Silly Camara v. Craig A. Lowe, in his official capacity as Warden of Pike County Correctional Facility, et al.

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA SILLY CAMARA, A 245-818-997, Petitioner, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:26-cv-00220

v. (SAPORITO, J.) CRAIG A. LOWE, in his official capacity as Warden of Pike County Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents. MEMORANDUM On January 30, 2026, the petitioner, appearing through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. In this petition, Silly Camara, a native and citizen of Mauritania, challenges the legality of his pre-removal-order immigration detention without an individualized bond hearing. At the time of filing, Camara

was being held in the custody of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at Pike County Correctional Facility, located in Pike County, Pennsylvania. I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Camara initially entered the United States without inspection at or

near Otay Mesa, California, on or about February 14, 2024. Shortly after Camara entered the United States, he was served with a Notice to Appear, DHS Form 1-862, dated February 15, 2024, which declared him

to be subject to removal as an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled,”! and which directed him to appear for

a hearing before an immigration judge in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on February 10, 2026. Resp. Ex. 1, Doc. 4-2. After his entry into the United States in July 2023, Camara settled in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where he was living before his incarceration. Camara had timely submitted an application for asylum, he was issued a social security card and a valid work permit, and he had been paying taxes. His asylum petition has not yet been adjudicated. Prior to his arrest and detention, Camara had reported to the Philadelphia ICE office for check-ins without incident. On September 24, 2025, without warning, Camara was taken into custody and detained by immigration authorities when he reported for a regular check-in. He was transported to Pike County Correctional Facility, where he remains in

1 Notably, a box on the Notice for declaring him to be an “arriving alien” was not checked. Resp. Ex. 1, Doc. 4-2.

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civil immigration detention. Camara has been denied any opportunity to

post bond or to be released on other conditions. II. DISCUSSION Since the United States began _ restricting immigration into this country in the late 19th century, it has distinguished between those noncitizens seeking entry into the country and those already residing within it. Noncitizens “stopped at the boundary line” who have “gained no foothold in the United States” do not enjoy the same constitutional protections afforded to persons inside the United States. But once a noncitizen enters the United States, “the legal circumstance changes,” for the constitutional right to due process applies to all “persons” within our nation’s borders, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” This distinction between noncitizens who have entered and reside in the United States and those who have not yet entered “runs throughout immigration law.” Quijada Cordoba v. Knight, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (D. Idaho 2025) (first quoting Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925); and then quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)) (citations omitted). Consistent with this distinction, “[tlwo statutory sections govern the detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of removal: 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and 1226.” Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F Supp. 3d 1104, 1111 (E.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-7429 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025). As

concisely summarized by the Supreme Court: “U.S. immigration law

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authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens a/ready In the country pending the

outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (emphasis added). Under § 1225, “an alien who ‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is

present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is treated as an

‘applicant for admission.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(a)(1)). Applicants for admission may be detained pending removal

under two separate provisions: § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(Q). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens who (A) are arriving in the

United States, see § 1225(b)(1)(A)@) (the “arriving aliens provision”), or

have been physically present in the United States for less than two years without being admitted or paroled, see § 1225(b)(1)(A)Gii) (the “designation provision”),2 and (B) are inadmissible either for

2 This so-called “designation provision” further limits this group of aliens subject to expedited removal proceedings to certain categories of aliens expressly designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, see § 1225(b)(1)(a) Gi), but the current scope of that designation is “the full scope of statutory authority,” and thus all aliens who have not been admitted or paroled into the United States and who have not been (continued on next page)

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misrepresenting a material fact while attempting to gain admission to the United States or for lacking proper immigration documentation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A); see also § 1182(a)(6)(C) Gnadmissibility based

on misrepresentation); § 1182(a)(7) (Gnadmissibility for lack of documentation). For these aliens, § 1225(b)(1) provides for expedited removal proceedings without further hearing or review, unless the alien

expresses a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum, in which

case the alien is subject to mandatory detention pending a final determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removal. See § 1225(b)(1)(B). See generally Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 618-20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (summarizing expedited removal provisions); Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 811 F. Supp. 3d 274, 291-92 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (same); Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 8d 48, 59-64 (D.D.C, 2025) (same),

physically present in the United States continuously for the two-year period prior to determination of inadmissibility are subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1). See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 90 Fed. Reg. 8139 (Jan. 24, 2025); see also Make the Rd. N.Y. v. Wolf, 962 F.3d 612, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (providing a historic overview of groups designated under § 1225(b)(1)(a)Gi)); Coal for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 62-64 (D.D.C. 2025) (same), appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025).

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appeal filed, No. 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025). Section 1225(b)(2) is a “broader ... catchall provision” that applies to other “applicants for admission” who are “seeking admission” to the United States.3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Under § 1225(b)(2), an applicant for admission is placed into ordinary (not expedited) removal proceedings. See § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also id. § 1229a (describing ordinary removal proceedings before an immigration judge). With limited exceptions, however, an alien is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) while removal proceedings remain pending. See § 1225(b)(2)(A); see also § 1182(d)(5) (authorizing the Secretary of

Homeland Security to grant humanitarian parole to aliens awaiting removal proceedings); § 1225(b)(2)(C) (providing that aliens arriving on land from a foreign territory contiguous to the United States may be returned to that foreign territory pending removal proceedings, rather than be detained); Quijada Cordoba, 809 F. Supp. 3d at 1113 (Section 1225(b) mandates detention without bond hearings, except for narrow

humanitarian parole.”).

