petition on the grounds that the 1995 amendment divested the compensation judge of jurisdiction over this matter. The Workers’ Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversed the decision of the compensation judge. Concluding that the 1995 amendment does not apply here, we affirm the WCCA.
Respondent Donna M. Silva sustained two work-related back injuries while working for two different employers. The first injury occurred in July 1993 while Silva was working as a -nursing assistant for relator Maple-wood Care Center, which was insured for workers? compensation liability by relator Minnesota Health Care Association/GAB Robins, Inc. (Maplewood). Silva sustained her second back injury in September 1994 while working as a nursing assistant for respondent Beverly Enterprises, d/b/a Greeley Healthcare Center, which was -insured for workers’ compensation liability by respondent Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania/ Constitution State Service Company (Greeley). Greeley admitted liability for this second injury and paid more than $33,574.27 in various workers’ compensation benefits to Silva.
Greeley petitioned for contribution and reimbursement from Maplewood, alleging that “a substantial portion, if not all, of the indemnity benefits and medical expenses [it] paid” .on Silva’s behalf were attributable to the July 1993 injury. Greeley’s attorneys mailed the petition on or about Thursday, June 29,1995, and the petition was received and filed by the Workers’ Compensation Division of DLI on Monday, July 3, 1995. .Maplewood filed an answer in which it denied liability and contended that the payments for which Greeley sought reimbursement were “unreasonable, unnecessary, excessive, and unrelated to any injury sustained during [Silva’s] employment” with Maplewood.
Following a prehearing conference, a compensation judge dismissed Greeley’s petition without prejudice, concluding that Minn.Stat. [568]*568§ 176.191 as amended and made effective after July 1,1995 provided arbitration as the exclusive remedy available to employers and insurers for resolution of disputes in contribution actions. The judge therefore determined that .the amendments to the statute divested the Office of Administrative Hearings of jurisdiction Over this matter. The judge rejected Greeley’s claim that, because July 1, 1995 fell on a Saturday, the amendments should not apply to a petition mailed before July 1 but received and filed by DLI on Monday, July 3. Greeley’s only recourse, according to the compensation judge, was to pursue its claim through arbitration.
On appeal, the WCCA reversed. Relying on its decision in Schmoll v. Washington Scientific Indus., Inc., 55 Workers Comp. Dec. 530 (Minn. Workers’ Comp. Ct.App.1996), the WCCA held that an arbitrator’s role under section 176.191 is limited to determining the percentage of equitable apportionment attributable to each employer and insurer only after liability has been admitted or a compensation judge has decided whether the earlier injury substantially contributed to the. subsequent disability. The WCCA did not address whether the 1995 amendment to section 176.191 governs Greeley’s petition, and remanded the matter to the Office of Administrative Hearings for further proceedings. Maplewood then petitioned to this court for a writ of certiorari.
Workers’ compensation laws are designed to provide a comprehensive system for compensating injured employees regardless of fault or negligence. Strict liability is imposed on the employer, and the employee’s recovery is limited to a fixed schedule. See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 120-21, 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (1977). The law evolved such that an employer takes an employee with whatever preexisting maladies he or she may have. See, e.g., Gillette v. Harold, Inc., 257 Minn. 313, 322, 101 N.W.2d 200, 207 (1960). Consequently, “[wjhen a disability develops gradually, or when it comes as the result of a succession of accidents, the insurance carrier covering the risk at the time of the most recent injury or exposure bearing a causal relation to the disability is usually liable for the entire compensation.” 9 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers Compensation Law, § 95.00 (1998); see also Michels v. American Hoist & Derrick, 269 N.W.2d 57, 59 (Minn.1978) (holding that employee is entitled to prompt payment of full benefits when employment immediately preceding total disability contributed to the disability). The harshness for insurers of this policy of requiring that a single insurer assume the entire cost of any single injury has been tempered in Minnesota and other jurisdictions by a practice that permits apportionment between two carriers when two successive injuries combine to produce the final disability. Larson & Larson, supra, § 95.31.