8 The statute expressly provides that § 1225(b)(2) does not apply to those to whom § 1225(b)(1) applies, as well as other categories not relevant here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B).

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Meanwhile, as noted above, § 1226 “authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. Such aliens who are already present in the United States may be detained pending removal under two separate provisions: § 1226(a) and § 1226(c). Section 1226(a) prescribes a discretionary detention framework for these aliens when subject to removal proceedings, providing that: “On a

warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from

the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), The statute further provides that

such an alien may be released on bond while removal proceedings remain pending. Jd. § 1226(a)(2). The relevant implementing regulations provide that a § 1226(a) detainee may be released on bond upon showing “that

such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the

alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(c)(8),

"This statutory authority to issue immigration arrest warrants has been delegated to a number of supervisory immigration officials listed in the applicable regulations. See 8 C.FR. § 287.5(e)(2); see also id. §§ 236.1(b), 1236.10).

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1236.1(c)(8). Immigration authorities® are tasked with an initial bond or custody determination, see id. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8), after which the alien may request an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge, see id. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); see also § 1003.19 (setting out procedures for the review of bond determinations by immigration judges). See generally Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397 (2019) (“If the alien is detained, he may seek review of his detention by an officer at the Department of Homeland Security and then by an immigration judge (both exercising power delegated by the Secretary); and the alien may

secure his release if he can convince the officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community.”) (citations omitted). An adverse bond determination by the immigration judge can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 236.1(d)(3), 1236.1(d)(3). See generally Borbot v. Warden Hudson Cnty. Corr. Facility, 906 F.3d 274, 275 (3d Cir. 2018) (summarizing § 1226(a) bond procedures). Finally, “Section 1226(c)... carves out a statutory category of

5 The same supervisory immigration officials authorized to issue arrest warrants. See 8 C.FR. §§ 236.1(c)(8), 1236.1(c)(8).

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aliens who may not be released under § 1226(a).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. This subsection specifies certain criminal histories that require mandatory detention of aliens who would otherwise be eligible for a bond hearing under § 1226(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Such criminal aliens may only be released under very narrow circumstances involving a determination by the Attorney General that the alien’s release is

necessary for witness-protection purposes and the alien does not pose a flight risk or a danger to the community. See id. § 1226(c)(4); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. The petitioner in this case, Silly Camara, has been detained by immigration authorities without a bond determination pending disposition of his ordinary, § 1229a removal proceedings.$ In his petition, Camara argues that, because he was detained within the interior of the United States, he is not properly subject to mandatory pre-removal-order

6 The parties appear to agree that the petitioner has been putatively detained without an opportunity for a bond determination pursuant to § 1225(b)(2). The respondent has identified no other basis for his detention. Moreover, the petitioner has not been placed in expedited removal proceedings, as would be expected for a § 1225(b)(1) detainee, he has no criminal record to qualify him for mandatory detention under § 1226(c), and immigration officials have refused to give him a bond hearing, as required under § 1226(a).

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detention under § 1225(b)(2). Rather, he contends that he may only be properly detained under § 1226(a), which requires that he be given an opportunity for an individualized bond hearing. Camara further asserts two claims under the Administrative Procedures Act CAPA”): (a) a claim that the agency has failed to follow its own bond regulations; and (b) a claim that the agency’s recent policy changes, subjecting non-citizens residing within the United States to mandatory detention without an opportunity for an individualized bond determination, were arbitrary and capricious.’ In addition to these statutory arguments, Camara

argues that his pre-removal detention without an opportunity to be considered for release on bond violates his Fifth Amendment due process rights.§ The respondent raises multiple arguments in opposition to the

7 Having granted relief on the basis of the petitioner’s primary statutory claim—that his detention is pursuant to § 1226(a) rather than § 1225(b)(2)—we decline to reach the petitioner’s alternative arguments that his detention violates the APA. 8 Having found a statutory basis for relief, we do not reach the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner as alternative grounds for relief. See generally Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 489, 445 (1988) (‘A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of defending them.”).

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petition. First, the respondent argues that the petitioner lacks standing to bring his APA claims, which expressly provides that it is available only for final agency action “for which there is no other adequate remedy in court,” 5 U.S.C. § 704.9 Second, the respondent argues that § 1225(b)(2) does properly apply to the petitioner, and that it prescribes mandatory detention. Finally, the respondent argues that applying § 1225(b)(2) here comports with due process. The respondent purports to have detained Camara pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), which provides for mandatory detention without the opportunity for release on bond. The petitioner, however, contends that he could only be properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and under that statute, he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing. “[Flor section 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, several conditions must be met—in particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine that the individual is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D. Mass. 2025)

9 See supra note 7. 10 See supra note 8.

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(quoting 8 U.S.C, § 1225(b)(2)(A)), appeal dismissed, No. 25-1902 (1st Cir. Dec. 23, 2025); see also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (citing Martinez); Ramirez-Montoya v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025) (citing Martinez and Kashranov); Carrero Romero v. Lowe, No. 4:26-CV-00009, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2026) (citing Ramirez-Montoya). Significantly, “Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only to an alien who is both an applicant for admission and ‘seeking admission.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6 (emphasis in original); see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 8709045, at *4 (citing Kashranov and Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, 807 F. Supp. 3d 397, 406 (D.N.J. 2025)); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Ramirez-Montoya). Section 1225 defines an “applicant for admission” as “laln alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Meanwhile, the phrase “seeking admission” is not defined in § 1225, and the courts of this circuit have construed the plain language of “seeking admission” to describe “active and ongoing conduct—physically attempting to come into the United States, typically at a border or a port of entry.” Kashranov, 2025

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WL 3188399, at *6; see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (citing Kashranov); Carrero Romero, 2026 WI 296215, at *4 (citing Ramirez-Montoya). “This reading preserves the distinction between ‘seeking admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’ ensuring that each phrase carries independent meaning.” Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *6; see also Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting Kashranov); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Ramirez-Montoya). It also comports with the Supreme Court’s finding in Jennings that “§ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297; Ramurez- Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (quoting Jennings); Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Jennings and Ramirez-Montoya). “In

sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b) demonstrates that it applies to individuals who are attempting to enter the United States, not those already within the country.” Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4; see also Kashranov, 2025 WL 3188399, at *7 (considering the statutory context of § 1225(b)(2) and concluding that this provision “contemplates inspection and detention at or immediately following border crossing”). Accord Cunha v. Freden, ___ F4Ath __, 2026 WL 1146044, at *5—9 (2d

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Cir. Apr, 28, 2026). By contrast, as the Supreme Court has previously recognized, “§ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303; see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Jennings). “Section 1226(a) creates a default rule for those aliens by permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings,” and it “permits the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303; see also Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (quoting Jennings); Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 8709045, at *5 (‘Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1226(a) provides for bond or conditional parole.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2)). “[U]nder Section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, [an alien discretionarily detained pending removal proceedings] is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he poses a danger to the communityl[] or... that he is a flight risk, if it seeks to continue detaining him.” Gomes v. Hyde, 804 F. Supp. 3d

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265, 277 (D. Mass. 2025);! see also YZ. v, Soto, 812 F. Supp. 3d 459, 462— 63 (D.N.J. 2025) (“Noncitizens who are arrested after having lived in the United States for a while do not generally have to be detained. They are instead entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration court.” (citing Gomes) (citations and footnote omitted)). See generally Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *4 (“[I]f an individual is detained attempting to enter the country illegally or while otherwise presenting themselves for inspection and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225. If they are arrested after having already entered the country, they are subject to detention under § 1226 and are entitled to a bond

11 We note that, applying First Circuit precedent, the Gomes court stated that the government may prove that an alien is a danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence, or that he is a flight risk by the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See Gomes, 804 □□ Supp. 3d at 277 (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 41 (1st Cir. 2021)). The Third Circuit, however, has held that the government must prove either dangerousness or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. See German Santos v. Warden, 965 F.3d 203, 213-14 (83d Cir. 2020) (“When the Government seeks to take more than just money from a party, we typically hold the Government to a standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence.”); see also Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 12 F4th 321, 333 n.9 (3d Cir. 2021) ([It is a ‘settled rule that when a party stands to lose his liberty, even temporarily, we hold the Government to a ‘clear and convincing evidence’ standard in the context of civil detention .. . .”) (quoting German Santos); Luciano-Jimenez vy. Doll, 547 F Supp. 3d 462, 465 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting German Santos).

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hearing.”). Here, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to the detention of Camara. We find that Camara is no longer seeking admission into the United States—at the time of his arrest and detention, he was not actively attempting to come into the United States at a border or port of

entry. Rather, he is already here, having resided within the United States for an extended period of time. See Kashranov, 2025 WL 31883899, at *1 (finding that petitioner who lived in the United States for almost two

years was not “seeking admission” but “already here”); Ramirez- Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5 (citing Kashranov). Thus, Camara may only be properly detained pursuant to § 1226(a), and therefore he is entitled to a bond hearing. See Carrero Romero, 2026 WL 296215, at *5. See generally Patel v. O’Neill, No. 3:25-ev-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) (“The overwhelming majority of federal district

courts that have addressed this issue have interpreted the INA to find

that persons similarly situated to Petitioner—noncitizens who previously entered the United States and are currently residing in the United States—are not subject to the mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) but instead are subject to the discretionary detention

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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and accordingly are entitled to a bond hearing.”); 7d. at *4 & n.7 (collecting Third Circuit district court cases). III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that the petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and thus he is entitled to an individualized bond hearing. Accordingly, the petition will be granted, and the government will be ordered to provide the petitioner with an individualized bond hearing within twenty-one days or to release him from custody. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: May 5, 2026 seg CE) shape ie SEPH F. SADORITO,JR. United States District Judge

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