In Minnesota, common law principles of equitable apportionment have long been applied to permit apportionment between insurance carriers when two or more successive injuries combine to produce the final disability. We have required successive employers and their, insurers each to contribute their proportionate share of the total responsibility for wage loss benefits when those benefits had been awarded on the basis of a single permanency rating of the disability resulting from more than one compensable injury. See, e.g., DeNardo v. Divine Redeemer Mem. Hosp., 450 N.W.2d 290, 292 (1990) (providing for equitable apportionment of wage loss benefits). See also Goetz v. Bulk Commodity Carriers, 303 Minn. 197, 199-200, 226 N.W.2d 888, 890 (1975) (providing equitable apportionment of disability and medical expenses). In 1995, however, the legislature amended Minn.Stat. § 176.191 to add subdivision la, which provides that “[ejquitable apportionment of liability for an injury under this chapter is not allowed,” with certain exceptions for settlement and arbitration. Subdivision la applies to all injuries except occupational diseases, in which case Minn. Stat. § 176.66 continues to allocate liability in multiple employer/insurer cases. See Minn. Stat. § 176.66 (1996).
Under section 176.191, subdivision la, employers and their insurers in a successive injury case may stipulate to an apportionment of liability. ■ Alternatively, under subdivision 5, also added in 1995, they may compel arbitration if $10,000 in medical benefits or [569]*56952 weeks worth of indemnity benefits have been paid. The request for this arbitration must be made within one year after the payment of the threshold amount. Minn. Stat. § 176.191, subd. 5. The decision of the arbitrator is “conclusive” on the allocation of liability among employers and their insurers. Subdivisions la and 5 of the amended section 176.191 “are effective for apportionment proceedings instituted after July 1,1995,” Act of May 25, 1995, eh. 231, art. 2, § 112, 1995 Minn. Laws 1977, 2072.
Greeley asserts that because July 1, 1995 fell on a Saturday, the following Monday, July 3, should be deemed to be the effective date of the amendments to section 176.191. In support of its position, Greeley cites to Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.01, which states:
In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute,' the day of the act, event or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, * * * in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not one of the aforementioned days.
(Emphasis added.) This rule clearly provides that if the last day of a period runs on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period is extended to the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Id. The compensation judge rejected Greeley’s argument, contending that the workers’ compensation statute is less flexible than the rules of civil procedure. However, there is nothing in the statute or eases interpreting the statute that prohibits the application of the rules of civil procedure or, in particular, Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.01. In fact, the WCCA has held that “Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 6.01 governs computation of time for service and filing.” Stordahl v. Northern Hydraulics, No. 476-82-1959, 1993 WL 491338, at *3 (Minn. Workers’ Comp. Ct.App. Oct. 27, 1993).
Here, the last day for proceeding under an apportionment system that had been in place for some 60 years fell on a Saturday. Greeley’s claim, received and filed at the close of the next business day, ought to proceed in that system. To hold otherwise would contradict what has long been recognized as a normal expectation in the practice of law and would cause the unintended result of Greeley being denied the ability to proceed with its petition. We reach this conclusion in light of Minn. R. Civ. P. 6.01, bearing in mind that the legislature does not intend to exact a result “impossible of execution,” Minn.Stat. § 645.14 (1996), and that “[statutes prescribing a relatively short period of time for outlawing an action are usually construed narrowly to the extent necessary in order to give the owner of a cause of action a fair opportunity to prosecute his claim,” 3A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on -Statutes and Statutory Construction (5th ed.1992). Moreover, we do not believe that this result is unduly burdensome in light of the 1997 amendments allowing resolution of equitable apportionment disputes within the existing litigation system in limited circumstances involving temporary orders. Act of May 9, 1997, ch. 128, § 4, 1997 Minn. Laws 854, 856-57. Therefore, we hold that the 1995 amendment pertaining to equitable apportionment does not apply to Greeley’s petition.
Having concluded that the 1995 apportionment legislation does not apply to Greeley’s petition, we decline to reach the remaining issues.
Affirmed.